Buddhist monks in the Temple of the Tooth. But here also Hindu influence is to be discerned in the ceremonies performed before the outer casket enshrining the Relic, to which are made daily offerings of food, fruit, and betel, and which from time to time is bathed vicariously by having water poured over its reflection in a mirror.\(^1\)

In addition to venerating the Buddha and paying respect to Hindu and to local deities, the people of Ceylon have always propitiated maleficent beings or yakhas, who may be nature spirits, or the ghosts of the departed. In other words, like the Burmese and Siamese, many of the Sinhalese are still animists. The so-called “devil dances”, with which the name of Ceylon is associated, are a feature of their animistic rites.

\(^1\) An illustration of the extent to which Buddhism and Hinduism are still intermingled is furnished by the following extract from the issue of the Times of Ceylon for 26th February, 1948:

“Hindu Pantheon in Buddhist Temple

Batticaloa, Tuesday.

An interesting ceremony in connection with the laying of the foundation stones for the erection of the images of the Hindu deities—Maha Brahma, Iskanda, Vishnu, Isvara, Ganadevi, Samandevi, and Nathadevi—took place at the Deva Mandiraya Buddhist temple in Koddamunai.

A large number of Buddhists and Hindus were present at the auspicious hour. Mangala Pirith was chanted by a number of Buddhist priests.”

(To be continued.)

Minor Sanskrit Texts on the Prajñā-pāramitā

1. The Prajñā-pāramitā-piṇḍārtha of Dīnāgā

By Giuseppe Tucci

The palmleaf manuscript containing the text of the Prajñā-pāramitā-piṇḍārtha by Dīnāgā was found in the monastery of Žalu which I visited in autumn 1939. It consists of three leaflets without indication of any date. This small book is an epitome of the Aṣṭaṭhaśārikā-prajñā-pāramitā and it is intended to classify the arguments expounded in this treatise and to adapt its long repetitions to the logic of a rational and intelligible scheme.

Though Haribhadra quotes from it, there is a certain discrepancy between the Abhisamayālaṅkāra and the Piṇḍārtha; anyhow, both represent two of the most significant efforts of Mahāyāna dogmatism to impress a logical coherence upon the bulky expositions of the Mahāyāna-Sūtras.

On account of their brevity and preciseness these versus memoriales of Dīnāgā enjoyed great diffusion in Mahāyāna schools, since in the most concise way they summarized one of the texts generally considered as the chief guide for realizing and experiencing the fundamental tenets of Buddhism, thus preparing the way to nirvāṇa.

The booklet was translated into Chinese by She hu, who arrived in K’ai fung in the year A.D. 980. It bears in Chinese the title: 佛母般若波羅蜜多集義論 and is said to be the work of Ta yü lung. Nanjiō (1309), followed by Bagchi (Canon bouddhique en Chine, page 604), restored the Sanskrit title in the following manner: Buddha-mātrika-prajñā-pāramitā-saṅgīti-kāritra, and attributed tentatively the work to Nāgarjuna.

The catalogue published by the Tōhoku Imperial University and Hobogrin on the basis of the Tibetan restored the Sanskrit title in the following manner: Ārya-prajñā-pāramitā-saṅgraha-kārikā, rightly attributing it to Dīnāgā.

The Tibetan translation is included in mDo agrel: 9Pags pa šes rab kyi p’a rol tu p’yan pai ts’ig le’ur bya pa: ārya-prajñā-pāramitā- saṅgraha-kārikā (mDo agrel, xiv, no. 2, and cxxviii, no. 7). But
it is also known as bryaṅ gston bsdus, which, as rightly stated by Cordier, corresponds to the Sanskrit Aṣṭāṣṭaśārikā-pīṇḍārtha. This means that the book was known under either title, though on the authority of the Sanskrit manuscript we may presume that the original title was Prajñā-pāramitā-pīṇḍārtha.

This book was commented upon by Triratnadāsa, dKon mo'og geum gi aḥams in his Prajñā-pāramitā-saṅgraha-vivarana.

Triratnadāsa is well known to the Tibetan tradition: according to Tāranātha (Schiefner, pp. 127 and 140) he was a pupil of Vasubandhu and a friend of Diṅnāga, who commented on one of his works. Some Tibetan authorities were inclined to identify him with Āryaśāra, though there is no support for such a view. His commentary exists in Chinese (Taishō, no. 1517) as well as in Tibetan (mDoṅ ǎrgel, xiv, no. 3).

The translators were: into Chinese She hu, into Tibetan the Kashmirian Pandit Tilakakalaśa and Blo 📷 ̣eson sns bāb of the rNogram clan. This is the well known lotsāva of the eleventh century, upon whom we are well informed by Tibetan sources; for instance, De ˌer ˌsong po, Ca, p. 37; Busston, History of Buddhism, trans. Obermiller, p. 215; G. Tucci, Indotibetica II: 'Rin c'een bzaṅ po, p. 30.

