THE ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA
OF
GAUDAPĀDA

EDITED, TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED
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TO

THE REVERED MEMORY

OF

GURUDEVA

RABINDRANATH TAGORE

bhedo yasya na vastuto'sti bhuvane práci prāticitī vā
mitratvam prakāṭikṛtaḥ ca satataṁ yenaṁ manah karmanā |
viśvam yasya padaṁ prasiddham aṁśaṁ satye ca yasya sthitir
bhūyāt tasya jayo raver anudinaṁ tenastu tṛptam jagat ||
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PREFACE

Introductory

It was in July, 1919, that, in order to prepare some lectures for my pupils in the Visvabharati, Santiniketan, I had to read the Upanisads anew; and in doing so when I, now with a little acquaintance with Buddhism, began to study the Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, popularly known as the Gauḍapāda-kārikā on the Maṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, I was struck with its contents which were known to me before this quite in a different light. I found there something new. In 1922, in the Second All-India Oriental Conference held in this University, which was presided over by my esteemed friend, Prof. Sylvain Lévi, then the first Visiting Professor of the Visvabharati, I read a paper on the subject, in which I said that a book under the title of The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, embodying the result of my studies in it, would shortly be ready for the press. But, unfortunately, it could not be done earlier than now. However, I wrote some stray articles in English and Bengali on the subject. While they arrested the attention of certain scholars trained on modern lines, they gave rise to adverse criticism mainly from the orthodox section of my friends strictly following the indigenous interpretation of the Upaniṣad, given by Śaṅkara, the commentator of the present work.
Not being satisfied with the interpretation offered by Śaṅkara and his followers, or some other teachers I have attempted in the following pages to present to the readers my own interpretation of the work as I have understood. But in no way do I claim that my interpretation is the interpretation, i.e., the interpretation intended by Gauḍapa himself. Gauḍapa has not appeared to me and said that mine is the true interpretation, nor has God told me anything to the effect, nor am I an omniscient being. It is quite natural and well-known to all that the same thing sometimes appears differently to different persons owing to a variety of circumstances. It would be sheer foolishness on my part, I am perfectly conscious, if I pretend to claim by writing the following pages any superiority to the commentator, whether he is or is not identical with the great author of the commentary on the Brahmasūtras, who is known by the same name, Śaṅkara. I have simply put down my views here and I request my readers only to see if the text can be explained also in the way I have followed here.

I may say here in the following words of Yaśomitra (AKV1, p. 2):

\begin{quote}
yuktā ced grāhyeyam na ced ato 'nyathā vidhātavyā |
nahi viśame 'rthe skhalitum na sambhavan mādṛśāṃ buddhiḥ ||
\end{quote}

On points related to Buddhism, which are frequently raised in the course of my explanation, I have in many cases quoted in support of my views more passages than one, though a single passage could serve the purpose, having meant them specially for those of my readers who are not adequately acquainted with Buddhist thoughts or have no easy access to Buddhist works.

In the present volume I have given a new edition of the text of the Āgamaśāstra based on a number of MSS and different editions as described below, followed by an English translation. After this comes my annotation.

At the end there are Appendixes including the text and English translation of the Maṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, Variants of the MSS used for the edition of the text of the Āgamaśāstra, and different Indexes as the Contents will show.

\textit{Manuscripts}

Let us give here a description of the MSS. referred to above:

1. A1. Adyar Library. No. IX. G. 52. It is in folios 20-28 of the codex. Written in Devanāgarī on paper in black ink, punctuated with red marks, and bounded on either side by double lines. Size 12.3"×4.8". Eleven lines on each page. No date, nor the name of the scribe. In this MS we have the MāU and the GK.

2. A2. Adyar Library. No. IX. F. 99. Fols. 30-39 of this codex contain the MāU and GK. Size 10"×6". Number of lines on each page 12 or 13. Written neatly in Devanāgarī on paper, punctuated and bounded on each side by a double line. No date, nor the name of the scribe.
3. A². Adyar Library. No. IX. F. 130. Fols. 38-53 of this codex, too, contain MaU together with the GK. Written in modern Devanāgarī on paper, bounded on each side by a triple line. Size 10.1" × 5". There are 8 or 9 lines on each page. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

4. A¹. Adyar Library. No. IX. B. 181. It is written on hand-made paper in Śāradā script. There are 30 folios. Size 9" × 6". Each page has 18–25 lines. The borders of the MS are completely worn out, and last 12 folios are torn and destroyed in the middle. It is written in black ink, but the numbers of the folios are given in English figures in red one. No date is to be found, but from the worn out condition of the codex it seems to be not less than two hundred years old. The name of the scribe is also not given.

This codex contains different Upaniṣads, 19 in all, the Vedāntasāra (Śaivadāraṇā), and the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, III. 10. 9–11. Here we have also the MaU and only the first prakaraṇa of GK.

5. B¹. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. No. 272 of 1879–80. It is written on paper in Devanāgarī. Size 10.5" × 4.7". Originally it had 67 fols., but the first 15 fols. are missing, and so we have now only 52 fols. Each page contains 10 to 14 lines. It is dated as 1765 (bāṇa-aṅga-aśva-avani), but, it is not known whether it is Śaṃvat or Śaka era.

This MS contains only the last three Books of the GK beginning with the first kārikā of Book II.

6. B². Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. No. 778 of 1891–96. It is written on paper in Devanāgarī. Fols. 45. Size 9" × 5". Like the preceding one it, too, has only the last three Books of GK together with Śaṅkara's commentary.

The kārikās, specially those in the last Book are numbered very carelessly; thus the last kārikā of the last Book is numbered as 93 instead of 100. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

7. D¹. Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Written neatly in Devanāgarī on paper. Size 11.4" × 6". There is no date, nor the name of the scribe. It contains MaU and the GK together with the commentary of Śaṅkara on both of them. Originally there were 42 fols., but fols. 18, 19, 30–35 containing kārikās 10–53 of the fourth prakaraṇa are missing. In three or four cases some letters are lost, the paper being torn or damaged. In this MS b is written for both b and v.

8. D². Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore. No. nil. Written neatly on paper measuring 11.2" × 5.6" and bounded on both sides by thick lines. There are 69 fols. It contains the MaU and the GK with Śaṅkara's commentary on both of them. No date, nor the name of the scribe.

10. IO. India office. No. 2783. In this codex there are three MSS, viz., (1) Prapâñcasāravivarana, (2) Laghukumudi, and (3) MâU together with the GK only up to the Book I. The slokas of māngalācaraṇa of Śaṅkara’s commentary are given with GK. The script is Devanāgari. No date, but it seems to be old. Almost correct.

11. K1. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśi (Benares). No. 290 (Cover No. 9). Written in Bengali character on paper. Size 9.2” × 4.2”. Fols. 24. Lines in each page 7. There is no date, yet it appears to be very modern. Writer’s name is not given. There are mistakes and omissions. The MS contains both MâU and GK.

12. K2. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśi (Benares). No. 163. This is a part of a bigger MS of which we have only 24 fols. (29-52). Size 12” × 5”. Each page has 9 lines. There is no date, nor the name of the scribe. This MS contains only the third Book of the GK with Śaṅkara’s commentary. It is not quite correct. Some of the kārikās are here misplaced.


It contains the original text of the MâU together with the commentary called Māndūkyaopaniṣadarthapraṅkāśa. Though the name of its author is not mentioned here he is no other than Kūranārāyaṇa, a follower of the Rāmānuja school. This commentary is published in the Anandashram Series, No. 62.

14. K4. Govt. Sanskrit College, Kāśi (Benares). No. 304 (Cover No. 9). It is the first 12 fols. of a bigger codex. Size 10.3” × 5.4”. Number of lines in each page 8. Written on paper in Bengali script. It extends up to the kārikā 12 of Book I together with Śaṅkara’s commentary. No date. Appearance modern. No name of the scribe.

15. PU. The Panjab University Library, Lahore. No. 948. Script Devanāgari. Fols. 9. Size 12” × 6”. Lines on each page 13-18. Date about 1850 V.S., as says one Bhoiral, a manuscript dealer and bookseller from whom it seems to have been secured. It contains MâU up to prabhavāpyayau hi bhūta-nām. atraite sloka bhavanti, and the GK of Book I.

16. PU. The Panjab University Library, Lahore. No. 746. Script Devanāgari. Fols. 142. Size 14” × 7”. Number of lines on each page varies from 13 to 18. No date, but said to be of about 1850 V.S. Obtained at Amritsar, and said to be of Kashmir recension. It contains the MâU and the GK together with the commentary of Śaṅkara followed by Ānanda-giri’s tiṅka.

17. V. Visvabharati. No. 1317. It is written in Grantha character on palm-leaf. Fols. 58. Size 15.7” × 1.3”. Lines 7-8 on each page. It contains the following works: (1) Śrimad Bhagavadgītā (fols. 1-29), (2) Isopaniṣad (fols. 30’), (3) Kenopaniṣad (fols. 30’-32’), (4) Kaṭhopaniṣad (fols. 32’-37’), (5) Praṇopaniṣad
In addition to the MSS described above the readings collected from the thirteen MSS, utilized for the preparation of the second edition of the MaU and GK together with Sāṅkara’s commentary and Ananda-giri’s sub-commentary in the Anandashram Series, No. 10, have also been consulted. The MSS collected for that edition are mentioned here, where necessary, according to the abbreviations used there, viz., K, Kh, G, Gh, etc. Besides, such editions as of Māheśa-candra Pāla, Calcutta, 1806 Śaka era; of MM. Durgācaraṇa Sāṅkhya-Vedānta-tīrtha, Calcutta, 1331 Bengali era; and of Gita Press, Gorakhpur, 1993 V.S., have been consulted.

The most important readings are discussed in their respective places in the main work, while variants will be found in the Appendix II, pp. 229 ff. See Introduction, § 4.

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I am deeply indebted to the authorities of the following Institutions, who have kindly given me on loan the MSS described above: Adyar Library, Madras; Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona; Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore; Government Sanskrit College, Benares; India Office, London; Panjab University Library, Lahore; and Visvabharati Library, Santiniketan.

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In conclusion I must express the deep sense of my gratitude to the authorities of the University of Calcutta,
ABBREVIATIONS

Ā Ānandagiri.
AAA Abhisamayālaśākārāloka (Prajñāpāramitā, Vol. I), Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, No. LXVII.
AAS Abhidhammatthasamgaha with Vibhāvaniṭīkā, ed. Fernando and Silva, Colombo, 1898.
AKB Abhidharmaśāstra (Tibetan Text), BB.
AKV Abhidharmaśāstra of Yasomitra, Fasc. I-II, BB.
AmK Amarakośa.
AN Aṅguttara Nikāya, PTS.
AO Acta Orientalia.
AP Abhidhanappadīpika, Colombo, 1900.
ĀŚ Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda.
AS Aṭṭhasālīmi, PTS.
ĀŚ Ācārāṅga Sūtra, PTS.
ASP Aṣṭasāhasrika Prajñāpāramitā, Bl.
AGAMASASTRA

AU Ātmopaniṣad.
AV Atharvaveda.
BA Bodhicaryāvatāra, Bl.
BAP Bodhicaryāvatārapāṇīkā, Bl.
BB Bibliotheca Buddhica.
Bbh Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. U. Wohhara, Tokyo, 1930. See BSB.
BBU Brahmapindu Upaniṣad.
BBV Byhadāranyakabhāṣyavārttika, Anandashram, 1892-94.
BG Bhagavadgītā.
BI Bibliotheca Indica.
BJS Brahmatāla Sutta in DN, PTO.
BP Bhāgavata Purāṇa.
BS Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa.
BSB Bodhisattvabhūmi, ed. U. Wohhara, Tokyo, 1930. See Bbh.
BU Byhadāranyaka Upaniṣad.
ChU Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
CN Chullaniddesa, PTS.

ABBREVIATIONS

DA Divyāvadāna, ed. Cowell and Nail, Cambridge, 1886.
DāV Der älter Vedānta von Max Walleser, Heidelberg, 1911.
DN Dīgha Nikāya, PTS.
DP Dhammapada.
DPA Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā, PTS.
DPP Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā, by E. Obermiller, Acta Orientalia, Vol. IX.
DSn Dhammasangani, PTS.
DV Daśavaikālikā Sūtra, Devchand Lalbhai Pustakodhārasamiti, No. 47.
ERE Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, ed. Hastings.
Ex Expositor, PTS (Translation Series).
G The edition of the MāU from the Gītā Press, Gorakhpur, 1893.
GK Gaudapadakārikā.
HU Hitopadesa, ed. P. Peterson, Bombay, 1887.
HV Harivaṃśa.
IU Itā Upaniṣad.
Jagadgururatnamālāstava of Sadāśiva-brahmendra with the com. of Ātmabodhendra Sarasvatī included in Vedāntapañcaprakaraṇi, Śrīvidyā Press, Kumbhakonam.

Jīnasārasamuccaya (Yes.fes.sin.po.kun.las-bus.pa), now only in Tibetan. Cordier, III. p. 298.

Jābala Upaniṣad.

Kaivalya Upaniṣad.

Kūranārayāṇa.

Kena Upaniṣad.

Kāśyapaparivarta, ed. Baron A. Von Staël-Holstein, Shanghai, 1926.

Kauśitaki Upaniṣad.

Katha Upaniṣad.

Kathāvatthu, PTS.


Laghucandrikā, Śrīvidyā Press, Kumbhakonam, 1893.

Lalitavistara, ed. Leffmann, Halle, 1902 and 1908.

Madhyamakāvatāra (Tibetan Text), BB, IX. French translation by Poussin, Le Muséon, 1907.

Madhvācārya.

Madhyamakālankārakārikā of Śāntirakṣita, Tibetan Text, Sde.dge, Sa, 53a'-56b'.

Maṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.


Maṇḍalabrāhmaṇopaniṣad.

Mimāṃsādarśana.

The edition of the Maṇḍūkya by Maheśa-candra Pāla, Calcutta, 1806 Śaka Era.

Madhyamakahādayakārikā of Bhāvyā, Tibetan Text, Sde.dge, Dza, 1b'-40b'.

Madhyamakahādayakārikāvātī Tarkajvalā of Bhāvyā, Tibetan, Sde.dge, Dza, 40b'-329b'.

Mālamadhyamakārakārikā of Nāgārjuna, BB, IV.

Muktikā Upaniṣad.

Mahārthamañjari with commentary, Pari-mala, TSS.

Majjhima Nikāya, PTS.

Mahānīddesa, PTS.

Mahānāradiya Upaniṣad (Minor Upaniṣads, Adyar).

Mānasollāsa of Sūrēśvara, Nirmayasa- sagar l'ess. Bombay, 1959, V.E., 1825 S. E.

Manorathapurāṇa, Mahāmukutārājavidyālaya, Siam, 2463 Buddha Era.

ÄAGAMASÄSTR

MS or 1 Mahāyānasūtraśālākāra, ed. Sylvain Lévi, MSA Paris, 1907; French Tr., 1911.
MSBT, MVB'T, or MVST, q.v.
MSt Mahāsadāna, ed. A. S ēl ān a n d a T e r a, Colombo, 1909.
MSV Mimāṁsāślokaśārītika, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1896.
MT Madhyāntavibhāgatikā, ed. S. Y a m g u c h i, Nagao, 1934.
MU Maitrī Upaniṣad.
MuU Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.
MV Madhyamakavytti, ed. L o u i s d e L a V a l l é e P o u s s in, BB. IV.
MVBT Madhyāntavibhāgasūtraḥśāyati, ed. B. B h a t t a c h a r y a a n d G. T u c c i, Part I, Calcutta Oriental Series, 1932.
MVD Madhyāntavibhanga Discourse, translated from Sanskrit by Th. St er b a t s k y, BB, XXX, 1936.
MVT Madhyāntavibhāga tīkā of S t h i r a m a ti, édition per S u s u m u Y a m a g u c h i Nagoya, 1934.
MVg Mahāvagga of Vinaya, ed. H. O l d e n b e r g, London, 1879.
MVt 1 Mahāvyutpatti, ed. S a k a k i, Japan.
MVt 2 Mahāvyutpatti, ed. M i n a e f f, BB.
MVu Mahāvastu, ed. E. S e n a r t, Paris, 1882-97.
N Nāgār j u n a.

ABBREVIATIONS

NAT Nyāyāṃśataraṅgini of Rāmācārya, ed. T. R. K r i s h n a c h a r y a, Nīrṇayaśāgara.
NK Nyāyakanda on Praśastapādabhāṣya, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, No. 6, 1895.
NPTU Nīṣīṁhapūrva-tāpani Upaniṣad.
NPU Nāradaparivājaka Upaniṣad.
NS Nyāyasūtra.
NSi Naiṣkarmyasiddhi with Candrikā, ed. G. A. J ac ob, Bombay, 1891.
NST Nirupamastotra in Two Hymns of Catuhausta of Nāgārjuna, ed. G. T u c c i, JRAS, 1932, pp. 309 ff.
Nt Nirukta of Yāsaka.
NUTU Nīṣīṁhatatāpani Upaniṣad.
P P u r u ṣ o t t a m a.
Pāṇi Pāṇīnī.
PAS Prajñāparamitāsthānagraha of Diānāga as quoted by O b e r m i l l e r in his paper The Doctrine of Prajñāparamitā, Reprint from Acta Orientalia, Vol. XI.
PB Praśastapādabhāṣya, ed. V. D v i d e d i n, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, No. 6, Benares, 1895.
PD Pāñcadaśī of Vidyāraṇya.
PO Poona Orientalist.
PP Padma Purāṇa.
PS Paramārthasāra, of Ādiṣeṣa, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, No. XII, 1911.

TAK  Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, No. XXX.

TG  Theragāthā, PTS.

TJ  Tarkajvala, See MHKV.

Tk  Trimsīkā of Vasu Bandhu, ed. Sylvain Lévi in the Vijñaptimātrasiddhi, Paris, 1925.

TM  Tattvamuktakalapa and Sarvārthasiddhi of Venkatānatha Desika with the Anandadāyini and the Bhāvaprakāśa, Bibliotheca Sanscritica, Mysore, 1933, 1940.

TP  Tattvaprakāśa, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, 1926.

TS  Tattvasamgraha of Sāntirakṣita, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Nos. XXX and XXXI, 1926.

TSN  Trisvabhavānirdesa of Vasubandhu, ed. Sujitkumar Mukhopadhyaya, Visvabharati, 1939.

TSP  Tattvasamgrahapāñjikā of Kamalaśīla, See TS.

TTU  Tripurātāpani Upaniṣad.

TU  Taittirīya Upaniṣad.

ABBREVIATIONS

TV  Tantravārttika of Kumārila as printed with the Śabarabhāṣya on the MD, Anandaśram Series.

U or UP  Upaniṣad.

UC  Uttaracarita of Bhavabhūti.

US  Upadeśasahasri.

VāP  Vāyu Purāṇa.

Vbh  Viśvāṃśa, PTS.

Vc or Vch  Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā, ed. Max Müller, Anecdota Oxoniensia, 1881.


ViP  Viṣṇu Purāṇa.


ViV  Vigrāhavyavartani, ed. K. P. Jayswal and Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, JBORS, XXIII.

Vk  Vimśatikā of Vasubandhu. See Tk.

VM  Visuddhamagga, PTS.


VS  Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā.

VSN  Viśnusahasranāma, Bibliotheca Sanskritica, Mysore, No. 19.

VSt  Vaiśeṣika Sūtra.
INTRODUCTION

§ 1. The Māndūkya Upaniṣad and its Extent

What work or works are we to understand by the name of MāU? And what is its real extent?

It is generally believed that the MāU comprises only the twelve prose passages beginning with “om ity etad akṣaram” and ending with “ātmānām ya evam veda” (see pp. 223-25). It is also assumed that the kārikās of Gauḍapāda are mere explanation of these passages. These two works are thus separate, though related to each other very closely as text and commentary.

But this is not admitted on all hands. Some hold that the Upaniṣad is composed not only of the twelve prose passages referred to above, but also of the kārikās, twenty-nine in all, attributed to Gauḍapāda, as contained in Book I. Thus according to them those prose passages and the kārikās in Book I are regarded as Upaniṣad of śruti. This view seems to have partly

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1 Of these passages the first seven are found with slight variations in some cases also in NPTU, IV, 1-2; NUTU, II; and RUTU, 5.
2 In 1925 I had an occasion to write (IHQ, Vol. I, pp. 119ff.) with regard to the present subject that this view was at least as old as Madhva ārya (1199-1274 A.D.), the great champion of the Dvaita school of the Vedānta philosophy. For, according to him and his followers, such as Vyāsa-tīrtha and Śrīvāsa, both the prose passages and the kārikās referred to are handed down by Varaṇa in the form of a māndūka 'trog' (see the commentary on the MāU by Madhva ārya with Śrī-
been subscribed to by Śaṅkara, the commentator of MāU, who says in the introduction to his commentary

\[\text{nīvāśīya, Kumbhakonam, pp. 2-3.}\] In support of it Madhvacārya quotes the following two passages from the PP and HV respectively:

(i) dhyāyaṁ nāśyaṁ devaṁ prāpvena samāhitaṁ [madhyākaśsūpi vāruṇaṁ tūṣyaṁ harim avyayam]  
(ii) iti madhyākaśsūpi sanātanā vāruṇaṁ śūrīn [These lines are not found, so far as I know, in printed editions of the works.]

Here Madhvacārya writes (ibid., p. 2): madhyākaśsūpi vāruṇaṁ catūśpāṇaṁ nāśyaṁ 'tra stūyaṁ. He regards the kārikās as mantras which are said to have been venerated by Brahmān, the creator. On this he quotes the following couplet not yet traced in the same work (p. 8):

brahmānān ito maṇḍūkya maṇḍūkyaṁ saṁśāvatāṁ 
atra dūkā bhavantī cakśārṇam pūrṇaḥ pūrṇaḥ

Vāsātirtha's tīkā, too, introduces the kārikās under mantras.

The commentator of NFTU, who is known by the name of Śaṅkara-cačārya and identical with the author of the Prapācīṣāstra, a Tantric work (see my paper, Śaṅkara's Commentaries on the Upāṇīṣads, in Sāturās Māketīs Śiśu Śaṁye Volumes, Orientalia, 2, pp. 101 ff. and against Raghuvāra Ṭīṭhīrulal Śaṁstī: Proceedings and Transactions, Fifth Indian Oriental Conference, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 691 ff.; as well as T. R. Chintāmani: Proceedings and Transactions, Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924, pp. 419 ff.) is also of the same opinion, though he does not give particulars as to whether the tīkā on the Upāṇīṣad is Vāraṇa or whether the kārikās are seen by Brahmān, the creator. Kārṇārāyaṇa, another commentator of MāU belonging to the Rāmānua school of the Vedānta maintains the same view taking the kārikās in Book I as mantras, which, in his opinion, too, together with the prose passages from the original Upāṇīṣad. Appaṇya Dīkṣīta is a person different from the celebrated author of the Śīdaṇḍaṭalai who is a commentator of the one hundred and eight Upāṇīṣads, seems to subscribe to the same views, for his commentary on the Upāṇīṣad extends only up to the prose passages and the kārikās of Book I. See the Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Adyar Library, Vol. I, Upāṇīṣads, pp. 116, 287-8.

After what I wrote as above in 1925, so far as my information goes, it was B. N. Kṛiṣṇaṁurti Śarma who in 1931 took up the case in right earnest and advocated it very strongly. His first paper (New Light on the Gaudapāda-kārikās) appeared in RFR, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 35 ff. He wanted

on it that the first of the four sections (prakaraṇa-catūṣṭāya) of the Agamaśāstra begins with "om ity etad akṣaram" (MāU, I), though the question as to whether that particular section or all the sections are regarded as śūrī or not is not raised by him. Leaving aside what is said by this Śaṅkara whose identity with the great author of the commentary on the Brahmaṇḍas is doubtful,3 it appears plausible that the view under discussion dates back at least from the time of Rāmānuja (1055-1137 A.D.), as he seems to quote in his commentary on BS, I. 1. 1, a kārikā of Gaudapāda (I. 16) as śūrī.

mainly to show that Madhvacārya cannot rightly be accused of holding the view that the kārikās in Book I are regarded as śūrī, and form a part of the original MāU. In doing so he tried to demonstrate that teachers "of the three schools of Vedānta, such as Śaṅkara, Ananda-giri, Madhusūdana, Brahmaṇanda, Kāraṇārāyaṇa, Mahācārya, Madhuva, Jayatirtha, Vāsātirtha, Kārman, Rāmācārya, etc.," are of the same opinion. In the same journal (RFR, 1932, Vol. III, No. 1; 1933, Vol. IV, No. 2) he wrote two papers more on the same subject. His writings gave rise to an interesting and long controversy in which took part some scholars, such as Y. Subrahmanya Sharma (RFR, 1933, Vol. IV, No. 3), and A. Venkata Subbiah (PO, 1936, Vol. I. Nos. 1-2), B. N. Kriṣṇanurtti's rejoinder being given in PO, 1936, Vol. I, No. 2, and 1937, Vol. II, No. 1. Besides, A. Venkata Subbiah wrote in IA, 1933, pp. 181 ff. an independent paper entitled The Madhyākaṇupāṇīṣad and Gaudapāda which deserves to be mentioned in this connection.

3 Those who think that the two Śaṅkaras, the author of the Satkābhāṣya on BS and the author of the commentary on AS, are one and the same should consider in the latter not only the distinction of māngalacarana, the inferior quality of composition of the slokas, the defect of metre (Ananda-giri's explanation can hardly be accepted), and the grammatical mistakes, but also the explanation offered of such kārikās as I. 10, II. 37, III. 25, and IV. 83 as to whether it is possible for the former. Cf. here his explanation of the words bhūta and abhūta in III. 23 with that in IV. 3: of semkhit in III. 25 with that of IU. 12. See note 2.

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He writes: jivasyaiva hi nirodhah śrūyate\(^{5}\) anādīmāyayā supto yada jivāḥ prabudhyata (I. 16) iti ca. By the word śrūyate evidently he regards the line as śruti.

B. N. Kṛishnamurti Sarma thinks that the above date is to be pushed back to the time of Sūresvara, the author of the BBV or even that of Śaṅkara, the author of the Śārīrakabāśyā on BS. But in spite of what he has said in support of the view one can hardly accept it when the statements made by the above two teachers themselves are taken into consideration. Sūresvara quotes ĀŚ, I. 11 (kāryakāraṇā\(^{1}\)) in his NSi, IV. 41, and tells us (Op. cit., IV. 44) that it is said by the revered Gauḍās.\(^{1}\) The word Gauḍa here refers to Gauḍapāda. As regards Śaṅkara, he, too, quotes in his commentary on BS, II. 1. 9, a kārīkā of Gauḍapāda (anādīmāyayā\(^{5}\), I. 16), and says it is a saying of those teachers who know the tradition of the Vedānta,\(^{5}\) just as said by him in another case (BS, I. 4. 14) with regard to another kārīkā of Gauḍapāda (mīloha\(^{6}\), III. 15).\(^{6}\) Here Sūresvara and Śaṅkara say in the clearest possible language that the kārīkās referred to above are by revered teachers.\(^{7}\) Hence, according to them, they are not śruti.

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\(^{1}\) evam gauḍā vijñānti na pūjyair ayaṃ astabhaḥ prabhāṭṣañ. This line, as in the printed text is metrically defective. The word ayaṃ seems to be omitted here.

\(^{5}\) atroktam vedāntasampradāyavidhir śācaryaiḥ.

\(^{6}\) tathā ca sampradāya vidhi vādantai.

\(^{7}\) For detailed discussion of this question readers are referred to the scholars and their papers mentioned in note 2 of this section.

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\(^{8}\) See RPR, 1933, Vol. IV, No. 2. It is interesting to note here that sometimes the kārīkās of Book I of GK is referred to as Gauḍapādyokta śruti (LC, p. 580), and Maṇḍukyaśāasanastava Gauḍapādyoktaśāstra (NAT, p. 123b). The reader may think over here as to how these two words are used here loosely.
BS, there were some authoritative teachers according to whom the kārikās of Book I of the GK were regarded as śruti and as such they formed a part of the MaU.

