The Ratnāvali of Nāgārjuna

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The Ratnāvali by Nāgārjuna was well known from the numerous quotations scattered in the Mahāyāna literature in India as well as in Tibet, but no manuscript of it was up to now available. Fortunately, Nepal, which has yielded so many treasures of ancient Indian literature, has recently rendered back to light a large fragment of this work, the importance of which cannot be overlooked by scholars. Nāgārjuna was certainly one of the greatest thinkers ever born in India, and whatever was written by him deserves our greatest attention. His thought has permeated, as it were, not only the Abhidharma of Mahāyāna, but also the mystical experiences of the Tantric systems. Therefore we must welcome anything written by him, because it will help our understanding of Buddhist, and therefore of Indian, mind.

The palmleaf-manuscript of the Ratnāvali is but a fragment,¹ but it will not be difficult to restore the missing portions after the Tibetan translation of the same text preserved in the bsTan agyur (mdo. agrel, vol. 4, fol. 124).² I begin by giving an edition and a translation of the first chapter, by far the most important from the ādhyātmika point of view. It is, in fact, from this that later authors chiefly draw their quotations of the Ratnāvali. The other chapters will follow in the next issue.

The small work is, in fact, one of those abrégs of the doctrine, usually in the form of letters, lekha, of which we know other examples from the pen of the same Nāgārjuna, from Candragomin, etc. But the Ratnāvali is styled a rāja-parikathā, that is, a discourse to a king. Who this king was is not expressed

¹ 1–23 leaves, of which 5, 8–14 and 22 are missing.
² There is a commentary on our text by Ajitamitra, to be found in the same volume of the bsTan agyur.
in the text itself, but we know from the commentator Ajitamitra that he was the same to whom, according to the Chinese and the Tibetan tradition, the Śisyaṅkha was directed, I mean bDe sphyod. Whether this Tibetan form may correspond to Śiṣṭavāhana, the name of the patron, according to the tradition, of Nāgārjuna, is a question still open to discussion.\footnote{In the course of this paper, the following abbreviations are used: TSP. = Tuttenseangranghapāṇikā, of Kamalaśīla (Geikvad’s Oriental Series); PP. = Prasannapadā by Candrakīrti the commentary upon the Mālamādhavyamākārikā (Bibliotheca Buddhica); BCAP. = Bodhicaryavatāraparipākā (Bibliotheca Indica).}

\[\text{\textquotedblleft} \text{Namo ratnakārī\textquoteright} \text{\textquotedblright}\]

Sarvadṛṣṭānavinirmuktaṃ guṇaṁ sarvair alaṃkṛtaṁ 
prāṇaṁya sarvajñam ahaṁ sarvasattvaśabandhavaṁ \[1\]
dharmam ekāntakapāṇam raś [n dhā] rmodāyāya te 
vakyāyām dharmāḥ śiddhiṃ hi yāti saddharmabhājane \[2\] 
prāg dharmābhuyadayo yatra paścān naiśāreyasodayaḥ 
śamprāpyābhuyadayam yasmād eti naiśāreyasam kramāt \[3\] 
sukham abhuyadaya[s tatra moṣo] naiśāreyo maṇiḥ 
asya sādhanasaṃkṣepaḥ śraddhāprajñāṁ samāśataḥ \[4\]

1–2. Having paid homage to the All-knower, the only friend of all living beings, who is devoid of every defect, but adorned with every good attribute, I shall expound for thy spiritual profit, O king, the law which is altogether propitious. Nay, the law brings forth its fruit (when the seed is planted in him) who is worthy of receiving the supreme law (as thou art).\footnote{Ekāntakalyāṇam means, as the commentator explains, that it is udānabhavāntakaleṣu that is propitious from beginning to end.}

3. Whenever there is perfection in the law, the supreme happiness of salvation will also appear later on, because those who have reached the perfect life (which is the consequence of the practice of the law) will gradually attain to salvation.\footnote{The way to salvation is represented by the Transcendental Wisdom, prajñā, the teaching of which cannot be imparted to those who are not yet ripe to receive it. The puṣya-samābhāra, or moral purification, must therefore always precede the investigation of the śūnyatā, viz. the doctrine of the śraddhatvād bhajate dharmam prājñatvād vetti tattvataḥ 
prajñā pradhānām tu anayoḥ śraddhā pūrṇaṃgāmasya tu \[5\] 
chandā dveṣād bhayān mohād yo dharmam nātivartate 
sa śraddhā iti vijñeyāḥ śreyāso bhājanaṃ param \[6\] 
kāyavāṃsanaṁ karma sarvaṁ samyak parikṣaya yaḥ 
parātmahitam ājñāya sadā kuryat sa paṇḍitāḥ \[7\] 
ahimṣā cauryaviratīḥ parādhāravivarjanam 
mithyāpaśuṣvanāpārābhaddhavādeṣu samyamaḥ \[8\]

4. Indeed, perfect life is considered to be happiness and salvation to be final emancipation from contingent life. The concise enunciation of the method of realizing that is summarized in faith and wisdom.\footnote{Tatra moṣo restored from Tibetan: de la mon mòlo de ba ste nes par legs pa l’ar par adod. As suggested by the commentator, the real meaning is that abhyudaya is not happiness, nor is naiśāreyasam final emancipation, but rather happiness and emancipation are to be understood as the result of them.}

5. In so far as a man is possessed of faith, he becomes a partaker of the law; in so far as he is possessed of wisdom he apprehends according to truth. Of the two virtues wisdom is the foremost; faith, however, comes first.

6. He who does not transgress the law on account of worldly cravings, hatred, fear, and mental bewilderment must be considered as a man possessed of faith; nobody is a fitter recipient than he for salvation.\footnote{From here up to verse 24, śraddhā, viz. its effect, I mean the practice of the law is described, which coincides with abhyudaya. Chanda, deṣa, bhaya and moṣa are symbolized by the four Māras who keep away men from the observance of the moral rules as laid down in the law.}
7. One must carefully examine whether actions deriving from one’s own body, words, thoughts, are good or not, and having settled what is good for others and for oneself, this only one must always do; then he is indeed a wise man.\footnote{The \textit{parikṣā} consists in examining whether a certain \textit{karman} is moral, \textit{kuśala}, immoral, \textit{akūsala}, or indifferent, \textit{asyākṛta}. Then the man is in a state of complete consciousness and presence of spirit, which is called the \textit{samprajānya} or \textit{aprāmāda}. This \textit{parikṣa} is expounded in the following \textit{slokas}.}

lobhayāpādānāstik[yadṛṣṭināṁ parivarjanān | ete karmapāthā] suklā daśa kṛṣṇā viparyayāt ||

9. amadyapāṇaṁ svājīvo 'vihimsā dānām ādārāt | pūjyapūjā ca maitri ca dharmā ca baisa samāsataḥ ||

śaṅkratapaṇād dharmāḥ kevalāḥ [nāsti tena hi] | [2,a] na paradrohaviratīr na paresām anugrahaḥ ||

10. dānālakṣamāspaṇaṁ yāḥ saddharmamahāpathām | anādṛtya vrajet kāyaklesago daṇḍakotpathiiḥ ||

11. sa samāsārātavīṁ ghorām anantājanapādapāṃ | klesavyālāvaliṅghāṅgāḥ sudirghāṁ pratipadyate ||

12. 8. Refraining from killing living beings, from theft and from adultery, control over one’s own words so as to avoid any false or slanderous or cruel or futile speech;\footnote{Up to adultery, the author enumerates the three bodily actions to be avoided; then the four \textit{vāk-karma}, and, in the first half of \textit{sloka} 9, the three mental actions, altogether the ten abstentions from immoral deeds.}

9. Complete abstaining from covetousness, hatred, and wrong views denying the existence of \textit{karman}; these ten virtues constitute the tenfold pure conduct. The actions opposed to these constitute the tenfold impure conduct.\footnote{Tibetan: \textit{c'as dā thog med pa la | niś kyi lla ba yongs spong ba || ade dag las lam dkar bu ste |}}

10. Not drinking intoxicating liquors, lawful livelihood, hurting nobody, kindness in giving, reverence towards those deserving reverence, and universal sympathy, this is in short the law.\footnote{Tibetan: \textit{lugs grub pa la sgreng las | s'os med sdi lhar de yin ni ||}}

11. Through penances alone inflicted upon the body one cannot get at the law; by that method one is unable either to stop doing harm to others or to benefit them.\footnote{Having thus expounded the very essence of the law, the author shows the \textit{vipākā} or consequence of \textit{karman}, so that everybody may be careful about the \textit{parikṣa} of what he is doing; \textit{sloka} 13, a, b. Restored from Tibetan: \textit{ak'or ba brag mi brad pa | mt'ang yas skye ba sva' can du | godanṣikā is for: godanṣikā}.}

hīṃsāyā jāyate 'lāyūḥ bahvābādho vīhimsāyā | cauryena bhoga vyāvasani saś[truḥ] paraśāri kaḥ ||