The authority which the Prajñā-pāramitā-pīṇḍārtha enjoyed is proved by the quotations from it found in some dogmatical works. Haribhadra refers to it five times in his Abhisamayāλānākārīloka: p. 14 (v. 7), p. 18 (vv. 3–4), p. 28 (v. 1), p. 80 (v. 57a), p. 218 (v. 56).

As regards the sources of the treatise there is no doubt that it follows strictly the points of view of Asaṅga. This is shown, for instance, by its classification of the various modes of unsubstantiation: these are according to Diṅnāga sixteen, as compared with other lists of eighteen (Mahāyutpatti, n. 934–951) or twenty śūnyatās (Haribhadra's Abhisamayāλānākārīloka, Tucci ed., pp. 90 ff); in the Abhisamayāλānākārīloka itself no classification of the śūnyatās is contained.

The chief source and the standard work on this topic being the Madhyānta-vibhāga, Diṅnāga follows naturally this book commented upon by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati. In one case he uses the same words as a kārikā of the Madhyānta-vibhāga; rūpādhyāya-śāv tad dehacāratuḥ śālakṣaṇavāhiṣṭaḥ (v. 10) to which verse 1, 17- of Madhyānta-vibhāga may be compared: bhokṣṭhbojanataddehacāratuḥ śālakṣaṇavastuḥśānātaḥ.

Naturally there is nothing extraordinary in it, since the works of Maitreya-Asaṅga were soon considered as most authoritative by the school to which Diṅnāga belonged. The kārikās were certainly learnt by heart by every pupil eager to become proficient in Mahāyāna dogmatics. But there is a certain difference between the traditional order of the sixteen modes of unsubstantiation as expounded in Madhyānta-vibhāga and that followed by Diṅnāga, as can clearly be seen from the following table:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Madhyānta-vibhāga</th>
<th>Diṅnāga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) bhokṣṭha (= adhyaśta)</td>
<td>Id.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) bhokṣṭhā (= bahūrūḥ)</td>
<td>Id.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) adhyāśta (abhyāsa)</td>
<td>Id.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) mahāśa</td>
<td>Id.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) śūnyatās</td>
<td>lakṣaṇaśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) paramārthaśa</td>
<td>śūnyatāśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) saṃskṛtaśa</td>
<td>prakṛtiśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) asaṃskṛtaśa</td>
<td>atyantaśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) atyantaśa</td>
<td>anavarāgraśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) anavarāgraśa</td>
<td>sarvadharmāśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) anavakāraśa</td>
<td>paramārthaśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) prakṛtiśa</td>
<td>abhāvāśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) lakṣaṇaśa</td>
<td>abhāvasvabhāvaśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) sarvadharmāśa</td>
<td>saṃskṛtaśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) abhāvāśa</td>
<td>asaṃskṛtaśa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16) abhāvasvabhāvaśa</td>
<td>anavakāraśa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This diversity in the arrangement of the śūnyatās is easily explained, since Diṅnāga tried to adapt rather forcibly to his scheme the contents of the Aṣṭāṣṭaśārikā-prajñā-pāramitā and was therefore compelled to follow the arguments of the text he commented upon.

The section on the ten viṅkāpvakṣaṇā points to the same conclusion: these viṅkāvases have been, as known, concisely enunciated by Asaṅga in the Mahāyāna-sūtrapanḍita (xi, 77), and then, with more details, in the Mahāyāna-saṅgraha-kāstra (trad. Lamotte, chap. 11, p. 115). Mention of them is also made in the Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi of Hsuan Tsang, trans. by La Vallée Poussin, p. 521.