Speaking generally our old teachers were śraddhādeva, 'trustful,' to use the word of the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa (I. 1. 4. 15), with regard to the authenticity of our sacred or Sanskrit texts. Any work dealing with Upaniṣadic matter would readily be accepted by them as Upaniṣad.9 Remember the number of Upaniṣads and their language, subject matter and the way of treatment therein. Are they all Upaniṣads, though they are called so? The Bhagavadgītā is not an Upaniṣad in fact, yet, it bears the name. We all know its colophon in which occurs the following: iti śrīmadbhagavadgītāsu upaniṣatstu. And it is so only owing to the fact that it is like an Upaniṣad. The practice of taking what is actually not an Upaniṣad as an Upaniṣad appears to have been in existence from the times of Pāṇini, as says Satyavratā Sāmaśramin in his Trayīparicaya, Calcutta, 1893, p. 69. From his work (I. 4. 79)10 we may gather a word, upaniṣathītya, which means 'having made like an Upaniṣad.' Does it not lead us to conclude as above? But grammarians differ here on the meaning of the word Upaniṣad, according to some it being tatvajñāna, the 'knowledge of reality,' while to others, rahasya, a 'secret' or 'secret doctrine.' Let us take here the case of Purāṇas. A Purāṇa is said to have 'five characteristics' (purāṇam paṇicalakṣanān). But there are Purāṇas which are, in fact, not so, though they are known to us under the same name. Similar is the case with regard to Upaniṣads and other works. It may be noted here in this connexion that it is not only the Book I of GK but also the remaining three Books of it which are sometimes held to be Upaniṣads, as Advaitaparākaraṇa Up., Alataśāntiparākaraṇa Up., etc.11

We have seen above that according to some authorities including specially Madhvācārya only Book I of GK is śruti, and the last three books are not so, and as such they do not form any part of MaU, as does Book I. In other words, they form a separate work or works with which the former has no connexion. If it is not so, it will be very difficult to explain as to why the last three books are not commented upon by those teachers. Why have they explained only the Book I? It cannot be said that these last three books were not known to them or in their time, as their existence before them can very satisfactorily be proved by the very simple fact that the great Saṅkarā who flourished long before them has quoted in his commentary on BS, I. 4. 14, a kārikā (III. 15) from one of those three Books.

The fact that they did not comment upon the last three books can be explained in two ways. First, it might have been their honest belief that those three books had no connexion whatsoever with the MaU which, according to them, comprised only the twelve prose passages

9 See Saṅkara on BG. II. 19 and 20 where he uses the words and mantra referring to the above two stanzas.
10 jāvikopaniṣadāv aṣupamye.
and the twenty-nine kārikās of Book I of GK. Secondly, it might be said that they could not explain them, for the dominant thoughts therein, viz., Advaïtavāda ‘absolute monism’ and Vijñānavāda ‘idealism’ would go against their own views, viz., Dvaitavāda ‘dualism’ or Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda ‘qualified monism.’ The first answer seems to be more reasonable than the second, for had they known that the last three Books, too, were really included in or connected with the original Upaniṣad they would have undoubtedy explained them, as is done by Puruṣottama, the grandson of Vallabha cārya, the great teacher of the Śūdrādvaita ‘pure monism’ school of the Vedānta.

§ 2. The Relationship between the Prose Passages and the Kārikās in Book I

As Madhva cārya says, the twelve prose passages of the Upaniṣad are divided into four parts.\

1 I have seen the commentary only on the first two Books as edited by Bhata Ramānātha Sāstrī and published from Puṣṭārka-Kāryāla, Bombay, Vikrama 1980. That Puruṣottama wrote or intended to write his commentary also on Book III (Advaita Prakarana) is known from his own words (adonātākhyānī cāraṇāya), p. 55. It seems that he commented or intended to do so also on the last Book.

2 It is known from the Tibetan sources that in about the first half of the eight century A.D. the GK was regarded as an Upaniṣat śāstra (gan.bhih.bstan, bca.). For Kamalasālī, a disciple of Sāntika, and the author of the Patijka of his MAK quotes some kārikās from Books II and III of our work which he calls Upaniṣat śāstra. It is to be noted that Kamalasālī’s remark cannot be considered with reference only to the above two Books.

MaU with Śrīnivāsaṇātyi, p. 8.

3 Part I, passages 1-6; Part II, passages 7; Part III, passages 8-11; and Part IV, passage 12.

§2] INTRODUCTION

Just after each of them there is a line: atraśi śloka bhavanti ‘here are these ślokas.’ These introductory lines when compared with similar sentences in different Upaniṣads will show that the ślokas are quoted there only to support what has been stated before. And we have already seen that Madhva cārya and others, specially the former, say the very thing quite clearly. Thus it follows from it that the ślokas or kārikās were already in existence and the prose passages came into being afterwards.

This will be confirmed if we compare the contents of the prose passages with those of the corresponding kārikās. The comparison will further show that it is the kārikās on which the prose passages are based and not vice versa.

Supposing that the kārikās are explanations of the Upaniṣad, i.e., of the twelve prose passages which are generally held to be so, one may naturally expect to see the difficult points in the latter explained in the former. And it also goes without saying that an exposition may add something new to what is said in the original, but it does not or should not omit the most important and difficult words or points in it. If these facts are borne in mind, it will be evident that it is the kārikās that should be regarded as the earlier work, and not the prose passages.

3 See BU, IV, 3, 11, 4, 8: tadd eka śloka bhavati; Op. cit., II 2, 3, IV, 4, 6, 7: tadd eka śloka bhavati; ChU, II, 21, 3, III, 11, 4: tadd eka śloka; TU, II, 1, 2, 1, etc.: tadd eka śloka bhavati; ChU, III, 12, 5: tadd etad rābhvyaktaḥ.
According to the general view, kārikās 1-5 are to be taken as the exposition of the prose passages 3-5.\(^1\) Now the words *saptāṅga* ‘with seven limbs,’ and *ekonavimsāttimukha* ‘with nineteen mouths’ in the passages 3 and 4 are the most difficult and they are explained differently by different commentators\(^2\); but not even the slightest mention of them is made in the kārikās. Why should the kārikās which are supposed to have been written in order to explain the text, i.e., the prose passages, omit these two important words?

Again, in the prose passages 3 and 9 we have the word *vaiśvānara* and not *viśva*, while in the kārikās (I. 1-4, 19, 23) there is only *viśva* and never *vaiśvānara*. Why is this discrepancy? A commentator is to explain what is actually found in the text, he is not allowed to take the liberty of changing it. Nor are the two words *vaiśvānara* and *viśva* identical or synonymous. It is difficult to account for this alteration. That it is owing to the exigency of metre is an absurd hypothesis.\(^3\)

In this connexion, there are three words more, viz., *jāgaritasthāna*, *svapna*\(^4\), and *sūpta*\(^5\) in the prose passages 3, 4 and 5 respectively. But they are entirely omitted in the kārikās. But why? It cannot be explained away by simply saying that they are not so important or difficult as to require any explanation; for, in order to understand the main thought of the passages the importance of these three stages, *viz.*, wakefulness, dream, and deep sleep, can in no way be ignored.

The fact is that the kārikās are older, and from them, as well as from some older Upaniṣads, the MaU, i.e., the prose passages to which that name is usually given is compiled or made,\(^6\) and in doing so some of the thoughts of these kārikās and of some older Upaniṣads are here in the prose passages simplified, modified or explained adding something new. Thus, it appears, in the present case, the author of the prose passages having found the word *viśva* in its special sense nowhere in the Upaniṣads\(^7\) seems to have substituted for it *vaiśvānara* which is used in such old Upaniṣads as ChU (V. 11, 12) and BU (V. 9, 1).\(^8\) Now the author of NUTU, I where the entire MaU is quoted with some slight variants,\(^9\) seeing both the words *viśva* in the kārikās and *vaiśvānara*\(^10\) in the older Upaniṣads, has adopted both of them\(^11\) and simplified the text to some extent.\(^12\) As to why these two terms are taken together in NUTU and what is

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\(^1\) It is to be noted that the first two passages have nothing in the kārikās as we have them before us.

\(^2\) See § here and on NPTU, IV; Mādhva, KN, and P on the passages: *Vidyāśraya* on NUTU, I; and *Nārāyanā* on RUTU, 3.

\(^3\) Note there is *prajñānaphana* in the prose passage 5, for which we have *phaneprējina* in kārikā I.

\(^4\) See pp. 223 ff., and *Dasu* : *Upaniṣads des Veda*, p. 574.

\(^5\) Excepting perhaps MU, VI, 7 which is not so old.

\(^6\) On the greatness of Vaiśṭāvāna see RV, I. 59. 6; 98. 1; Nr, VII. 21.23; BS, I. 2. 32.

\(^7\) The MaU is almost entirely found also in NPTU, I.

\(^8\) For a different view of Viśva-Vaiśvānara, Taittir and Prajīta *et al* Tāvā and Prajīta, Hiraṇyagaskha and Taittir, and Vaiśvānara and Taittir in PD, I, 16-29.

\(^9\) Shubhakshak caturātma viśva vaiśvānaraḥ prathamah pādah.

\(^10\) This is also with NPTU, I. For example, *saṅkṣaṇa* is substituted here for *pravīśkaṇa* in the kārikās. Here *saṅkṣaṇa* is undoubtedly simpler than *pravīśkaṇa*. For details the reader is referred to that Up.

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their special significance is clearly shown by Viśdya-raṇya in his tīkā on it and in PD I. 28.29. See also VeS, § 17.

Similarly the three states, jāgarita, svapna, and susupta in the prose passages (3-4) are later additions from BU, or ChU, or both for a clear exposition of the terms bahisprajña, antahprajña, and ghanaprajña in kārikā I.

That the MāU (i.e., the prose passages) has drawn upon the kārikās and some other Upaniṣads can be gathered from the comparison of both the texts. In the kārikās we have simply ghanaprajña (1) and ānandabhuj (3) or ānanda (4), while the prose passage (5) reads as follows (see p. 224):

yatra supto na kaṇcana kāmāṁ kāmayate na kaṇcana svapnaṁ paśyati (BU, IV. 3. 9) tat susuptam. susuptasthāna ekbhūtāḥ prajñānaghaṇa (BU, IV. 5. 13) evānandamayo (TU, II. 5. 1) hy ānandabhuk cetumukhāḥ prajñās tṛtyāḥ pādāḥ.

Which of these two, the kārikā and the prose passage, is the original, and which is the exposition, may now easily be ascertained.

The word ghanaprajña in the kārikā is no doubt, identical with prajñānaghaṇa in a somewhat different form, and to explain it the prose passage has introduced the word ekbhūta found, in fact, in the form of ekabhavati in different Upaniṣads.\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\) Cf. ekabhavati, BU, 6. IV. 4. 2 (seven times). See PU IV. 2 (twice); NPTU, IV. 1; NUTU, 1.

\(^{16}\) See note 14.

[52] Introduction

The kārikā I. 19 runs thus:

viśvasyaṭvavivakṣāyam ādisāmānyam utkataṁ |
mātrāsaṁpratipattau syād āptisāmānyam eva ca ||

And the corresponding prose passage (9) is this:

jāgaritasthāno vaiśvānaro 'karaḥ prathamā mātrāpter ādimattvād vā. āpotīti ha vai sarvān kāmān ādīś ca bhavati ya eva veda.

It means that Vaiśvānara whose sphere is the waking state is the first mārā 'measure,' the letter a, on account of obtaining (or pervasiveness) or on account of its being the first (āptā ādimattvād vā). One who knows thus obtains one's all desires and becomes first of all.

Now, if these two texts are compared it will at once be clear that the second is merely the exposition of the first with a tinge of the language used in the Brahmaṇa.

Here is one point more. In the first text the reason is advanced as to why Viśva (=Vaiśvānara of the second text) is to be regarded as the letter a. And the reason is samaṇya 'similarity'—similarity between Viśva and the letter a. And this similarity is 'beginning' (ādi) or 'obtaining' or 'pervasiveness' (āpti). Now, according to the order of Viśva, Taijasā and Prājñā, Viśva is at the beginning or first (ādi); just so is at the beginning or first the letter a of a, u and m of which Om is composed. Owing to this similarity Viśva is said to be identical with the letter a. The second similarity is āpti which by Saṅkara is thus explained: As Viśva pervades all the visible world, so does the letter a all the speech. On account
of this similarity, too, Viśva is to be regarded as the letter a. The second text, however, gives a somewhat different explanation of this identity of Viśva and a. For, while the first text says that owing to both the similarities of ādi and āpti they are identical, the second text clearly says that it is owing to either of them (āpti ādīmattpad vā). All these seem to be later developments.

The case is exactly the same with kārikās 1. 20, 21 and the corresponding prose passages 10 and 11 of the Upaniṣad, to which the reader is referred.

There is one thing more to be noted with regard to the kārikā 1. 21 and the corresponding prose passage 11 of the Upaniṣad. In the former one of the two similarities is māna ‘measure’ from √mā ‘to measure’ while in the latter the word is not māna, but mīti ‘measure’ from √mī. Similarly, while in the former we have āpīti ‘disappearance’ from āpi-√i, in the latter there is laya ‘disappearance.’ There is, however, no difference of meaning, as shown, in the two cases. Yet, how far such divergency between an original text and its explanation in Sanskrit can be accounted for is to be considered seriously.

The conception of ātman as having four fourths or quarters (catuspād) is not so explicit in the words of kārikās¹⁷ as in those of the Upaniṣad, 2. This idea is, however, fully developed in the Upaniṣad 2 from the very beginning. This fact also goes to show the priority of the kārikās.

The distinction between Turya or Turiya ‘fourth’ and the other three, viz., Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña, as made in the kārikās (l. 10-15), has nothing corresponding in the Upaniṣad, but the nature of Turya, which is expressed in a kārikā (l. 29) simply by two words, śiva ‘blissful’ and dvaita-upaśama ‘cessation of duality’ is thus elaborated in two passages, 7 and 12, of the Upaniṣad:

(i) nāntahprajñānaṁ na bahiṣprajñānaṁ nabhayataḥprajñānaṁ na prajñānāgahanaṁ na prajñānaṁ nāprajñānaṁ adhistām avyavahāryam agrāhyam alakṣanam acintyam avyapadesyam ekātmāpratyayasyaṁ prapañcāpāsaṁ saṁtamaṁ śivam advaitaṁ caturthaṁ manyante. sa ātma sa viññeyah.

(ii) amātraṁ caturtho vyavahāryaḥ prapañcāpāsaṁ saṁīva dvaita evam onkāra ātmāva. saṁviśatya ātmānātmānam¹⁸ ya evam veda.

These two passages are mere amplification or exposition of what is briefly said in the kārikā, l. 29, and consequently appear to be later developments, as shows also the language used here.

Again, it is to be noted that though in the Upaniṣad (1) Brahman or Ātman is said to have four quarters (catuspād) which are explained there later on (3-6), there is no express mention of them in the kārikās which are supposed to be an explanatory work.

¹⁶ One may, however, say that the word sā in the text may be taken in the sense of ca or api. But Saṅkara or Saṅkarānanda does not say so.

¹⁷ See l. 10-15 (where the fourth state is described), 24, and 29 (where Oṅkāra is described with or without mātra).

¹⁸ See VS, XXXII. 11: ātmānātmānam abhisamāvete.
INTRODUCTION

Compare the kārikā l. 24 with the prose passage 8 of the Upaniṣad and it will be found that the former is explained in the latter in some detail and not vice versa.

The kārikā (l. 6) opening the discussion about the origin (prabhava) of all things may be connected with the last part of the passage 6 of the Upaniṣad: prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām. Here prabhava is described in the kārikās l. 6-9 at some length, but apyaya ‘disappearance’ is not even touched in the kārikās. This would hardly be possible if the kārikās were meant to explain the Upaniṣad.

All these considerations lead me to conclude as follows:

(i) The kārikās in Book I are not the exposition (vyākhyāna) of the MaU.

(ii) The MaU is mainly based on the kārikās, and not vice versa.

(iii) And as such the MaU is later than the kārikās.

Here we must remember what Madhavacārya has said on the point. Serious charges may be and have been brought against him saying ‘that he is addicted to the fabrication of evidence and that he very frequently cites passages from books which do not and

\[\text{\textsuperscript{22}}\text{ See RPR, Vol. II, p. 51.}\\\text{\textsuperscript{23}}\text{ This view was originally expressed by me long ago in IHQ, 1925, Vol. I, pp. 119-125, 295-302. Against this see S. K. Belvalkar’s observation in his Vedānta Philosophy (Sriekopāla Ram Malik Lecture), Part I, pp. 192-193. But I do not think that the modification of my opinion is necessary.}\\\text{\textsuperscript{24}}\text{ A. Venkataramahī 1A, 1933, p. 189.}\\\text{\textsuperscript{25}}\text{ It is taken from KU, II, 2.}\\\text{\textsuperscript{26}}\text{ It has drawn much also upon some older Upaniṣads as will be seen from the text printed herewith, pp. 223 ff.}\\\text{\textsuperscript{27}}\text{ See Max Walliser: Der älter Vedanta, p. 5. He says that the kārikās do not show that the Upaniṣad was before them.}\\\text{\textsuperscript{28}}\text{ Or Appaya Dikṣita in his Madhvamatavidhvamsana may give a list of such books, or may say of him:}\\\text{\textsuperscript{29}}\text{ tathāpyā anandatirthiyam matam agrāhyam eva naḥ |}\\\text{\textsuperscript{30}}\text{ yatra vaidikamaryādā bhūyasy ākulatatām gataḥ }\]

Or, again, most of the authorities cited by him in his commentary on the MaU may not be traced; or one may or may not attach any value to the myth he has given us that Varuṇa having assumed the form of a frog received the mantras, i.e., the kārikās originally visioned by Brahman, the creator; yet, in the present case, we have to accept, as we have shown above, his view that the mantras or kārikās are older and on them is based our MaU.

§ 3. The Inter-relationship of the Four Books of the Āgamaśāstra

It is generally held that the Āgamaśāstra has four prakaranas or Books, viz., Āgama-prakarana, Vaitāthya\(^1\), Advaita\(^2\), and Alātāṣṭāni.\(^3\) Here arise the following questions: Are these Books, in fact, four parts of the same work, or are they four independent treatises compiled in one volume? Again, is it that
while one or more of the Books form a work, the remaining one or ones constitute another work?

Śaṅkara, the commentator, with his followers, holds that the four Books are the different parts of the same work entitled Āgamaśāstra. And so, in order to show their mutual connexion first with reference to Books I and II, he writes just at the beginning of his commentary on Book II: "When the Reality is known there is no duality"—This is already said (I. 18d), and it is supported by such śrutis as 'There is only one without a second (ChaU, VI. 2. 1). This is, however, only a statement of scripture (āgamaṁātra). With a view to showing that the unreality of duality can be established also by reasoning (upapatti) Book II is begun with the words 'vaitathyam,' etc.'

Now, as regards the relationship between Books II and III Ś observes (III. 1): "The determination of

\[1 \text{Ś could easily refer here also to I. 16, 17 and 29. Moreover, in the manner which he has adopted in showing the relationship between the first two Books the following might also be added in his favour, as in his opinion the Āgamaṇḍakaraṇa begins with 'Om ity etad ākaram ity ādī,' in other words, it includes the MaU. We read in the concluding kārikā (29) of Book I: dvaityasatyopadānāṁ śivaḥ, which is in fact the same as prapañcācāpātāmaṇā śaṁtam śivaṁ and prapañcācāpātāmaṇā 'dvaityaṁ of the MaU, 7 and 12 respectively. This very thing is re-assured in Book II, 35 by a phrase which is exactly the same in sense as the above, i.e., prapañcācāpātāmaṇā 'dvaityaṁ. Again, in I. 10 we have advaitaṁ sarvabhāvānāṁ, and the same thing in one or other form is seen in many places in Book II: tasmād advayāt śiva (II. 33); advaita yojayet smṛtīm (II. 36), advaitaṁ samanupajjāya (II. 36). Cf. here also advaitaṁ paramārtho hi (III. 18). And this truth is established there (II. 16 ff.) by strong reasons showing the unreality (vaitathyam) of all things as in dream. Thus does it not show that these two Books are closely connected with each other?

\[5 \text{Where is it in Book II?}

\[3 \text{II. 7.}

\[4 \text{advaitaṁ kitāmanātāraṇa pratipattayaṁ śhovit tākeśīpi.}

\[5 \text{In fact, it is not 'at the end' (ante), nor is it in any of the original kārikās. It is the commentator's own observation. See the commentary on II. 7.}
account of their mutual contradiction. As there is no place of evil passions in it; the view of non-duality is the right view, and as such it is praised. Now, here (in Book IV) having shown in details that their views are not right being mutually contradictory they are to be thrown away, and by doing so the establishment of the view of non-duality is to be concluded by the method of inference called avila\(^6\) ‘negative.’ For this, (the Book called) ‘The Cessation of the Fire-brand’ is begun.’

Let us now examine the above statement of §. By his observation regarding the connexion between Books I and II, he wants to mean that though it is said in Book I that there is no duality, yet, it is merely an expression of āgama, no reason being offered there in its favour. And so in order to support it by reasons Book II is written. But is it really so? Is it that there is no reasoning at all in Book I? None can give the answer in the affirmative. Certainly various reasons are advanced in Book II, but it cannot be said that Book I is altogether conspicuous by their absence. For, they are to be clearly found in kārikās 16-18, though not to that extent as in Book II. Here arises a question: If the connexion between Books I and II is really as it is shown by § to be, then why is it that the author of Book II himself does not say so just at its beginning, though he could do so easily? But instead of doing this he begins it without any reference to Book I, only alluding to the opinion of the wise that all things in dream are unreal. He could also write here that the determination of Om is through the realization of non-duality which depends on the unreality of external things, which is dealt with in Book II. But he has not done so.

Let us consider here another point. We have already seen that in accordance with some teachers such as Madhavaśārya, the MāU is composed of the twelve prose passages and the twenty-nine kārikās in Book I. It is quite clear from it that, in their opinion, the work is a complete whole having no connexion with any of the remaining three Books of the ĀŚ. This view seems to be confirmed by the fact that its subject matter, i.e., the determination of Om, is here dealt with completely, as one can easily understand from the last two kārikās of Book I, after reading which one does not feel that anything more remains to be further discussed and elucidated; and, in fact, we see nothing directly of Om in the following Book or Books. Thus it follows that the treatise consisting of the kārikās of Book I has no relationship to any of the Books that follow. It is also to be noted here that the views of the teachers referred to above cannot be ignored altogether.

Further, if Book II is a continuation of Book I, it could be expected that the former should somehow or other presuppose the latter. But does it do so? If so, where? Moreover, what does one lose if one takes Book II as an independent work on the advaita Vedānta? Does one find in reading this Book in that light anything improper, non-sensical or unintelligible without assuming

\(^6\) Ānandaśārya unnecessarily takes it as ādīta saying that ādīta is nothing but avila.
its connexion with Book I? Or does one really feel that without Book I it appears to be incomplete? That it is complete in itself will be clear if we attentively read at least the concluding portion of it, i.e., kārikās 35-38.

Now with regard to the connexion between Books II and III let us remember what S says. His words, put briefly, would amount to this that non-duality can be understood not only by āgama, but by reasoning (tarka) as well. Consequently to exhibit the reasoning Book III is required. If that is so, we shall have to accept that according to S the object of both the Books II and III is one and the same, i.e., giving the arguments for non-duality. In that case, why should there be two separate Books instead of one in which all could be included? This leads one to think of a different object for which Book III must have been written. And what this object was will be clear if one examines the contents with some amount of care. Here at the beginning (III. 1-2) the author tells us about ‘non-originating’ (ajāti) and having established it concludes in the end (III. 48) that it is the highest truth (uttama satya). In doing so he discusses the Vedānta, and in that connexion the absence of difference between Jiva and Brahman. He treats also of a samādhi ‘intense abstract concentration’ called asparśayoga meant for the realization of the Truth.

It is not that there is no mention of non-duality in this

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8 Book III. 18: advaitam paramārthah hi. See Book I. 17: advaitam paramārthah.
9 See III. 17.
10 Com. on IV. 1: tad iha vistaraṇa anyonyaviruddhayaḥ asamyagdarianatvam pradaitya, tatpratijetah advaitadarśanasaiddhir uparaṣṭhavasyāḥ.
the first place, though only their mutual contradiction is simply referred to; no detail of it is to be found. There is no allusion to Vaināśikas in this Book. But if by that word the Buddhists are meant, no mutual contradiction with the Dvaitins, (or among themselves,) is to be found of their views. On the contrary, the author of the ĀS has accepted or approved of them throughout the Book as the present writer has attempted to show. How is it then that in accordance with Ś, one can expect to understand from this Book that the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas are wrong and the view of non-duality is right? Thus one can hardly connect in this way the present Book with the preceding one or ones. We should also remember here the questions that have already been put in discussing the relationship between Books I and II. See p. lii.

Is there then no relationship of any kind between Books IV and others? How can it be so? Certainly there is a relationship and it is rather a close one, as the following lines will show. A careful reader will see that a large number of expressions in various forms in the first three Books are literally quoted or alluded to in Book IV. And it will be noticed that some matters dealt with in the former are done so again in the latter. For instance, I. 16 = III. 36⁵ = IV. 81¹; II. 6-7 = IV. 31-32¹¹; (cf. II. 1, 4 with IV. 33, and II. 2 with IV. 34¹³); III. 20-22 = IV. 6-8¹⁵; III. 29-30

= IV. 61-62¹¹; III. 48 = IV. 71. Besides, such expressions or topics as the following are to be found in more than one Book: jneyābhinna jñāna, the knowledge is not different from the knowable is in III. 33 and IV. 1; ajñātivāda, the theory of non-origination in II. 2 ff and IV. 3 ff. Such being the case it must be accepted that Book IV is rather closely related to other Books.

But this relationship is not such as between a work and its different chapters on the following grounds:

With reference to later Sanskrit works it is a well-known practice that their commencement is with a maṅgalācarana, prayer for success, which includes a nāmakāra, paying homage, to one for whom the authors have regard. Now, as we have at the very beginning of Book IV a kārīkā embodying maṅgalācarana, it naturally induces one to think that it is not a chapter of any work, but itself an independent work.

It is, however, true that maṅgalācarana is found not only at the commencement of a work, but also in other places of it, as in the case of the Nyāya-kāndali of Śrīdhara on the Praśastapādabhāṣya, or of the Saṅjīvanī of Mallinātha on the Raghuvamśa. But it is to be noted here that in such cases it is done in each of the chapters, and not in any particular one, whereas in the present case, here in ĀŚ we have it

¹¹ See III. 2, 48; IV. 4, 5.
¹³ The second half is, however, identical.
¹⁵ Here is a slight variation, and it is that for the word bhava in the former there is dharma in the latter with regard to the first and the last kārīkās.
only in Book IV, so far as the extant editions and the MSS that are examined can show.\(^{15}\) Here we may remember a Buddhist work, viz., the Pañjikā of Prajñākaratmi on the Bodhicaryāvatāra. It consists of nine chapters. Here the māngalacarana is only in the first\(^{16}\) and the last chapters, and not in others. Evidently the māngalacarana at the beginning of its chapter IX does not mean to say that it is an independent work. Considering the contents of this chapter of both the Bodhicaryāvatāra and its Pañjikā, which deal with praṇāpāramitā, it appears to me that the only thing that can be said is this that the māngalacarana of the Pañjikā simply suggests a special importance of both the works, the Pañjikā and the BA. Thus the māngalacarana of Book IV cannot conclusively show that it is an independent work and not the continuation of the preceding ones. But here is a thing which should not be left unnoticed. Both at the beginning and at the end of Book IV there is a māngalacarana in the form of namaskāra ‘paying homage.’ Does it not imply that the Book is an independent work and complete in itself?

Let us discuss here another point. We have already seen that a number of kārikās in Books II and III are repeated in Book IV. Why is this repetition? Moreover, certain things treated of before are discussed again in Book IV; e.g., ajātivāda ‘theory of non-origin’ discussed in III is discussed again in IV. But why? A point discussed and settled once in a chapter may, if necessary, be alluded to in a subsequent chapter, but why should it be discussed and settled again? Is it not useless? Why should the author of Book IV indulge in such a useless action? This leads one to think that Book IV is an independent work in which the author has incorporated certain things that are already dealt with by him elsewhere, while others are discussed again more elaborately or in a different way. The discussion of the ajātivāda is an instance on the point.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that these four Books are four independent treatises and are put together in a volume under the title of the Āgamaśāstra.

§ 4. The Text of the Āgamaśāstra

We are now to discuss a few points regarding the text of the ĀS, as we have now in the extant editions and the MSS examined for them. Here arises a question: Is it that the text is a complete one? It seems to me that the answer cannot be given in the affirmative. It will at once occur to the mind of a reader that the first kārika of Book I has found its place there quite abruptly. Without any reference to the three states, waking, dreaming and deep sleep as described in the

\(^{15}\) We have some ground to think that at the beginning of Book I a few kārikās are now missing. It is not improbable that there was a māngalacarana in those kārikās.