14. pratīkhyānām mṛṣāvadyat pāśuṁyāṁ mitrābhedanām | apiṣṇṛṣvamānāṁ raukṣyād abaddhāḥ durbhagāḥ vacaḥ ||

15. manorāthān hanty abhīdhīya vyāpādo bhayadhī ṣmṛtaḥ | mithyādṛśaṁ kṛṣṇitīva madyapāṇaṁ mādhubrāmaḥ ||

16. 12–13. Those men who, disregarding the great road of the supreme law, clear on account of generosity, moral conduct, and patience, wander through the wrong paths of that wildness which are bodily penance, enter indeed a terrific forest, viz. the \textit{samsāra} which has infinite rebirths as its trees, while beasts of prey, namely moral defilements, lick their limbs.\footnote{Restored from Tibetan: \textit{byi bo byed pas dgra dan beas. This sloka expands the vipākā of immoral bodily actions; the sloka 14th, that of actions derived from one’s own speech, the 15th, that of mental actions.}

16. Covetousness causes the failing of every desire,
hatred is said to be the source of fears, wrong views produce incapacity of seeing aright, drinking of intoxicating liquors is the cause of mental confusion.

17. Avarice is the cause of poverty, bad livelihood of being deceived, pride of low birth, envy of scanty personal strength.

18. Anger of bad colour; stupidity is derived from not asking wise men (about the law); this fruit is ripened when one is reborn as a man; but first of all there is the rebirth in bad conditions of existence.¹

19. All those sins are called vices; their consequence has been explained above. All virtuous actions bring forth an effect quite contrary to that.

20. Covetousness, hatred, bewilderment, and karman derived from that are sinful; absence of covetousness, hatred, bewilderment, and karman derived from that are sinless.

21. From sinfulness every pain and every unhappy destiny are derived; from sinlessness every happy destiny and every pleasure in life are derived.

nivṛttir [2, b] aśubhāt kṛṣṇena pravṛttas tu śubhe sādā
manasā karmanā vācā dharmo 'yam dvividhāṃ smṛtaḥ ||
narakapratītyagyabhyo dharmāt asmād vimbucyate
nṛṣu deveṣu cāpnoti sukhaśāriyavastarjan ||

dhyānāpramāṇārūpyais tu brahmādyasaṣkham aśnute
ityābhivyadyadharmo 'yam phalaṃ cāśya samāsatāḥ ||

22. Refraining from every sinfulness and constant practice of sinlessness with mind, body, and word: this is styled the twofold law.

23. By this law one is saved from being born in the hells and among ghosts and beasts; nay, one gets plenitude of joys, glory, and kingly power both among men and gods.

24. One gets the happiness of the gods, Brahmā, etc., through the four meditations, the four immeasurable experiences, and the four absorptions in the immaterial spheres; this is in short the law of the blissful life and its fruits.

25. On the other hand, the law of salvation consisting in the subtle and deep vision [of reality] was said by the Victorious ones to be terrible to foolish men who have not ears [prepared to hear it].¹

ahāṃkārapraṣṭuteyam mamakāropasamhitā
prajā praṣāhitaikāntavādinā 'bhīhitā khila ||

26. Asty ahaṃ mama cāstiḥi mithyātait paramārthataḥ]

¹ Now Nāgārjuna expounds what is salvation and what the way which leads to it, viz. praṣāhā, whose essence consists in the doctrine of the voidness of everything and which, on account of its depth, is likely to fill with fear those who are not yet fit to hear it. Therefore the teaching of Buddha is always based upon the knowledge of the moral and mental preparation of his disciples and hearers, upāya-kavāsalya.

25, c, is restored from Tibetan: byis pa 't os dan mi idan pa. So in the commentary, while the text of the kārikās has wrongly dan mig idan pa.
yathābhūtapaṛījānān na bhavaty ubhayam yataḥ || 28. ahamkāro naḥṛṇo 'rthataḥ || 29. bijam yasyāntaṃ tasya prarohāḥ satyataḥ kutaḥ || 30. yathādārśam upādāya svamukhapatribimbavat || 31. drṣṭyaṃ tām tū ca caivaṃ naṁ kāci ca api tattvataḥ || 32. 

26. When the foolish man hears the utterance: "I am not, I never shall be, nothing belongs nor ever will belong to me" he is stricken with fear, while the wise man gets over every fear.¹

27. The Buddha, who utters exclusively what is good to creatures, has stated them to be the offspring of the error that there is an ego and something belonging to the ego.²

28. From the point of view of the absolute truth it is wrong to say that there is an ego or that there is something belonging to the ego, because both these assumptions are impossible when one has fully understood the reality of things.³

29. The groups forming a person are originated from the assumption of a personality, but this personality is, from the standpoint of the absolute truth, unreal; then, if the seed of something is unreal, how can its sprout be real? ⁴

¹ This verse is quoted in TSP., p. 866, and BCAP., p. 449.
² For the wise man there is no fear, because, having realized the truth of this doctrine, he gets over any attachment to the idea of the personality or of something belonging to it, and therefore the samsāra, which is the first cause of fear, vanishes for him. But for the others—as explained in the following sūkṣma—the samsāra will continue to exist, in so far it is a mere creation of their wrong assumption of a personality and of the existence of things.
³ The sentence: "From the point of view of the absolute truth" implies that the ego, etc., may be said to exist only from the point of view of the conventional worldly truth, samsāra, loka, vyāvahāra, satya.
⁴ The five groups are, as known, rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and viññāna. Arthaṭṭha is, according to the commentator, to be taken in the sense of pariṇāma-ṛṇaḥ. The verse is quoted, as taken from the Ratnavali, by Candrakīrti PP., pp. 346 and 458. The author wants to demonstrate that the notion of the groups is dependent upon that of personality and vice versa, so that neither is self-existent.

30. If one considers the groups as unreal, the assumption of a personality is abandoned; when the assumption of a personality is abandoned there is no more room for the groups.¹

31. Just as through the medium of a mirror one sees the reflex of one's own face, though it is in fact nothing real, even so one perceives the personality through the medium of the groups, though, in truth, it is nothing real, but like the reflex of the face.

32. Just as without the medium of a mirror no reflex of the face can be seen, even so without the medium of the groups, the personality cannot be perceived.

33. The noble Ananda having heard from the Buddha such tenets, obtained himself the insight into the law and over and over repeated them to the monks.

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35. The assumption of an ego exists as long as there is

¹ This sūkṣma is also quoted in PP., pp. 346 and 458. Verses 31–4 are quoted by Candrakīrti in PP., p. 345.
the assumption of the five groups; when there is the assumption of an ego there is again karman, and from this a new birth.

36. This whirl of life which has no beginning, no middle, and no end, like a whirling firebrand, whirls round with its three successions (personality, karman, and birth), which are the cause one of the other.

37. In so far as the ego cannot be demonstrated as being produced either by itself or by another or both by itself and another, nor as being produced either in the past or in the present or in the future, the ego vanishes; then karman and lastly new birth.¹

38. When a man has recognized [that the idea of] the growth of cause and effect and [that of] their destruction must be understood in this way, he cannot maintain either that this world is not or that it is in reality.

na bhāvīṣyati nirvāṇe sarvam etan na te bhayam |
ucyamāna iḥābāvās tasya te kim bhayāṁkaraḥ || 40.
mokṣe nātmā na ca skandā mokṣaḥ ced idṛṣṭa priyaḥ |
ātmakaṇḍhāpanayanam kim ihaiva tavāpiyam || 41.
na cābhāvō ‘pi nirvāṇaṁ kuta eva tasya bhāvātā |
bhāvābhāvaparāmarśaṁṣayo nirvāṇaṁ ucyate || 42.

¹ It is not produced by itself on account of two laws admitted by Nāgārjuna and his followers, viz. that of ābhāsā or abhāva and that of stūtanmi nirodhāni. Whatever was in a previous moment non-existent is devoid of self-existence and therefore cannot come to existence by its own agency; nor can existence be active upon itself. It cannot be produced by another, because the idea of cause is equally an antimony; in fact the cause is such, only in relation to its effect. But, then, as long as the effect is not produced it is absurd to speak of cause, and, if this cause is non-existent, a fortiori the effect will be non-existent.