2 A summary and synopsis of this work is to be found in: rgya gṣun bṣad sgrub . . . min gi rnam grols by Klaön rdol bla ma, complete works. t'a.
Nāmaḥ praṇītāramitāyai
praṇītāramitā jñānam adhvayam sa tathāgataḥ
| sādhya tādārtha-yogena tācchādyamaṃ granthamārga-yoḥ || 1 ||
| āśraya ādhihkarāś ca karma bhāvanyaḥ saha ||
| prabheda lingam āpaca saṃsūkṣmam udāḥṛtaṃ || 2 ||
| śraddhāvātam pravṛttiyaṃgam śāstā parṣac ca sākṣiṃ ||
| deśakālau ca nirdiṣṭau svaparānāyaprasiddhaye || 3 ||
| saṅgiti-kārtā loke hi deśakālopalakṣitam ||
| saṃsārkīkam vadaḥ vaktā prāmānayaḥ adhiracchati || 4 ||
| sarvaṃ ca itiṃ nipātātmāraṇādēḥ prakīrttaṃ ||
| prāsaṅgīkām tu evathā Mukhyā dvātrin inscription eva hi || 5 ||
| prabhedaḥ svaśākāraḥ śūnya-yati yathāramsam ||
| nirdiṣṭo 'sṭasahasrāyaḥ sa viṣṇuyo 'nyāpadeśataḥ || 6 ||
| ittham aṣṭasahasrīyaṃ anyānāṃ 'ṛthaṃ yathoditāṃ ||
| granthasamkīkṣeṣaṃ iṣṭo 'tra ta evārthā yathoditaḥ || 7 ||
| bodhisattvam na paśyāmi uktaṃva tattvato muniḥ ||
| bhokta 'dhyātmikavastuṇāṃ kathitā tena śūnyatā || 8 ||
| rūpam rūpasvabhāvena śūṇya ity uktitaḥ punah ||
| bāhyāya āyatanānāha bhogāyaṃ pratisiddhavān || 9 ||
| rūpāy ābhāve taddeśapraśītanāhaśankācit ||
| gatāṛthaḥ yena tad drṣṭam tadāḥdhyātmikam ity asat || 10 ||
| adhyātmikāṇ̄aṃ śūṇya-vit prakṛtāḥ api śūnyatā ||
| viṣṇa-nārūpyam gotraṃ hi kṛpa praṇītātmaṃ maṃsa || 11 ||
| notpanno na niruddhaṃ va svatva ity ādīnā śhutam ||
| sattvasaṃśārayoḥ kāmaḥ darśāḥ tena śūnyatā || 12 ||
| Buddhadharmāḥ tathā bodhisattvadharmānaḥ na paśyati ||
| ity ādīnā vinirūṣṭāḥ śūnyā daśabodhāyaḥ || 13 ||
| prati prati yato dharmāḥ kalpiṃ iti kirttitaṃ ||
| tato na paramārthaḥ 'sti dharmāṃ iti coktavān || 14 ||
| ātmāditṛṣṭe uchchedaḥ mahatyā prakṛtāṃ iṣṭe ||
| tataḥ pūdanānārātmyaṃ bhagavān sarvāthaḥ jagau || 15 ||
| sarvadharmaḥ anuttānaṃ iti kirttayatāḥ tathā ||
MINOR SANSKRIT TEXTS ON THE PRAJÑĀ-PĀRAMITĀ

māyopamādiśabdaś ca paratantro nīgyate || 36 ||
prthigjananām yaś jñānām prakṛtyavasadānīkam ||
uktaṁ tad buddhaśabdaṁ bodhisattvo yathā jīnaḥ || 37 ||
nījām svārāpam pracchedāya tad avidyāvāṣkritam ||
māyāvad anyathā bhāti phalam svapna īvojihati || 38 ||
advayaśanyathākhyātā phale vāpy apavādhīnām ||
apavādavikalpānām apavādo 'yam ucyate || 39 ||
nārāpam śūnyatā yuktā paraśpara-virodhātaḥ ||
nirūpā śūnyatā nāmārūpam ākārasangataṁ || 40 ||
ity ekavākṣaṅkṣaya baddhā nānāvākṣapānaṁ ||
reṇuḍhā nānayat tād rūpam śūnyatāyāḥ kathaṁcana || 41 ||
asad eva yataḥ khyati taś avidyāvānīmrtam ||
asatkhyaṅpahanaśaktyaiva sāvidyeti nīgyate || 42 ||
idam evocate rūpam prajñāpāramitēti ca ||
advayaṁ dvayam evaitad vikalpadvayabādhanam || 43 ||
yuktum cāha viśuddhatvā tathā cânupalambhataḥ ||
bhāvabhāvavivirāhā ca nānātvam api paśyati || 44 ||
nāmāmātram idam rūpam tattvato hy asvabhāvakaṁ ||
tat svabhāvavikalpānām avakāśam nīrasyati || 45 ||
rūpam rūpavasabhāvena śūnyam yat prathamoditaṁ ||
tat svabhāvamsāropasakalparaḥpratisedhanam || 46 ||
nātpadam na nirodhām ca dharmānam paśyati yat ||
bhagavān āha tad vyastā tadvāsasya kalpana || 47 ||
kṛtiraṁ nāma vācyāś ca dharmāṁ te kalpiṁ yataḥ ||
sabdārthayaṁ nāmā mṛtyuḥ kālakalpanā || 48 ||
bhāyārthabhiniyate ca bhūryāṇyā bālasya jñhitate ||
tathāvāp maṁ na tv atarthaṁ 'sti kaścāṁ || 49 ||
ātra nāma kalpiṁ nāmā mṛtyuḥ kālakalpana ||
vaṁ cārtyo tato nīṣṭhā yathānāmārthakalpana || 50 ||
prajñāpāramitām buddho bodhisattvo 'pi vā tathā ||
nāmāmātram iti prārhā yvasan satyārthakalpana || 51 ||
sabdārthapratisedho 'yam na vau vinīvāryate ||
evam anyeṣv api jñeyo vākyeyeṣv arthavinīśayaḥ || 52 ||
nāvapalabhate samyaṁ sarvanāmāṁi tattvāvīt ||
yathārthathvam tenedam na dhvaner vinināṁ || 53 ||
Subhūtis tu dvayam yvasan śādām śabdārtham eva ca ||
bodhisattvaya no nāma paśyānti sa utkāvān || 54 ||
prajñāpāramitā-vākyam nāsti yan neyata gataṁ ||