\(^{16}\) As the first folio of the MS, the basis of the present edition (Bibliotheca Indica) of BAP is lost, and the second one, in some parts illegible, is broken down, the beginning lines of BAP could not be printed. Hence it could not be ascertained from the edition as to whether there is any māngalacarana at the beginning. Yet, from its Tibetan version we know that it actually exists.
prose passages of the MaU this kārikā is not intelligible.¹ It appears therefore that one or more kārikās here are missing.²

It may be said that as in Book IV,³ so here, too, at the beginning of Book I, a mangalācarana is expected, but it is not found. Hence it appears that originally at least one kārikā was composed here for it, but subsequently somehow or other it was lost. This point of mangalācarana cannot, however, be much insisted upon. For, in the time of the author of the ĀŚ this practice of mangalācarana was not so much persisted in as in later days. The great Śaṅkarā, the author of the Śāṅkarakā-bhāṣya, does not follow it, so far as his undisputed works are concerned.⁴ So it may be that the author did not like it at the beginning of Book I, though he actually followed it in Book IV. Thus this point is not of much importance.

Let one read kārikās 5 and 6 and say if there is any connexion between them. Kārikā 6 seems to have come here all of a sudden. The commentator Ś is silent here on their mutual connexion. Does this not lead one

¹ This fact should not, however, be taken as a reason for supposing the priority of the MaU to the kārikās refuted elsewhere on strong grounds.
² According to those who hold that the kārikās of Gaṇḍapādā are written as an explanation (vyahhyana) of the MaU, one might naturally expect at the beginning some words to that effect, but they are not found. In accordance with this theory also at least one kārikā is lost here.
³ The commentary on the Śāṅkhyakārikā may also be added here, but it is not quite certain that its author and the author of ĀŚ, though both of them are known by the same name, Gaṇḍapādā, are identical.
⁴ It is disputed that the beginning stotras of the commentary on the Tu, which go by his name are actually written by him.
§ 5. Readings of the Text

We may now speak here a few words with regard to the readings of the ĀS. The collation of the MSS referred to above as well as of the different editions of the work has resulted in showing or suggesting true or better readings in many cases, which have mainly been discussed under the kārikās concerned, giving the grounds for the readings adopted. There are, however, other cases where I have not offered my reasons for selecting a particular reading, as they can easily be understood by the reader himself. Below will be found, for example, some notable readings that are chosen or suggested:

1. duṣ tu (I. 11) for dvau tu.
2. cāyatraṇa (II. 4) for cāyatavatena.
3. *pi pratipadyate (II. 7) for vipratipadyate. See IV. 32.
4. *vyavasthitān (II. 13) for vyavasthitān.
5. nāśabhāvena (II. 34) for nāśabhāvena.
6. sa-yatha (III. 11) for kham yathā.
7. yad a (IV. 12) for yady a. As we have yadi in b, it cannot again be expected in a; nor can it, in that case, be construed properly. Besides, the reading yad a is actually found in V.
8. nādi (IV. 23) for nādeḥ, and jātīr (v) supported by PU for hy ādir.
9. samsāra nopalabhya (IV. 56) supported by A' and I0 for samsāram na prapadyate.

§ 6. The Name of the Work

The present work popularly known as Māndūka-kārikā (or Śkārikā) or Gaudapadākārikā (or Śkārikā) is traditionally called Āgamaśāstra. It is owing to this fact that the commentary on it by Ś is called Āgamaśāstravivaraṇa. Sometimes it is named also Āgamanārtha or Upadesāgrantha as some of the colophons show (p. 244), occasionally both of these names are used together (loc. cit.). It is also called or described as Māndūkya-vārttika, or Māndūkyaopaniṣad-gaudapadāvyākhyāna, or Gaudapadāvyākhyāna, or simply Gaudapādiya after its author, as is shown by some MSS. Again, sometimes it is referred to as Māndūkyaśākhā.

1 See the Colophons, pp. 231, 234, 236, 244.
2 The word vārttika is not properly used here, as the present work has not the characteristics of a vārttika, for a vārttika is said to be a work which criticizes what is said, what is not said, and what is said wrongly in the original work, as says Rājaśekhara in his Kavyamimamsā, GOS, No. 1, 1916, II. p. 5: uktānukta-duruktacintā vārttikam.
3 Sāyaṇa on TA, VII. 1 (p. 483); VII. 2 (p. 570); māyāmātṛam idam dvaitam advaitam paramārtaratāl | iti māndūkyaśākhām trutivākyam udāhitaṁ ||

Here I. 17 of our text is referred to. For other two names see § 1, note 8, p. xxxv.
It may be noticed here that two MSS, D and D', describe the work as Vedaśāntamūla ‘origin of the Vedānta’ which is very significant.

Now let us discuss as to why this book is called Agamaśāstra. The word āgama among other things means ‘a traditional doctrine’ or ‘ anything handed down and fixed by tradition’; and śāstra gives the sense in such cases as the present one, of ‘ a religious or authoritative treatise’. Thus the compound word, Agamaśāstra, means a śāstra pertaining to āgama, i.e., authoritative treatise which deals with or is based on a traditional doctrine or doctrines. That the Agamaśāstra is in fact of such character is fully borne out throughout the book itself, as the following few lines will show.

Besides the general meaning ‘ to remember’, the root śmṛt figurally means also ‘ to hand down memoriter, declare,’ and so its past participial form śmṛta is used in the sense of ‘handed down memoriter, or declared, mentioned,’ etc. Thus the sentence śāstre śmṛtam means ‘it is handed down memoriter or declared in a scripture.’ And though the subject of the sentence is not expressed in this or similar cases, it is easily understood, it being a teacher or teachers or a similar person or persons who may or may not have been mentioned before. Now with regard to our case the word śmṛta is employed by our author not less than eleven times. This fact clearly shows that our author refers to or deals with some doctrine or doctrines handed down traditionally. This is clear also from his employment of the following phrases in the work:

1. satām iti vinīścayaḥ (I. 6); 2. svapna ahū maniśinah (II. 2); 3. svapna ahūḥ prakāśitaṃ (II. 3); 4. evam ahū maniśinah (II. 5); 5. drṣṭāṃ vedāntaṃ vicaksanāḥ (II. 31); 6. iti tattvaviḍuḥ (II. 34); 7. munibhir vedapāragaiḥ | nirvikalpo hy ayaṃ drṣṭāḥ prapañcopasāmo dvayāḥ || (II. 35); 8. vādinaḥ kecid (II. 3); 9. vivadanto dvayā hy evam ajātiṁ khyāpayanti te (IV. 4); 10. khyāpyamānām ajātiṁ taḥ (IV. 5); 11. jātim icchanti vādinaḥ (IV. 6).

§ 7. The Author

We have already seen, as the great Śaṅkara says in his commentary on the BS, I. 4. 14 and II. 1. 9, that the work was by an Ācārya ‘teacher’ to whom the tradition of the Vedānta was known. But the question

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1 For āgama see MV, pp. 268-9. For the Buddhist interpretation of the word śāstra one may be referred to MVST, p. 4 from which the following is quoted here:

yac chāsti ca klesātipān saññāni santaṃkṛtyate durgatiḥ bhayāc ca [tac chāsāhī trāpaṇaḥ ca śāstraṁ]*

It is quoted also in MV, p. 3. For a description of śāstras see Rāja-Śekhāra, Op. cit., II. For the significance and importance of the word śāstra (Tibetan bstan.bcos, Chinese luni) mark its use in Nāgārjuna’s fundamental work, Madhyamakakāśatra.
is: who is that Ācārya? That he is Gauḍapāda\(^2\) is well-known traditionally and found in the colophons of each of the four Books in MSS of the original and its commentary. He is sometimes called Gauḍapādācārya,\(^3\) Gauḍācārya,\(^4\) or simply Gauḍa.\(^5\) From this we may think that his real name is Gauḍa, the words -pāda, -pada, -caraṇa, or -acārya being added to it simply as honorific.\(^6\) That his actual name is Gauḍa is stated very clearly by Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī (middle of the 17th century A.D.) in his SMV, p. 6, ll. 9.12.

Now the question arises: Is the word Gauḍa his personal name or does it simply signify that he belongs to a country called Gauḍa?\(^7\) In Suresvara’s NSi, IV. 44, there are two words, Gauḍas and Drāvidas, which refer to Gauḍapādācārya, the author of the present work and the great Śaṅkarācārya, the author of the Upadeśasāhasri, respectively, according to the commentator, Jñānottama.\(^8\) It may be said that as Śaṅkara is referred to by a name related to his native country, Draviḍa (i.e., Kerala, the modern Malabar), and not by a personal name, so the case must have been the same with Gauḍapāda; in other words, he, too, must have been alluded to by a name connected with his country which is Gauḍa. Otherwise, why should Suresvara mention him in a different way?

Walliser (op. cit., p. 3) is of opinion that by the two words of Suresvara, Gauḍas and Drāvidas, we are to understand two Vedantic schools. If we are to know by the word Drāvidas a school founded by Śaṅkara in Malabar (the representative work of which is here said to be the Upadeśasāhasri), we must take also the Gauḍas as a native school established in North India in the land of Gauḍas,\(^9\) which might have already been much advanced in culture. It is, however, immaterial, to my mind, to discuss as to whether the words actually refer to the two

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\(^2\) Sometimes we have Gauḍapāda (JM, 10) and Gauḍacarana (SMV, p. 5, l. 23), most probably for metrical exigency.

\(^3\) S on SU, l. 8 (p. 30).

\(^4\) PD, II. 23; Śāyaṇa on TA, VII. 2 (p. 565).

\(^5\) NSi, IV. 44.

\(^6\) A V e n k a t a s u b b h i a h (IA, 1933, p. 193) is of the same opinion.

\(^7\) There is evidence to show that the country called Gauḍadesa was once regarded as the land between 82° and 88° longitude and 25° and 28° latitude along with the adjacent districts of North Bengal (Matsya P., XII. 30; Kārma P., Part I, 209; Līṅga P., Part I, l. 65, 34; JASB, 1906, pp. 273 ff.) Recent researches show that the country is identical with North Bengal. See H a r a n c h a n d r a C h a k l a d a r: Annals of the Rhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 43 ff.

\(^8\) It may be noticed here that in the second edition (Bombay Sanskrit Series, No. XXXVIII, 1906) of the NSi occurs the following line in Jñānottama’s commentary on IV. 44: kevalāṇām api drāvidavasānasāhasri. Seeing this the editor, C o n e l l e t G. A. J a c o b writes in his notes (p. 244): “Who are the kevalas referred to in the commentary?” The fact is that the word kevala is wrongly written, or read, or printed for Kerala, the ancient name of the country. The same mistake occurs also in the revised editio (1926) of the book, p. 193.

\(^9\) Walliser thinks that the country might have been so named owing to much cultivation of sugar-cane (gauḍa). Cf. the word punḍra for North Bengal, which also means ‘sugar-cane’ (of red variety).
representative teachers or to the two schools represented by them, both the interpretations being equally possible.

It may be pointed out here that merely the word Gauda cannot invariably refer to one who is an inhabitant of the Gaudadeśa. One may not actually be an inhabitant of it, yet, may be regarded as a Gauda. Abhinanda, the author of the Yogavaisishthasara or Laghuyogavaisishta, though a Kashmirian, is called Gauda. Similarly Brahmānanda, the well-known author of the Laghucaṇḍrikā, though not born in Gaudadeśa, has the epithet Gauda, probably as he was educated in Gaudadeśa, Bengal, being, as is said, a fellow student of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya. One who has any connexion, past, present, or future, in respect of oneself or one’s ancestors, with the Gaudadeśa may be a Gauda. On this one may be referred to MD, 1.3.23 with Sābaraśvamin’s commentary in which it is said that a man who has set out for the city of Mathurā is regarded as a Mathura; similarly one who lives in the city of Mathurā, or one who has come out from the city of Mathurā is also called a Mathura.10

With regard to our author we should remember here the views of Balkrisnana and Sarasvati already once referred to. He writes (SMB, p. 6, ll. 9-12): There was in the country of Kurukṣetra a river called Hiraravati.11 On its banks there were some Gauda people, the pre-eminent of whom was our author, and as he was absorbed in deep meditation beginning from the Dvāpara age, his special name is not known to modern people and so he is celebrated by the general one.12

Let us notice here the observations made by Wallace (op. cit., pp. 6 ff.). He thinks there was none named Gaudapāda who is believed to have been the author of the present work. By the word Gaudapādas we are to understand the four Books (prakaraṇas) of the work and Gaudapādyakārikā is the name for the whole work, as found in MSS. This last title seems to be somewhat artificial and it can be guessed that the work was commonly known as Gaudapādi in the same way as the provincial expression Bhadracari for Bhadracaryā. In fact both the titles Gaudapādi and Āgamaśāstravivaraṇa have been shown by C. F. Hall in one of his contributions.13 Wallace says further that the quotations from later works correspond to his opinion that no teacher known as Gaudapāda was the author of the book, but it

10 Mathurāyām abhāprouthito māthura iti. Mathurāyām vasan māthumāyā nirgata ca.
11 It remains to be identified. It is doubtful if the name is correctly written by the scribe of the MS or read or edited accurately by the editors.
12 Gaudāpārāsab kuruṣṭrodāloka hiraśvatī nodhitāhavagauḍegenduṣṭireṇaḥ deśavīṣṭahhavaṣṭitaṁnamatva prasiddhah, dvāpara-yugam ārāhayaeva samādhiṇyaghatvādunlabhajante aparajītaṁvīṣṭahbhidhāṃ saṃyayamāmiva lokavastihāmbh.
13 Such practice is still very common in the country: e.g., Vidyāsāgari, a tīka by Annapūra Vidyāsāgara on the Khandaḥkhandāhādhyāya; Ramakṛṣṇadri, a tīka on the Nyāyakusumārodaya by Rāmabhadra; so are Dinakari, Rāmavādri, etc. etc.
existed among the contemporary people as a fundamental work of a school and not as a production of a definite author. He shows from the Tibetan sources that though the work was known to the Buddhist authors as a Vedāntaśāstra in which the doctrines of the school are explained, nothing is known there of Gaṇḍapāda who is supposed to have composed it. Saṅkara in his Sārirakabhubṣya quotes twice, as shown above, from the work referring to our author (or authors) as those to whom was known the tradition of the Vedānta (vedāntārthasampradāyavid or simply saṃpradāyavid). The commentator, Govinda and Anandagiri in his Nyāya- nirnaya introduce the above opinion of Saṅkara as the ‘approval of the old’ (vyādhasammati, BS, I. 4. 14 and II. I. 9). Sureśvara has quoted two kārikās (NSi, IV. 41, 42; our text I. 11 and 15 respectively) mentioning their author as Gaṇḍas (gaṇḍaih), while he takes Saṅkara as the representative of the Drāvida tradition. In the commentary on the NSi Jñānottara describes the quoted passages as gaṇḍapādayā-vākya. We have already seen in the PD (II. 28) the Gaṇḍa teaching, but the commentator, Rāmakṛṣṇa, does not know

16 That is, the Tibetan translations of Sāntirakṣita’s Madhyamakā-lokaśākārakāra together with its commentary by Kamalatīla, as well as of Bhāvaviveka’s Madhyamakāhādayakārika and its commentary Tarkajñāna by himself Vide infra.

15 It is, however, not true that Sureśvara never mentions the name Gaṇḍapāda, for he uses it at least once in his BrV, IV. 4. 886 (p. 1066). In the same work he also used the words gaṇḍapādaya vacas (I. 4. 389, p. 510) and gaṇḍacārya (II. 1. 386, p. 951).

the author, he describes the passage quoted as ācārya-sammati. Saṅkara quotes in his VeS, § 33, two kārikās, III. 44, 45, referring as tad uktam, and Nīśimha Sārasvatī, the commentator, does not name their author simply alluding to them as vyādhasanmati ‘the opinion of the old.’ Rāma-tīrtha, another commentator, says that it is a contemporary opinion. Again, if we examine Kāśmiraka Yāti, the author of the Advaitabrahmasamudāhi (p. 277) we find no evidence that the Gaṇḍapādakārikā was known to him as a work of a single author. Vijnānabhiṣku has quoted kārikās (II. 32, III. 5, 26) from the work in his Saṅkhyaapravacanabhubṣya, (I. 45, 47: 153; VI. 50). But there is nothing to show that Gaṇḍapāda was taken to be their author. Wallace thus says that not a single passage can be quoted from all these texts which can make us believe that Gaṇḍapāda had Gaṇḍapāda as its author. We are told that Saṅkara received instruction from Govinda who was a disciple of Gaṇḍapāda with whom the former had a conversation and he had another conversation with Vyāsa himself. The same sort of contradiction is found also with regard to the residence of Govinda; one source gives it as the banks of the Narmadā and the other the Himālayas. This sort of things does not give us a historical clue.

16 Not vyādha-as writes Wallace.

17 Excepting, as he himself has pointed out, one passage from Ś’s commentary on the SU, I. 8, where the following line occurs: tathā ca śaktiṣyā gaṇḍapādācāryaḥ. But that the commentary is not by the great Ś is the view not only of Wallace but also of others including the present author.
Wallace thus finally observes that the whole tradition is fabulous, and with this the last of the arguments in favour of the authorship of Gaudapādi by a certain Gauḍapāda vanishes. And as one could not explain the word Gaudapādi one imagined a fictitious Gauḍapāda. Now he adds that for the history of Vedānta we can gather from the preceding discussion that in a time considerably before the activities of Śaṅkara there existed a philosophical school in the country of Gauḍa and in the same district in which Buddhism flourished till the eighth century. This school for the first time put the traditions of the Vedas and Upaniṣads in the form of a śāstra, i.e., a school doctrine and embodied it in a collection of sayings (Spruchsammlung) consisting of the four pādas of the Gaudapādakārikā. Already in the time of Śaṅkara this text, the only older Vedānta text which has been preserved and perhaps the only one which was ever produced, enjoys high consideration quite independently of legendary traditions which connect Śaṅkara with Govinda and Suka with Gauḍapāda. The existence of the North Indian school at the beginning of the century preceding Śaṅkara seems well-established.

We are, however, to consider here the following without entering into a hair-splitting discussion. There is a text before us known as the Āgamaśāstra or Gaudapādakārikā, or passing under any other similar name; and of this text there must be an author. There may, however, be more than one author. The work may represent the view of the predominant school of a particular people. But can we only for this reason think that it is the production of the whole people of the land? When a very prominent man of a country pronounces something in public, it may be regarded as the opinion of the country itself, and not as his personal view, though he may not consult the people of the country before doing so. In the same way, it appears to me, that the present work is by one person and yet, it represents the views of the entire country to which he belonged. But who is that person? He is one Gauḍa. When there is no contradiction nor any incongruity, why should we not accept the tradition, as far as possible? Thus, as we have already seen, the actual name of the author is Gauḍa, or with the honorific word -pāda or Gauḍa,pāda, or Gauḍācārya.

Much could be known of any author from the old records on which naturally one inclines to depend for ascertaining the truth. But they are so fantastic and self-contradictory in the present case that it is almost impossible to find out the truth from them. ¹⁸ These

¹⁸ On their unreliability observes S. K. Felvalkar in his Vedānta Philosophy, Poona, 1929, pp. 231-232: “while all the other so-called Prācīna, Bhāratīya Saṅkaraviyāyas are prejudiced in favour of one or the other Pontifical See, and so contain almost shameless tampering of traditions and documents which is provable to the hilt even by the accusations on the score of falsification of records which each party finds it possible to bring against the other. When such is the case of the avowed followers of the School, it need hardly be wondered at if the pronounced opponents belonging to the Madhyā and the Rāmānujya Schools have gone one better, and indulged in a remorseless thrashing of mud in the hope that some of it might stick.”
records are the accounts of the life of the great Śaṅkara and those who were connected with him in some way or other. Readers desirous of knowing these legendary accounts of Gauḍapāda are referred to those works themselves which are to be used very cautiously.

§ 8. The Date of Gauḍapāda

Now let us discuss the date of our author, and in doing so we shall begin from one of the old accounts of the school already referred to, viz., JM, in which Gauḍapāda is mentioned as having some connexion with a few Greeks. It is said there (10) that the feet of Gauḍapāda were adored by Ayārcya, and he was the preceptor of such Niśkā mystics as Apālīya. Here Ātmabodhendrā, the commentator, adds something on the authority of such works as Gauḍapādālāśa of Harimīśra, and Patañjālovījaya (= Ocarita) of Rāmabhadrā Dikṣīta). He writes that when Gauḍapāda on a peak of the Himalayas was seeking after the truth of the self under the guidance of Śuka,² it was through his influence that the wrong Buddhistic views (saudhudon-haddhvanām) of the persons headed by Ayārcya who was being attended by such Yogins belonging to the Western border of the country as Apālīya and Dāmiśa (apālīyā-damśādyapārāntāyogībhiṣ ca), as well as by Prāvīti, the Śākya chief of Taxila (takṣāśālāhīsa-śākya-prāvīti- pramukhāhī), were made to disappear.

If here one turns over the pages of The Indian Travels of Apollonius of Tyana by Osmond de Beauvoir Priaux, JRAS, 1860, pp. 70 ff., one will easily see that Apālīya in the Sanskrit text is no other than the Pythagorian philosopher Apollonius of Tyana, who flourished in the first century A.D. He travelled to India and came to the court of Phraotes who was the same as Prāvīti in the Sanskrit text, the king of Taxila. And Dāmiśa of our text is indetical with Damis,

² In connection with Gauḍapāda’s tapasyā in the Himalayas the following story may be related here from Nārāyaṇa’s tika on MaU: The four parts of the MaU of the recension of the RV yet, note that the Upaniṣad is said to belong to the AV) were explained by Gauḍapāda by his four Books (prakaranas). He was a disciple of Śuka and the grand preceptor of S. He flourished at the end of the age called Dvāpara. At the hermitage of Badarihā he devoted himself to propitiating Nārāyaṇa and having obtained a boon from him he entered into a cave of a mountain, so that he would not look at the face of any one born in the age of Kali. In this state he was approached by Ś and requested to come out of the cave, but he did not comply with the request. Yet, having written the four Books of his work on the leaves of a Banyan tree with red chalk he gave them to Ś. Report of Sanskrit Manuscripts in Southern India by E. Hultzsch, No. III, p. 133. But there is no end of such legends on which one can hardly rely.

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the fellow traveller and friend of Apollonius. The last person in our text, Ayārca, is the same and one with Iarchas (probably a corruption from Rac'hyas, op. cit., p. 83, note), a Greek king. 3

All this looks well, but do you gain anything from it about the date in question? The Greek account simply relates the travel of Apollonius, 3 being completely silent about Gauḍapāda. There is no doubt that some names of both the accounts are identical, but it does not follow from it that the persons having the same names are also identical. Supposing that the account is true it will be for a further creation of confusion in settling the date even of the great Śi, into which we do not enter here as useless.

Hence without having recourse to such legendary records for the determination of the date of our

3 Perhaps it is M. Hiriyanna (IHQ, 1926, pp. 415-416) who has first made the identification. See also Gopinath Kaviraj, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

4 How far this account is true it is not easy to say. Prıaulx, the author of the paper observes (Op. cit., p. 104): “of Damis’s geography, I can only say that it reminds me of a fairy tale... Who shall explain these discrepancies, account for these mistakes and fix localities thus vaguely described?” “Reviewing the whole work of Philostratus (i.e., the original author of the life of Apollonius) it seems to me that Apollonius certainly pretended to have travelled through and made some stay in India, but that very possibly he did not visit it, our Damis never accompanied him; but if we may judge from cinnamon and pepper-trees... fabricated this journal perhaps from books written upon India, and tales current about India, which he easily collected at the great mart for Indian commodities, and resort for Indian merchants—Alexandria.”

5 Or Bhavya, as he is sometimes called, or Bhāvaviveka as suggested from the Tibetan sources (e.g., Idan hbyed). Bhāvaviveka was the founder of the Prāsaṅgika school of Nāgārjunā’s Madhyamika system. He is much criticised by Candrākīrtti in his MV. I. Bhāvaviveka’s Prajñāparamāsāstra (Nanjio, No. 1185) was translated into Chinese by Prabhākara Mītra in 630-632 A.D. He was a junior contemporary of Dharmapāla (Th. Wittet: On Yuan Chüan’s Travels in India, II, p. 222) who lived in the 5th century A.D. (Winternitz: History of Indian Literature, Eng. Tr., 1933, Vol. II, p. 362). Thus it can be said that the date of Bhāvaviveka is 500 A.D., or a few years after it.
celebrated Buddhist teachers who flourished between 200 A.D. and 400 A.D. For instance, see our text, IV. 22\textsuperscript{ab}:

svato vā parato vāpi na kāścid vastu jāyate
And read here Nāgārjuna's (200 A.D.) MK, XXI. 13\textsuperscript{ab}:

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate
See our text, pp. 105 ff. and 127 ff. Again, we read in our ĀŚ, 7\textsuperscript{cd} and 29\textsuperscript{cd}:

prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathaścid bhavisyaḥ
And in MK, XV. 8\textsuperscript{cd} we have:

prakṛter anyathābhāvo nahi jātupapadye
The following line occurs in ĀŚ, IV. 4\textsuperscript{h}:

abhūtaṃ naiva jāyate
And let us cite here the following from the CS, 373\textsuperscript{e} of Nāgārjuna's disciple Āryadeva who probably lived, in the words of Winterlich (A History of Indian Literature, Eng. Tr., 1933, Vol. II, p. 350), "at about the turning point of the second and third century A.D."

nabhūtaṃ nāma jāyate
See our text III. 44 (pp. 77-78):

laye sambdhayeyc cittam vikṣiptam śamayet punah |
sakaśāyaṃ vijñāyāc champa-prāptaṃ na cālayat ||

With this read the following from MAS, XIV. 9\textsuperscript{cd}—10\textsuperscript{th} of Maitreyanātha or Asaṅga (400 A.D.):

linaṃ cittasya gṛñṇiṣyad uddhataṃ śamayet punah |
śamapraṃptaṃ upekṣēta tasmāṃ ālambane punah ||
§8

INTRODUCTION

quotations and cross-references in early and reliable texts. ¹¹ § 9. Alleged Borrowing by Gaudapāda

Let us discuss the question from a different point of view. There is a work Paramārthaśāra⁹ attributed to Ṣeṣa who is apparently the mythical Ṣeṣa, as he is referred to in the work itself as ādhāra (8), i.e., jagad-ādhāra (87). From this some take him as Paṭaṇjali, the less mythical Ṣeṣa, the author of the Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini.

It is also called Aṛyāpaṅcāṣṭi owing to the fact that it is composed in eighty-five stanzas in the Aṛyā metre, though in fact there are eighty-seven stanzas. ¹⁰

¹¹ Our old traditions are so divergent that according to them as well as the modern researches we shall have to place Śaṅkara some time between the 6th century B.C. and the 9th century A.D., viz., 6th century B.C., 4th century B.C., 1st century B.C., 4th century A.D., 6th century A.D., and the 9th century (788-820) A.D. The last date is now accepted by many a scholar. See Gopinath Kaviraj, op. cit., pp. 23 ff.; Belvākar, op. cit., pp. 209 ff.

⁹ There are so far at least five editions of this book, the latest and critical one being by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastrī (Transliterated Text, English Translation and Notes), Karnataka Publishing House, Bombay, 1941.

¹⁰ It may be that the first two stanzas which are not in Aṛyā, but Upaṭi, were added later on. But, if it is so, as regards the first of them, it was added long before Abhinavagupta who has adopted it just at the beginning of his PS, 1. The last stanza (87: vedanta) does not also appear to constitute the original, being added by a second hand, as is suggested by Suryanarayana Sastrī, op. cit., p. 40, note. Mark here the employment of the perfect tense, in the word babandha. The original number, 85, can however, be obtained by reckoning an additional stanza between 18 and 19 given from a MS in a foot-note in the Trivandrum edition (PS) being fully supported by PS², 9 (and not 6 as in PS¹).
It is a Vedantic work. Its excellence and importance can be understood by the simple fact that Abhinavagupta (in the end of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century A.D.), the great teacher of the Pratyabhijñā school and Poetics, adapted it, though retaining the original title, for writing a manual of the Pratyabhijñā school, by some omissions, additions, alterations and improvements. That it is an adaptation of the first work is known from the statement of Abhinavagupta himself.

In this work of Šeṣa there are some passages, or words, or thoughts that supply certain points of resemblance to those of our ĀŚ. In order to see if this fact can throw any light on the question of the time of Gaudapāda we should like to discuss it in the following few lines.

S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (op. cit., p. viii) has noticed some of these points of resemblance.

[8]

and writes (p. ix) after discussing them as follows: "It seems plausible that Gaudapāda was drawing on some earlier sources, agreeing in part, while rejecting in part, and that the rejection was not consistent or thorough. Such a hypothesis may well consider the Paramārthasāra the original drawn upon." There is not the least doubt that Gaudapāda has drawn much upon earlier works, as it is perfectly clear throughout his book, but can Šeṣa's PS be included in them, though it may appear to be so?