The third antimony: “neither by itself nor by another,” is evident, being the consequence of the two others. To the refutation of the idea of time Nāgārjuna has dedicated the second chapter of his Mādhya-makakāvikā. The meaning is that it is not produced in the past, because whatever is past is no longer active, nor in the future, because it would be like the birth of a child from a barren woman, nor in the present because the present has no duration. The conclusion of this is that it is impossible to demonstrate either that there is a producer or that there is a thing produced.

samāsanā nāstītādṛśtaḥ phalam nāstītī karmanāḥ |
apunyāpāyikā caśā mithyādṛśī iti smṛtā ||

39. But, if a man lacking discrimination hears this law which puts an end to all sorrows, he, on account of his ignorance, fears a place where there is nothing to be feared, and trembles.²

40. When they say that all this will not exist in the nirvāṇa, this tenet does not make you afraid; but when we state that here everything is not existent, how is it that this statement fills you with fear? ²

41. In the condition of salvation (as you believe it to be) there are neither the groups nor the ego. But if such a kind of salvation is dear to you why do you not like the elimination of the individual ego and of the groups in this very existence [as preached by our doctrine]? jáne [3, b] nātyaṣṭādānteḥ pāpapunyavatyikramah |
durgateṣu sūgatae cāsmaṁ sa mokṣaḥ sadbhir ucyate ||

45. sahetum udāyam paśyantī nāstītam ativartate |
āsiṭām api nopaṇi nirodhām saha hetunā ||

46. prājātāḥ sahasajāteṣa ca hetur ahutukro ‘rthataḥ |
prājātāḥ apraśītyāt upatītṣe caiva tattvataḥ |

47. But nirvāṇa is not even non-existence; how can it be existence? nirvāṇa is called the suppression of any notion of existence and non-existence.³

¹ The place where there is nothing to be feared is nirvāṇa, which is suppression of the personality.

² The sentence: “All this” is the whirl of cause and effect. The nirvāṇa referred to is evidently the upaniṣadic nirvāṇa. The author asks his supposed opponent why, though going after the upaniṣadic nirvāṇa, which is suppression of every personality, is he, nevertheless, unwilling to accept this doctrine which makes the realization of nirvāṇa possible in this very life.

³ Now Nāgārjuna, having referred to nirvāṇa, states, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, that nirvāṇa which he describes is not like the nirvāṇa of the other schools, but it is beyond the notion of existence and non-existence. The verse is quoted in PP., p. 525.
43. To say it in a few words, the nihilistic view consists 
in denying that karman brings forth its effect. This view 
is sinful and causes rebirth in the hells. It is called a 
wrong view.¹

44. To say it in a few words, the realistic view consists 
in affirming that karman brings forth its effect. It is 
meritorious and causes rebirth in happy conditions 
of existence. It is called the right view.

45. But when through the right knowledge one has 
suppressed any notion of existence or non-existence, one is 
beyond sin and virtue. Therefore the saints say that this 
is the salvation from good as well as from bad conditions 
of existence.

46. In so far as one recognizes that any origin has its 
cause, one gets rid of the nihilistic view, and in so far as one 
understands that there is a destruction of things determined 
by causes one gets rid of the realistic view.²

47. If a cause is born before the effect or along with it, 
in both cases, from the standpoint of the absolute truth 
it cannot be the cause. In fact, the notion of birth cannot 
be conceived either from the conventional or from absolute 
point of view.³

48. The notion of relation may be expressed in this way: 
When this thing exists this other thing also exists, for example, 
the idea of short in relation to that of long; when this thing 
is produced this other thing also is produced. for example, 
the light when there is a lamp.²

49. If there is not the idea of short there cannot be that 
of long, as a self-existent thing; if there is no lamp it is 
impossible to have any light.³

50. When one understands that the origin of the notions 
of cause and effect is like this, one cannot be the follower 
of the nihilistic view, in so far as he admits that the real 
nature of this world consists in the display of subjective 
differentiation.

¹ Since the cause is called a cause in so far as it produces an effect, if it 
exists before the production of this effect, that cause cannot be the cause of 
this effect, because it would have no relation to it.

² a, b is quoted in PP., p. 10, where we read: hraste dirgham yathā sati ; the 
Tibetan supposes dirgha hraste yathā sati. ā policeman is not the du-btsin.

³ Of course, the notion of cause belongs to the samastiṣṭa, viz. to the 
relative truth, because, as stated in the following verse, from the paramārtha 
point of view, viz. from the point of the absolute truth, the notion of cause 
is absurd.
51. Destruction also is derived from the display of subjective differentiation, and therefore one cannot admit that it is something real in itself. In such a way one does not become a follower of the realistic doctrine. Therefore, in so far as one has taken standpoint in neither view, one attains to salvation.

52. A form seen from afar becomes manifest to the eyes when one gets near to it. If a mirage were really water, how is it that this cannot be seen when one gets near? ¹

53. This world does not appear to those who are far away [from the truth] as it appears to those who are near [to it]—that is like a mirage devoid of specific characteristics.

54. Just as a mirage looks like water but it is neither water nor something real, in the same way the groups look like the ego, but in fact they are neither the ego nor something real.

nāstikā durgāṭiṁ yāti sugatiṁ yāti cāṣṭikaḥ
yatābhāṣūtparipārījānāṁ mokṣāṁ advayāṇīśeṣaḥ || 57.
anīcchāṁ nāstītāśītve yathābhāṣūtparipārījāṇāya
nāstītāṁ labhate mohat kasmān labhate 'stītāṁ' || 58.
syād āstīdūṣaṇād asya nāstītā'kṣipyate 'rthataḥ'
nāstītādūṣaṇād eva kasmān nā'kṣipyate 'stītā' || 59.
na prātiṣṭhā na caritāṁ na cittāṁ bodhiṣṭhīrayāt
nāstikāvate'rthato yesāṁ kathāṁ te nāstikāṁ sṛṣṭāḥ || 60.

55. If a man [seeing from afar] a mirage, believing that it is water, goes near to it and then thinks that there there is no water, this man is a fool.²

56. So, when a man takes this world, which is similar to a mirage, to be either existent or non-existent that man is under the influence of bewilderment. But if there is bewilderment there is no salvation.

57. The nihilist is bound to be reborn in bad conditions of existence, the realist will be reborn in good conditions of existence. But those who have understood the things as they really are attain to salvation, in so far as they have taken their standpoint in neither view.

58. Those who, unwilling to conceive existence and non-existence according to their real nature (as stated by us), state, on account of their ignorance, [that nirvāṇa is] non-existence why they do not state that it is existence?

Sāṃkhyapunāśita dhanupramukhavatādakṣaṁ kṣaṇavatādakṣaṁ prāchā lokāṁ yadi vadaty āstīnātītavatādakṣaṁ || 61.

viddhi gambhīrām ity uktam Buddhānām śāsānām tattvāt || 62.
vibhavām naiti nāyāti na tiṣṭhāty api ca kaśchāpam
traikālīvatatātmā lokā eva kuto 'rthataḥ' || 63.
dvāyor api āgatātī prasthitā ca na tattvataḥ
lokāntivāyaśaṁ tasmā viśeṣāṁ ka ivārthataḥ || 64.

59. If you object that by the refutation of the existence its non-existence is logically implicit, why then refutation of non-existence would not imply existence? ¹

60. [For us] there is no thesis to be demonstrated, no rules of conduct, and on account of our taking shelter in the supreme illumination, not even mind, our doctrine is really the doctrine of nothingness. How then can we be called nihilists? ²

61. You may ask the common people along with its philosophers either the Śāṃkhyas or the Vaiśeṣikas or the Jainas or those who maintain the existence of a personality as represented by the five groups whether they preach a doctrine like ours beyond the dualism of existence and non-existence.³

¹ That is, it is impossible to affirm existence or non-existence, because this affirmation implies logically its contrary.
² Of course, all this from the standpoint of absolute truth, not from that of conventional truth. Nihilism is in fact, affirmation of a negation, but for Nāgārjuna truth is beyond either negation or affirmation.
³ Quoted in PP., p. 275, as taken from the Rātanvāli.
62. Therefore you must realize that this present of the law going beyond any dualism of existence and non-existence is the ambrosia of the teaching of the Buddhas known as the deep one.

sthītaḥ abhāvād udayo nirodhaś ca na tattvataḥ | uditāḥ sthitāḥ ceti niruddhaś ca kuto 'rthataḥ || 65. kathām akṣaṇīko bhāvah pariṇāmaḥ sadā yadi | nāsti cet pariṇāmaḥ syād anyathātvam kuto 'rthataḥ || 66. ekadeśe [a, b] kṣayaḥ vā syāt kṣaṇikaṁ sarvaso 'pi vā | vaisāmyānupalabdhēś ca dvidhāpy etad āyuktimat || 67. kṣaṇike sarvathā bhāveta kutaḥ kācīt purāṇataḥ | sthairyād akṣaṇike cāpi kutaḥ kācīt purāṇataḥ || 68.