TRANSLATION

(1) The gnosis is the monistic knowledge; it is the Tathāgata, the object to be realized; this word expresses the book in which this knowledge is expounded and the path to salvation as well, in so far as both are intended to this same aim.

(2) These are the arguments dealt with in the text of the Agastasahasrika: the basis, viz. the Buddha, the fitness for (listening to) the teaching (viz. the Bodhisattvas), what should be done by these (Bodhisattvas), the meditation (on the contraries of the ten imputations), the classification (of sixteen aspects of unsubstantiality), logical arguing, the faults in which one may fall, the advantages.

(3) As factors able to lead the believers to the appropriate action, the recorder (saṅgītikārā) in order to state his own authority indicates who is the teacher, whose assembly listened to the teachings, the time and the place where the teaching was held.

(4) As a matter of fact, in this world, the recorder (saṅgītikārā) expounding things of which witnesses are known and that are definite as regards space and time, becomes an authority when he relates them.

(5) All these (references), viz. the fact that he (the saṅgītikārā) heard the teaching as explicitly indicated by the adverb (so), the pronoun (I) and the verb (have heard), etc., are occasional; the fundamental teachings of the gnosia are in fact thirty-two only.

(6) The sixteen various aspects of the unsubstantiality have been expounded progressively by the Agastasahasrika: they must be understood as being explained by various enunciations.

(7) So this Agastasahasri results from these arguments, as many as they have been enunciated, not one less; a summary of the book

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1 This verse is missing in the Chinese translation, where it is inserted in the commentary upon v 48, but in prose.
is here wanted; the arguments are the same as those explained there.

**The Sixteen Unsubstantialities**

**I. Unsubstantiality of inner elements (adhyātaṃsāṁśānyatā).**

(8) The ascetic truly said: “I do not see the Bodhisattva”; in this way he explained the unsubstantiality of the elements which are supposed to constitute the inner individuality of the sentient being.\(^{12}\)

**II. Unsubstantiality of outer elements (bahirādhyāśānyatā).**

(9) When again it is said that the objects visible, etc.,\(^{13}\) are unsubstantial in so far as in them there is no such a thing as visibility, etc., he excludes that external perceptions are enjoyable by that same person.

**III–VI. Unsubstantialities of body, of space, of attributes and unsubstantiality itself (bahiradhyātmanahādaḥkāśavāśānyatāsāṃśānyatā).**

(10) If visible objects and the like do not exist, it is implicit that the body in which they (are supposed to co-exist), the world which constitutes\(^{14}\) the support of this, the (thirty-two) marks of the great man vanish; when one realizes this, individuality appears to that man unreal as being a mere inner assumption.

**VII. Unsubstantiality of nature (prakṛtiḥsāṇyatā).**

(11) If the inner experiences are unsubstantial, the unsubstantiality of nature is implicit;\(^{15}\) in fact the spiritual family of which one partakes consists of consciousness and it is said to result in compassion and gnosis.

**VIII, IX. Unsubstantiality endless and unsubstantiality without beginning and end (atyanta and anavardrāsānyatā).**

(12) When He states that the individuals are neither born nor annihilated\(^{16}\) and so on, in this way, He clearly shows that individuals as well as the cycle of transmigration are unsubstantial.

**X. Unsubstantiality of all elements (sarvadharmasāṁśānyatā).**

(13) When it is stated that he does not see either the attributes of the Buddha or those of the Bodhisattva, he shows that the ten powers of the Buddha and so on are unsubstantial.

**XI. Unsubstantiality of the absolute (paramārthaśānyatā).**

(14) Since it is stated that the attributes\(^{17}\) are imputed, therefore, he declares that from the point of view of the absolute truth the attributes do not exist.

**XII. Unsubstantiality of unreality (abhāvaśānyatā).**

(15) Since with every mean he (the Bodhisattva) uproots the view that there is an ego, therefore the Blessed one has declared that in no way there exists a personality.