In order to avoid prolixity I propose to discuss only two points raised by Suryanarayana Sastri.
in the hope that this may decide the case. He writes: “Both are concerned with the three forms—Viśva, Taijasa and Prajña—as veiling the fourth which is the real.” This refers, as he says, to PS₁, 31 and GK, I. 1 and 11.

The most important thing to be pointed out here first is that between the two texts, ĀS and PS₁, the latter is certainly a later development, as a perusal of the texts will show. Let us, however, make an attempt to understand PS₁, 31 as it is before us without taking any help either from the commentator or from Abhinavagupta. The word jāgrat-svapna-susūpta is an adjective of viśva-taijasaprajin. But what is to be understood from the abrupt statement that Viśva, Taijasa and Prajña are jāgrat, svapna and susūpta respectively? What are these three, Viśva, Taijasa and Prajña? How can one know them? How is one to understand that there is only one and the same who is regarded as three (i.e., Viśva, etc.) owing to three different stages (i.e., jāgrat, etc.)? How is it that turya undoubtedly referring to Vasudeva in the preceeding kārikā (30) is put in the neuter gender,

17 Is the last part of this statement exactly so? Do chādita in PS₁, 31 (=āyaṇa in PS₁, 34) and -buddha in kāryakārya-buddha and kāraṇa-buddha in GK, I. 11 convey the same idea? We are to consider here GK, I. 15 and NSI (IV. 41, 42) where these two kārikās of Ga u d a pāda are quoted.

18 He has here the following two kārikās (PS₁, 34 and 35):

ṣaṭjaṭhitamāhārā jāgrat-svapna-susūpta iti tasmin |
bhānti turye dhāmani taḥāpi tair āyāman bhāti. (In the first half of this kārikā in PS₁ quoted in foot-note 2- svapnam is to be read as -svapnau.)

jāgrat viśvam bhedat svapnas teṇāh prakāśmāhātmyat |
prajñāb suprāvasthā jāmāgānātmyat tataḥ param turyam

while the latter word is in the masculine? Moreover, what is the significance of tāḥ in the first half? If it is not superfluous, what is it that it refers to? How far are we justified with the commentator in taking the word with chādita in the second half? Again, why is it that eva should be used in the first half after tribhir? All this taken together shows, as far as I can judge, that Śeṣa’s work presupposes that of Ga u d a pāda, and not vice versa. Śeṣa had before him ĀS, I. 1-5 (as well as MaU, 3-7) upon which he has drawn adding something (adimadhyanidhana) more quite independently as he has done throughout his book. While in ĀS there are five kārikās, Śeṣa has only one, and even in it he has made some addition. This on one hand and the metrical exigency on the other did not allow him, as seems to me, to express his ideas adequately with the result that there occurred some anomalies. Comparing PS₁ and PS₂ with the GK here it appears to me that as Śeṣa could not express himself adequately and consequently his kārikā became obscure Abhinavagupta added here one kārikā more, as has already been pointed out, explaining all that was absolutely necessary for its proper elucidation.

Now, what is the source or sources of Abhinava’s interpretation here (kārikās 34, 35), without which we cannot understand the kārikā of Śeṣa? Certainly it was not only Ga u d a pāda, for such things as

19 Abhinava is quite justified in putting turya in the neuter gender as he has before it (kārikā 34) dhāman, neuter, which is referred to by the former word and we can think that he got it from GK, I. 5, 22.
śṛṣṭisthitisamphāra cannot be known from his work. One is therefore inclined to say with some amount of certainty that it was partly the work of Śeṣa, and partly the tradition connected with him, though under the present state of our knowledge we do not know if this tradition is recorded anywhere. Nevertheless, we have to accept its existence, as we cannot explain the difficulties without it. The question arises here as to how Abhinava came to know that tradition. Does it not persuade one to think that the distance of time between Śeṣa and Abhinava is not as wide as it is supposed to have been? What is there against thinking that PS' and PS' belonged to the same period, though the former must have evidently been a little earlier? In this case the question of the interpretation of the present kārikā of Śeṣa given by Abhinava can very satisfactorily be explained. What is there that can be offered for pushing back the date of PS' to a period before GK?

Again, with reference to the creation of the world Śeṣa in his work which deals with the Vedānta has effected a synthesis of the Saṅkhya and the Vedānta systems by the introduction of the creation from Upendra (= Viśnu = Vāsudeva = Hari = Narayana-Paramātmā = Brahman) through prakṛti with the gradual evolution from it of buddhi (= mahat), etc. In the process of the creation he has accommodated also the theory of anda 'cosmic germ,' found, as for instance, in the Manusamhitā, 1. 8 ff. and the Viśnu Purāṇa, 1. 2. 58 ff. Here we are to note what Kulūkā observes on Manusamhitā, 1. 8:

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abhidhyānapūrvikāṁ sṛṣṭiḥ vadato manoḥ prakṛtir acetanā svatantrā pariṇamata ity ayaṁ pakṣo na sammataḥ, kintu tridāṅgivedāntasiddhānta evābhimataḥ pratibhāti.

It is further elucidated by him in another place (I. 15):

nauv abhidhyānapūrvavakasṛṣṭyabhidhanad vedanta-siddhānta eva manor abhimata iti prag uktam, tan na sangacchate. idānā mahādārikareṇa sṛṣṭyabhidhanad vedantadarśanena ca paramātmāna evaśāṅkikareṇa sṛṣṭi uktaḥ. ut tāyate. prakṛtito mahādārikareṇa sṛṣṭi iti bhagavadbhāskarīdarśane 'py upapadya iti tadvido vadalī. 30

Now Bhāskara is one of the post-Śaṅkara commentators of the BS. Undoubtedly he was in the ninth century A.D. being criticised by Vācaspati Miśra (841 A.D.) in his Bhāmati (BS, III, 3. 29). Śeṣa seems therefore to have been well acquainted with the Vedantic system maintained by Bhāskara and has then combined his theory with that of Manu and others according to whom in the process of creation there intervenes the theory of anda.

I do not therefore think that I can concur with Suryanarayana Sastrī in suggesting that 'the Paramārthasāra is the original drawn upon.' (p. ix).

30 See Bhāskara's commentary on the BS (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1914), II, I. 26: tataḥ ca brahmaṇaḥ pariṇāmānuparśvam eṣṭayaṁ iti tāparyānavah. Udayāna observes in his Ngayakusumānājī, p. 332: brahmaṇapariṇātam iti bhāskaragotre yujyate.
In passing we are to take up another question in this connexion. B. L. Atreyā having noticed "much common between Kārikās (i.e., GK) and Yogavāsiṣṭha not only in thought, but also in language" 21 concludes that the latter is prior on the following three grounds: (1) The kārikās do not form "an independent treatise on the Advaita Philosophy," being "a sort of commentary on the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad." (2) "On the other hand, the philosopher Vasiṣṭha claims to have received his doctrines directly from the cosmic mind (Brahmā) and to have realised their truth in his own experience. The philosophy of Vasiṣṭha includes almost all the views held by Gauḍapāda." And (3) "Gauḍapāda-kārikās represent a later phase of the Advaita philosophy, when it tended to become critical, hostile and polemical towards other contemporary schools of thought, whereas Yogavāsiṣṭha represents the earlier phase."

As the space at my disposal does not allow me here to enter into a detailed discussion I desire simply to make a few observations as briefly as I can. I do not see that I can follow the above arguments. For, supposing that the GK is a sort of commentary and Vasiṣṭha received his doctrines directly from Brahmā, are we in any way justified in thinking that the YV is prior to the GK? Does it follow from that? As regards the third argument of Atreyā he thinks that the Advaita philosophy as represented in the GK is of a later phase, because it is "critical, hostile and polemical towards other" systems. But may one ask here: Is there anything in the GK that may be regarded as "critical, hostile and polemical?" If so, what and where is it so? On the contrary, one may find there (GK, III. 17; IV. 3-6) clear non-hostility (avirodha), and there is no instance of anything that is critical and polemical. If, however, the mention of different views in the GK is meant thereby, the case is the same also with the YV. 22

It is not always safe to conclude the priority or posteriority of one of two works simply seeing the same or similar passage, or thought, occurring in both of them. For instance, we read the following in the GK, II. 6 23 and IV. 31:

ādvā ante ca yan nāsti vartamane 'pi tat tathā |
The same line occurs also in the YV, IV. 45. 45 and a similar one in III. 11. 13, as quoted in our text, p. 142, note 3. Now, apart from the question of the date of the GK, can we determine with any amount of certainty the priority or posteriority of one of the two works unless we take into consideration the other factors that are connected herewith? One may be referred here to the present Annotation on GK, IV. 31, and it will be found that the same thought only in slightly different words is expressed in such works as MK and ĀS, which are undisputably far earlier than YV. Now, if we see that Gauḍapāda has abundantly drawn upon

22 For instance, see III. 62. 10-11; 84. 22-27, vivadante by asambuddhaḥ svavikalpavijñābhāsaḥ.
23 Atreyā has noticed it.
such earlier works can we ever think in this or similar cases that he has borrowed from YV, unless there is any strong ground for doing so? When there are two texts containing the same thing, one earlier and the other later, one may quote from either of them; but to decide definitely as to from which one it is actually done one should discuss carefully.

Another instance of what is common to both GK and YV, as noted by Atreya, is the non-difference between the states of wakefulness and dream (jâgrat and suṣupta), as found in GK, II. 5 and YV, IV. 9. 11 ff. Here, too, when we see that the first half of the GK clearly refers to the BU, IV. 3-14 (see p. 19), upon which, just as upon other Upaniṣads, Gauḍapāda draws so much, as is evident from the work itself,³¹ how can we think that YV is here the source of GK? On the contrary, a careful perusal of YV will at once show that in his answer to the question put to him by Rāma about the difference between wakefulness and dream Vasiṣṭha has written a number of ślokas (YV, IV. 19. 9 ff), and attempted thereby only to explain what is very briefly stated in GK. Does this fact point to the priority or posteriority of YV to GK?³²

³¹ See next section.
³² According to Atreya the date of YV is the sixth century A.D. But his arguments do not appear to me to be strong or convincing. It may be noted here in this connection that there are two things that may specially be mentioned in Śvāmi Bhūmānanda’s “paper entitled Priority of the Yogavasiṣṭha to Saṅkarācārya: (1) Saṅkara quotes (BS, III. 4, 50), the Vasittha dharmaśāstra (ed. A. A. Führer, Bombay, 1883), X. 18;

§ 10. The Works of Gauḍapāda

With regard to the works ascribed to Gauḍapāda the only one that can be accepted with certainty as written by him is the ĀŚ. The authorship of a few other books is ascribed to him. The most important of them is a bhāṣya on the Saṅkhyakārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa. There is a bhāṣya under his name also on the Uttaragīta. But there is no strong ground for holding that they are actually by Gauḍapāda, the author of the ĀŚ, nor is there anything of the nature that can decide the case otherwise, though I incline to subscribe to the view that they are not by Gauḍapāda. A commentary, too, on the NUTU is attributed to him. There are three other works which pass under the name of Gauḍapāda as their author. A commentary on the Durgāsaptāsāti is one of them. This is referred to by the great Tantric teacher Bhāskaraśārya in his commentary on the same and (2) mentions the name of Vasiṣṭha in his commentary on the BG, XIII. 4. But the question whether these two Vasiṣṭhas, the Vasiṣṭha of YV as well as the Vasiṣṭha in the list of the teachers of the Saṅkara school are identical, remains to be settled, though according to some of the authors of the tiks on BG, the Vasiṣṭha referred to by Saṅkara is the author of YV.

¹ There is a manuscript, No. 1405, of this work in the Grantha character in the Visvabharati Library, Santiniketan. The following occurs there on folio 24a:

kavacam bijam ādiṣṭam argale śaktir iṣṭate
kilakam kilakam prāhūr saptacam mahāmanoh

iti gaundapādabhūtyavacanah.

And again: yady api vedāntamūrdhanyai gauḍapādācāryai sarvam idam nirūṣṭṣaciptapādaśrātraparastvena vyākhyātam.

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work. The other two are Tantric treatises, *viz.*, *Subhagodaya* and *Śrīvidyārātmāstra*.

Here arises a question: Can we think that there are two Gaṇḍapādās, one Vedantic and the other Tantric, being the authors of works on the Vedanta and Tantricism respectively? In the *Śrīvidyārāma* which is a Tantric work by Prabhācārya, Śaṅkarācārya is said to have been the founder of a Tantric school. There is in this work also a list of the succession of his teachers and disciples. But it seems impossible to reconcile this list with the traditional one of the Advaita Vedanta school. So the list in the *Śrīvidyārāma* hardly helps us in this matter. Nevertheless, we may simply note in the list given here that there are two Gaṇḍapādās, one of them being mentioned as Gaṇḍa (No. 55) and the other Gaṇḍapādaka (No. 65), who is, in fact, the same as Gaṇḍapāda, the suffix -ka being evidently on account of the metrical exigency. On this the reader may form his own judgment.

§ 11. The Sources

The sources of the Āgamaśāstra, which one naturally desires to know, roughly fall into three classes, *viz.*

1. *Vedic texts*: Vedas and Upaniṣads,
2. *Schools or Teachers*,
3. *Buddhist works*.

With regard to class (1), these are mostly Upaniṣads, Vedas being quoted in not more than two cases (III. 24b and c). It is, however, to be noted in this connexion that when there is a passage which occurs both in a Veda and in an Upaniṣad it is very difficult to ascertain as to whether the reference is actually to the former or to the latter. For instance, here in III. 24b we have indro māyābhir iti. This is found in RV, VI. 47. 18 as well as in BU, II. 5. 19. How can we, in this case, ascertain that the reference is in fact to the one and not to the other? The case is exactly the same with the second instance (III. 24 c) of a quotation from a Veda. Similarly with regard to II. 24 we know much of kāla ‘time’ from the AV, XIX. 53, 54 and the ŚU, I. 2, IV. 1. But here it is very difficult to conclude whether the reference is actually to the former or to the latter, or to the both of them. Again, the Kalavīdas ‘knowers of time’ are, as says Ānanda āgiri, astronomers, and it is not impossible that our author might have alluded to some work of them, or simply to the view held by them or to their school.

In the course of the present Annotation many references to different Upaniṣads have been inserted in support of a point or points in our text, but which of them, if any, is in fact meant by the author in any particular case we cannot say definitely. It may be that in some cases the Upaniṣadic authority, really meant by the author, is different from what the present
annotator has quoted. For instance, with regard to pāda (II. 21) which is capable of being interpreted differently, various references are given in the Annotation, or still other references may be shown. But it is not easy to ascertain the particular reference or references the author himself intended. Nevertheless, it is certain that the author had in his mind any one or more of these or similar passages when he was writing his book.

Among the references in the Annotation the names of the Bhagavadgītā (XIII. 22 in II. 22 of our text) and the Brahmasūtra (II. 3. 19-32 in II. 23 of our text) will be found. But we cannot be sure that these two works are actually drawn upon by our author, though they may elucidate the texts to some extent.

Similarly for the explanation of our text there will be found some references in the Annotation to such minor Upaniṣads (for instance, in II. 32) as Avadhūta Up., 8; ĀśramaO, 4; AtmaO, 31; JābalaO, 6; TripurātāpaniO, V. 10; BrahmasūtraO, 10. But whether these minor Upaniṣads are prior to the Āgamaśāstra is to be left as an open question, though some of them such as BrahmasūtraO and JābalaO, are before Śaṅka r as is quite clear from his commentary on BS, III. 2. 18 and 4. 20 respectively.

In five places (III. 12, 24, 25, 26 and 36) passages from Upaniṣads are expressly quoted, while in III. 11 and 23 the words Taïtiriya and śrutī are actually mentioned and in II. 3 a passage of the BU, IV. 3. 10 is clearly alluded to with the word śrayate. Similarly in II. 5 another passage from the same Upaniṣad (BU, IV. 3. 14)

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is clearly referred to though with the word maniṣins¹ and not śrutī as before and usual. In III. 12, 13 and 15 references to Upaniṣads are also very clear. In two or three more places (I. 2, 8, 9) references seem to have been made to Upaniṣads.²

It will be seen that no Upaniṣad is quoted or referred to by our author in his last Book, Alātasānti. There is absolutely nothing of the kind.³

As regards class (2) of the sources readers are referred to § 6: The Name of the Work of the present Introduction, p. lxiii, where the names of different schools or teachers alluded to in our text are mentioned.

It appears from these names that some of the schools or teachers mentioned by our author here were undoubtedly prominent at his time, but gradually they have lost their prominence and have fallen almost into a state of oblivion.

With regard to class (3) of our sources, i.e., the Buddhist texts, the reader is referred to the Annotation on II. 31, 32, 35 (cf. 38), 44, 46, and most of the kārikās in Book IV.

§ 12. The Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad as the Main Upaniṣadic Source of the Āgamaśāstra

In the preceding section we have seen that the BU is one of the sources of the AS in which there are

¹ As in the Upaniṣad itself (BU, IV. 3. 14) there is atha khañ avahā our author seems to have chosen to take the nominative as maṇiṣins and not śrutī. See II. 1, 5; IV. 54, and Appendix X: Additional Notes, II. 1.

² See the Annotation.

³ With regard to the word dārśā in IV. 100 we cannot say definitely that it refers to KU, II. 12, as it is often found also in Buddhist works.
some quotations from or references to the former. In the present section it is proposed to examine to some extent the inter-relationship of these two works by which we shall see that the main Upanisadic source of the ĀS is the BU.

From the text of the ĀS as it is before us it is quite clear that G a u d a pādā has drawn much upon it. In fact, Book I of our text is mainly based on it. Nay, it may be declared that Book I of the ĀS is nothing but an epitome or essence of the BU, IV. 2-3 with some clear exposition and an addition of the upāsanā¹ ‘meditation’ of Praṇava or Om. By writing the first Book of the ĀS G a u d a pādā has in reality made a key to that portion of the BU, without which it would have been extremely difficult to understand its true significance.

The opening part of the ĀS, i.e., the part dealing with the three divisions of the One (i.e., Puruṣa) such as Viśva, etc. (I. 1-4, 10), is to be found only in different words in the BU, IV. 2-3, as says Śaṅkara very clearly on BU, IV. 3. 1 (p. 519).²

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¹ III. 1 and Appendix X on it.
² atra ca jātrastvapnasangupaptairūtuṣiṇyā upanyāstāṇī anyaprasaṅgena indīhaḥ (IV. 2, 2), praviviktāhārataḥ ‘I. V. 2, 3), sarve prāśaḥ (IV. 2, 4), sa eva neti neti (IV. 2, 4). idānāṁ jātrastvapnaiddvāresāvah mahāta taskṛta vistarato ‘dhīmāgam karvaṇāḥ (p. 519).

See here also Śaṅkara’s observation in showing the relationship between BU, IV. 2 and IV. 3 (p. 518):

“vijñānam anāṃnam brahmy avagatam. tad eva punar indharanajñāḥ praviviktāhāras tato ‘ntarādhyāye līṅgatā praviviktāhāratah tataḥ preṇa jagaṣṭātām. See further on IV. 3. 1 (p. 519).

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We see in our text (I. 1-4, 10) that the One, i.e., Puruṣa³ (=Brahman = Ātman of the MāU, 2) owing to different states is called Viśva, Taijasa, Prajñā and Turya (or Turiya, I. 15). None of these names excepting Prajñā (BU, IV. 3. 21 and 35) is, however, to be found in the BU. For Viśva it reads (IV. 2. 2) Indha ‘shining’ which is the same as Indra, the former, as the Upaniṣad would say, being used by people cryptically.⁴ As to why the Puruṣa is called Indha S u r e ś v a r a says (BBV, IV. 2. 37) that ‘because he shines day and night’ (idhyate ‘harmām yasmand indhanamā tataḥ pumān). This ‘shining’ implies, according to A n a n d a g i r i , his enjoyment of gross things in the waking state (sthitā upadhyātyetvaya sada jāgare śphūtā). Śaṅkara is found to have employed both the terms in his commentary on the BU, Indha (BU, IV. 3. 1, p. 519) and Vaiśaṅkara (BU, IV. 2. 24, pp. 513-519), but not Viśva, so far as goes my information, with regard to the commentary referred to. From the text of the BU (IV. 2. 3, 3. 11, 35) itself it appears that

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³ As in the original of the text, i.e., BU, IV. 3 we have this word.
⁴ It is a well-known saying in Brahmaṇas that gods are fond of the cryptic, as it were, and dislike the evident ‘parokṣaśāya iva hi devah pratyaśadviṣaḥ —BU, IV. 2. 2). S u r e ś v a r a says (in BBV, IV. 2. 37; p. 1369) that even now people do not like to call a superior person directly by his personal name; pratyaśadviṣaḥ pradviṣiṣi ‘muktiṣāsnāṁ ta ity utkṛti kāmoyanti ca! ‘

In referring to a superior person the use of amāka ‘so and so’ or unī in Bengali, is still found. It is to be noted that in the country, at least in Bengal, a woman does not call her husband by his name, but for it uses such words as unī.
if any other term for Viśva is to be chosen from that work it is only śārīra ‘existing in the body,’ ‘embodied.’ But Gaṇḍapāda has not accepted it, but has adopted a new name, Viśva, probably thinking the latter to be more expressive of the idea behind it. Finally in the hand of the author of MaU it has undergone a further change in the form of Vaiśvānara ‘common-to-all’ perhaps for the same purpose.

Of these names Turya (or Turya) ‘fourth’ is evidently not a name in fact, but as it is described after the first three Viśva, etc., it is so called, being their fourth. In the BU Indhī-Indra is a name, no doubt, but Taijasa and Prājña were originally mere adjectives, becoming names afterwards. Sometimes the appellation Līgāṭman is found for Taijasa, as writes Śaṅkara in his commentary on the BU, IV. 2. 3 (p. 515), IV. 3. 1 (p. 518). Similarly sāsūpta is used for Prājña as says Sūrēśvara (BBV, IV. 3. 5, p. 1377). Undoubtedly this word clearly expresses the state of the Person.

As regards the wording of our text in the first Book of ĀS with which we are now concerned the following comparison may be made:

(i) With regard to Viśva our author writes (I. 2):
dakṣinakṣimukhe viśvah. See here BU, IV. 2. 2: indho ha nāma ya’ yan daksīne ’ksan puṃsah (= BU, II. 3. 5; IV. 2. 2; V. 5. 2, 4). ¹⁵

(ii) In I. 2 we have akāśe ca hṛdi prājñāḥ, and we read ya eso ’ntar hṛdaya akāśah in BU, II. 1. 17, IV. 2. 3, 4. 22. Cf. BU, I. 6. 1.

(iii) In I. 3 there is pravīviktaḥ, and in this connexion we read tasmād eṣa pravīviktaḥārata irāva bhavati in the BU, IV. 2. 3.

(iv) With regard to the third or sāsūpta state of the Person in I. 3, 4 there is anāndabhus or ananda, and in BU, IV. 3. 32 we read eso’sya parama ananda. See also, Op. cit., IV. 3. 33. ⁹

It is to be noted here that the above conception of Puruṣa is found also in ChU, VIII. 7-12 in the course of Prajāpati’s instruction to Indra and Viśnu. Here, too, the first three names, Viśva, etc. are not given, Sāṅkara has used different appellations for them; viz., for Viśva he writes Aksipuruṣa ‘eye-person’ (VIII. 7, 4, 7 9), or Chāyāpurusa ‘shadow-person’ (VIII. 10.4), or Chāyatman ‘shadow-self’ (VIII. 7. 4, 8. 1, 2);¹⁰

he is visible to our eyes, and this means that he is the ordinary incorporated soul ‘śārīra ātman’. This is quite evident from Gaṇḍapāda’s employment of the word ‘mukha after daksinākṣi’ (I. 1: daksinākṣimukhe ‘in the front of the right eye’). As to why the right eye is specially mentioned Sūrēśvara says (BBV. V. 2. 37-38, p. 1365) that it may be due to some excellence of the right eye, which might have been known to the Āśīta, or to the fact that the right limbs of a man is more vigorous than the left ones. Sometimes the left eye is also referred to in BU, IV. 2. 3. See below.

¹⁵ See also BU, II. 5. 8.
¹⁹ Mark that the MaU is here silent.
²⁰ The idea that a person is seen in the eye and specially in the right one is often found in Upaniṣadic texts. Besides the BU quoted above see ChU, IV. 15. 1, VII. 7. 4; KU, IV. 2, 17; MU, VII. 11. It simply signifies that
for Taijasa he has Svapnātman (VIII. 11. 1-2); and for Prājña he employs Sūṣuptastha (VIII. 11. 1-2).\footnote{It is to be noted that Sāṅkara while in his commentary on BU gives all the three names, Viśva, etc., he does not do so in the commentary on the ChU. It is further to be noticed that he, though so very fond of quoting truti does not refer to ChU in his commentary on BU, nor BU in that on ChU.}

For Turya we have in the Upaniṣad (VIII. 12. 3)

A few words may be added here as to why Viśva is said to be in the eye or in the right eye and consequently is called Akṣiparaṇa, Chāyāpuraṇa or Chāyātman.

To understand the Highest Self (paramātman) is very difficult for a man who is not properly trained. It took Indra, as says the ChU, VIII. 7. 3 ff., not less than one hundred and one years to realize him. So he is instructed to do it gradually, following the maxim of the view of the star Arundhatī 'Alcor' belonging to the Great Bear (Arundhatīdolarsanangūga). The star being a very small one cannot be seen at once. So a man in order to show it to another man first points out to the latter somethings other than the actual star one by one and finally succeeds in doing so. Sāṅkara writes (ChU, VIII. 12.) the same thing in another way: On the second night of the bright half of a month a man desirous of showing a second man the fine moon first points out a tree before the latter saying: 'See, there is the moon.' In the same way he points out to him a series of trees one by one and then the peak of a mountain, on which the moon is visible, and thus the second man actually sees her. Similarly in our case, the mind of an ordinary man being too much attached to external things cannot at once grasp the Highest Self who is extremely subtle. Therefore, he is first instructed to know his incorporated Self 'śaśira ātman', other Selves or the different states of the 'self being described gradually. Now, how to know the corporated Self? What is the best means for it? The sage of the Upaniṣads says: 'Look here. Here is my right eye. Look at it. What do you find in it?' Certainly he would see himself reflected thereon. And pointing out the shadow the sage would tell him 'Here is the Self.' This is elaborately described in the episode of Pajñapati and his two disciples, Indra and Viscocana, in the ChU, VIII. 7-12, where it is said that the Self is to be seen not only in the eyes, but also on a looking glass aśḍara, water ap), and an earthen jar filled with water (aśḍaraśa). Sāṅkara rightly adds here (ChU, VIII. 7. 4) also such things as the blade of a sword kshaṇḍgāḍi. See Ku, IV. 2, 11. 17-18.

\footnote{See BG, XV. 17.18: uttamānta puruṣaḥ tv anyāḥ paramātmanah udhyāya | yo lokatrayam āvīṣṭaḥ bhūḥ tattvaś ca yasyaśe | yasmat kṣaram añito āham akṣaraś api cottomaḥ | atosmi loke veda ca prabhūtaḥ puruṣottamaḥ.}

\footnote{Sāṅkara refers to BU, V. 6. 1 (sa vā sāyaḥ ātman, but not appropriately.}

\footnote{See AS, II. 21.}

\footnote{For minor Upaniṣads see Brahmopaniśad, 2: tatra catupādaḥ brahma vibhāti; NP 1U, V. 1; NUTU, 1; RUTU, 3: so 'yam ātma catupāda.}

\footnote{It is quite appropriately Uttamaḥ puruṣaḥ 'the Highest Self.'}

That this conception of Puruṣa in ChU is a later development of that in the BU goes without saying. Now, though the ChU like the BU is far earlier than our text, there is nothing which can show that it is the former and not the latter which has been drawn upon by our author; yet, we have already seen what can be said in favour of BU.