63. How can this world be something real, since it does not vanish into non-existence nor come to existence nor even possess the duration of an instant, and is, therefore, beyond the threefold temporal relation?

64. From the standpoint of absolute truth, both this world as well as nirvāṇa are equally non-existent, either in the future or in the past or in the present; how can then any difference between them be real?

65. Since there is no duration, there is in truth neither origin nor destruction; how can therefore [this world] be really born, permanent, destroyed?

66. If there is always change into new forms is not, then, existence momentary? If, on the other hand, there is no change how could you explain the modification which we perceive positively in things?

yathānti 'sti kṣaṇasyaivaṁ ādīr madhyam ca kalpyatām | tryātmaktvāt kṣaṇasyaivaṁ na lokasya kṣaṇaṁ sthitīḥ || 69. ādīmadhyāyasānaṁ c[ntyāni kṣaṇavat punaḥ | ādīmadhyāya]vasānaṁ na svataḥ parato 'pi vā || 70. noīko 'nekapraḍedatvāṁ nāpraḍedād ca kaścana | vinaikam api nānko nāstītvam api cāśītvām || 71. vinaśaṭ pratipakṣād vā syād aśtiūsya nāstītā | vinaśaṁ pratipakṣo vā kathām syād astyasaṁbhavat || 72.

67. One thing is momentary because either it disappears partially or totally. But since no difference appears in the two cases, therefore both assumptions are equally illogical.

68. If things are mere moments, they are, then, in no way existent; therefore any temporal relation like that of oldness, etc., would be impossible: if, on the contrary, things are not momentary, on account of their duration any temporal relation like that of oldness, etc., would be equally impossible.¹

69. If the instant has a final moment, we must assume that it has the other two moments as well, viz. the initial and the middle; but inasmuch as the instant consists of three moments the world cannot have the duration of the instant.²

70. Again, beginning, middle, and end must be considered to be like the instant, viz. divided each one into three moments; the condition of being beginning, middle, and end is not existent by itself nor by another.³

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¹ Verses 68-70 are quoted, as taken from the Madhyamakasiddhānta, by Candrakirti in PP., p. 548.
² This verse meets the possible objection, viz. that, if there is no instant, as it is not simple, but complex as being composed of three moments, then the instant would be implicitly represented by these three moments, into which the instant has been decomposed. The answer of Nāgārjuna is that they also, if they are something real, must be composed of other moments, and so there would be regressus in infinitum. Moreover, the fact or the condition of being beginning, middle, and end is, from the absolute point of view, illogical because it is not by itself, which would be contradictory, nor by another cause, because, in this way, there would not be the necessary connection between the cause and its effect, which is the fundament of the causal relation. So, as demonstrated in the following āloka, everything has only a relative existence.
contradictory theses like that of existence or non-existence of things, feel but fear of this law which does not state the existence of anything we can depend upon, and are then ruined.

77. And being themselves ruined they want to ruin others, also being afraid of (this teaching) where there is nothing to be feared. Be careful, O king, unless these wicked ones might ruin you also.

PS.—I prepared the edition of the text on a modern copy marred by many clerical errors. But, on my request, His Highness the Mahārāja Jodha Sham Shere was kind enough to send me a good photographic copy of the original, which in many a point permitted a revision of my first readings.

131.
The Ratnavali of Nagarjuna

BY GIUSEPPE TUCCI

In the April issue, 1934, of this Journal, I edited and translated the first chapter of this work of the great Nagarjuna, still a fundamental treatise in the monasteries of Tibet. I now publish the remaining portions of the second and fourth chapters, the second being incomplete and the third entirely missing. The fifth and last pariccheda contains chiefly vinaya-rules, and will be published in a subsequent issue, along with the Tibetan text and the English translation of the missing portions.

In this way, another of the most important works of Nagarjuna will be made accessible to Buddhist scholars.

I have nothing to add to the short notes which I prefixed to the edition of the first chapter. To the sources there referred to I must add a short but very useful commentary upon this treatise from the pen of one of the two most famous pupils of Tsong k'a pa, namely rGyal ts'ab rje. It is contained in the first volume of his complete works (gsun 'ubam, sNart'ang edition). It bears the title: dBu ma rin c'en ap'ren bai snin poi don gsal bar byed pa.

II

[6a] Kadali pāṭītā yaḍvān niḥśeṣāvayavaiḥ saha |
na kiṃcit puruṣas tadvat pāṭītah saha dhātubhiḥ || 1
sarvadharmaṇa anātmāna ity ato bhāṣitaṁ jinaḥ |
dhātuṣṭaṁ ca taṁ sarvaṁ nirūtaṁ taṁ ca nārthataḥ || 2
naivah atiḥ na cānātmā yātābhūtyena labhyate |
ātmānātmakṛtaṁ ca varvārāśāmaḥ mahāmuniḥ || 3
dṛṣṭaśrutādyam muninā na satyaṁ na mṛṣditaṁ |
pakṣad dhi pratipaśaḥ syād ubhyaṁ taṁ ca nārthataḥ || 4
iti satyāṃrtātito loko 'yaṁ paramārthataḥ |

1 See Journal, April, 1934, p. 397.
asmād eva ca tattvena nopayta asti ca nāsti ca || 5
yac caiva sarvathā neti sarvajñās tat katham vadet |
sāntam ity athavānāntam dvayaṃ viddvayam eva vā || 6
asaṃkhīeyā gatā buddhās tathaiva Antony atha sāṃpratāḥ |
kotyagṛasaḥ ca sattvāntas teyyhas traikālyajano mataḥ || 7
vṛddhihetur na lokasya, kṣayas traikālyajasambhavaḥ |
sarvajñāna katham tasaya pūrvaṃ veyākṛtaṃ krtaḥ || 8
etat tu dharmaṃ gāmbhīryam yat tad guhyam prthigajane |
māyopamatvam lokasya buddhānām sāsanāṃtāṃ || 9
māyāgajasya drṣyeta yathā jānmaṇa eva ca |
na ca kācit sa tattvena jānmaṇāta caiva vidyate || 10
māyopamāsyalokasya tathā jānmaṇa eva ca |
dṛṣyate paramārthaṇa ca na jānmaṇa eva ca || 11
yathā māyāgaja naiti kutaścīd yatī (6b) na kvacit |
cittamohamāmātṛatvād bhāvatvena na tiṣṭhaṇi || 12
tathā māyopamo loko naiti yatī na kucacit |
cittamohamāmātṛatvād bhāvatvena na tiṣṭhaṇi || 13
traikālyavāyatvīvṛttatāmā loka evam nu ko 'rthataḥ |
yo 'sti nāasty athavāpī syād anyatra vyavahārataḥ || 14
catusprakāram ity asmāt santo 'nanto dvayo 'dvayaḥ |
buddhena hetor nānyasmād ayam avayākṛtaṃ krtaḥ || 15
śarīrāścītā tiyan sthūla pratyakṣāgocaraḥ |
satāmat drṣyamāṇāpī yadā citte na tiṣṭhaṇi || 16
tadātiṣṭuskmā gāmbhīraḥ sādharmo 'yam anālayaḥ |
apratyakṣaḥ kathāṃ citte sukhena vataśyaṅyati || 17
sambudhyāṃṃ nirvṛttto 'bhūd dharmaṃ desayitaṃ muniḥ |
durjñānām atigāmbhīryāḥ jñātavā dharmaṃ imaṃ janaḥ || 18
vināsāyati durjñāto dharmaṃ 'yam avipaścitaṃ |
nāstitādṛṣṭisamale yasmad asmin nimajjati || 19
aparo 'py asya durjñānān mūrkhā paṇḍitamāṇākāḥ |
pratikṣeṣavastitāmā yātī avicīm adhomukhaḥ || 20
durbhuktena yathānāne vināśām adhigacchati |
subhuktenāyur ārogyam balaṃ saukhyāṇi cāsūtē || 21
durjñātēna tathānāne vināśām adhigacchati |
samyājijñānātra sukhaṃ bodhipī caṃnoty anuttarāṃ || 22
tasmād atro pratikṣeṣaṃ drṣṭim tyaktvā ca nāstikim ||
false. In fact, if there is a thesis, an antithesis is derived from it, but both thesis and antithesis do not really exist (as per se existent without their contrary). 1

5. Therefore from the metaphysical standpoint this universe transcends both reality and unreality, and so, in truth, it cannot admit either of existence or of non-existence.