**XIII. Unsubstantiality of reality (abhāvasvabhāvaśānyatā).**

(16) So when He says that all attributes (rūpa, etc.) are not born, then the Buddha, who knows the truth, has implicitly declared that the attributes are equally devoid of substance.

**XIV, XV. Unsubstantiality of conditioned and unconditioned elements (sāṃskaṛta-asāṃskaṛtaśānyatā).**

(17) By stating that there is neither growth nor diminution of the pure and impure elements, the existence of any moral category, either in the plane of the conditioned existence or in that of the unconditioned existence, is refuted.

**XVI. Unsubstantiality of non-repudiation (anavakāraśānyatā).**

(18) The meritorious actions are unsubstantial, their conduciveness to nirvāṇa inherent in them is also imputed.

This is the summary of the various aspects of unsubstantiality.

**The Ten Distractions**

(19) When mind is distracted by the ten mental distractions from the other thing (knowledge), then it is unfit, as it happens with the fools,\(^{19}\) for the realization of the monastic knowledge.

(20) The treatise of the gnosis is meant to eliminate reciprocally these distractions by having recourse to (the dialectics of) a thesis and an antithesis.\(^{20}\) Those distractions have summarily been taught in the (following) way.

**I. Distraction of non-existence (abhāvaśānyatā).**

(21) So when the teacher said: “The Bodhisattva exists,”\(^{21}\) he, showing that the constituents of the human personality exist from a conventional point of view, refutes the distraction consisting in the imputation of the non-existence.

(22) According to this same rule in the Aṣṭasahasrikā, as well as in the other redactions of the gnosis, from the introductory verses up to the end, the imputation of non-existence must be refuted.
IV. Distraction based upon negative assumption (apavādavikṣepa).

(34) When He says, in the course of the teaching, that unsubstantiality is not such on account of unsubstantiality, He expresses an absolute refutation of the negative imputation.

(35) The same applies to other expressions such as “The Buddha is similar to a magic appearance; he is like a dream”; those who know should apply this same method even to the other expressions contained in the gnosis.

(36) The Buddha is said to be similar to a magic appearance because He coincides with the monistic knowledge itself. With the expression “He is like a magic appearance” the relative is indicated.

(37) That inborn knowledge which, being pure by its nature, is present even within the individuals, this very knowledge is expressed by the word Buddha; the Bodhisattva is to be understood as the Buddha.

(38) This knowledge, its nature being obstructed by nescience, appears quite different from what it really is, as a magic show; just as (what is dreamt in) a dream does not attain its aim (when one awakens), the same happens with it.

(39) This is called refutation of the imputations consisting in the negative assumption of those who hold a negative view as regards monistic knowledge in so far as they understand in an improper way either that knowledge itself or the result (which is derived from the realization of truth).

V. Distraction based upon assumption of identity (ekatvavikṣepa).

(40) It is not logical to say that visible matter is unsubstantial since there is contradiction between the two statements; unsubstantiality is unmaterial, while whatever is material is possessed of some form.

VI. Distraction based upon assumption of diversity (nādatvavikṣepa).

(41) In this way the logical impossibility of the imputation of the identity excludes the imputation of diversity; visible matter is in no ways different from unsubstantiality.

(42) It is a creation of nescience that whatever does not exist appears (as existent). It is called nescience because it has the capacity of making to appear as real what in reality does not exist.

(43) The same thing indeed may be called visible matter and
gnosis as well; the duality is in reality only identity; this comes to the refutation of both imputations.

(44) The Buddha explained the logical reason of this statement in so far as things are by their essence pure and transcending perception. He considers also diversity (as inadmissible) since existence and non-existence are contradictory.\(^{44}\)

VII. Distraction based upon the assumption of an essence (svabhavaväviksæpa).

(45) When it is said that this matter is purely nominal, but in fact it is devoid of essence, this does not allow any place for the imputation of any essence.\(^{46}\)

(46) When, then, it was before stated that matter is devoid of the essence of matter,\(^{46}\) this was meant to refute a false judgment consisting in (admitting) the existence of such a thing as essence.

VIII. Distraction based upon the assumption of a diversity (vîsevâviksæpa).

(47) When the Buddha states that he does not see either birth or disappearance of things,\(^{47}\) He thus refutes the imputation that these things have a characteristic of their own.

IX. Distraction based upon the assumption that names correspond to things (yathârthandâmbhinniveâviksæpa).

(48) Name is factitious and things, in so far as they are nameable, are imputed; therefore it is impossible to think that the relation between the objects and their name corresponds to something essential.

(49) The attachment to external things as if they were real is proper to the fools and is the consequence of an error; therefore this is a convention adopted in common life, but in reality there is nothing.

(50) Therefore in this world the name is imputed, but, in fact, there is no object expressive by it; it is therefore an established fact that objects are imputed according to their names.