In support of the view that the main source of the AS is BU we may discuss here one point more. The idea of Brahman (=Puruṣa = Ātman) as having four fourths or quarters (catuspāda) at the beginning of the MaU is not a new one as it is found long before it even in the RV, X. 90. 3\footnote{See BG, XV. 17.18.: uttamaḥ puruṣaḥ tv anyāḥ paramātmanah udhyāya | yo lokatrayam āvīṣṭaḥ bhūḥ tattvaś ca yasyaśe | yasmat kṣaram añito āham akṣaraś api cottomaḥ | atosmi loke veda ca prabhūtaḥ puruṣottamaḥ.} as well as in ChU, III. 18. 2.\footnote{Sāṅkara refers to BU, V. 6. 1 (sa vā sāyaḥ ātman, but not appropriately.}

The difference of these texts lies, however, in the fact that the quarters (pādas) are different in them. For instance, in the RV referred to above all the beings (viśā bhūtāni) are regarded as one quarter, and the remaining three quarters (tripād) are said to be in the heaven, while in the ChU, IV. 5-8
the four quarters each consisting of four parts (catuṣṭkāla) are named as Prakāśavat 'shining,' Anantavat 'endless,' Jyotisvat 'luminous,' and Āyatanavat 'having an abode.' In another place of the same Upaniṣad (III. 18. 1–6) the quarters of Brahman are described differently with reference to person (adhyātma) and with reference to divinities (adhiḍaivata). With reference to person they are speech (vāc), breath (prāṇa), the eye (cakṣus) and the ear (śrotra) representing respectively with reference to the divinities fire (agni), wind (vāyu), the sun (āditya) and quarter (diś). But in the MaU the quarters are described quite in a new way and it is remarkable. It is said that these four quarters are nothing but the same Self with its four states. The first three of them are waking (jāgrat), dreaming (soṣpna), and deep sleep (suṣupta). And the Self with them is called Vaiśvānara ‘common-to-all,’ Tajasa ‘brilliant,’ and Prāṇa ‘intelligent’ respectively. The fourth state is the true or absolute essence of the Self having no connexion whatsoever with anything else. In this state the Self is regarded as sānta ‘quiescent,’ śīva ‘blissful’ and advaita ‘without a second.’

It is to be noted here that while in RV and ChU the Puruṣa or Brahman is represented as the Universal or World Self, in the MaU it is represented as the individual Self though ultimately in fact it is identical with the Universal Self.

Now, it is remarkable that though in the MaU, as we have seen above, there is a clear mention and description of the four quarters of the Self (catuṣṭpāda), in the ĀŚ it is not so. Even the particular word catuṣṭpāda or any of its possible equivalents is not to be found here. Up to kārikā 5 we come across the three-fold division of the Self, viz., Viṣva (instead of Vaiśvānara as in the MaU, 3), Tajasa and Prāṇa (1. 1–4). It is clearly said in out text (1. 1–2) that the One exists in three ways in the body, and this idea is further expressed in 1. 3–5. Yet, it cannot be said from this that the idea of four quarters is altogether unknown to the author of the ĀŚ, as it is implied in 1. 10–15 in which the word turiya or turiya, which is the same in meaning ‘fourth,’ as caturtha in the MaU, 7, is used. It is further implied by the author’s employment of the word pāda in 1. 25. This difference between the ĀŚ and the MaU with regard to the idead of four pādas, implied in the former and expressed in the latter, is significant. It shows that the origin of the ĀŚ is not the MaU, but the BU in which the idea of pādas in this connexion did not then so develop.

En passant we should like to discuss one thing more. There is a very striking difference at the very

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15 For details see the Upaniṣad.

16 See BU, IV. 1. 2–7 where each of the following six things, vāc ‘speech,’ prāṇa ‘breath,’ cakṣus ‘eye,’ śrotra ‘ear,’ manas ‘mind,’ and hṛdayā ‘heart’ is regarded as a pāda. Consult Sāṅkara and Suresvara (BBV, IV. 1. 16 ff) according to whom each of the above six is explained as catuṣṭpāda ‘having four quarters.’

17 This fact will also show that the ĀŚ is prior to the MaU in which the obscure points of the former are made clear.
beginning between the two texts, MaU and ĀS. It is this that while the MaU begins (1.2) highly extolling Om symbolically identifying it with Brahman-Ātman, the ĀS has here nothing of the kind. It simply proceeds gradually to describe the One with its first three states, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājñā (1.1-5) the fourth having come afterwards (1.10). Here in the ĀS till kārikā 19 there is no mention of, or reference to Om. So it is to be found that here in our text mention is made first of the One and then of Om. This order is quite right and logical. For, here there are two things, the object which is to be approached or realized (upeyā) and its means (upāyā). And it is reasonable that the object is stated first and then the means. Here the object is the realization of the Puruṣa or Self in its absolute state and the means is the meditation of Om. This is done in the ĀS, but it is quite reverse in the MaU, for here the means Om is stated first and then gradually the object (3.7) which is repeated later on (12). The author of the MaU seems to have been much influenced by earlier Upaniṣads, (such as ChU, I.1.1; TU, I.8.1) and too much bent on the glorification of Om, and this is why he has changed the reasonable order found in the ĀS. There is no upāsanā of Praṇava in the BU and this is why our author of the ĀS did not include it in the main thesis of his work. Then independently of the BU in which no means for the realization of the object is shown Gauḍapāda has added the remaining portion of the first Book of his ĀS setting forth Praṇava and its upāsanā.

§13. Pre-Śaṅkara Teachers of the Vedānta and their Works

So far with regard to Book I. Let us now take up Book II and see the connexion it has with the BU. This Book is rightly called Vaiṣṇava ‘unreality’ as it shows the unreality of the world in the waking state just like that of the experience in dream. This is the subject discussed herein by Gauḍapāda with various arguments. And here, too, he has taken his stand on the BU, IV.3, where it is clearly declared that the two states, waking and dream, are in fact one. Not only are passages quoted from the BU, or referred to by him (II.3,5), but they are supported by his own arguments. This will be quite clear if one takes pains to read BU, IV.3 and the second Book of the ĀS. And it should be noted that here in the latter we find the oldest interpretation of that portion of the BU, though in a concise, yet, very substantial form.

In Book III we are referred to BU not less than six times (12, 13, 15, 24, 25 and 26).

Thus we may safely conclude that the main Upaniṣadic source of the ĀS is the BU.
Bhagavadgītā, it may conveniently be divided into two, pre-Śaṅkara and post-Śaṅkara.

Among the teachers of the pre-Śaṅkara Vedanta the most distinguished is Bādarāyana, the celebrated author of the Brāhmaṇas, the source of which is the Upaniṣads. It is the Brāhmaṇas that constitute the Sūtra-prasthāna ‘the Course of Sūtras.’

We all know that the difference of opinions is but natural. Owing to various factors the same thing is viewed differently by different persons. So it is found in the Brāhmaṇas that there are both the offering of oblation before sun-rise (anudita-homa) and the offering of oblation after sun-rise (udita-homa), there being a regular discussion thereof establishing that the latter is preferable and not the former (Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, XXV. 5-6; Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa, II. 1. 2-8; cf. however, II. 1. 2. 12). There are also functions in these Brāhmaṇas, which are discarded saying that these are not to be preferred (adyeta) or performed (kārya), though they are actually enjoined by others. There are many such contradicting, obscure or dubious cases, and an attempt has also been made in later works to find out a solution of these problems.¹

Now as with regard to karmam the teachers had their different views, so they differed also on points of jñāna. In some cases they entertained even quite opposite views. For instance, with regard to creation while a sage of a certain Upaniṣad (i.e., TU, II. 7. 1;

¹ For instance, see MD, X, 8, 6 with reference to Sañceta-bhārata.

see ChU, III, 19, 1) tells us: ‘In the beginning, verily, this was non-existent (asad va idam agra āsīd),’ but from another text (i.e., Aitareya Aranyaka, II. 4, 1) we know: ‘Verily, in the beginning this was only Self (atmā va idam eka evāgra āsīd).’ And the following is found in the ChU, VI, 2. 1-2, evidently refuting TU, II. 7. 1 quoted above: ‘Verily, in the beginning this was, my dear, existent only one without a second. On this some say that verily in the beginning this was non-existent only one without a second; from that non-existent the existent was produced. But, my dear, whence could it be? How from non-existent could the existent be produced? On the contrary, my dear, verily, in the beginning this was existent, only one without a second.’

From the above it is quite clear that all the śrutis do not always tell us the same thing, clearly there is difference among them.² Such being the case the question arises as to which of them is to be accepted as valid and which is to be rejected as not valid. How can one say that this is valid, and that is not valid? For, as śruti there is no difference whatsoever.³ Therefore if you accept one, you will have to accept all of them. And in that case you cannot arrive at any definite

² See with the Prabha of Puyārśi and the Vāyupadīya of Bhartṛhari, I, 8:

tavyathavādārūpam niṣcaya svavikalpajh
ekatvāṁ dvaitināṁ ca pravādā bahuddhā sminyāh

³ Śaṅkara has rightly observed (BS, III, 2, 15: nahi vedavāyānām kasyacid arthavatvam kasyacid anarthavatvam iti yuktam pratipattum pramāṇavāvātāt.

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conclusion. And if there is no conclusion of any kind the teaching of the Vedānta has no value to a person as it does not or cannot lead him to his final goal. The Vedānta is not a science for mere speculation, for one is to adjust one's life according to it. For only in this way one can fulfill the mission of one's life. It was therefore felt absolutely necessary by the teachers to bring into a harmony, a compromise or a connected sequence, all conflicting, obscure or dubious statements of the sages of the Upaniṣads. This was the origin on one hand of the Mimāṃsāsaūtras with regard to the question of kārmāṇ, and on the other of the Brahmasūtras in respect of jñāna.  

Let us however put here a question: Are we right in thinking that even through the methods or maxims (aṅgāyā) shown in the Brahmasūtras in connection with the explanation of the Upaniṣadic texts, we can in all cases get their true significance? By 'true significance' we mean the significance intended by their respective sages. It is true that the word aṣat may imply in some cases 'unfolded' or 'that of which the name and form are unfolded' (āvyaktas or avyaktanāmaścintā). For instance, see aṣat ca sac ca parama vyāmana (RV, X. 5. 7); or nāsod aśā na sac aśā tadbhām (Op. cit., X. 129. 1). In such cases aṣat does not mean 'false, non-existent' (nirupakṣaḥ aṣat), as the son of a barren woman, though in other cases it may actually mean so. Now considering the above passage of the Chū it is clear that the word aṣat in the Tū quoted above is used in its literal sense, i.e., the sense of unreal non-existent (nirupakṣya aṣat), though an attempt is made in explaining it away figuratively to mean 'unfolded' (āvyaktas) according to the subsequently established maxims of the Vedānta. But a question arises: Well, in the Tū the word aṣat may imply avyaktas as you maintain (see here BU, I. 4. 7; tad bhodan tathā avyaktas aṣāt), but how do you ascertain that this meaning is in fact intended by the sage himself? How do you know that he does not want here to mean thereby absolutely non-existent (nirupakṣya aṣat)? We can only accept that the meaning avyaktas is your explanation. But this may or may not be intended by the sage himself. There is this doubt that can hardly be removed.

§13  INTRODUCTION

It is well-known that Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa are the authors of the Mimāṃsāsaūtras and the Brahmasūtras respectively. But there are reasons to think that there were also other authors of the Mimāṃsa- and the Brahma-sūtras which are different from the extant ones. For instance, Bādarāyaṇa, a teacher, is quoted not less than four times both in the present Mimāṃsa- (III. 1. 3; VI. 1. 27; VIII. 3. 6; IX. 2. 33) and Brahma-sūtras (I. 2. 30; III. 1. 11; IV. 3. 7; IV. 4. 10). From this it may appear that Bādarāyaṇa was an author of both the sūtras. But we cannot ascertain only from this that he was actually so. It may be that he had some views on some particular points of kārmāṇ and Brahman and these are alluded to in those two works by their authors. Jaimini, as the author of the Mimāṃsāsaūtras is known to us all. He is referred to eleven times in the Brahmasūtras on different topics (I. 2. 28, 31, 3. 31, 4. 18; III. 2. 40, 4. 2, 18, 40; IV. 3. 12, 4. 5, 11). Here, too, we may think that Jaimini wrote also Brahmasūtras. But though from only this it is not safe to decide that he really did so, Sureśvara's Nī (2nd ed. by Hiriyanna), p. 52, shows that it is a fact. Kāśakṛtstna, a teacher, is quoted in BS, I. 4. 22, and his Mimāṃsa is mentioned not less than three times by Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya. This Mimāṃsa may be both Kārmimimāṃsa and Brahmamimāṃsa (i.e., the Mimāṃsāsaūtras and the Brahmasūtras).

5 See Jaimini's Sūtraśāstra in the Garbe-Festgabe, 1927.
or either of them, and in this case probably the latter. 
Bādarāyana in his BS refers also to Ātreya (III. 4. 44), Āśmāratha (I. 2. 29, 4. 20), Kārṣṇājini (III. 1. 9), and Aujulomi (I. 4. 21, III. 4. 45, IV. 4. 6).

Then comes a number of teachers, some of whom flourished before and some after the great Śaṇkara. Some of them explained the BS of Bādarāyana, some the Bhagavadgītā, and some an Upāniṣad or Upāniṣads. There were also some who interpreted more than one kind of the above works. This was done either by writing a gloss (vṛtti) or a commentary (bhaṣya). As we are concerned here with the preŚaṇkara Vedānta the following teachers who are connected with it may be mentioned in this connexion.

So far as we know the first of all these teachers is Bodhayana (about the first or second century A.D.). He wrote a lengthy gloss or commentary (vistirṇa vṛtti) on the BS of Bādarāyana on which is based the Viṣistadvaita system of Rāmānuja, the Mīmāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini, and the Devatākanda, in other words, on the whole of the Mīmāṃsāsūstra. This

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8 He is mentioned also in MD, IV. 3. 17, VI. 7. 35.
9 The Bhedabheda doctrine of the Nimbārka school owes its existence to him.
10 To them may be added the names of Kāśyapa alluded to by Śaṅdilya in his Bhūtisūtras, 29, and of such sages as Asita, Deva, Bhrigu, and Parśara referred to in different works. But we do not know if they were the authors of different Brhamśūtras or if any one of them wrote also Mīmāṃsāśūtras, though we know something of their views from the fragmentary accounts available from certain books, some of which are referred to above.

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vṛtti is called Kṛtaṇi (Prapācacyḍaya, TSS, p. 39; Journal of the American Oriental Society, 1911, p. 17).

Next comes Upavarsa. He is credited with the authorship of a vṛtti on both the Mīmāṃsāśūtras and Brahmaśūtras. This vṛtti was, however, in fact a bhaṣya or Mahābhāṣya and consequently he was regarded as a Mahābhāṣyakāra as well as a Vṛttikāra, being the author of the vṛtti.

According to Rāmānuja (Vedārthasaṁgraha, p. 154) and Śrīnīvāsa Aδāsa (Yatindramata-dipikā, Poona ed., p. 2) Guhadeva, Kapardika (or Kapardin) and Bhāruci are three ancient Vedānta teachers and authors. The former two, being referred to by Rāmānuja among the śītas ‘wise men’, seem to have been in favour of the Viṣistadvaita-vāda. One Bhāruci as an author of a Dharmaśūstra is mentioned in such works as Vijnanesvara’s Mitakṣara on the Yajnavalkya-sūnti (I. 18, II. 124), and Madhavacarya’s tīkā on the Parasaraśamhitā (II. 2. 3, Bombay Sanskrit series ed., p. 510). It is not known if the Vedāntic Bhāruci is identical with Bhāruci, the writer on the Dharmaśūstra. If it is so, he may be held to have belonged to the first half of the ninth century A.D.

Bhārtihari’s name is found among a host of writers on the Vedānta (Siddhārthaya, p. 5). He may be identified with the celebrated author of the Vākyapadiya (600-650 A.D.), the very first kārikā of which points to the Vedāntic doctrine.
With him is mentioned in the same work Bhartrmitra. According to the Nyāyaratnākara on the Ślokavārttika (I. 10) he wrote a commentary on the Mimāṁsāśutras and made the Mimāṁsāśāstra atheistic. Whether this Mimāṁsist Bhartrmitra and the Vedāntic Bhartrmitra are one and the same is not known, nor do we know anything of any Vedāntic work that might have been written by the latter.

Brahmanandin (or Brahmānandin) is another teacher. He is known as the Vākyakāra or Chāndogyavākyakāra quoted or referred to by Rāmānuja in his commentary on BS and Madhusūdana Sarasvati in his tīkā on the Saṁkṣepasārīraka (III.218-220). According to Bhāskara on BS, I. 4. 25, Brahmānandin approved the Parināma-vāda, but Madhusūdana Sarasvati (Op. cit.) is of opinion that it was in fact gradually to lead one to Saddhādevaita-vāda ‘Pure monism’ through the Vivarta-vāda or the doctrine maintaining that the appearance of the universe is imposed on Brahman which is the only reality, the phenomenal world being held to be a mere illusion.

After him is Dravidacārya or Dra-midacārya (cir. 750 A.D.). He was in favour of the Vīśiṣṭādvaita-vāda ‘Qualified monism’ and as such is mentioned and quoted by Rāmānuja in his commentary on BS. As Madhusūdana Sarasvati says (Saṁkṣepasārīraka, III. 218-220), he wrote a bhāṣya on Brahmānandin’s vākyas owing to which the latter was called Vākyakāra (Brahmanandī-viracita-

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nāṁ vākyānāṁ sūtrarūpānāṁ bhāṣyakartā dravidā-
cāryo'pi). It is known from Ānandagīri’s tīkā on Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya on the ChU that Dra vidā-
cārya wrote a vast commentary on the ChU compared with which Śaṅkara’s commentary was a smaller one (alpagramantha). He is said to have written a bhāṣya also on the BS.

Brahmadatta was a renowned teacher of the Vedānta. In the Prapañcalḍaṇḍya he is said to have composed a commentary on the BS. Some of his views are alluded to in such works as the Sarvārtha-siddhi (II.16), a tīkā by Veṅkaṭānātha desika on his Tatvamuktaikalapa; Nsi, I. 67-68; and Śaṅkara’s commentary on the BU, I. 4. 7. One of them may be mentioned here and it is this that it is the long bhāvanā ‘meditation’ of the knowledge arising from the Vedānta-vākyā and not the knowledge itself, as holds Śaṅkara, that removes one’s illusion. Some informations of him as collected by Hiriyanna will be found in Nsi (2nd ed.), p. xxiii, and the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Vol. II, Part I, p. 1 ff. See also Gopinath Kaviraj, Op. cit., p. 13 ff.

Bhartṛprapaṅca was also a great Vedāntic teacher before Śaṅkara. It is known from the words of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (Saṁkṣepasārīraka, I. 7) that Bhartṛprapaṅca explained the Sūtras of Vyāsa, i.e., Bādarāyaṇa (kaścit tattvātmā vyā-
cakṣaṇair bhartṛprapaṅcādibhiḥ). Yāmūnācārya (Op. cit., p. 5) says that he was one of the writers on
the Vedānta, and we know from the introductory lines of Ānandagiri’s śīkā on Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya of BU (p. 2) that while Śaṅkara commented on the Upaniṣad belonging to the Kāvyā recension Bhartrīprapañca wrote his commentary on the text of the Mādhyaandina recension, and the former’s commentary was bigger than that of the latter. In many cases Ānandagiri in explaining Suresvara’s vārttiṣa on the BU, refers to or quotes from Bhartrīprapañca. Of all the commentators before Śaṅkara, the works of whom could not yet been discovered it is Bhartrīprapañca whose quotations are now mostly available. For the fragments gleaned together from his writings by Hiriyanna see The Indian Antiquary, 1924, pp. 76-86; and Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1925, pp. 439.

I should like to mention here one teacher more of the pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta. He is Sundarapāṇḍya. He was a great Mīmāṃsik and Vedāntin of South India (6th century A.D.). His three kārikās (gaṇamithyāvā) are quoted by Śaṅkara in the last portion of his commentary on BS, I. 1. 4. Amalananda in his Kalpataru (BS, III, 25) quotes his other three kārikās (niḥśreyārohānaprāpyā). These last three kārikās together with two more are cited by Kumārila in his Tantravārttiṣa (Benares ed.), pp. 852-853. It seems that these kārikās are from a vārttiṣa of Sundarapāṇḍya that he

§14. The Conspectus of the Contents of the Āgamaśāstra

Now we may give here a conspectus of the contents of our text, and in doing so Book I may conveniently be divided into two parts; part (i) containing kārikās I. 1-18, and part (ii) the remaining kārikās, i.e., I. 19-29. While part (i) discusses what is to be realized, part (ii) is devoted to show its means.

It is well-known that in the Upaniṣads all thoughts centre round the Puruṣa (Ātmān = Brahma), ‘Self’ who is ‘all that has been and that will be’ (RV, X, 90.2 : puruṣa evedaṃ sarvaṃ sad bhūtaṃ yac ca bhavyam). He must be known, according to the sages of Upaniṣads, for the fulfilment of the mission of one’s life.


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But how can he be known properly? As he is extremely subtle, Gaṇḍa pāda leads us gradually from the gross to the subtle, following our common and every-day experience. And in doing so he takes his stand on such Upaniṣads as the BU and ChU, and shows (I. 1-5) that the self, though in reality, only one (eka eva) remains in the body in three forms (tridhā dehe vyavasthitah), in accordance with his three states, jāgrat ‘waking’, svapna ‘dream’ and susupta ‘deep sleep’. When the self is in the waking state he is called Viśva ‘all’ (because as an embodied one (śāriśa) he is known to every man). In the state of dream he is named Taijasa ‘brilliant’ (because he himself is his light (svayamjyotis) in that condition; i.e., he does not depend for his light on others for seeing things there, as he does in the waking state in which he is to take light from such things as the sun, the moon, and fire). In the state of deep sleep he is called Prājña ‘intelligent’ (because he is never dissociated from his intelligence).

Viśva is the embodied self (śāriśa ātman), hence it is metaphorically said that he remains in the front of one’s right eye, meaning thereby that he may be seen reflected in one’s right eye (or in such things as

1 See BU, IV. 3. 1-9 : asena bhūṣaṇena jyotiṣa prasvapātya tatravem puruṣasvayamjyotir bhavati,
2 BU, IV. 3. 23 ff.; yad vai tan na paśyati paśyan vai tan na paśyati. nahi draśtu dīpti viparītāloppa vidyāe ‘cināśītāt, na tu tad dvīṣyam asti tato ‘nyad viśhakitaṃ yat paśyeta.
3 As the right portion of the body of a male person is said to be more powerful than the left the reflection therein is brighter. See p. lxxxvii, note 7.
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water or a looking-glass). Taijasa is in the mind, as it is here that a man dreams. Prājña’s seat is in the space of one’s heart. Again, Viśva has the consciousness of outside, Taijasa of inside, while Prājña has his consciousness compact. These three enjoy or experience the gross, the subtle and bliss respectively.

In passing the author refers (I. 6-9) to the opinion of the sages that all things have their origin and mentions different theories or purposes of creation. The first theory is this that one creates all as the rays of one’s mind (ceto’ṃśa). This simply means that it is the mind that appears in the form of the external world which has, in fact, no reality. This is the author’s own view.

Then he reverts to his main subject, the Self, and says (I-10) that besides his three forms or quarters (pādas) in accordance with the three states, waking, etc., referred to above, there is one form more; it is his real, natural or innate form. It has no particular appellation as he is beyond all expressions and is designated by the simple word Turya (or Turya) ‘fourth’ as occupying the fourth place in order with the above three. This Turya is above all changes and duality, all-pervading, and when realized removes all miseries.

Gaṇḍa pāda then shows (I. 11-18) some points of mutual agreement and disagreement of these four forms or quarters (pādas) of the Self, and says that one, if awakened from one’s sleep due to illusion

5 BU, IV. 3. 32 ff.
(māyā), can realize the state of Turya in which there is no duality at all. Duality, i.e., the expansion of the visible world, or the expressions, is mere illusion, and as such it has absolutely no reality. (Here it may be said that as there is no duality, in fact, it does not cease to exist. It is just a knot made and loosened by dint of illusion (māyayaiva kṛto granthir māyayaiva vimocitaḥ). Nevertheless, we have our common practice with duality, but it is only for our instruction, i.e., it is only by that practice that we can understand and attain to the state of non-duality which is the highest (advaitaṁ paramārthaḥ). Here ends the first part of Book I.

The second part (19-29) demonstrates the means for the realization of that non-duality or Turya. It is nothing but the upāsanā 'meditation' (dhyāna) of the Puruṣa (= Atman = Brahman), 'Self' through the symbol of Ṛṇava or Om.

In Book II Gauḍapāda discusses and establishes the unreality (vāitathya) of the external world. For this purpose he begins this Book as Book I basing it on the BU, specially on its IV. 3. 8 ff. He says referring to the sages⁷ of that Upaniṣad that all things in dream are unreal on the following three grounds:

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⁶ See the following saying of the Bhāgavat (i.e., Buddha), as quoted in MV, p. 540: aśāśena kṛto granthir aśāśena mocitaḥ.

⁷ Gauḍapāda does not employ here or elsewhere (i.e., II. 5, cf. IV. 54) such words as guṇ or muni (II. 35) as is generally done in similar cases, but he has here the word maniśīn. This word, which is a Vedic one forming a phrase with aha, is used twice in our work (II. 1, 5) as in KU, I. 3, 4 and BG, XVIII. 3 (with a variation that pṛa is prefixed to aha).
which are outside and fixed. There is, however, no difference between these two sorts of creation—the creation of those inside which exists as long as exists the thought (citā), and the creation of those outside, which exists as long as exists the (notion of) the two, i.e., the perceptible (grāhya) and the peripient (grāhaka); both of these two creations are only imagined and there is nothing for their difference. Again, the things which are within and not-manifest, and the things which are without and manifest are all imagined, indeed, the only difference there being that the latter are cognized by different organs of sense. As to the creation of the internal and external things he tells us (II. 16) that first one imagines oneself as a personal Self and then various things, internal and external, following the recollection of one's experience. Of this he says further (II. 17-18) that as in the dark a piece of rope, or a continuous line of water, etc., not determinately known, is imagined to be a snake, so is imagined the Self. Now when the piece of rope is known determinately the things that are imagined there disappear at once, so is to be known about the ascertainment of the Self (Ātman). It is an illusion of the Self owing to which he is imagined differently by different persons, such as the Breath (prāna) by those who know it, or Elements (bhūtas) by those who know them (II. 19-30). But the reality is, concludes (II. 31-34) the teacher, that according to those

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8 The illustration of sajī-sarpa which is so widely known in Vedāntic works is found perhaps for the first time here in the Ās. It is not in any of the Upanishads used for his Concordance by Jacob.
forms, functions and names of the jars may be different, but the space is the same. This is the case also with Jivas. As the space of a jar is neither a transformation, nor a part of the space, so is a Jiva neither a transformation nor a part of the Ātman. As the space is never soiled with a dirty thing such as dust and smoke, yet it appears to be so to the ignorant, so appears the Ātman with impurities to those who are not enlightened. In death or birth, in moving forward or backward, he exists in all bodies just like the space. All the conglomerations of limbs, etc., as in dream, are created by the illusion of the Ātman.

Now having shown what the Jiva is according to the Upaniṣads (TA, II, 1-6 and BU, II, 5) Gaṇḍha pāda says (III. 13) that the praise of the identity of the Jiva and the Ātman as well as the censure of their difference in the Upaniṣads is reasonable. And so, though their difference is found in some Upaniṣadic texts it is merely attributable with reference to the future state, and certainly it is not in the primary sense (III. 14-16). Indeed in the scriptures the creation is described with various illustrations showing a distinction between the Jiva and the Ātman. But in fact there is no distinction. It is only to lead one to the truth. For, there are three kinds of people, viz., of the lower, the middle, and the higher visions and in order to help them an upāsanā is meant here (by the description of the creation involving some distinction which is mere attributive). Here (III. 17-18) with regard to the view of non-duality which he holds, our author says that it does not conflict with that of the dualists and shows how it does not do so.

Gaṇḍha pāda now (III. 19-32) to his main proposition, i.e., non-origination and offers some arguments in favour of it, refuting the views of his opponents. He says that though it is said that it is the unborn that is born, it cannot be maintained. It is true that in the scriptures creation or origination is found both from the existent (bhūta) and the non-existent (abhūta), yet, that which is reasonable is to be accepted. In scriptures origination is said to be through illusion, it is denied there and its cause is negativised. Now, origination may be either of the existent (sāt) or of the non-existent (asāt), but neither of them is possible. That which exists may originate only through illusion and not in reality; because, if it originates in fact, it is to be accepted that the thing which had already been originated originates again. The origination of the non-existent is not reasonable either in reality or through illusion, as in the case of the son of a barren woman.