6. How could therefore the all-knower affirm that this universe, about which no statement is absolutely possible, has an end or is without an end, is a duality or a non-duality? 2

7. "Many Buddhas have gone, will come, or do appear in this very moment. The notion of a limit as regards living beings in their innumerable series is said by them to be born from the threefold temporal relation." 3

8. "There is no cause for the increasing of the world of creatures; their passing away is determined by the threefold temporal relation. How could then the Buddha, who is the all-knower, leave this question as regards the commencement or the end of the world unanswered?" 4

9. In this consists the very depth of our doctrine, viz. that it remains a secret for the ordinary people. The teaching that the world is to be compared with a magic play represents the essence of the doctrine of all Buddhas.

10. We can perceive the birth or the end of an elephant

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1 Reference is made here to a simile to be met very often in the sūtra literature.

2 Tib.  ऐंग्र द्रूढ़ देव कुलदेव मेद के पौड ताल ताक पी यिन. "It has been ascertained for you that the six constituents are devoid of self."

3 Three are the statements to be demonstrated: (a) existence or non-existence of a self cannot be proved in se; (b) existence or non-existence of an essence cannot be proved in se; (c) refutation of those who argue against the view of the Master, viz. that the question whether this world has an end or not must be left undetermined: (a) = v. 3; (b) = vv. 4-6; (c) = vv. 6-15. This verse is quoted by Candrakirti. PP. p. 359.

4 Here the third argument (c) begins; it is intended to prove that the Buddha is right in maintaining that no determination is possible as regards this world. After the thesis (v. 6) there is the objection of the opponent (vv. 7-8), and then the reply, which consists of two examples (10, 11, 12) and a conclusion.

5 The reason of the appearance of the Buddhas in this world is their desire to lead human creatures towards nirvāṇa. If their preaching is really efficacious, this implies that numberless creatures have been saved, are saved, and will be saved by them.

4 There is no reason for admitting that beings may come to existence now who did not exist before; since, then, the number of creatures does not increase and, on the other hand, their disappearance into nirvāṇa through the preaching of the Buddhas is proved by past experience, it would seem that the ultimate end of this world is a well established fact. Here the objection of the opponent ends.
created by magic power, though in reality, it has neither birth nor end;
11. even so we can see a beginning and an end in this world, though, from the standpoint of the metaphysical truth, it has neither origin nor end.
12. As an elephant created by magic power comes from nowhere and goes to nowhere, in so far as, being due to a mere bewilderment, it does not stay anywhere as something existent,
13. even so, this universe like a magic play comes from nowhere and goes to nowhere; being due to a mere mental bewilderment, it does not stay anywhere.
14. What is, therefore, in its essence this universe, which, transcending the threefold temporal relation, cannot be said to be or not to be, except from the standpoint of the conventional truth?
15. Therefore for this very reason, and for no other one, the Buddha left this world undetermined as regards four points, viz. if it has an end, if it has no end, if it is duality, if it is a unity.\(^1\)
16. The uncleanness of the body, though it is something material and perceivable, does not abide in the mind, though it is continually under our eyes;
17. how, then, could this perfect doctrine, extremely subtle and deep and devoid of any support, easily descend into our mind?
18. This is why the ascetic, after having realized this doctrine, declined, at the first moment,\(^2\) to preach it; he knew in fact that this very doctrine is very difficult to be understood by common people on account of its depth.
19. If this doctrine is not well understood it causes the ruin of the unintelligent man, since he sinks into the impurity of nihilism.
20. Some other fools who think themselves to be wise do not understand it properly, and therefore fall head down into the hell Avīci, being ruined by their criticism against the perfect doctrine.\(^1\)
21. By food badly digested a man gets his ruin, but by food well digested he enjoys long life, good health, physical strength, and other pleasures;
22. even so those who do not properly understand the doctrine will get their ruin; on the contrary, by its right understanding one obtains happiness in this life and the supreme illumination.
23. Therefore, giving up any criticism against this doctrine and getting rid of the nihilistic view, strive after the right knowledge in order to arrive at the complete attainment of your object.
24. If one does not thoroughly understand this doctrine egotism is originated; from this, karma, both moral and immoral is derived, and from this a new life which will accordingly take place in good conditions of existence or in bad ones.\(^2\)
25. Therefore as long as this doctrine, which annihilates egotism, is not thoroughly understood, so long apply yourself with great care to the [practice of] the law, which consists in liberalty, moral conduct, and patience.

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1 According to rGyal tSā'ab, instead of duality and unity, we should understand "both" and "neither". This verse refers to the four points as held by four different schools: (a) No existence when this life is over; (b) Continuation of the āṭman when this life is over; (c) Both end and non-end (viz. its modalities —gnaa skabe—subject to an end but not its essence); (d) Neither end nor non-end; opinion held by some Vātsāpatiryās (gnaa ma bai eS), since, for them, individuals are undetermined.
2 Another discussion is here introduced as regards the depth of this teaching. Three points: (a) general statement (vv. 16–17); (b) this depth is the reason why the Buddha did not preach the doctrine to those who were not in a condition to understand it properly (v. 18); (c) Why this depth must be considered: three subdivisions: (a) its wrong interpretation and the sin which follows from it (vv. 19–20); (b) advantages of its right understanding (vv. 21–21); (c) instruction for its proper understanding (v. 23).
3 vv. 19–20 are quoted by Candrikirti PP., p. 496, II. 1 and 8; in ISa durāyāga instead of durājātu.
4 The discussion on abhyāsya is here introduced.
26. Therefore, o king, whoever in the beginning, in the middle, and in the end accomplishes his actions according to the law, never sinks either here or in the other world.¹

27. From the law one gets renown and happiness and has no cause of fear either during life or at the point of death; he will share copious happiness in another existence; be therefore always a partaker of the law.

28. The law alone is the supreme policy, because the affection of men is captivated by the law. When the affection of men is captivated, the king is not deceived either here or in the after life.

29. That policy which is against the law displeases subjects; and when subjects are displeased, the king cannot rejoice either in this or in another life.

30. How is it possible that some men of mischievous

¹ According to rGyal tsa'ab the order of the arguments is as follows:—

| 1 | Necessity of accomplishing whatever turns into spiritual welfare |
| 2 | Necessity of giving up whatever turns into cause of bad existences |
| 3 | Necessity of giving up adharma and of practising dharma. |

| (a) synthetic enunciation |
| (v. 44, 45) |

| (b) in detail |
| (v. 46) |

| (a) synthetic |
| (v. 33) |

| (b) in detail |
| (v. 34, 35) |

| (c) developing the causes increasing virtue |
| (v. 36) |

| (a) practice of the four saṃsāra-nivṛtti |
| (v. 37) |

| (b) practice of truthfulness, etc. |
| (v. 38) |

| (c) developing the causes increasing virtue |
| (v. 39) |

| (a) practice of the four saṃsāra-nivṛtti |
| (v. 30) |

| (b) practice of truthfulness, etc. |
| (v. 31) |

| (c) developing the causes increasing virtue |
| (v. 32) |

intelligence could think a science productive of evil, intended to deceiving others, harmful, conducive to bad rebirths (viz. politics) to be a science aiming at the public welfare?

31. How can a man addicted to deceive others be considered as really clever when, on the contrary, he deceives only himself for thousands of rebirths?

32. If you want to displease your enemy, give up every sin and take shelter in virtue; in this way you will obtain your own benefit and at the same time your enemy will not be pleased.

33. Liberality, kindness in speaking, benefiting others, being intended to the spiritual profit (of others as well as of oneself), through these virtues behave towards men and religion.

34. Truth alone begets firm confidence [of subjects] in kings; even so untruth engenders extreme mistrust towards them.

35. Truth in reality is not that which is devoid of falsehood, nor that which develops in a pure mind; truth is the absolute good done to others; its contrary is falsehood on account of its being harmful to others.

36. A single brilliant act of liberality overshadows the faults of the kings; even so miserliness ruins all their virtues.

37. A man who has control over himself acquires deepness of mind; from deepness of mind he obtains dignity; from dignity lustre is derived; from lustre authority. Practise therefore control over thyself.

38. A king who, on account of his wisdom, is resolute in his ideas, who does not depend upon others and is determined, cannot be deceived; be therefore solely devoted to wisdom.

39. A king who is possessed of the four blessings, viz. truth, liberality, self-control, and wisdom, is praised by gods and men, as the law itself with its four blessings.

40. When [a king] sits together with his ministers restrained in their speeches, spotless, purified by their wisdom and
their compassion, wisdom and law will then grow in him for ever.

41. Scarce are those who can give wholesome advice, scarcer are those who listen to them, but far scarcer still are those who immediately practise wholesome counsel.¹

42. Having therefore understood that something is wholesome though unpalatable, do it at once; even so a clever man in order to recover his health drinks a medicine however acrid.