X. Distraction based upon the assumption that things correspond to names (yathârthandâmbhinniveâviksæpa).

(51) The Blessed one also stated that the gnostic, the Buddha and the Bodhisattva are mere names and in this way He refuted the imputation that there exists something really existent.

(52) This is the refutation of the things as named by the name, but this does not mean that the object in itself is denied.\(^{49}\) A similar determination of the things must be understood as (being applicable) to the other expressions (contained in the gnostic).

(53) The man who knows according to truth does not perceive anything as corresponding to the names. Therefore this refutation is made as regards the existence of the objects connoted by names, but it does not deny that sounds have a conventional purpose.

(54) But Subhâti, denying both the name as well as the object expressed by the name, said: "I do not see any name of the Bodhisattva."\(^{50}\)

(55) There does not exist in the gnostic any expression which should not be understood according to this method of interpretation; its various meanings are to be grasped in this way by men possessed of subtle intelligence.

(56) Gnosis is called counterfeit when one disregards in it the arguments undertaken or assumes in them a different meaning.

(57) This, and this only is the synopsis of the arguments contained in the gnostic; this meaning comes again and again even in connection with other arguments (dealt with in the books of the gnostic).

(58) If some merit has been acquired by me in making an exact summary of the gnostic called Așasahasrikâ, this may help the creatures to reach the supreme gnostic which transcends this existence.

NOTES

1 That is, transcending grâhya and grâhaka, object (râga, etc.) and subject.
2 In so far as it is the result, viz. the identification with the supreme reality symbolically said to be the Buddha. This verse is quoted also in Dohâkoja Râka, ed. Bagchi, p. 67.
3 By the Bodhisattva.
4 This means that the word Prajñâ-pramâna has a double meaning, one primary (mukhya), viz. monistic knowledge, and one secondary (pavseta), viz. the text and the path.
5 Viz. the wrong assumption which one should avoid or any false statement as regards the gnostic.
6 This refers to the concluding formula of the gnostic upon the merit which is derived from reciting, reading, etc., the gnostic.
7 The author proceeds to explain the first of the thirty-two arguments included in the gnostic, the dâraya or fundamant, viz. the Buddha. In this way he establishes the validity of the gnostic in so far as it is the revelation of the Buddha. He then explains the traditional beginning of the dâraya: evam mayâ árâtana, "so I have heard."

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65
knowledge, by the agency of the nescience, duality arises; of the third, knowledge purified of the duality of subject and object. The sources on this topic are numerous:


The passage of the Aṣṭasahasrārthik, referred to here is: praśādhetu te, Subhāte, bodhiśattvāsvam mahaśravasvam prajñāpāramitā śravaṇyā yathā bodhiśatā mahāsattvā prajñāpāramitāṁ nirūpya (p. 4). According to Tiratnākara priseśāya te Subhāte refers to paratastra, the literal meaning of the sentence to parikulita, nirūpya to parisnaṇna.

In so far as by the fact that these three aspects exist, it is impossible to state that there is absolute non-existence.

The Buddha, Subhūti, etc. Because the fools could take literally the words of the Prajñāpāramitā and consequently think that at least in those cases a subject and an object exist.

This is introduced in order to answer to the eventual question: Why is the parikulita refused and not the parisnaṇna? The reply is that from the point of view of absolute truth, there being no substantiality in anything whatever, there is no place for refutation either; śāntam rūpaśravaṇo, cf. v. 9.

The Buddha himself is nothing but monistic knowledge, which is the same as the knowledge inborn within the particular selves, though obscured by ignorance. ASPP., p. 39 (Subhūti): samyakam-buddhātāṁ mūlpaṇam.

In so far as it is under the operation of avidyā. This implies that it is wrong to state that nothing exists. The thing which is called monistic knowledge is not only identical with Buddha, but it is the kernel (sīnā go) of individuals.

Some may argue that were this monistic knowledge within the individuals, it should be manifest, perceptible. And therefore this stanza is introduced.

On account of the imputation of subject and object, etc. This implies that all conventional knowledge (foe and beam, learned or mediated upon) has no value when one awakens (gets the real knowledge).

Viz. na śāntaścā śāntam. It refers to the sentence in the Praj. P.: yaddharaṇa śāntatā na tad rūpaṁ, and refutes the possible assumption of an identity of rūpa and śānta.

Rūpa and śānta cannot be distinct because this would imply duality; while, nothing is admissible but non-duality: ASPP., p. 10 (Subhūti): na by añgad madhyante nīrūparāpan.