As in dream so in waking there is only the mind, yet it appears in the form of the duality of the percipient and the perceptible. The duality is perceived by the mind, but when it becomes non-mind, i.e., when its function of thinking (manana) ceases, there is no duality. The author says here (III. 33-36) that the mind which becomes non-mind, and as such is free from the states of dream and deep sleep and has no determination (nirvikalpa), is identical with Brahman.
This state of the suppressed (nirghita = niruddha) mind is different from that in the deep sleep, because while in the latter it falls into a condition of stupidity (mūḍha avasthā), it is not so in the former. This is attainable (III. 37-47) through an intense abstract concentration, called Asparāyoga 'contactless concentration,' which, though very difficult, can be realized gradually by the means suggested by the author. When by that process the mind is completely suppressed being free from the states at stupefaction and distraction, not moving at all and having no sense-image whatsoever, it becomes Brahman. And it is said that in this state it rests on itself (svasthā), it does not originate and is identical with the knowable which also does not originate. Here the author concludes (III. 48) that there is nothing that originates, and this is the highest truth.

Gaudapāda begins Book IV, unlike the first three ones, with his homage to the 'Greatest of men' and the teacher of the yoga known as Asparāyoga, whom the present writer thinks to be no other than the Buddha (IV. 1-2). Introducing his thesis (IV. 3) he says that there are two classes of disputants, one of them holding that it is the existent (bhūta) that originates while the other says that which originates is the non-existent (abhūta). But the Advayas (=Advaya-vādins), i.e., Buddhists declaring that there is no origination at all maintain that neither the existent nor the non-existent comes into being (IV. 3-4). Gaudapāda who is a Vedāntin subscribes to this last view and says (IV. 5): 'We approve of non-origination declared by them; we do not dispute with them, listen as to how there cannot be any dispute.' He then advances (IV. 6-71) various arguments gathered from Buddhist sources in support of the view attacking and refuting the theory of origination in different ways and arrives at the conclusion that non-origination is the highest truth. In the course of it he shows among others that though it is generally believed that a thing which is not born is born, it cannot be so in reality, for in that case it is to be admitted that nature changes; what is unborn must always remain unborn, it is its nature. Yet, if you say that it takes its birth, then evidently it changes. But what is nature does in no way change (IV. 6-10).

The theory that the cause itself is the effect that is born (as held by the Sāṅkhya) cannot be maintained (IV. 11-13), nor can there be any reasonable relationship or order between the cause and its effect (IV. 14-21). Again, nothing is produced either from itself or from other than itself; nor is there anything produced that is existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent (IV. 22). It is not possible to prove the beginning of a cause or of an effect, and as such neither of them comes into being (IV. 24).

Gaudapāda offers here some reasons in his support from the standpoint of the Vijñānavādins (IV. 25-39) showing that the external things are unreal though they appear to be not unreal; they are, however, false as the experience in dream, being cog-
nizable only by mind (citṛdaśya). He tells us again (IV. 40-41) that origination cannot be established, for there is no non-existent arising from the non-existent, nor is there any existent arising from the non-existent; there is no existent arising from the existent, and where is the non-existent arising from the existent?

It is true that the Buddhas have sometimes said of origination, but it is the instruction meant only for those who are afraid of the doctrine of non-origination (IV. 42). As an elephant called by illusion is said to exist only owing to the perception and the common practice, so it is said that a thing exists (IV. 44). He declares (IV. 45-46) that there is only vijnana without the two (i.e., the percipient and the perceptible), it is quiescent and has no origination (aja); it does not move, it is not an object (vasta), yet, it appears to admit movements, it appears to be an object. Thus the mind and the objects have no origination. As a fire-brand being moved appears to be straight or crooked, even so the mind when it moves appears as the percipient and the perceptible (IV. 42). And as the fire-brand when it does not move has no appearance of its being straight or crooked, even so when the mind does not move, it does not appear in the form of the percipient and the perceptible (IV. 48).

We have already seen that causation (hetuphalabhava) is not reasonable. The author explains it further in the following few kārikās (IV. 53-56) for his main purpose of establishing non-origination. With the same object in view he refutes (IV. 57) like the Buddhists theories of eternity (sāsvata) and annihilation (uccheda), and says (IV. 58) that it is in the empirical truth (samvrtisatya) that things are originated, but not in reality. From an illusive seed may come forth an illusive sprout. This sprout is neither eternal, nor has it annihilation. It is to be known with regard to all things. Therefore there is no room for the appellation of 'eternal' and 'non-eternal' of anything (IV. 60). As in dream so in waking it is owing to illusion that the mind which is only one moves having the appearance of the external things. Whatever is experienced in dream is nothing but the mind, similarly whatever we see in the waking state is only the mind. As a creature formed of dream or made of illusion or by some supernatural power takes birth and dies, even so all these creatures exist and do not exist. Therefore there is no Jiva that takes birth, there is no possibility of it. That nothing originates is the highest truth (IV. 61-71). The duality consisting of the subject and the object is only the vibration (spandita) of the mind which has, in fact, no object, and consequently has no relation whatsoever to it (IV. 72-74).

Owing to the persistent belief in what is non-existent (abhatabhinvēsa) the mind relates itself to its objects, but when their absence is known it turns back from them having no relation at all (nihsaiiga). Now, when it so turns back and does not move onwards, that position of it is unwavering, it is then free from sorrow, desire and fear. This is the field of the activities of the Buddhas. It shines forth once for all having no
origination, nor sleep, nor dream, and is the essence of reality (dharma dhātu, IV. 74-81).

This truth is, however, made obscure by the childish with their different notions; yet, one who can realize it attains the state of omniscience free from duality. And if it is so, what is beyond it that one may desire (IV. 82-85)? The author then shows that it is through the 'supra-mundane' (lokottara) knowledge by the realization of which one may become omniscient (IV. 86-89). Here he asks us to learn certain things from the Agrāyāna (= Mahāyāna) of the Buddhists giving some of its leading thoughts (IV. 90-95).

As the state of detachment (asaṅgatā) of our mind or knowledge is absolutely necessary, he tells us what it is and how it can be effected. Both the objects and their knowledge have no origination, and as there is no relation whatsoever between them the knowledge is said to be free from attachment (asaṅga). If this state is not achieved, there is no disappearance of the 'cover' or 'obscuration' (ādāraṇa-cyuti) from which we suffer. But in reality there is no cover or obscuration of anything, all the elements of existence being naturally unsullied (IV. 96-98). Concluding, the teacher declares that according to the Buddha the knowledge is not related to its objects, and these two things, i.e., the knowledge and its objects, are not mentioned by the Buddha (IV. 99), for, in fact, he has said absolutely nothing.

§ 15. The Philosophy of Gauḍapāda

Let us now make an attempt to discuss a little the philosophy of Gauḍapāda as it is in our text, though it has already been done to some extent in the preceding section, i.e., the Conspectus of the Contents. As some of the philosophical views of our teacher have already been shown incidentally they will not be repeated here. Indeed, much has been written on this by my predecessors, yet when a new annotation is added hereto the subject may be discussed anew according to the light derived from it. In doing so we should keep our minds free from the influence of later thoughts, for it is not always safe to explain an older text by the thoughts in a subsequent work or works.

Now, it goes without saying that our teacher, Gauḍapāda, is a Vedāntist and he mainly deals with the Vedānta in the present work declaring its conclusion (II. 12, 31, 35). Naturally, therefore, as a Vedāntist, he treats his subject in accordance with the scriptures (śruti), yet, not without pure reasons. Direct or indirect, his reasonings are in many cases based on scriptures (II. 1-10; III. 24-26). But when there are contradictory scriptures, he says (III. 23) that those which are with reasons (yukti yokta) are to be accepted. Besides, throughout the work he has advanced a number of independent grounds which are very cogent. With a view to removing an apparent contradiction in the scripture he would interpret (III 14) a text in its secondary sense saying expressly
that the primary one is not reasonable. The well-known practice of explaining Upaniṣadic texts in their secondary senses among the later commentators of the Brahmasūtras may be seen first here in Gaṇḍāpaḍā’s interpretation.

Among the Vedāntists Gaṇḍāpaḍā is an Advaitist, the highest truth to him being advaita ‘nonduality’ (advaitam paramārthataḥ, I. 17; advaitam paramārtho hi, III. 18; advaita yojayet sāṁtīm, II. 36). He says (II. 31) that according to the Vedānta the universe is like dream or illusion or an imaginary town in the sky (gandharvanagāra). There is no duality at all, it is mere illusion (I. 17).

The statement of the duality in the scripture is intended for the instruction (of the ignorant), and so when the truth is understood the duality does not exist (I. 18) and its cessation is bliss (I. 29; see also II. 35). He says (I. 17) further that the duality is due to illusion (māyā). In order to support this view he quotes scriptures (III. 24) which say ‘There is no plurality (neha nānāstī kiñcana, BU, IV. 4. 19; KU, IV. 11); and ‘Indra appears multiform through māyās’ (BU, II. 5. 19); and he concludes (III. 24) that ‘He (Prajāpati) is born variously, though (in fact) he does not take birth (VS, XXX, 19).

Having thus offered the scriptural evidence for maintaining the view that the duality is mere illusion and as such it has no reality, Gaṇḍāpaḍā gives us some pure reasons. Here, too, first he refers us to a scriptural text (BU, IV. 3. 14) and says (II. 5) that the two

states, dream and waking, are the same and one, because of the identity of the nature of the things experienced in them. That the things in dream are unreal is well-known to all and it is said also by the wise (BU, IV. 3. 8 ff.), and can be maintained on the following grounds:

The things (such as mountains) in dream are within as they are enclosed or in an enclosed place (II. 1, IV. 33); but if they are real it is impossible. The time being very short, or there being no fixed rule of time, it cannot be said that the dreamer really goes to the distant land dreamt of by him and sees things there. Nor is he seen there when he awakes (II. 2, IV. 34). Again, when he awakes he does not find his friends and others whom he had then in dream grasped (IV. 35). Further, it is said in our scripture (BU, IV. 3. 10) that in dream there are no chariots, etc., yet, they are seen there. Similarly, in the waking state, too, the things we see around us are unreal on account of the fact that they are within (II. 4; IV. 33). That which is non-existent at the beginning and at the end is so also in the middle, i.e., at the present. Therefore, being like the unreal (such as mirage) the external things appear as not unreal (II. 6; IV. 31). In both the cases, dream and waking, things are only imagined by the mind. That which is imagined by the mind within is regarded as non-existent (asat), while that which is imagined by the mind without is regarded as existent; but the unreality of both of them is reasonable and a matter of experience (II. 9, 10). Whether in
the mind is further said (IV. 72) and described elaborately by Gaudapāda (IV. 47-52) with a very apt illustration of the fire-brand (alāta). A fire-brand, only when it is moved, and not when it is not moved, appears to be straight or crooked, or so. Now these appearances are not produced from anything other than the fire-brand. And when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it, nor do they enter into it. Similarly when the vijnāna or mind moves and not when it does not move, it appears in the form of the duality consisting of the percipient and the perceptible. These appearances are produced not from anything other than the vijnāna; and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it, nor do they enter into it. He says again (IV. 63-66) that as animals seen in dream are visible to the mind of the dreamer and do not exist apart from it, and as such they are the mind of the dreamer, even so the animals seen in wakefulness are visible to the mind of the waking one and do not exist apart from it, and as such they are the mind of the waking one.

Clearly this is the Vijnānavāda ‘Idealism’ before us. Now taking here into consideration the passages quoted under IV. 72 from the LA, and comparing the kārikās IV. 47-52 with the corresponding Buddhist passages quoted in the Annotation under IV. 52, one will be struck with the agreement between a Vedāntist and a Vijnānavadin. One will also be in

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1 Gaudapāda seems to have been fond of compromising conflicting views (III. 17; IV. 5) and so considering the opinion of the Dvaitins, i.e., those who maintain duality, he says (III. 17 #1) that they are firmly fixed in their own distinctive conclusions and contend one another, but his view does not conflict with theirs. In explaining it he says (III. 18) that the supreme reality is non-duality, yet, it is not that we do not admit duality, we do it; so there is no conflict amongst us. The only difference amongst us is this that while according to you duality is in reality as well as in appearance we hold that it is only in appearance on account of illusion, and not also in reality (III. 19).

2 Mark here the use of the word vijnāna in these kārikās, and not of citta or manas.
a position to understand how far G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a is here influenced by the Buddhist thoughts and arguments. It is, however, to be noted that G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a, though much influenced by the Buddhist thoughts, maintains his position as a Vedántist. It is true that he advocates the V i j ā n an a v ā d a, but certainly it is originally adopted by him from the U p a n i ṣ a d i c source, i.e., BU, IV. 3. 14. on which is based his fundamental statement (II. 5) that the two states, dream and waking, are one. This U p a n i ṣ a d i c seed of idealism being influenced by its elaborate system in Buddhism and the vast literature on it by the Buddhist teachers who flourished before G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a, has developed into what we now find in the Āgamaśāstra. But when there are the above and the similar germs of idealism in the U p a n i ṣ a d s 3 it must be accepted that it did not first originate with the Buddhists, though it has much developed in their system later on.

There are thus two schools of V i j ā n an a v ā d i n s, (1) Vedántists headed by G a u ḍ a p ā ḍ a and (2) Buddhists with M a i t r e y a at the head. In both the schools the external world is the creation or transformation of the mind. But while in the first the cause for that transformation is m ā y ā (III. 29; IV. 61) it is v ā s a n ā (LA, X. 150) 4 in the second, both of them being without beginning (a n ā d i). This m ā y ā and v ā s a n ā may, however, be regarded as the same thing. For v ā s a n ā, though explained as p u r v a j ī n ā n a ‘previous knowledge’ is conceived as a cosmical force, transcendental illusion (The Conception of Buddhist N i r v ā n ā, Leningrad, 1927, p. 209). The real difference then between these two schools in the present case is with regard to the intervention of the Ṇ a ṭ m a n with whom m ā y ā is connected in the first, and his denial 5 in the second where the v ā s a n ā is with the c i t t a.

Now, the m ā y ā of the J i v a referred to above like v ā s a n ā has no beginning. He sleeps on account of it being himself deluded by it (I. 16; II. 19). He himself imagines himself and various other things through his own m ā y ā, some of them being within while others without (II. 13). These things, i.e., those which are within and exist as long as exists the thought (c i t t a), as well as those which are without and exist as long as remains the notion of the two, are only imagined (II. 14, 15). In the process of the imagination first he imagines himself as a J i v a ‘personal soul’ then various things, external and internal (II. 16). Consequently as in the dark, a piece of rope not known determinately is imagined to be a snake or a continuous line of water, etc., even so is imagined the self; but when that piece of rope is known determinately the imagined snake, etc., vanish and there is no duality. So is to be known of the ascertainment of the self (II. 17, 18).

3 See A i t o r e y a U p a n i ṣ a d, III. 2-3; TU, III. 5: v i j ā n aṁ brahma vim uṣ j aṁ, v i j ā n aṁ dhy eva’.  
4 bāhavo na vidyate | artho yathā balair vikalpyate ।  
  vāsanaṁ luoṭaṁ cittaṁ artha-bhāsaṁ pravarate ॥  
5 c i t t aṁ ś a ṭ aṁ na dhīyo ’sti dvidhā c i t t aṁ pravarate |  
  grāhyo-gṛāha-bhāvena āstāmiyām na vidyate ॥ LA, III. 21
But what is the characteristic of a Jiva? As we have seen above, Gaudapada explains it (III.3-9) by an apt illustration of akāśa 'space' or mahākāśa 'great space' and ghatākāśas 'spaces occupied by different jars'. As it is owing to the condition (upādhi) of jars that the ākāśa is regarded as ghatākāṣas, so it is on account of the conglomerations (of the different parts of the body) that the Ātman is regarded as Jivas. Consequently as when the jars are destroyed spaces occupied by them are completely merged into the great space (mahākāśa), even so are merged the Jivas into Ātman when the conglomerations are destroyed. The spaces occupied by all jars are in reality only one; yet if the space occupied by one jar is covered by smoke or dust, etc., not all the spaces occupied by all other jars are connected with it. The case is the same also with the Jivas in regard to their happiness, etc., i.e., if one Jiva feels happiness or suffers pain, not all the Jivas are subjected to it. There may be different conditions (upādhis); their forms, functions and names may differ from one another, but as regards the space occupied by them there is no difference. Similar is the case with reference to the Jivas. Again, the space occupied by a jar is neither a transformation (vīkāra), nor a part (avayaava) of the space (ākāśa), similarly a Jiva is neither a transformation nor a part of the Ātman. Gaudapada says further that the Ātman like the space remains in all the conglomerations or bodies which, too, have no reality as dream being the creation of the illusion of the Ātman (III. 10). The Jiva is the supreme soul of the 'sheaths' (kosas) as described in the TU, II. 1-6, and the supreme Brahman or Ātman is shown in the Madhuvindya section of the BU, II, 5. That the identity of the Jiva and the Ātman without distinction is praised and their distinction is censured in the scriptures is reasonable (III. 13), for though in some texts their distinction is to be found, those texts are to be taken in their secondary sense, the primary one being not reasonable (III. 14). Here the distinction is made purposely, it is made out of compassion to help one of inferior vision in one's upāsanā which is for such a person impossible without some sort of distinction (III. 11-16). It is not that such a distinction must be a real one.

It is said that the mind becomes non-mind and Gaudapada is definitely of opinion that Brahman is nothing but the mind that has become non-mind. He says that the mind in the state of susupta 'deep sleep' falls into a sleeping state (laya), but it does not so when it is suppressed (nirhita = niruddha), and indeed that is Brahman above fear and radiant with the light of jñāna (III. 35). See IV. 77-81, and below. He expresses the same thing in other words saying that when the mind is completely suppressed (niruddha) and as such is free from all movements and does not perceive anything else it becomes Brahman (III. 46):

yādā na hiyate cittaṁ na ca viśipyate punah
anīśganam anābhāsaṁ nispannam brahma tat tada ॥

'When the mind is not in the state of sleep, nor is
It is to be pointed out that here for the first time, so far as goes my information, it is found that Brahman is nothing but the citta which by nirodha is anidra (I. 16; III. 36; IV. 81; = alina = amudha), asvapna (I. 16, III. 36; IV. 81; = avikṣipta),^7 aningana (III. 46; = akṣipta), and anabhāsa (III. 46; = nirabhāsa = nirākāra = arūpaka, III. 36). Another appellation of this citta is sanirvāna^8 ‘with extinction’ (III. 37), i.e. in this state it is extinct. It is jñāna ‘knowledge’ or ‘thought’ but akalpaka (III. 33; = nirvikalpa) ‘indeterminate’ and consequently asanga ‘having no attachment or relation to any object’ (IV. 72, 96; = nihsaṅga IV, 79, see IV. 99; = nirviṣaya, IV. 72).^9 Being as such this jñāna is not different from the knowable (jñeyābhinna), which is Brahman (III. 33).

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6 The first half of the kārika implies that in this state of the mind, which can be reached by Asparašyogā (III. 39.45; IV. 2) it is free from the conditions known in the Yoga systems as mūḍha ‘stupified’ and viṣipta ‘distracted’ (Vṛṣṇa on the YS, I. 1). These two are also expressed by our teacher as anidra ‘sleepless’ and asvapna ‘dreamless’ respectively (III. 36; I. 16; IV. 81).

7 Vācaspati (YS, I. 1): mūḍham tu tanaḥsaṃudrakāḥ nirdvivittam, kṣiptād viṣṇiṣṭam. viṣṇuṣaśaḥ sthānaviṣṇuṣaḥ sthānam.

8 Here sanirvāna mind = amanibhaça (III. 31; MU, VI. 34; IV. YS, III. 67, 81; = amanostha (III. 32; Mukti UP, II. 29) = amanibhaça = Brahmapindha UP, 4) manabhaça (MU, VI. 20; = manabhaça = Mukti UP, II. 10, 33, 36, 39) = manalāça (Nādabindha UP, 47) = acitāta (Mukti UP, II. 20) = citsamāñlo (Op. cit. II. 32, 34; Śaṅkhyā UP, in One Hundred and Eight Upāṇiṣads, Ninnayagari, 1917, p. 358).

9 See the Annotation on IV. 72.

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§15] INTRODUCTION

It is further said that in this state the mind rests in itself (svaṣṭha, III. 47; = atmasaṃstha, III. 34).^10
This Brahman of Gaṇḍapāda then points on one side to the state of kaivalya ‘the state of being not connected with anything else,’^11 or the resting of the Draṣṭ ī or Puruṣa ‘Self’ in himself (svaṛūpa, i.e., cintāmaṇi ‘pure thought’), as described in YS, I. 3,^12 and on the other to the resting of the citta in the viṣṇaptimātrata of the Yogācāras or Vījnānavādins. According to the latter citta, manas, vījnāna and viṣṇapti are synonyms.^13 Therefore viṣṇaptimātrata is the same as vījnānamātrata which means the state of pure and simple vījnāna ‘intellect’ or ‘consciousness.’ Here in this state there is the highest cessation of the perceiving faculty of the mind. And this is in their opinion muktī ‘deliverance.’^14 This is also the ‘highest place of Viṣṇu’ (KU, I. 3. 9; MU, VI. 26; RV, I. 22. 20; 154. 5 with a slight variation), not only according

10 This will remind one of the following in the CHU, VII. 24. 1-2:
Yatra nānyat paśyati nānyat chhori nānyayā vijñānitā sa bhūmā,^4 sa bhagavān
kasmin pratiṣṭhīta iti. sve mahānīti. yadi vai na mahānīti.

11 YS, IV. 34: puroṣṭaḥ saṁyanyām guṇaṁ prātiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṁ
svairipratītaḥ and citsaktēḥ.

12 tadd draṣṭāḥ svairūpe vāsthaṁ.

13 Vā, p. 3; AK, II. 34; MV, p. 303; VM ed. D. Kosambi, i.e., XIV.82.

14 MSA, XI. 47: pramāṇa upalambhaya vigamah; Tk, p. 29: acitī	nupalambhaḥ sau; see TSN, 36.

15 vidīdā naivrātmanvālmidhāmaṁ iha dhīman bhavagataṁ
samaṁ taṁ ca jñātvā pratisvhitāṁ sa labhavāmgrabapataḥ |
tatata labhitaṁ paribhāṣā iha na khyāti tād api
 tad akhyānena muktiṁ parama upalambhaya vigamah' MSA, 47.

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to the Upaniṣadists,¹⁶ but also to the Vaiṣṇavas (BP, II. 1. 19).¹⁷

One point is to be discussed here. Brahman of the Vedantists or G a u ḍ a p ā d a (III. 30) is eternal (nītya), and if it is so, how can it be suggested, as done before, that Brahman and the citta in Vijñāaptimātratā are the same, according to Yogācāraśa jñāna is not eternal, but momentary (kṣaṇīka)? The following is the solution:—

In the authoritative Buddhist works the following words are used for nirvāṇa: dhruva ‘enduring’, amita ‘not dying’, acyuta ‘stable’, ākṣara ‘imperishable’, ajarjara ‘not decaying’ and apalokita¹⁰ ‘not broken down.’ Certainly these words do not imply momentariness, but on the contrary some kind

The third and the first part of the fourth lines are explained there thus: tatas tatra tattvavijñāaptimātratādānā manasās tad api tattvaṁ na khyāti vijñāaptimātratām. tad akhyānam muṣṭīḥ.

¹⁶ MBU, p. 12:
yan manas trijñāaptisthityasanasakarman |
tan mano vilayam yati tad viṣṇoḥ paramam padam ||

¹⁷ tatraikāvyasāya dhyāyed avyayicchinnena ceiṣā |
mano nirvāṇam yuktā tataḥ kiśāca na smaret |
padāṃ tot paramam viṣṇoḥ mano yatra prosiddi ||


¹⁹ Poussin has for it in French (Lac. cit.) with a query “le Soupyunne” (‘suspected’ or ‘surmised’). But as clear from B u d d a h a g h o s a on SN, IV. 370 (apaluṣṭatāya apalokitaṁ) it is derived from āpa-vṛuj and not from āpa-vṛukh as may appear. And so it can be said in the words of Y a s o m i t r a (AKV³, p. 23) with regard to the derivation of the word lokā that rujir iha ghiḥo na lokih. See my note, A passage of the Abhidharmakosābhikhyāyā, in IHQ, Vol. II, pp. 418 ff., and Poussin’s Rejoinder, p. 656.

of stability. Now the citta in the state of vijñāaptimātratā is described variously according to the vairity of the aspects beginning from the ‘Path of Illumination’ (daṛśanamārga) in V a s u b a n d h u’s T k, 29-30.²⁰

It is said there to be lokottara jñāna ‘super-mundane knowledge,’ aṣrayaparāvṛtti (aṣrayasya parāvṛttiḥ) the revolution or change of the recipient’, i.e., the ‘ālayavijñāna,’ and anāśrava dhatu ‘undefiled element’ which is dhruva ‘enduring.’²¹ Here by the word aṣrayaparāvṛtti referred to above we understand, in brief, that owing to the elimination of the two sorts of evil condition (daṇḍhulya), viz., the ‘covers’ or ‘obscurations’ (āvaranaḥ), namely, the knowable (jñeya) and the passions (kleśas), the recipient (aṣraya), i.e., ālayavijñāna, turns back to its natural state in the form of advaya jñāna ‘the knowledge free from the two,’ i.e., the subject and the object. In other words, the ālayavijñāna which was before covered or obscured, the obscurations being now removed, gets its own innate state, i.e., the state of advaya (= lokottara) jñāna. This is called anāśrava dhatu ‘undefiled element’ which is dhruva.

²⁰ See our text, IV. 18, foot note 1, where these two kārikās with the introductory line of S t h i r a m a t i are quoted.

²¹ On these words the commentary of S t h i r a m a t i may be quoted here:
aparicitaśvāti Tīb. ḍrēṣa. par. ma. byas. pa. dā, for anucitaśvāti (in the printed text) leke samudācārakārvānt version for which Tīb. suggests samudācārakārvānt reading kun tu bhyas ba. med. pa. dā, nirvikalpatvat ca lokād uttātram iti jñānam lokottaram ca tad iti’. aṣrayo ‘tā sarvabijjakam ālayavijñānaṃ, tasya parāvṛttiḥ ya daṇḍhulasiṣcakādvaṇādvaṇābhāvaṇa parāvṛttiḥ’. nirbuddhalyavat sa tu aṣrayavigata ity anāśravaḥ’. dhruvo nityāvād akṣayataḥ’.
But what is the true significance of the word dhrūva, that is intended here? Among the 33 descriptive words for nirvāna found in SN, IV. 368-373 and 46 synonyms for it in AP, 6-9, we have dhrūva and never nitya. It is true that sometimes the words nitya, dhrūva and sāvāta are used as synonyms (Pali vevecana = vivacana = paryāya), as says Bu dh a g h o s a himself on SN, I. 142. Yet, there is some difference in their meanings. For while sāvāta, according to him, means ‘always existing’ (sādā vijjamānaṁ) dhrūva implies ‘enduring’ (dhuvan’thi thiram; he writes also on SN, IV. 370: thiraṁtha dhuvanam).

Jaina teachers, too, are of the same opinion. In connexion with the definition of dhravya ‘substance’ in their system they give the same explanation of the word dhrūva or dhravya using the same or similar words.

In the older Upaśāds Ātman or Brahman is nitya and not dhrūva. The word nitya implies that it does not admit of any change, while dhrūva does not do so. Let us give here an illustration. If of a lump of gold a number of different ornaments is made one after another, their forms change, yet, through these changes the same gold continues to exist. Owing to this continuance it can be said that gold is here dhrūva ‘enduring’, but not nitya ‘eternal’.

The Ālayavijñāna is certainly momentary (kṣanika), as it changes every moment. It does not therefore move forward as one and the same (ekam abhinām), but continues in an uninterrupted stream (santati) as the flood with its currents (srotasā oghatvā). This continuity has no beginning, nor has it an end (anādinidhana) till nirvāna. Now as through all the moments the Ālayavijñāna continues it is dhrūva and not nitya.

It may be pointed out here that there is more than one kind of nityatā ‘eternity’ according to the primary and the secondary senses of the word: viz., (i) kulaśathanatītā ‘eternity as unchangeability’ as of Ātman or Brahman of the Vedāntists; (ii) parināmanityatā ‘eternity as transformation’ as held by the Sāṅkhya and the Jainas. To these two may be added, according to the Buddhists, (iii) one more, viz., santatinityatā ‘eternity as continuance.’ It may, however, be the same as parināma-nityatā. Where in such cases in Buddhist texts the word nitya is employed it is to be taken in this light.

Now in support of the main problem we are here concerned with, the following couplet may be taken into consideration:

prabhāsvaram idam cittam prakṛtyāgantavo malaṁ
teśām apāye sarvārtham taj jyotir avināsvaram

22 With regard to pāpakā daññhigata: idam niccaṁ idam dhuvam idam sasataṁ. See also Sthiramāti, Tt, 30, explaining dhrūva as quoted in foot-note 21.