43. Keep always in your mind that things such as life, good health, and kingship are impermanent; frightened therefore [by impermanence], you will seek for the law as the only refuge.

44. Realizing that death is inescapable and that, as soon as one is dead, the consequence of sin is sorrow, you cannot annihilate sin even through the enjoyment of this life.

45. If, in a certain moment, you see no danger and in another moment you see a danger, then, if you trust in one, how is it that you do not trust the other?

46. By being addicted to drinking one is in this world despised by others, is unable to carry out his business, loses his wealth and, on account of the bewilderment that proceeds from that, he cannot accomplish his duty. Give up therefore drinking.²

IV

[15α] adharmam anyāyyam api prāyo rājā ‘nujīvibhiḥ | ācāraṇa stūyaṃ tasmāt kṛchṛd vetti kṣamaṃ kṣamaṃ | 1 anyo ‘pi tavād yaḥ kaścid durvaçaḥ kṣamaṃ apiyaṃ | kim u rājā mahāhāmaḥ tvām mayā bhikṣuṇā satā | 2 tvatkrād eva tu snehāj jagatām anukampayā | ahām eko vadāmi tvāṃ pathyaṃ api apiyaṃ bhṛṣāṃ | 3 satyaṃ śākṣānārthavat pathyaṃ śiṣyaḥ kāle ‘anukampayā | vacya ita āha bhagavaṃs tad evam abhidhyase | 4 akrodhe satyavāyake ca śālgyamāṇo yadi sthitāḥ |

¹ Tib. de dag las kyi shi mi shan yin | p'an pai rjes su byed pa dkon
² Tib. de bas can ni rtag tu spona
śarkarāmodako yadad elāmaricakarkaśaḥ || 41
mātsyanyāyaś ca te naivaṃ nyāyaḥ rājaṃ bhāviṣyaḥ || 42
na cānyaś ca vādharma dharmaś caivaṃ bhavaṃ bhāviṣyaḥ || 42
paralokāt tvayā rāyaṃ nāmitaṃ nāpi neṣyeṣa || 43
dharmaḥ prāptaṃ ato 'syārthe nādharmam kartum arhasi || 44
rājyena bhāndaṃulyena duhkhaḥbhaṅgadaparamparām || 45
rājan yathā nārjayaśa prayatnāṃ kriyātaṃ tathā || 46
rājyena bhāndaṃulyena rājyabhaṅgadaparamparām || 47
caturdviṃpaṃ api prāpya prthivīṃ ca krikaṃtvarīṇaḥ || 48
śāriṃ maṇsasaṃ caiva sukhadavaṃ idāṃ matam || 49
duhkhapratikriyāmātraṃ śāriṃ vedaṃnāsukham || 50
samjmānayaṃ maṇsam tu kevalaṃ kalpanākṛtāṃ || 51
duhkhapratikriyāmātraṃ kalpanātmātraṃ eva ca || 52
lokasya sukhadavaṃ saṃvṛtāṃ vyartamaḥ etad ato'rthataḥ || 53
dvipaṃsāpavāvāśaṃśaṃsvavidhānaṃ saṃvāśāvāsaṃ || 54
śayā'ṃmapāhasthaṣaṃsvaviṇaṃ caikakhaṃbhogaṃtaḥ || 55
yadā ca yatra cittaṃ śaṃ yadānena sakhaṃ kila || 56
śeṣānāṃ amanastakārataḥ teṣāṃ vyarthatvam arthataḥ || 57
viṣayāṃ paṅcābhiḥ paṅca cakraṃ śaṃśaḥ indriyaiḥ || 58
na kalpayati yed grhāṇaṃ nāmāt teṣu tādā sukhanaṃ || 59
jānte viṣayamaḥ yaṃ yaṃ yena yenendriyena ca || 60
tadā na śeṣaḥ śeṣāṃ vyartāḥ eva yatas tadā || 61
indriyaiḥ upalaḥbhaya viṣayasyaṃkṛtāṃ manah || 62
upalaḥbhya vyāṭitāṣya kalpayanaṃ manyataṃ sukhanaṃ || 63
ekama arthaṃ viṣayati yady apya ekama indriyaiḥ || 64
tad apya arthamaṃ vinā vyartamaḥ vyartamaḥ 'ṛtho pi ca tad vinā || 65
pratitya mātāpitaraṃ yathoktaḥ putrasambhavaḥ || 66
cakṣūrūpe pratyayiyum ukto viṣayamaṃ sambhavaḥ || 67
ātānāgatā vyarthāḥ viṣayāḥ sārdham indriyaiḥ || 68
taddvyānāntarikta tva vyarthāyae 'pi ca śāṃpratāḥ || 69
alātacakaṃ grhūtāti yathā cakṣur viparyayāt || 70
tathāndriyaṃ [17b] grhṇanti viṣayāṃ śāṃpratān īva || 71
indriyaiḥ indriyārthāḥ ca paṅcābhiḥ ṭamataḥ || 72
pratirām bhūtavaiṣaṃvṛtāṃ eṣaṃ vyartavatvam arthataḥ || 73
nirṇindhanā 'gnir bhūtānaṃ vinirbhāge prasaṃyate || 74
samparka lakṣaṇābhāvaḥ śeṣeṣv api eṣa nīrṇayaḥ || 59
evaṃ dvīdhiṣṭiḥ bhūtānāṃ vyarthatvāt saṅgatir vṛṭthā ||
yyarthatvāt saṅgatēś caivaṃ rūpam vyartham ato ‘ṛthataḥ || 60
vijñānavedanasāṃjñāsamskarānām ca sarvaśaḥ ||
pratyekam ātmavaiyarthād āyaiyarthāṃ paramārthe tathaḥ || 61
sukhābhīmāno dhukhāsya pratikrīte yathārthataḥ ||
tathaḥ dhukhābhīmāno ‘pi sukhasya pratigātatajāḥ || 62
sukhe saṃyogatṛṣṇaivaṃ niḥsābhīvayāḥ prahīyate ||
dhukhe viyogatṛṣṇa ca paśyataṁ muktir ity atāḥ || 63
kaḥ paśyati iti cittaṃ vyavāhāraṇa kathaye ||
na hi caittam vinā cittaṃ vyarthatvān na saheṣṭye || 64
vyartham evaṃ jagan matvā yāthābhūtyān nirāsapaḍaḥ ||
nirvāti nirupādāno nirupādanavahināt || 65
bodhisattvavo ‘pi dṛṣṭvaivaṃ samabhau nīyata mātaḥ ||
kevalaṃ tv asya kāruṇyād ābodher bhavasamtaḥ || 66
bodhisattvasaṃv sambhāro mahāyānīe tathāgataḥ ||
nirūḍhaḥ sa tu sammūdbhāiḥ pradviṣṭaś caiva nīnaye || 67
gunadūsānabhijñō vā doṣasamadhiḥ gunesu vā ||
athavāpi gunadvesaḥ mahāyānāsaṃ nīnakaḥ || 68
paropagāhātaio [18a] doṣan parānugrahino gunān ||
jñātvocaye gunadvesaḥ mahāyānāsaṃ nīnakāḥ || 69
yat svārthanirapekṣatvāt paraṭhākaraṇaṃ paryayaṃ ||
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(To be continued.)

Four Anthologies of Arabic Poetry

BY F. KRENKOW

'Ayy Abū Allāh Ibn al-Muʿtazz; Kitāb al-Ḍāḏ'. Ed. by

Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā as-Ṣūlī, Kitāb al-Awrāk.
Ed. by J. Heyworth Dunne. pp. 256 and 17. London,
1934.

Abū Hīlāl al-ʿAskarī, Dīvān al-Maʿānī. Ed. by Ḥusayn

Ismaʿil b. Aḥmad b. Ziyādat Allāh at-Tujibī al-Barqī;
al-Mukhtar min Shīr Basīḥār. Ed. by Sayyid
Muhammad Bādir ad-Dīn al-ʿAlawi. pp. 341, 15, 27,

It is remarkable that four important works on the criticism
of Arabic poetry, and at the same time anthologies, should
appear in one year and, to avoid any misunderstanding, I shall
deal with them in the chronological order of the deaths of
their authors.