Even on the basis of logical grounds it is evident that the knowledge pure of any vibala is the contrary of the distractions. It is pure on account of its being prakṛti-rakshāvara; it transcends perceptibility, because such a thing as identity and so on cannot be seen.
The non-perceptibility gives the opportunity to Triratnasada to summarize the idealistic doctrine of knowledge as expounded by Dinnaga and his school, and to ascertain its self-feeling. On this discussion one may refer to Tachershacs, Buddhistic Logic, Leningrad, 1930, vol. ii, pp. 384 ff.

nāma-nātāram idam yad rāpaṃ; cf. ASPP., 31 (Subhāti): nāmadārastad sarvadharmadāṃ.

rāpaṃ svaṁdvēna śāntaṃ, v. 9; viz. matter is devoid of any proper and general character: raha dāh p'yi mte' an ñid.

topāda, vide v. 12.

kṛtrinam nāma.

vastu is evidently = paramārtha as for instance in Nyāya-binda. See Tachershacs, op. cit., p. 68. On vastu see the long discussion in Bodhisattva-bhāmi, ed. Wogitara, pp. 45 ff.

Nor, it is implied, any Bodhisattva. ASPP., p. 25 (Subhāti): nāhaṃ tad dharmam samanupaysyami yaśasya nāmadāyaṃ yaduta bodhisattva, etc.

Viz. the thirty-two arguments as stated in this book, arthāārīdātī, viz. according to the various questions put to the Buddha as regards skandha, bodhisattva, Buddha, etc.

TIBETAN TRANSLATION

śes rab pa rol p'yi gnīs med ye śes de ni de bzhin gsgs
bsgrub bya don de dāh ldan pas
ghan lam dag la dei sgra yin (1)

rten dāh dbaṅ du bya ba dāh
las ni agom pa dāh bcas dāh
rab dbye rtags dāh ltuṅ ba dāh
p'an yon bcas par yan dag brjod (2)

dad ldan ajug pai yan lag tu
ston pa dбаṅ po aṅkor dāh ni
yul dūs nag kyaṅ nes bstan pa
sdud po raṅ ñid tsa'ad ma ni (3)

rab grub p'yi rin aṅjig rten na
yul dūs kyiś n'er mts'on zhiṅ
dbaṅ por bcas pa smra ba yi
smra po ts'ad mar rje su rtogs (4)

ta'ig p'rad bdag t'oś la sogs pa
ādī dag t'am rads ley la ni ²

1 Ch. 作相.
2 和合.

MINOR SANSKRIT TEXTS ON THE PRAJĀ-PĀRAMITĀ

brjod pa yin te gtsa boi don
gsung bu rta gnīs de dag ñid (5)

stoṅ pa ñid kyi dbye ba ni
nram pa bou drug bgrgyad ston par
rim pa jī bzhin brjod pa ni
gzhan gyis betan par sās par bya (6)

de ltar ji skad bhaṅ don gyi
bgrgyad ston 'aṅ dir don ma ts'aṅ med
aṅ dir gzhan badus pa yin 'adon de
don ni jī skad brjod de ñid (7)

byaṅ c'ub sems dpa'i de ñid du
ñas ma mto' on ŋes t'ub pas gsums
za po naṅ gi dōnos rnam s kyī
ston pa ñid ni de yis brjod (8)

gzugs ni gzugs kyi raṅ bzhin gyis
stoṅ pa ŋes ni gsums pai p'yi
bza' bar bya ba p'yi rin no
mc'ed rnam s kyaṅ 'aṅ dir b'ag go (9)

gzugs sogos med na byin no
lus gnas mts'an ñid zad pai don
rtogs ñid gaṅ gis de mto' on ba
de yaṅ naṅ ba yin p'yi rin med (10)

gaṅ p'yi rin naṅ rnam s tun ñid na
raṅ bzhin yaṅ ni stoṅ pa ñid
aṅ dī ltar rnam sās daṅ bzhin rig
bṛtse daṅ sās rab bdag ñid yin (11)

sems can skye med aṅgag pa yaṅ
med ces sogos kyiś sams can daṅ
aṅkor ba dag ni stoṅ ñid gtsor
des ni gsal bar betan pa yin (12)

sās rgyas c'os daṅ de bzhin du
byaṅ c'ub sams dpa'i c'os rnam s ni

1 Ch. 色等相.
mi mt'ón žes bya la sog's kyi 
stobs buc la sog's ston par bstan (13)

gan p'yir c'os rnam s� so ni 
so sor brtags žes rab brjod pa 
des na c'os rnam don dam du 
yod min žes kyañ brjod pa yin (14)

gan p'yir bdag sog's ìta ba ni 
'c'en po goed mdsad de yi p'yir 
boom ldan ñdas kyiñ nmam kun tu 
gan zag bdag med ñid du guña (15)

c'os rnam t'ams cad ma skyes žes 
brjod par mdsad pas de bžin du 
de ñid ría pas rnam kun tu 
c'os kyi bdag med guña pa yin (16)