23 Tattvārthādībhagasūtra, V. 29; upadāvyahadrāvyayuktam sat.

24 Tattvārthādībhagasūtra, V. 29; dhrūva = sīthira; Tatvaadhikā on Pravacanasūtra (ed. A. N. U. P a d h y e , 1935), II. 3 (dhrūva = aśthitaḥ); Tatvaadhikā on Pañcaśāsnavargā (Rāyaścandra Jainaśastramāla, 2nd ed.), 10: puvottarabhāvocchedotpādayor api svajāter aparītyaṁ dhuvam; Sanmatītarka (Gujarāt-Purāntāts-mandira, Ahmedabad, 1940 V., S., Gāthā 12, p. 410 (dhrūva = sīthita)).
Mark that citta is said here to be avināśvara jyotis 'the light that is not liable to be destroyed'.

It may therefore be safely concluded that Gaṇḍa-pāḍa's Brahman and the citta in viññaptimātratā of the Yogācāras are in fact the same thing with the only one difference that while the former is nitya the latter is dhruva.

Let us remember here what Gaṇḍa-pāḍa says about Brahman (III. 35-36, 46-47), as we have seen just now from the Vedāntic point of view, and compare it with what he says in IV. 76-81 of the 'field of the activities (viṣaya) of the Buddhists' describing

and approving the views of the Buddhists; it will then be clear that the same thing has been said by Gaṇḍa-pāḍa in two places almost in the same words though from the two different standpoints.

We have already discussed the Vijnānavāda as it is in our text. It may be noted here in this connexion that it is treated here by Gaṇḍa-pāḍa only with a view to the establishment of the Ajātaivāda 'the Theory of Non-origination' which is one of the most important topics of the philosophy of Gaṇḍa-pāḍa. Having proposed to show what it is first in III. 2 and then in IV. 5 he declares (III. 48) and affirms (IV. 71) that the highest truth is that nothing originates. For details the reader is referred to the Conspectus of the Contents (pp. cxiii-cxxvi) and the work itself, we should like to point out here only a few important aspects of it.

The subject is dealt with by our author as a Vedāntist separately in two places, Book II and Book IV. In the former he does so purely from the Vedāntic point of view supporting his thesis by scriptures and grounds based on them or in favour of them, some of these grounds being strikingly similar to those offered by the Buddhists for the same purpose; while in the latter he expresses his approval on behalf of his school regarding ajāt as declared by the Advayās or Buddhists saying that he does not dispute with them on this point and asking his followers or the people at large to listen to him as to how there cannot be any dispute. He proceeds then to show throughout the Book IV the
arguments of the Buddhists taking even the actual words from their authoritative works in a number of cases. Readers are here referred to our text with Annotation.

One point may be pointed out here. In Book IV G a u ḷ a pāḍa has discussed nothing directly of the Vedānta, as nothing Vedāntic will be found therein. In explaining the Vedānta in accordance with his own light he establishes the Ajātivāda in Book III, as we have seen above. Then in Book IV he supports that theory referring to the Buddhists who also hold the same view independently of the Vedāntists. Gauḍapāda says here that his school approves of what they say on this point and shows their arguments one by one.

From this it may appear that whatever is said by Gauḍapāda as the opinion of the Buddhists in that Book is approved or accepted by him. But can it be said strictly? The Buddhists being the follower of the Middle Path (madhyama pratīpad) reject both the extreme views of ‘eternity’ and ‘annihilation’ (sāvāta- and uchchada-vaṇḍas). This is alluded to in our text in IV. 57-60. But how can Gauḍapāda as a Vedāntist accept it when his Brahman in his own word (III. 33) is eternal (nitya)? Nevertheless, in the present case, Gauḍapāda seems to have accepted the middle theory, for, as the case is put here, there may not be raised any objection. Or it may be that Gauḍapāda has here simply mentioned the views

of the Buddhists as he has done it in some other cases in this Book. For instance, see IV. 90.

It is a very striking fact that some of the most remarkable doctrines as discussed and established by Gauḍapāda have not been appreciated in subsequent works on the Vedānta even of the Advaita school; for instance, the peculiar conception of Brahman, the Ajātivāda, the Sarvajñatadvāda (IV. 85, 89) and the Viṣṇūnavāda, besides what Gauḍapāda approves of the views of the Advayavādins or Buddhists in Book IV. Even the great Śaṅkara himself does not appear to subscribe to the above doctrines of our teacher. It need not, however, be said that his Māyavāda has undoubtedly got strong impetus from the first three Books of the Āś. His Adhyāsavāda as explained by him in his Śārikakabhasya and other works has no mention in the ĀŚ, though a distant relationship may be found out. Here he is undoubtedly influenced by the Buddhist Viṣṇūnavādins specially in explaining their doctrine of Trisvabhāva or Trilakṣaṇa ‘three characteristics’ (IV. 74, pp. 175 ff).

Of the philosophy of Gauḍapāda there is much more that deserves to be discussed separately, but in order to avoid prolixity readers are referred to the text itself, specially to its Book IV together with the new Annotation of the present writer, in which he has tried to explain many an important and hitherto obscure point of the work. From this, it is hoped, readers will be in a position to form their own judge.
ments as to how much G a uḍ a pāḍa is influenced by Buddhist thoughts and how much of them he has adopted into his own system of the Vedānta.  

BOOK I

1

bahiṣprajñā vibhur viśvo hy antaḥprajñās tu tajīṣaḥ |
ghanaprajñās tathā prajñā eka eva tridhā sthitāḥ ||

The all-pervading one is Viśva 'all' when he has the consciousness of outside; he is Taśa 'brilliant' when he has the consciousness of inside and when his consciousness is concentrated he is Prājñā 'intelligent'. The one exists in three forms.  

1 Literally 'condensed' (ghana), in other words, when consciousness does not admit of any distinction within itself, as is the case in wakefulness and in dream.  

2 See i. 2.

2
dakṣinākṣimukhe viśvo manasy antas tu tajīṣaḥ |
ākāśe ca hrdī prajñās tridha dehe vyavasthitah ||

'Viśva is in the front of the right eye, within the mind is Taśa, while Prājñā is in the sky in the heart.' Thus he remains in the body in three ways.  

1 KiU, IV. 17; Mu, VII, 11; ChU, IV. 15, 1, VII. 7, 4; Bu, II. 3, 5, IV. 2, 2, V. 5, 2, 4.

2 Bu, II. 1, 17, IV. 2, 3.

viśvo hi sthūlabhūṁ nityāṁ taijasāḥ pravīviktaḥ bhūgaṁ anandabhūk śāntiḥ bhūgaṁ nibodhataḥ

‘Viśvo enjoy what is gross, Taījaśa what is fine, and Prājñā bliss. (Thus) know enjoyment to be of three kinds.’

sthūlaṁ tarpayate viśvaṁ pravīviktaṁ tu taijasāṁ anandaś ca tathā prājñāṁ tridhā tṛptiṁ nibodhataḥ

‘The gross satisfies Viśva, the fine Taījaśa, and bliss Prājñā. (Thus) know satisfaction to be of three kinds.’

tṛṣu dhāmasu yad bhūyaṁ bhoktā yaś ca prakṛtīnāṁ vedaitad ubhayaṁ yaś tu sa bhūjiṇāno na liyate

‘One who knows both what is said to be enjoyable, and what is said to be the enjoyer in three stages, is not tainted through enjoying.’

prabhavaḥ sarvabhistānāṁ satāṁ iti viṇīcayaḥ sarvaṁ janayati prāṇaṁ cetoṁśaṁ puruṣaṁ pṛthak

‘The settled opinion of sages is that all things have their origin. (Some hold that) the Breath, the Puruṣa (self), creates all—the rays of the mind, differently.’

For the creation by Prāṇa see BS. I. 1. 23. Prāṇa is here Brahman.

The objective world is the vibrations of one’s mind (cittaspandaḥ, see IV. 72) which shines inside. These vibrations are called here rays (anīsa) and assume different forms just like the rays of the sun on the clouds appearing in the form of the rainbow.

vibhūtim prasaśvaṁ tv ane manyaṁ saścīcintakah sa supportaṁ svapnaṁśaṁsvarūṇi saśtraṁ anyāṁ vikalpiṁ

‘Other theorists about creation assert dogmatically that the creation (of the world) is (his) expansion, while others imagine that creation is of the nature of dream and magic.’

1 As in the Upaniṣads. TU. II. 6. 1: so kāmayaṁ bahu syāṁ prajāyeyā. 2 This view is held by some of the Vedantists including our teacher (see II. 31) and the Buddhists, Madhyamikas and Yogācāras.

icchāmatram prabhoh saśtraṁ iti saśtuṁ viṁścitāṁ kalāṁ prasūtin Bhūtānāṁ manyānte kālaṁcintakah

‘Those who are assured about creation say that creation is the mere volition of the Lord, and those who theorise about time consider the creation of beings to be from Time.’

1 See note on I. 7. Kūraṇārāyana, a follower of Rāmaṇuja, says that they are Upāniṣadas or the followers of the Upaniṣads, who say He is satyasaṁkālopa ‘one whose purpose is true or fulfilled’ (ChU, 3.14.2). 2 They are Astronomers. See SU. I. 1; MU. 7; MB. XII. 224, 227; SS. pp. 10–11 and specially the hymns on Kāla in the AV, XIX. 53, 54.
Now as regards the object of the creation the author says:

bhogārthaṃ srṣṭr ity anye kriḍārthaṃ iti cāpare
devaśayaiśa svabhāvāḥ 'yam āptakāmasya kā sprṛḥā

'Some (say) that the creation is for the sake of (his) enjoyment,' while others (are of opinion) that it is for the sake of his sport. It is, however, the nature of the Shining One, for how can desire be in one for whom every object of desire is (already) secured.

Kūraṇāyana says here in his tīkā: harer atṛptaśyaiва bhogārthaṃ srṣṭr ity anye. Śrīnīvāsatīrtha, an annotator of Madhvacārya’s commentary on MaU, clearly says that this view is held by Rāmaṇuja or his followers (kecid rāmānujāḥ).

1 See BU, 1.4.17; śāmaivedam agra āsid eka eva. so kāmayata jāya me syād atha prajāyeyā vittam me syād atha karma kurvyeti.
2 See BS, II, 1, 33: lokavat tu līśkaśvaśyam; MU, VI, 1: viśvakriḍāratiprabhū.
3 The second half of the karika is quoted as trūti in the Madhvābhāṣya on BS, II, 1, 33.

nivṛtteḥ sarvādaukhaḥāṃ isānāḥ prabhur avyayāḥ
advaitāḥ sarvabhāvānāṁ devas turyo vibhūḥ smṛtaḥ

'The Turvya ‘fourth one’ is said to be all-pervading, efficient in removing all miseries, the shining one, changeless, and of all things without a second.'

1 The other three are already mentioned: Viśva, Taįjaśa and Prājña.

kāryakāraṇabaddhaḥ tāv ityete viśvataijasaḥ
prājñeḥ kāraṇabaddhaḥ tu dve tu turya na sidhyataḥ

'It is held that those two, Viśva and Taįjaśa, are bound with cause and effect, Prājña is bound with cause, but in Turvya neither of them can be asserted.'

Here according to the commentator ‘cause’ (kāraṇa) is non-grasping of the truth (tattvāgraṇa), while ‘effect’ (kārya) is grasping the truth otherwise (anyathāgraṇa). See I, 15. These two are common to both Viśva and Taįjaśa. In Prājña there is only tattvāgraṇa, ‘while in Turvya there is neither of them. Cf. PS, 31; PS, 34, 35.

1 This karika is quoted in the NSi, IV, 41.

nātmānaḥ na parāś caiva na satyaṁ nāpi cīntam
prājñaḥ kiścanaśaṃvetti turyaḥ sarvadṛk sādā

'Prājña knows nothing—neither himself nor others, neither truth nor falsehood; but Turvya is always all-seeing.'

As to why Prājña is bound with cause (tattvāgraṇa) and Turvya is not bound with either of cause and effect (anyathāgraṇa) is stated in the following karika.

1 See BU, IV, 3, 21.
2 See IV, 84: Cf. sarvajña, III, 36, 47.
As Prājñā does not know anything he is regarded as bound with the cause (tattvāgraha) which is just like darkness (tamas). As regards Turīya there being nothing except himself he is all-seeing and thus in the absence of all ignorance he is not bound in any way.

3 See US, XVIII, 26.

13
dvaitasyāgrahaṇam tulyam ubhayaḥ prājñāturyayoh¹ bijanidrāyutah prājñāḥ sā ca turye na vidyate ॥

'Non-recognition of duality is common to both Prājñā and Turīya; but Prājñā is with sleep which is a seed (i.e., cause of specific cognition), while it does not exist in Turīya.'

In this kārīkā the difference between Prājñā and Turīya is shown. In the text nidrā 'sleep' implies tattvāpratibodha 'non-realization of truth' (I. 15), and as it is the cause of specific cognition in dream and waking it is called bija 'seed'.

14
svapnanidrāyutav ādyau prājñas tv asvapnanidrayaḥ¹ na nidrāṁ naiva ca svapnaṁ turye paśyanti niṣcitāh ॥

'The first two (Vīśva and Taivas) are with sleep and dream, Prājñā is with dreamless sleep, while those who are certain (about the truth) see neither sleep nor dream in Turīya.'

It follows, therefore, from the above that Turīya is not bound either with cause or with effect.

1 Dream (svapna) is 'knowing otherwise' (anyathāgraha) and sleep (nidrā), as said before, is 'non-cognition of truth' (tattvāpratibodha). See I.15.

15
anyathā grhnataḥ svapna nidrā¹ tattvam ajānataḥ ॥ ॥viparyāse tayoh kṣīre turiyaṁ padam asnute ॥

'Dream is for him who takes the truth otherwise, and sleep is for him who does not know the Reality. The error in these two (svapna and nidrā) being destroyed one attains the stage of Turīya.'

1 See YS, I. 10.

2 See NSi, IV. 42; US, xvii. 26.

16
anādimāyayā suptō yadā jīvā prabudhyate¹ ajam anidram asvapnam advaitaṁ budhyate tadā ॥

'When the jiva sleeping on account of illusion which has no beginning is awakened, he realizes (the state of Turīya) which is unborn and in which there is neither sleep nor dream, nor duality.'

1 The commentator says that this māyā is in the form of tattvāpratibodha and anyathāgraha.

2 See I. 14, III. 36, IV. 81.

17
prapañca:yādi vidyeta nivarteta na samśayaḥ¹ māyāmātram idam dvaitaṁ advaitaṁ paramārthaḥ ॥

'If the expansion of the (visible) universe (prapañca) were (really) existing it would have to cease to exist, no doubt, but this duality is mere illusion, in absolute truth there is non-duality.'
AGAMASAstra

For the meaning of prapañca see Candragiri on MV, p. 350:


Op. cit., p. 373:
prapañcāc hī vāk prapañcācāyat arthān iti kṛtvā.

18

vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenaicit
upadesād ayaṁ vādō jñāte dvaitām na vidyate

'False creation (vikalpa)1 would cease if it were created2 by some one. This statement (of vikalpa) is for the sake of instruction. When (the Reality) is known there is no duality.'

It means that if it is held, as we hold, that the vikalpa (= prapañca in the preceding kārikā) 'false creation', i.e., duality, is made by some one it must disappear. We say that it is said so in order to instruct the ignorant or stupid people, so that they may gradually arrive at the truth (ajñānām avabodhārthaṃ.—YV, III. 84.24). This will be clear from YV (III. 84.19-27), from which a few lines are quoted below.

The second half of the kārikā is identical with YV, III. 84.25a and 27b with the single variation that in 26a there is avibodhād for our upadesād. The reading avibodhād, however, seems to have actually been avabodhād. See the following from YV, III. 84:

upadesāyā sāstresu jātaḥ sabdo-thavārthajaḥ
pratīyogivavacchedasaṃkhyālakṣaṇaprayatavān 19
bheda dṛjñata evaṁ vyañjabharan na vāstavāḥ
vetālo bālakasye vāryārtham parikalpitaḥ 20

1 That is, duality which is only imaginary.
2 Lit. imagined.

In a of the kārikā KN reads na nivarteta for vinivarteta. Accordingly it would give the following meaning: vikalpa would not cease if it is created by some one, but the fact is not so, for it is mentioned only for one's instruction. KN, however, explains it differently.

19

viśvasyātavāvakṣyāyām ādi sāmānyam utkaṭaṃ
mātṛasampratipattau syād āptisāmānya eva ca

'In the desire of saying that Viśvavā is A and in knowing the measure1 the common quality 'first' (ādi) as well as 'pervading' (āpti) is quite apparent.'

Ātman is to be meditated through the symbol Om, and for doing so these two must be regarded as identical. This identification of Ātman and Om is described in this and the following two kārikās. In the present kārikā the first part (pāda) of Ātman, viz., Viśvā is identified with the first part or measure (mātra) of Om, viz., the letter A. It is to be noted that Om results from the euphonic combination of the three letters (mātras), A, U and M. In such identification there must be some common quality (sāmānya dharma) of the things to be

1 That is, in knowing the identity of the first mātra of Om, i.e., A, with the first pāda of Ātman, i.e., Viśvā. See I, 20, 21, note 1.

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meditated as identical. In the present case there are two common qualities, 'first' (ādi) and 'pervading' (āpti). As Viśva is the first of the four pādas of Ātman, so A is the first of all the letters of which Om is composed. And, again, as the reward of one who understands this identity of Viśva and A is far-reaching (for one attains thereby everything that one may desire), so is far-reaching A, for, as said in the śruti, A is all speech, as it manifests itself in different letters.³

² See bhāktivāda in Vedic texts: Nirukta, VII. 24: bahubhaktivādini brāhmaṇi bhavanti; and the present writer's Vedic Interpretation and Tradition in the Proceedings of the Sixth Oriental Conference held at Patna, p. 498.

³ Sāyana says in his commentary on the TA, VII: etad api aitareyake samānmānam aha vai sarva vak. saiaḥ sparśamabhār vasyāyaṁmahavi nāmavatāh prabhu. This passage is quoted by commentators on the BG, X. 33. See AA, III, 23 with Sāyana: tasyatasyaśākāro rasaḥ.

20

Taijasasyotvavijñāna utkaro drṣyate sphyutam I
mātrāsampratipattau syād ubhayatvam tathāvīdham II

'The quality of Tāijasa as the letter U is clearly seen. The common quality 'subsequence' (uktāra) as well as the state of being in (the middle of) both (ubhayatva) is clearly seen.'

The common qualities required for identification of Tāijasa with U are uktāra 'subsequence' and ubhayatva which is the same as madhyasthata 'intermediate position.'

¹ That is, in understanding that the second mātra of Om, i.e., U, and the second pāda of Ātman, i.e., Tāijasa, are identical. See I, 19, note 1. and 21, note 1.

I. 21

Tāijasa is subsequent to Viśva and U is subsequent to A; therefore there is utkara. Tāijasa and U both are in the middle being between Viśva and Prājñā and A and M respectively.

mākārabhave prājñasya mānasāṃśayam utkataṁ I
mātrāsampratipattau tu layasāṁśayam eva ca II

'I understand the identity of Prājñā with (the letter) M and in understanding the measure the clear common quality is 'measure' (māna) as well as 'disappearance' (laya).

The commentator's explanation of the kārikā, as I understand it, is as follows: In involution Viśva and Tāijasa enter into Prājñā, while in evolution they come out of it; and as such they, as it were, are measured with Prājñā, just as grains of barley are measured with prastha 'a special standard of measure,' generally a basket made of bamboo or cane of particular capacity. In measuring the grains they are first put into the basket and then they are taken out. Now as Viśva and Tāijasa enter into and come out of Prājñā, so in pronouncing Om continually. A and U, as it were, merge into and emerge from M. This is the first common quality, called 'measure' (māna) for the identification of Prājñā and M. The second common quality called 'disappearance' (laya) is this: In susupti 'profound, deep and undisturbed sleep.' Viśva and Tāijasa disappear in Prājñā. Similarly in pronouncing Om, A and U seem to disappear in M.
And having understood Om with each of the pādas one should not think of anything else.  

For d cf. BG, VI. 25: "atmasamthama manah āttvā na kīcid api cintayet. See BP, II. 1.19.

25

yuṇījita praṇavā cetaḥ praṇavo brahma nirbhayam  
praṇavo nityayuktasya na bhayam vidyate kvacit

'One should apply' the mind to Om, for Om is Brahman in whom there is no fear. And nowhere is fear for him who is always fixed' upon Om.'

1 That is, concentrate.
2 That is, whose mind is always fixed.

26

praṇavā hy aparām brahma praṇavaś ca param smṛtāḥ  
apūrvo 'nantaro 'bāhyo 'naparaḥ praṇavo vyayāḥ

'Om is said to be the lower, as well as the higher Brahman. Om is without any antecedent and unchanging, and it has nothing other than itself, nor has it inside or outside.'

1 BU, IV. 5. 83: anantaro'bāhyah.

27

sarvasya praṇavo hy ādir madhyam antas tathaiva ca  
evam hi praṇavaṇā jñātvā vyāsnu te tad anantaram

'Om is the beginning, middle, and end of all. Having known Om in this way one attains it' immediately.'

1 Original kād. It seems to refer to Brahman in the preceding kārikas. The commentator takes it to refer to ātmabhāva.
praṇavaṁ hi varam vidyāt sarvasya ṛddi samsthitam
sarvavyāpinam oṁkāram matvā dhīro na śocati II

‘One should know Om to be the Lord present in the heart of all. Having understood the all-pervading Om a wise man does not grieve.’

1 BG, XIII. 17: ṛddi sarvasya dhīṣṭitam; KU, II. 3. 17: sādā jānāṁ
hi ṭaye sannivṛṣṭaḥ.
2 KU, I. 2. 22; II. 1. 4, 3. 6.

amātro ‘nantamātraś ca dvaitasyopāsamaḥ śivaḥ
oṁkāro vidito yena sa munir netaro janaḥ II

iti gaudapādiya āgamaśāstra āgamākhyāṁ
prathamam prakaraṇam samāptam.

‘He and no other person is a sage (muni) who knows Om which has no measure, and yet has an unlimited measure, and which is the cessation of duality, and which is bliss.’

‘Here ends, in the Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍaṇḍa, Book One, called Traditional Doctrine.’

1 I. 22.
dreamt) by going to (different) places; and no person, on waking, is in the place (where he dreamt himself to be)."

It cannot be held that in a dream one goes to different places and sees things in those places, for one may see things in a dream in a very distant land, but the time being short it is impossible to think that the dreamer travels to that distant land and sees the things there. Moreover, it is found that a dreamer, on waking, does not see himself in the country where he dreamt himself to be.

Thus it follows that the things seen in a dream do not exist in the external world.

1.1 Support of this view the author refers in the next kārikā to the BU. IV. 3. 10:

3

abhāvaś ca rathādīnāṃ śrūyate nyāyapūrvakam 1
vaitathyaṃ tena vai prāptam svapnaḥ ahuḥ prakāśitam 2

'& The non-existence of chariots, etc. (seen in a dream), with the reason thereof, is learnt from the śruti.' Therefore, it is

1 See BU. IV. 3. 10 which runs as follows: na tatra rathā na rathayogā na pāṅkhu bhavanty atha rathāṃ rathayogāṃ pathaḥ sakte. In this passage tatra refers to svapna. See also IV. 3. 13:

svapnānta uccāvacam īsamāno
nīgāsi devāh kurute bahāhī
uteva sribhiḥ saheḥ maṃgamāno
jaśād uvevapi bhaṣyāṇi pāṣyati

As regards the nāgap 'reason' referred to here, Purusottama writes: svapnānta uccāvacamiyamāna-īti māntreśānekariṣupakaraṇam ukte vatsam nāyataṃ bodhayed durbhiṣajyaṃ hāsmai bhavañī anena sūptasya nirbandhena jagaraṇa kaśtam aha yady anyatra gato bhavet tākaraṇaḥ na vaded (?) durbhiṣajyaṃ ca. yatra sūptas intrauṣṭra sriyā svapne rāmamāṇāḥ skhalite jāgarat tām bahāhī pāṣyet. yata no pāṣyati tataḥ karoti, yataḥ karoti tato rathāyabhaṅgāḥ evam ca svapne pūrvaḥ rathāyabhaṅgāḥ paścāt karaṇād ityādīnāyapūrvakam.

4

antahsthānānāṃ bhedānāṃ tathā jāgarite smṛtām 1
yathā tatra tathā svapne saṁyataṃ na bhidyate 1

'& The same 2 is declared of the things 3 in waking on account

1 The actual reading of d in all printed texts and MSS. examined is saṁyataṃna bhidyate which hardly gives any proper sense. The commentary does not help us on this point. It explains: antahsthānānāṃ saṁyataṃna ca svapnāntaḥ bhavāṁ jārajiṣaḥ bhedaḥ—'on account of being inside as well as of being covered the phenomena in a dream are different from those in waking.' But this explanation is hardly possible, for one naturally expects here to know the non-difference (abheda) and not the difference between the things in waking and in dream. Accordingly one might disjoin the sanātī in jārajiṣaḥ bhedaḥ in the commentary taking the last word as abhedaḥ and not bhedaḥ, though a nāgārī evidently accepts the latter. Apart from the propriety of that explanation the question is: How should one construe the second half of the kārikā? What is the nominative of the verb bhidyate? According to the commentators it must be svapnāntaḥ bhāṣa, but it is not in the text, nor can it be understood or supplied from any of the preceding kārikās.

One may, however, take the line as saṁyataṃna na bhidyate. In this case the nominative is viṣayatīya 'unreality' which is to be supplied from the preceding kārikā. The author wants here to show the unreality of the phenomena in the waking state just like that of those in a dream on the same ground, i.e., antahsthāna which is due to saṁyataṃna of the place. Thus it is said that the viṣayatīya of the things in waking does not differ from that of the things in a dream, for in both the cases saṁyataṃna is the same, there being no difference whatever.

2 That is, viṣayatīya already described in the preceding kārikā.

3 The words bhāṣa (IV. 33), bhāṣa (II. 13, 16, 17, 19, 33; III. 20, 22), and bheda (II. 4, 5, 11, 12) are the same as regards the meaning.

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of the fact that they are inside; for, as there (i.e., in waking) so in a dream the state of being enclosed does not differ."

See II. 1, IV. 33.

I should, however, like to suggest the reading as *samanattvam na bhidgate* which makes the sense very clear.

As to how the state of being enclosed (*samanattva*) does not differ in waking and dream, is discussed and shown in some of the following kārikās (II. 9, 10, 13, 14, 15; III. 29, 30; IV. 61, 62, 64–66), where it is fully explained, as the Viśṇu-nārāyana-vādins would say, that there being no external thing in reality, whatever we see around us either in waking or in dream is only imagined (*kalpita*) by mind which is inside our body and inside of a body is covered (*samanattva*). Says Dīnāga in his *Alambanaparipāka*: 6: 'yad antar jīneyarūpaṁ tad bahirvad avabhāsate.

Puruṣottama writes here: jāgārīta iti, bahir anubhavat katham antalātthavat ity ākāśyām svapnātulyatvād iti vaktum svapnasyaitatarāyaṁ āha yathā tatreti. yathā jāgārite manodhyāto 'rthā śarirasaṃvṛtatavena bāhyebhyo bhidyata iti śarīrāntalāṭhathavāṁ tathā svapne 'pi pūrvam uktam. atas tattulyatvāt tathey arthaḥ.

The commentary reads in explaining the kārikā:

jaṭāvṛtvānām bhāvānām vaitathyaṁ iti pratiñāma dṛṣṭvāvat iti hetub. svapnāntābhāvavad iti dṛṣṭantaḥ. yathā tatra svapne dṛṣṭānāṁ bhāvānām vaitathyaṁ tathā jāgārite 'pi dṛṣṭvām avādītaṁ iti hetūpanoah. tasmāj jāgārite 'pi vaitathyaṁ smṛṭāṁ iti nigamanam.

Now the author goes to show further in the next kārikā that there is no difference between the two states, waking and dream; in fact they are one:

svapnajāgārite sthāne hy ekam āhur maṇīṣṭhaḥ
bhedaṁ hi samatvena prasiddhenaiva hetunā

'The wise say that the two states, dream and waking, are one, on account of the identity of things (in those two states), for the reason that has been well established.'

The first half of the kārikā refers to BU. IV. 3. 14:

atha khalv āhur jāgāritaṁ evāṣayaṁ ity yāni hy eva jāgrat paśyati tāni supta iti.

Here eṣaṁ refers to svapna, as says Śaṅkara: eṣaṁ svapnaṁ.

For svapnąjāgārite sthāne cf. BU. IV. 3. 9: dve eva sthāne bhavataṁ.