'Ayy Abū Allāh, son of the caliph al-Muʿtazz, lived the life of
a patron of letters and men of learning and no doubt his
social position as the son of a ruler not only assured him an
ample income, but also attracted to a prince of his literary
tastes men of similar inclinations. These men were also
responsible for inducing him to be proclaimed caliph on
Saturday the 20th of Rabiʿ I, 296 (18th December, 908),
and one of the chief leaders in the movement was his friend
Muḥammad b. Dāʾūd b. al-Jarrāḥ, who was appointed Wazīr.
The coup was unsuccessful and both Ibn al-Muʿtazz and Ibn
al-Jarrāḥ were killed the following day. Ibn al-Muʿtazz was
born in Shaʿbān 247, and consequently was not 49 years old
1. Even if a king follows a path contrary to religion and to reason he is nevertheless praised by his subjects (on account of fear); he, therefore, hardly knows what is appropriate or not.

2. It would be very difficult to say to anybody else what is appropriate, when it is unpleasant; how much more will that be to an emperor as you are, since I am speaking, a simple monk as I am?

3. But on account of your love and because I feel compassion for the living beings, I alone will say to you what befits you, though it will be extremely unpleasant.

4. (The master), out of his compassion, must say at the proper moment to his disciple what benefits him, is true, mild, and full of significance.

So said the Blessed one. You are now instructed according to this principle.

5. If a man persists in being mild and truthful when he is praised, he will always accept that which is worth hearing; even so those who want to wash themselves choose water possessing good properties.

6. When I say these words to you knowing that they are profitable in this life and in other existences, put them into practice; they will prove useful to yourself and to the world.

7. You have got your wealth since you were liberal in former existences; but if, being ungrateful and greedy, you are not now also liberal towards those who beg some help from you, you will never get this wealth any more.

8. A servant, if he is not paid, does not carry in this world any provision on the way, but a poor beggar without being paid carries for the other life baggage a hundred times heavier.
9. Be always noble-minded and delighting in noble deeds, because from a noble deed every kind of noble fruits are derived.

10. Make your temple the prosperous and renowned abode of the Three Jewels, unhurt even in thought by mean kings.

11. It is better not to build that temple which does not cause horripilation to neighbouring kings, since it is not a glory even when one is dead.

12. With the example of your extreme generosity let the admiration and the endeavours of the generous ones grow and kill the endeavours of the dull-witted ones, even at the cost of all your possessions.

13. Even against your will you must give up everything and pass into another existence. But whatever has been employed for the law will go ahead.

14. The property of a previous king has fallen into the hands of the king (his successor); of what use can it then be to the religion, happiness and glory of his predecessor?

15. From the enjoyment of your wealth you get only happiness in this life, but from the gift of that wealth you will get happiness in a future existence. Since whatever has not been either given or enjoyed is lost, sorrow only is derived from that wealth; how can that produce happiness?

16. When you are on the very point of death you are unable to give away; you are, in fact, then no longer master of your will on account of your ministers becoming disaffected towards the king whose departure is impending and eager to do what pleases the new prince.

17. While, therefore, you enjoy good health, even at the cost of all your wealth, quickly build a temple. You are in fact amidst the very conditions from which death comes, like a lamp put where a strong wind blows.

18. Let all other religious duties, such as processions, etc., established by former kings, continue as they are.

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1 There are four kinds of officers: (a) those entrusted with spiritual affairs (c'os dpön); (b) ministers (bla'la gugs pos); (c) generals (dmag dpön); (d) ministers of finance (nor gyi pfer).
others; still listen to the method by which you may have two things (apparently irreconcilable), viz. kingdom and law.

29. You must always collect many ministers inspecting various businesses, possessing the experience of old men, born in high families, who know the rules of government and are afraid of committing sin.

30. Even if they order according to justice, punishment, imprisonment, and beating (of culprits), be yourself always moved to compassion and disposed to kindness.

31. With your compassion, O king, you must always bend to righteousness the mind of all living beings, even of those who have committed terrible sins.¹

32. Special compassion indeed one must feel for those cruel persons who have committed terrible sins; in fact these miserable men are the proper object for the compassion of noble-minded men.

33. Every day or every five days set free prisoners who are becoming weak [by the imprisonment]; set free all the others also according to the proper course; let nobody remain in prison.

34. If the thought does not come to your mind to set somebody free, this means that you have not yet a perfect control of your feelings as regards that man. But from this lack of control perpetual accumulation of sin is derived.

35. Up to the time of their discharge let them enjoy a pleasant imprisonment and the comfort of barbers, baths, drinks, food, medicines, and garments.

36. You must punish them from compassion and from a desire to turn them into worthy persons, as you do as regards unworthy sons; but you must not be moved by hatred or by desire of material welfare.²

37. After having pondered (the proper means) and having well known the case, you must expel from the country bad people and murderers, without killing or injuring them.

38. Uninfluenced [by others] you must explore your state with the eyes of the spies; always attentive and thoughtful you must do whatever business is in accordance with the law.

39. Always honour with generous gifts, respect and homage those who take their resort to virtue, and as is proper, others also, but according to their merits.

40. The king may be compared to a tree whose abundant flowers are the respect bestowed upon the worthy, whose great fruits are his liberality, whose shadow is his forbearance; the subjects will take shelter in his kingdom like birds in such a tree.

41. If a king possessing the virtues of liberality and morality is also full of majesty, he pleases his subjects like a sweetmeat of sugar, hardened by cardamom and pepper.

42. Following this policy, you will get a kingdom not ruled by the “policy of the fish”; acting in this way there will be neither unrule nor injustice, but law only.¹

43. You did not carry with you this kingdom from the other world, nor will you carry it thither (after death). It has been obtained through law, and therefore, if you want to get it (in another life), you must not do anything against law.

44. You must endeavour, O king, with all your energy not to gain at the price of that capital which is the kingdom those goods of sorrow which are wont to come one after the other.

45. But rather with all your energy you must endeavour, O king, so that at the price of that capital which is your kingdom you may enjoy a long series of royal goods.²

46. Even if one obtains as universal emperor supremacy

¹ That is those for which there is no other expiation but hell.
² Tib. Snod med pa yi bu dag la | snod du ruñ bar gyi ggod ltar || sán rje yis ni ts’ar bcad pa yi | sdañ bas ma yin nor p’yr min ||
over the world with its four continents, one can only experience two kinds of joy, one physical and the other mental.¹

47. Bodily pleasure is a pleasant sensation which merely consists in the removal of pain; the mental one consists in mere ideas, and is produced only by imagination.

48. In this world any kind of pleasure is either a mere removal of pain or a mere imagination; it is therefore in fact unreal.

49. The four continents (as in the case of the universal emperor), the territory, the town, the habitation, the place of residence, sits, cloths, beds, food, drinking, elephants, horses, women are enjoyed severally.

50. Whenever and wherever our mind is fixed [upon something], from that and then only pleasure is derived. But all other things have in fact no scope in so far as at that moment we do not pay attention to them.

51. When one, perceiving the five objects of sense-perception with the five senses, such as the eye, etc., does not work with the imagination, then, for this reason, one does not feel any pleasure in them.

52. When we know a certain object with a certain sense, then, we do not know other objects with the other senses, since at that time the other [objects] are no object [of perception, not being in relation with the senses].

53. The mind perceiving the form of an object which has already been perceived by the senses and (is therefore) past, working with the imagination, thinks it to be a pleasure.

54. If, in this world, one sense knows only one object, then, without its object of perception, that sense would have no scope and the object also will have no scope without the sense which perceives it [in so far as both are reciprocally conditioned].

¹ This long discussion here begins meant to show that no pleasure (and therefore, for necessary implication, no pain) is per se existent or possessed of characteristics per se existent. This leads Nāgārjuna to discuss also perception in its various aspects and to conclude that no such fact as perception can be said to be existent.

55. The birth of a son is conditioned by the mother and the father; even so it is stated that the production of consciousness is conditioned by a sense, e.g. the eye and its object, viz. the object visible.

56. Objects along with their (correspondent) sensory moments, either past or future, are of no purpose [as regards the production of consciousness]; even so the present ones because they cannot be dissociated from the two aforesaid moments.

57. The eye wrongly perceives as a wheel a turning fire-brand: even so all senses [wrongly] perceive the various objects as being present.²

58. The organs of senses as well as the objects of senses are said to be composed of the five material elements; but since each element is in se unreal, even those senses and those objects are in fact unreal.³

59. If we conceive the material elements as being separate, the consequence would be that fire can burn without any fuel: if, on the other hand, they are combined together, it is impossible to speak of their characteristics: the same decision must also be applied to the other elements.

60. In this way, since the material elements are in either case (viz. either separately taken or combined) unreal, their combination is (also) unreal; since their combination is unreal, material forms are therefore unreal.

61. [In the same way the other] constituents like

² In these two stanzas Nāgārjuna meets the objection that viśāna exists since its objects exist; but while the contents of consciousness are distinct in accordance with their temporal succession, the Mādhyamika does not admit any time to be per se existent; present is only existent in relation to a past or a future. The perception of something as present is due to mental bewilderment, as when we wrongly take a turning firebrand to be a wheel.