ka na ma t'o bcas med rnam 
p'el dañ 'iams pa med pai p'yir 
ñdus byas ñdus ma byas pa yi 
dge ba rnam ni gsal ba yin (17)

dge ba rnam ni ston pa na 
der brten mi zad de bžin du 
g'ag ñid de ni ston ñid kyi 
rab tu dbye ba bsdus pa žes (18)

sems kyi nmam par gyeñ pa bcus 
gûn nas sms ni rnam gyeñs par 
byis pa rnam la gûn med kyi 
ye ñes ggrub pai skal ba med (19)

de dag p'an ts'un gûn po dañ 
mi mt'un p'yogs kyiñ bzlog pai p'yir 
šes rab p'a rol tu p'yin gûn ste 
de rnam kyañ ni bsdus tu bstan (20)

ston pas p'uñ po kun rdsob pa 
gzigs p'yir byañ sms dpa' yod ces

1 Xyl.; kyiñ. Ch. 無 相.
2 Ch. 無 相.
3 Ch.: adds. 有 相 = bñus as in Sanskrit.
rnam par byed pa bži yis ni
yoṅs su grub pa rab tu begrags
des rab p'a rol tu p'yiṅ pa ni
saṅs rgyas kyis ni gžan bstan med (29)

kun rtog gyeṅ par rnam boe yu
mi mt'un p'yogs bstan ts'ul la ni
gsum po bs dus daṅ so so ba
āḍir brjod par ni śes bya ste (30)

dper na grub daṅ gzaṅ dbaṅ daṅ
rab tu brtags pas ṅag daṅ por
dnoṅ po med par raṅ bžin ghyis
rnam par gyeṅ pa sel ba bžin (31)

des na saṅs rgyas de bžin du
byaṅ c'ub ma t'ob par brjod pa
yoṅs su rdoṅs pa bar gyzis āḍir
brtags rnambsal bar śes par bya (32)

no bos stoṅ pai gzugs rnam la
gaṅ du 'am gaṅ gis sgro ḡdogs ḡgyur
des na ṅag gžan rnambs la yaṅ
de bzung par ni rtogs par bya (33)

stoṅ ṅid kyis ni mi stoṅ ḡes
bya bai ṅag ni stoṅ pa na
skur pa yi ni rnam rtogs rnambs
'tams cah du ni sel ba gsuṅs (34)

de bžin saṅs rgyas sggyu ḡdra daṅ
de ni rmi ḡdra ḡes bya yaṅ
ts'ul āḍi ṅid ni mk'as rnambs kyis
ṅag gžan dag la'āṅ śes par bya (35)

gzii mt'un pa yis rgyal ba ni
sggyu ma lta bur rab brjod ciṅ
sggyu ma lta bu la sogs pai
sgra rnambs kyis kyaṅ gžan dbaṅ brjod (36)

so soi skye boi śes pa daṅ
raṅ bžin ghyis ni rnam byaṅ ba

1 Ch. 無色無空.
MINOR SANSKRIT TEXTS ON THE PRAJÑĀ-PĀRAMITĀ

de na no bo ñid du ni
rnam rtog rnams kyi go skabs sel  (45)

gzugs ni gzugs kyi ran bzin kyi
ston par sna brjod gan yin pa
de ni ran gi no bo yis
sgro ñdogs rnam rtog ñgog byed yin  (46)

c'os rnams kyi ni skye ba dahn
ñgag pa mt'öñ ba med ces gan
bcom idan ñdas kyi gsuns pa des
de yi k'yan par rnam rtog bsal  (47)

gañ p'yar miñ beos brjod bya yis
c'os de dag kyan brtags yin pas
sgra don dag gi aśrel ba ni
ño bo ñid du des mi bzed  (48)

byis pai p'yi rol don du ni
mön ñes aśk'ril pas agiyin ba yin
t'a sniad ñdi yan de bzin te
ñdi la don ñga' yod ma yin  (49)

des ñdir ji lta miñ byas pa
de lta brjod byai dnos po de
yod miñ dahn p'yar miñ ji bzin
don du rtog pa ñdog ma yin  (50)

bden don rnams rtog sel ba na
ñes rab p'a rol p'yan pa dahn
sañs rgyas de bzin byan sems dpa'
niñ tsam ñes ni rab tu gsuns  (51)

ñdi ni sgra don ñgog pa ste
dnos po sel bar byed pa miñ
de bzin du ni ñag gzan la'ñ
don rnams ñes par ñes par bya  (52)

de ñid rig pas miñ rnams kun
don ji lta bar yan dag tu
dmigs pa med ñid de yin p'yar
sgra ñdi zlog par byed ma yin  (53)