³ This stanza replies to the objection that senses and objects of senses exist since their cause, viz. material elements, exist; but since no material element can be demonstrated to be in se existent, their effect must necessarily be unreal.
consciousness, sensation, ideas, and forces separately taken are in se completely unreal: therefore from the standpoint of the absolute truth there is only unreality.

62. Just as there is an assumption of pleasure, when in fact there is removal of pain, even so the assumption of pain is derived from obstruction of pleasure.

63. By [meditation on the principle that] everything is devoid of any essence one puts an end to the thirst after association with pleasure and the thirst after dissociation from pain: for those who see (such a truth) there is liberation thence.

64. If you ask who can see that, we reply that from the standpoint of conventional truth it is the mind which sees that (but not from the absolute standpoint); in fact (the function of) mind is not possible without mental contents nor along with these, since it will serve no purpose.\(^1\)

65. When one, perceiving that there is nothing which one can depend upon, considers this world according to its real nature, viz. as unreal, then, having extinguished the sources of attachment, one enters into Nirvāṇa, just as fire which is extinguished when the combustible matter comes to an end.

66. The Bodhisattva also has this vision and therefore he is certain to attain to the perfect illumination; but it is only out of compassion that he passes from one existence to another, before entering the gate of the supreme illumination.\(^2\)

67. The Tathāgatas have expounded in the Great Vehicle, the accumulation (of merit and knowledge) of the Bodhisattvas: only those who are bewildered by foolishness or hatred can find fault with it.

68. A man abusing the Great Vehicle is one who does not distinguish between merits and sins, or one who takes merits to be defects or one who hates merits.

69. An abuser of Mahāyāna is said to be one who knows that sins are of harm to others and merits benefit others and still abuses Mahāyāna.

70. He who hates the Great Vehicle, which is a mine of merits, in so far as it rejoices in benefiting others without any consideration for personal interest, is thereby burnt (by the fire of hell).

71. Even a man possessing faith (in the law) may hate the merits (of the Great Vehicle) on account of some principle badly understood\(^3\); even so somebody else being addicted to anger. But (the scripture) says: "Even a man possessing faith may be burnt (by the fire of hell)"; How much greater will the danger be for a man inclined to hatred?

72. The doctors say that a poison can be the antidote of another poison; even so there is no contradiction when we state that man must dispel what is harmful to him even at the cost of his own pain.\(^2\)

73. Tradition says that mind goes in front of the elements of existence\(^4\) and mind is the best among them. If one, being only interested in what is salutary, does what is salutary, even at the cost of personal pain, how can that prove unprofitable to him?

74. One must do that which will, in the future, be salutary to oneself and to others even if it is (at present) painful; how much more, then, must he do that which is pleasant and equally salutary to the doer and to others? This is the eternal law.

75. If by giving up a bit of pleasure one may get afterwards a large joy, a brave man should give up that bit of pleasure, having in his mind the large joy to be gained in the future.

76. If one is unable to stand even that, then doctors, etc.,

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\(^{1}\) Its contents being in this case already given in it.

\(^{2}\) They renounce to disappear into nirvāṇa in order to benefit creatures.

\(^{3}\) This refers to the duṣkara-caryā implicit in the practice of Mahāyāna.

\(^{4}\) "Mano-puwavegamā dhammā, manoseṭṭhā manomaya,” Dhamma pada, 1, 2.
prescribing bitter medicaments would be ruined. But this principle cannot be applied.\(^1\)

77. What seems unsalutary is considered sometimes by the experts to be salutary; a general rule and the exception are praised in all philosophical systems.

78. How could a man in full possession of his mental faculties abuse the Great Vehicle where it is stated that all results are preceded by compassion and purified by wisdom?

79. Ignorant men, enemies of themselves as well as of others, on account of their bewilderment abuse to-day this Great Vehicle, being troubled by its extreme excellence and its extreme depth.

80. This Great Vehicle is composed of many virtues such as those of liberality, morality, patience, energy, meditation, wisdom, compassion; how is it therefore possible that there is in it any wrong utterance?

81. By liberality and morality one realizes the profit of others; by patience and energy one's own profit; meditation and wisdom are conducive to liberation. This is the summary of the contents of the Great Vehicle.

82. The teaching of Buddha is condensed in precepts which are salutary to others as well as to oneself and are conducive to liberation. They are included in the six perfections; therefore this (Great Vehicle) is indeed the utterance of Buddha.

83. That Great Vehicle, in which the Buddhas have shown the great path leading to illumination and consisting in acquisition of moral merits and wisdom, is not seen (by common people) only on account of their ignorance.

84. In so far as he is possessed of inconceivable attributes, the Victorious One is said, in the Great Vehicle, to be endowed with inconceivable attributes like the other (whose attributes

\(^1\) On account of attachment to small pleasures one cannot miss greater pleasures. The objection here refuted is that sorrow is always sorrow and should therefore be given up.

transcend mind); therefore you must allow this majesty of the Buddha.\(^2\)

85. Even as regards moral rules only, he remained a field inaccessible to the noble Śāradvatiputra; how can you not allow that the majesty of Buddha is inconceivable.\(^3\)

86. According to the Great Vehicle unsalubrity is considered as absence of birth, but for the other systems void is the destruction of things; destruction as well as non-birth can in fact be considered identical.\(^3\)

87. How could, then, the other teachings of Mahāyāna be not acceptable to the wise, since they have realized according to reason the principle of unsalubrity and the majesty of the Buddhas?

88. It is very difficult to know what the Buddhas have said in their metaphorical utterances, and therefore having recourse to impartiality you must protect yourself (against the different and contradictory wordings of the law as expounded) in the one Vehicle or in the three Vehicles.\(^4\)

89. Impartiality is not cause of demerit; but (if you are partial as regards some principle and therefore) you hate (another), this is a cause of sin; how can that be propitious? Therefore those who seek their own welfare must not feel any hatred against the Great Vehicle.

90. In the Vehicle of the Auditors there is no mention of the vow of the Bodhisattva nor of his virtue of devolving upon others the fruits of his career. How is it, then, possible

\(^2\) This greatness of the Buddha implies also that his revelation, viz. Mahāyāna, must be accepted.

\(^3\) This means that unsalubrity of things is not a novelty preached by Mahāyāna; it is also asserted by other schools (Hinayāna). The only difference is that while for Hinayāna it is kṛpta; viz. the result of a destruction of something existent, for Mahāyāna this unsalubrity is in fact non-production.

\(^4\) The teaching of the Buddha being manifold, one must avoid dogmatism: there are, in fact, various degrees of revelation according to the different mental and moral fitness of individuals.

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that one could become a Bodhisattva by following the precepts of that school?

91. The Buddhas did not state in that Vehicle the blessings necessary in order to obtain the illumination of the Bodhisattva. Who else superior to the Victorious Ones can be an authority on this matter?

92. From a path which is similar to that of the Auditors and implies in addition the blessings, the sense of the noble truths and the coefficients of illumination, how can a superior fruit of Buddhahood be derived?¹

93. In the sūtras there is no word designed to enjoin the career towards illumination, but this is said in the Great Vehicle, and therefore it should be accepted by the wise.

94. Just as a master of grammar teaches even the alphabet to disciples, even so the Buddha teaches the law as it may be accessible to those to be converted.²

95. The Buddha in fact preached to some the law so that they could be freed from sin, to others so that they could accomplish meritorious deeds, to others the law based on a duality.³

96. To some others he preached the law beyond duality, deep, terrifying those who are afraid (of such principles)⁴; to others again the law consisting in the two tenets of compassion and unsubstanciality, viz. the two means leading to illumination.

97. Therefore the good ones must destroy any feeling of opposition against the Great Vehicle and find their supreme spiritual peace in it if they want to attain to perfect illumination.

98. By having faith in the Great Vehicle and by following the precepts enjoined in it one attains to the supreme illumination and midway to all happiness.

99. Liberality, morality, patience, truthfulness, are said to be the religion chiefly for the householder; the essence of this (religion) is compassion; it must be taken hold of with great energy.

100. If you think that to rule a kingdom according to religion is difficult since world (and religion) are opposite, then, if you strive after glory in religion success will be easy.

¹ This criticism is directed against the Arhats as a stage superior to that of the Auditors.
² Viz. the teaching must be gradual according to the fitness of those to be converted. VV. 94–6 are quoted by Candraghoja P.P., p. 350, I. 11 seqq.
³ One is freed from sin after he abstains from akihata; the result of meritorious deeds is rebirth among gods, etc.
⁴ Viz. the theory of unsubstanciality of things.
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