'The reason that has been well established' (prasiddhenaiva hetunā) refers to antalāṭhāna already explained (II. 1, 4).

Though in fact the objects of waking experience appear as real, still they are unreal. How it may be so the author proceeds to say in the following kārikās:

6

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne 'pi tat tathā 1
vitathāḥ sadhāḥ santo'vitathāḥ iva lakṣitāḥ

See IV. 31.

'That which is non-existent at the beginning, and at the end, is so also at the present (i.e., in the middle); being like the unreal things still appear as not unreal';

For a full discussion see IV. 31, which is identical with the present kārikā.

1 That is, being like mirage, etc., which are acknowledged to be unreal by all.

7

saprajoyanatā teṣāṁ svapne 'pi pratipadyate 1
tasmaṁ adyanantavattvenā mithyaiva khalu te smṛṭāḥ

The reading of b generally found in editions and MSS. examined is svapne *vipratipadyate*; but as the sense requires it should be svapne 'pi prati-
that the things have some purpose also in dream is
known. Hence owing to their having a beginning and an
end, indeed, they are regarded as unreal.'

For particulars see IV. 32 which is a repetition of the
present kārikā.

padgote which is actually found in a MS., D. in IV. 32
which is identical with the present kārikā. Here, too, MS. Vn. reads svapne ca prati\". It is supported
also by MS. Ch 117 of the Comm. in Ānandāśrama ed. which has svapne
prati\" for svapne viprati\".

8

apūrvāḥ sthānidharmaḥ hi yathā svarganiśāsinām 1
tān ayaṃ prekṣate gatvā yathāiveha susūkṣitaḥ 2

'(The phenomena of dream) are strange, like (the char
acteristics) of the inhabitants of the heaven; they are the char
acteristics of the person in the place (of dream, i.e., the dreamer
himself). Just like one who is well trained here, he goes and
sees them (in dream).

I confess this kārikā is not quite clear to me. I simply write
what I have been able to gather from it in the light of the
commentator.

It is to be noted that in a I suggest the reading apūrvāḥ
sthānidharmāḥ for apūrvam sthānidharmah, so that the former
can be connected with tān in c. For other readings see the
commentary and the Appendix.

The kārikā seems to say as follows: The phenomena
of dream, on the analogy of which the objects of the waking
experience are held to be unreal, are sometimes strange, as the
characteristics of some gods, such as the thousand eyes of
Indra, and this is the nature of the dreamer (sthānīn ‘one in
the place’ of dream) himself. And just as a man who is

well trained goes to a place and sees there strange things, so
he sees strange things in a dream.

The next two kārikās seek to establish the unreality of
dream and waking experience alike:

9

svapnaṁ api tv antaḥ cetasa kalpitam tv asat
bahiś cetoghitam sad dṛṣṭam vaitathyam etayoḥ

'Even in the state of dream that which is imagined by mind
within is (regarded as) non-existing (asat), while that which is
cognized by mind without is (regarded as) existing (sat); (but)
the unreality of (both of) them is a matter of experience.'

10

jāgradoṣaṁ api tv antaḥ cetasa kalpitam tv asat
bahiś cetoghitam sad yuktam vaitathyam etayoḥ

'In the waking state also, that which is imagined by mind
within is regarded as non-existing (asat), while that which is
cognized by mind without is regarded as existing, (sat);
the unreality of (both of) them is reasonable.'

Cf. these two kārikās with IV. 63-66.

The opponent here says that it cannot be said that every
thing in the waking experience and dream is unreal, for there
must be at least one thing real without which we cannot
go on:
ubhayor api vaitathyam bhedanam sthanayor yadi
dka etan buddhyate bhedan ko vai tesam vikalpaka
d
'If in both the states the different things are unreal, well, then who is it that cognizes these things? Who is it that imagines them?'

The answer is given in the following karika:

d
kalpayaty atmanatmanam atmdeva svamayayaa
da eva buddhyate bhedan iti vedantaniiscayah
d
'It is the self, the shining one, that imagines the self by the self through its own illusion (maya), and verily it is that (self) which cognizes the things. This is the conclusion of the Vedanta.'

For such use of the word atman in the sense of self see BG, II, 55; V, 17; VI, 5, 6.

The word deva here and in similar cases (I, 1; II, 19, 21) does not mean a 'god'. Its literal sense is 'a shining one' and it is used to denote anything that shines in any way, or that which has some sort of glory or power. For instance, in Upanishadic texts see PU, I, 1, 2 (where the following are called devas: akasa, vayu, agni, puthru, va, manas, ca
gus and stotra); 5 (vayu); 8 (pravishna); IV, 1, 2, 5, 6 (manas); 11 (agni, etc.) BU, IV, 3, 13 (sa
karana: deva dyotamanaha). Purusottama would take the word in the sense of 'a playing one': atra deva iti kriyapanatvam utkam teneyaam kriyapanam prahlitai.

It may be noted incidentally that the words prabhu (I, 8, 10; II, 13) and vibhu (I, 1, 10) in such cases are not to be

c
connected with the sense of 'god': they simply mean 'powerful'. See BG, V, 14, 15.

See also our text II, 19: SU, IV, 9.

In what manner the Atman imagines so, is shown in the next karika:

d
vikaroty aparana bhavananta citte 'vyavasthitan
niyatam ca bahic citta evam kalpayate prabhuh
d
'It brings about some things in the mind within, which are not fixed, also some other things in the mind without which are fixed. This brings about the powerful one.'

vikaroti 'brings about' (lit. 'makes variously'). Com. nana karoti = kalpayati (II, 12) or kalpayate (II, 13, 16; see 14, 30, 33; I, 18, II, 9).

There are two kinds of things, things in dream, and those in wakefulness, and both of them are imagined in mind. The only difference between them is that the former are imagined inside and are not fixed vanishing at once, while the latter are imagined outside and are fixed, for they serve our practical purposes.

The next karika seeks to show that in fact there is no difference between them:

1 In h the commentator with a number of editions and MSS. reads vyavasthitam for avyavasthitam which is clearly supported by Purusottama. The sense of the karika demands in the first half a term opposite to nitya in the second half, and it is avyavasthitam (svanitya) and not vyavasthitam. In the phrase bahicitta evam (in c and d) the commentator takes the first word as bahicitte. But it must be bahicitte. Purusottama clearly reads the latter. Cf. antaicitte in h.
14
cittakālāś ca ye 'ntas tu dvayakālāś ca ye bahihī
kalpitā eva te sarve viśeśa nānyahetukāḥ

'Those which are within and exist as long as exists the thought (citta), and those which are without and exist as long as remains (the notion of) the two (i.e., grāhya 'perceptible' and grāhaka 'perceptient'), are all merely imagined. And (in this respect) there is no difference on any other ground.'

For dvaya see III. 29, 30; IV. 4, 24, 61, 62, 72, 75, 87.

That in such cases dvaya 'twofold' means grāhya and grāhaka, 'perceptible' and 'perceptient' respectively, is quite clear from the words of the author himself (IV. 72b): grāhya-grāhakavad dvayam. It is also well known throughout the Buddhist literature, for instance, MS, XIV. 28 (p. 94):

dvayagrāhavisamyuktāṃ lokottaram anuttaram
nirvikalpaṃ maṇḍetāṃ jānaṃ sa labbhe punah


svadhātutvā dvavyābhāsāḥ saśvidyākleśavīttayaḥ
vikalpāḥ sampravartante dvayadravyavivarjitāḥ

dvavyābhāsā iti grāhya-grāhakābhāsāḥ. dvayadravyavivarjitā iti grāhya-dravyavēya grāhakādravyēya ca.

See also the following quoted from the Āryaḍhyātānaya-paripṛcchā in MV, p. 463:

na hi kulaputra dvayaprabhāvītā tathāgatadharmaṭā. tatra ye dvaye caranti na te samyaikaprayuktā mithyaprayuktās te vaktavyāḥ. katamace kulaputra dvayaṃ. ahaṃ rāgaṃ prahāsyāmīti dvayam etat. ahaṃ dveṣaṃ prahāsyāmīti dvayam etat. ahaṃ mohāṃ prahāsyāmīti dvayam etat.

II. 14.15] ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA

TS, 3,538:
prakṛtyā bhāsvare citte dvayakārākalaṁkite
dvayakārāvivimūḍhātmā kaḥ kuryād anyathāmatiḥ (tim) ≥
dvayakārāvivimūḍhātmī prabhūgrāhyagrāhakābhiniyeśāḥ.

—Panjiśā.

Though both of the experiences, i.e., the experiences in dream and waking, are mere imaginations, and as such are not different, yet there is some difference between them with regard to the means of their cognition. This is shown in the next kārikā:

15

avyakta eva ye 'ntas tu sphūta eva ca ye bahihī
kalpitā eva te sarve viśeṣas tv indriyāntare

'Those which are unmanifest within and those which are manifest without are all imagined indeed, but there is some difference owing to the difference of the organs of sense (with which they are cognized).'

The experiences of dream being related only to the mind (manomātrasandhāt) are unmanifest (avyakta = asphūta); while those of waking being related to external senses, such as eyes, etc. (cakṣurādibhir indriyasandhāt) are manifest (sphūta). Hence it is to be admitted that there is some difference between them. But this difference is not due to any reality (astiitvākta) of external things; for the phenomena of dream, too, appear for the time being to be as real as those of waking. Therefore this difference lies in the fact that while the things within are cognized by mind, those without are cognized by external senses. The following line of Anandaśīri is to be noted here specially: ye manasy antarbhavaṇāripatvād asphūta ye ca manaso bahir upalabhya-

mānāḥ sphūta bhavanti te sarve manahśandananātratvena

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The creation of internal and external things are effected thus:

jīvaṃ kalpayate pūrṇaṃ tato bhāvān pṛthagvidhān
bāhyān ādhyātmikāṁ caiva yathāvidyas tathāsmytih

"First one imagines a personal soul (jīva), and then various things, external and internal. As one knows so one recollects."

Mark that it is a personal soul (jīva) that is first imagined, and then the other things. And it is so, because the imagination of the latter depends entirely on that of the former. Says the commentator (II. 17): jivakalpanā sarvakalpananāmīyam 'the imagination of jīva is the root of other imaginations.' This imagination of a personal soul is what is called satkāyadṛśī or svakāyadṛśī (MK. XXIII. 5). Pali satkāyadīthi, 'theory of individuality' in Buddhism. It is generally known as ātmadṛśī. Pali attadīthi, or ātmavāda. Pali attavāda. This satkāyadṛśī is fourfold: thinking that (i) rūpa (so also cedana, samjñā,

6 To mention only a few see DSA, pp. 182, 183, § 1093; MN, I, 300; SN, III, 16 ff. 42, 44, 46, 50, 102, etc.: MVII, § 208: rūpaṃ ātman svāmīvat, rūpānaṃ atma alākṣāvat, atmiyam rūpam bhūjayat, rūpe ātma bhājeyat. The following may be quoted here which refutes the above view:

rūpan nātmā rūpānaṃ naeva cātmā
rūpe nātmā rūpe aṁśa na ca 1

This is quoted in SS, p. 20; MV, p. 355.

7 These stanzas are from PV. II. 217-19. BAP reads tattvātāha for tattvāyāha, paritṛṣṇ for 'tṛṣṇa and tu for so in karika 1', 2' and 2 respectively. The last verse is quoted in AAA, p. 67; NK, p. 279. Cf. the views
āniscitā yathā rajjura andhakāre vikalpataḥ
sarpadhārādibhir bhāvais tadadvā ātmā vikalpitaḥ

‘As in the dark a rope which is not determinately known is imagined to be a snake or a continuous line of water, etc., so is imagined the soul (ātmā = jīva).’

1 See note 2.
2 In the commentary on śloka 93 of his Madhyamakālaśākāra which is now available only in its Tibetan version, Taṅjur (Mdo, sa = XXVIII, 52, 1—84° 7; Cordier: III, p. 311). Sāntirakṣita quotes some kārikās from Books II and III of our work. The following is the Tibetan version of the present kārikā:

ji. litar. mun. khuṅ. ma. rtags. te t
thag. pa. sbrul. gyi. rgyun. la. sogs. t
dīos. po. rnam. par. btags. pa. ltar. t
de. bzin. bdag. kya. rnam. par. btags. t

In a Tib. has andhakārabile (mun. khuṅ) for andhakāre and in it takes sarpadhāra as sarpasaṇa dharā (sbrul. gyi. rgyun), and not sarpa ‘snake’ and dharā ‘continuous line’.

18 niścitayaṁ yathā rajjvāṁ vikalpo vinivartate
rajjura eveti cādvaitaṁ tadadvā ātmaviniścayah

‘As the rope being determinately known the thing imagined vanishes and there is non-duality—it is nothing but the rope, so is the ascertainment of ātmā.’

According to Tib.¹ the reading rajjura eveti in c is rajjura ekaiṭa (thang. pa. gcig. śid), and it appears to be better. In d Tib. literally reads ātmapi niścitah (bdag. kyaṅ. nes. pa. yin) for ātmaviniścayah.

¹ It runs thus:

ji. litar. thag. pa. nes. rtags. na t
rnam. par. rtags. pa. bdag. bgyur. te t
thag. pa. gcig. śid. gais. min. pa. t
de. litar. bdag. kyaṅ. nes. pa. yin

19 prāṇādbhir anantaṁ tu bhāvaṁ etaitaṁ vikalpitaḥ
māyaiṣā tasya devasya yayāyaṁ mohitaṁ svayam

‘It (Ātmā) is imagined as Prāṇa ‘breath’ or ‘life’ and other innumerable things.² This is an illusion of it, the shining one,³ by which it itself is deluded.’⁴

¹ See II. 12.
² See II. 20 ff.
³ See BU, IV, 15: yadaitam anupaśayantri ātmānaṁ devam ănjasā.
⁴ The following is the Tib. version:

srog. la. sogs. pa. mthabs. yas. paḥi t
dīos. po. de. dag. rnam. par. btags. t
gās. gis. de. bdag. śid. smois t
de. nī. lha. deḥi. sgyu. ma. yin t

In c the actual reading is dog for bdag and in d there is rgyu for sgyu. In c there are only six syllables instead of seven. One may, however, add here pa after smois.
It is said that Ātman is imagined as Prāṇa and such other things. But what these things are is stated in the following kārikās (20-28):

prāṇa iti prāṇavido bhūtānīt ca tadvidhaḥ  
guṇa iti guṇavidas tattvānīt ca tadvidhaḥ 1

‘Those who know prāṇa ‘breath’ or ‘life’ (imagine) it as prāṇa; those who know bhūtaś elements’ as bhūtaś; those who know guṇaś ‘ingredients’ as guṇaś, and those who know tattvaś ‘categories,’ as tattvaś.’

The knowers of prāṇa are some followers of Upaniṣads; their view is found in the following: MnU, III. 4: prāṇo hy eṣa yāḥ sarvābhūtāire vibhāti; Pu. II. 4: prāṇo sarvaṃ pratiśhitam ti CE, I. 11. 4-5; BU, IV. 4. 18; BS, I. 1. 13. Ananda-giri says that they are the votaries of Hirayagarbha, etc., Vaiśeṣikas and others.

The bhūtaś ‘elements’ are āve, vīz., earth, water, fire, air and sky (or ether). According to Madhyamikas and the Sautrāntikas there are only four elements excluding the sky (Ch. IX, 3, 5). The Vaiśeṣikas, however, admit it as bhūta (AK, 1.8). Ananda-giri says that the view referred to here is held by the Lokayatikas who maintain that the first four elements are the origin of the world.

1 The following is the Tib. version:

srog dug rin pa thugs srog ces brjod
thub po yin zhes de rig rnam
yon tan rig rnam yon tan sham
yat dag yin zhes de rig rnam

Tib. yon, dag is generally used for Skt. samyak and sometimes for bhūta; and paramārtha; but it is only here in d, so far as I have noticed, that it is employed for tattva.

II. 20-21] ĀGAMAŚĀTRA

The guṇaś are the three constituent elements of Prakṛti of the Śāṅkhyā philosophy, vīz., sattvā, rajās and tamās.

As regards the tattvaś Ananda-giri says that the Śaivas are referred to here, according to whom there are three tattvaś, vīz., ātman, avidyā and Śiva.

pāda iti pādavido vīṣayā iti tadvidhaḥ  
loka iti lokavido deva iti ca tadvidhaḥ 2

‘Those who know pādaś ‘quarters’ (imagine it) as pādaś; those who know vīṣayāś ‘objects’ as vīṣayāś; those who know lokas ‘worlds’ as lokas; and those who know devaś ‘gods’ as devas.’

Pāda may refer to what is known from such passages as the following: RV. X. 90. 3 pādā śyā viśvā bhūtāni tripād asyāṁśitaṃ divi; ChU, III. 12. 6; pādo śyā sarvā bhūtāni 18. 2; vāk pādaḥ prāśāpādaḥ caṅkṣaḥ pādo īgniḥ pādo vāyuḥ pādaḥ; also IV. 63. 8. 3. A says it alludes to the four pādaś of ātman, vīz., Viśa, Taḥa, etc., described above.

According to Ā the vīṣayāś are the objects of senses (indriyāś). They are five, vīz., sound (śabda), the tangible (śparśa), colour (rūpa), savour (rasa), and odour (gandha). These are to be enjoyed again and again, and as such are regarded as tattvaś ‘principle.’ This view is, as Ā tells us, held by Viṣṇyāna and others (vīṣṇyāyan-prabhūti). This Viṣṇyāna appears to be the author of the Kāmikā. Of ‘others’ we may take the Lokayatikas and some Tāntrikas, Buddhist and Brāhmaṇic. See The Basic Conception of Buddhism, pp. 62 ff.; SS, pp. 37 ff.; Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa;
Visvabharati, 1933, p. 2. The following is quoted from the last mentioned work:

svādhīśaiva yatparamāma jajagadharakṣātodnya mahābhūmi
bhuddāna viṣāyān bhogi murcyate na ca līpyate || 17
yathāiva viṣātattvajīto viṣām ālokya bhakṣaya na
kevalāṃ murcyate nāsa rogamuktā ca jāyate ||

The loka-vīdū are, according to Ā, the followers of the Purāṇas holding that there are three loka-s ‘worlds,’ viz., bhū ‘earth,’ bhuvās (bhuvāra) ‘atmosphere,’ and svār ‘heaven.’

The deva-vīdū are, as says Ā, the followers of the Devatā-kāṇḍa, i.e., that part of the Veda (cf. Niṣṭhā or Nīruktā, VII) which deals with devatā-s ‘deities.’ They hold that karma-phala ‘consequence of action’ is given by Devatās, Agni, Indra and others, and not by God.

vedā iti vedavidō yājña iti ca tadvadā ||
bhoktāti ca bhoktṛvadā bhojiyām iti ca tadvadā ||

‘The knowers of the Vedas (imagine it) as the Vedas, the knowers of yajñās ‘sacrifices’ as yajñās, the knowers of the bhokty ‘enjoyer’ as bhokty, and those who know bhojiya ‘enjoyable’ as bhojiya.’

According to Ā, yajñāvidū are Baulha yāna and others.

The bhoktṛvīdū are the Sāṅkhya-s who maintain that ātmān is only enjoyer (bhokty) and not also doer (kartṛ). Or see BG, V. 29: bhokтарaṇa yajñatapāsam; IX. 24: bhokta ca prabhub eva ca; XII. 22: bhartā bhokta mahēśvaraḥ. See also our text, I. 9.

In accordance with the same authority bhojiyāvidū are the cooks (śāpaka-rāṣī), for in their opinion food (bhojiyām vastu) is the principle. Cf. TU, III. 2-1: annaḥ brahmavi śāpaka; ChU, I. 3. 6: annaḥ hidam sarvam sthitam.

sūkśma iti sūkṣmavidāh sthūla iti ca tadvadā ||
mūrtta iti mūrtavidā iti ca tadvadā ||

‘Those who know what sūkṣma ‘a subtle thing’ is (imagine it) as sūkṣma, those who know what sthūla ‘a gross thing’ is as sthūla, those who know what mūrtta ‘an embodied thing’ is as mūrtta, and those who know what amūrtta ‘non-embodied’ is as amūrtta.’

Sūkṣmavidū are those who hold that the dimension of ātmān is like that of an atom (aṇū). Accordingly they would refer to all the Vaiṣṇava teachers, such as Rāmaṇuja, Nīrāka, Madhava, and Vālābha. For the discussion see BS, II. 3. 19-32. See also MuU. III. 1: sūkṣmac ca tat sūkṣmataran vibhāti; 9: eso ‘nir ātmā cetasā veditavyah; MU, II. 5: sa vā esa sūkṣmo ‘grāhyah.

Sthūlavidū refer to a class of Lokāyatikās holding that the gross body is ātmān.—A.

Mūrtavidū are Āgamicas, followers of Āgamas (Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas). mūrttas trisūlādhiḥāra mahēśvarā śakrādhiḥāra vā paramārtho bhavati.—A. The following passage (BU, II. 3. 1) may here be cited: dve vāva brahmāno rūpe mūrttaḥ caivā mūrttaḥ ca.

A says Amūrtavidū are Śaivyādins. But see the passage quoted above from the BU.

kala iti kālavidi disā iti ca tadvadā ||
vādā iti vādavidu bhuvanānti tadvadā ||

‘Those who know kāla ‘time’ (imagine it) as kāla, those who know diś-es ‘directions’ or ‘quarters’ as diś-es, those who know 10.30.11—5
vādas 'discussions' as vādas, and those who know bhuvanas 'worlds' as bhuvanas."

Kālāvids are astronomers. Kāla is the cause of all existence. See AV, XIX. 53, 54; SU, I. 2, VI. 1; SS with Gupta, pp. 10 ff.

The knowers of diś-es, as says Ā, are svārodāyaṇaṇa, i.e., those who know good or bad omens by voices of birds, etc., holding that the diś-es are the highest reality.

Vādāyaṇaṇaṇa are, according to the same authority, those who hold dhātuvāda 'alchemy', mantravāda 'formulas of sacred texts,' or 'the science of magic,' and so on. Here vāda may, however, refer to 'discussion' as in NS, I. 1.1, 2. 1.

The knowers of bhuvanas are those who know the system of the worlds (bhuvanakoṇa) and say that there are in all fourteen of them. See ViP, XXXIII-LX (Bhavanavinyāsa and yotispracāra).

25

mana iti manovido buddhir iti ca tadviḍāh

"Those who know manas 'mind' (imagine it) as manas, those who know buddhi 'intellec' as buddhi, those who know citta 'thought' or 'consciousness' as citta, and those who know dharma 'duty' and adharma 'non-duty' as dharma and adharma."

Ā says that a particular section of the Lokāyātikas who opine that manas is the self (atman) is referred to by the word manovido, and the knowers of buddhi are Buddhists who maintain that the intellect is the self (atman). The knowers of citta are evidently Yogācāras or Vijñānavādins. The knowers of dharma and adharma are the Mīmāṃsists.

26

paṇcavimśaka ity eke śaṭṭvinśa iti cāpare

ekatriniśaka ity āhur ananta iti cāpare

"Some say it to be consisting of twenty-five, some consisting of twenty-six, some consisting of thirty-one, while others to be endless in number."

Here paṇcavimśaka refers to the opinion of the Śaṅkhyas, according to whom there are twenty-five tattvas 'principles,' viz., 1. prakṛti, 2. mahat, 3. ahaṅkaṇa, 4. 8. five tanmatras, 9. manas, 10-14. five jñānendriyas, 15-19. five karmendriyas, 20-24. five mahabhūtas, and 25. puruṣa.

By śaṭṭvinśa we are to understand the view of Pāṇaṅālas or the followers of the Yoga system. Their tattvas are the same as those of the Śaṅkhyas enumerated above plus īśvara, the twenty-sixth.


As Nos. 8-12 are merely the manifestations (vibbhūtis) of māyā, as said by the commentator of the MM, p. 50, one may

1 Nos. 1-5 constitute the tattva called pati;
2 This is according to MM, p. 50; but TP, III. 8 clearly reads vidyā and the commentator explains it as asuddhāvidyā;
3 Nos. 6-12 constitute the tattva known as pāta;
4 Nos. 13-36 are included in the tattva named pāta. See MM, verses 13-25; TP. II. 5-11, III. 4, 12.
excluded these five, thus making the number thirty-one as required in our text.

There is one point to be noted here. According to TP, IV. 2, between avyakta and buddhi or mahat there is an additional tattva called guṇa, but in MM it is not mentioned.

27

lokālokavidāḥ prabhur āśramā iti tadvidāḥ Ⅰ
stripūṇnapūṇśakaṁ laṁgāḥ paraparam athāpāre Ⅱ

‘Those who know lokas ‘people’ (imagine it) as lokas, those who know āśramas ‘stages of religious life’ as āśramas, those who know liṅgas ‘sexes’ as a male, a female, or a eunuch, while others as para ‘higher’ and aparā ‘lower’.’

The lokavidas or lauṅkikas are those who hold that the pleasing of people (lokaṁnurañjana) is the real thing.—Ā. See II. 21.

The āśramavidas are, as says Ā, D a ṣ a and others. Probably they are the writers on religious laws (dharmaśstraṅkāras).

Laṁgas are grammarians, as says Ā.

Here parāpara refers to those who say that two Brahmans are to be known, and the higher and the lower. MU, VI. 1: dve brahmaṁi veditavye paraṁ caivaṁparaṁ ca.—Ā.

28

ṣṭitr iti ṣṭīvīdō laya iti ca tadvidāḥ Ⅰ
sthitit iti sthīvīdāḥ sarvam cēha tu sarvadā Ⅱ

II. 28-30] ĀGAMAŚĀTRA

‘Those who know sṛṣṭi ‘creation’ (imagine it) as sṛṣṭi, Ⅰ those who know laya ‘destruction’ as laya, and those who know sthiti ‘continued existence’ as sthiti. Ⅰ All (these imaginations) are always here.’

1 See I. 7.
2 The knowers of sṛṣṭi, laya and sthiti are, according to Ā, the Paurāṇikas ‘knowers of Purāṇas.’
3 W’iha refers to Ātman.

29

yaṁ bhāvaṁ darṣayed yasya tāṁ bhāvaṁ sa tu paśyati Ⅰ
taṁ cāvatī sa bhūtvāsau tadgraṅghaṁ samupaiti tam Ⅱ

‘Whatever thing is presented to him, he sees it; that (ātman) becomes it (i.e., the thing presented), and satisfies him. And the strong attachment to it (i.e., the idea that herein lies the truth) takes possession of him.’

30

etair eṣo pṛthagbhāvaiḥ pṛthag eveti laksitāḥ Ⅰ
evaṁ yo veda tattvena kalpayet so ’viṣāṅkitaḥ Ⅱ

‘Verily it (ātman) is considered different through these things that are not different from it. One who knows it in fact may imagine without any hesitation.’

When one sees a piece of rope as a snake, in fact, there is no difference between these two things, for the snake is nothing but the piece of rope which simply appears as a snake. Thus there is only the piece of rope and not the snake which is merely imposed thereon. In the same way there is only ātman, all things other than that being mere imagined.
31

svapnamāye yathā drṣṭaṃ gandharvanagaram yathā
tathā viśvam idaṃ drṣṭaṃ vedāntesu vicakṣaṇaiḥ

‘As dream and illusion are seen, and as is the town of Gandharvas, so is seen all this universe by those who are well-versed in the Vedāntas.’

The word gandharvanagara ‘an imaginary town in the sky’ is not pre-Buddhist and is frequently used in Buddhist works. The thought, too, of the kārikā has often found expression in them. For instance, SR, IX (p. 29):

yathaiva gandharvapuruṣaṃ maricika,
yathaiva māyā supinam yathaiva
svabhāvaṇāya tu nimitabhaṇanā
tathopamān jānatha sarvadharmān

See MV, p. 178; MK, XVII. 33:

gandharvanagarākāraśa maricisvapnasannibhā

LA, X. 144 (p. 283):

gandharvanagarasvapnamāyānirmāṇasādṛṣṭā


māyāsvapnaniḥ bhāva gandharvanagaropamāḥ
maricydakacandrabhāḥ svavikaliṃ vībhāvayet

1 Tissendar writes in his Popular Scientific Recreations: The mirage or Fata Morgana is a very curious but sufficiently common phenomenon and in the Asiatic and African plains it is frequently observed. * * * The Fata Morgana and the inverted images of ships at sea are not uncommon on European coasts. Between Sicily and Italy, this effect is seen in the Sea of Riggio with fine effect. Palaces, towers, fertile plains with cattle grazing on them are seen with many other terrestrial objects upon the Sea.—The Palaces of Fairy Morgana, p. 649.

II. 31-32

See also 279, 291 (pp. 301, 303).

In showing the Buddhist view Śaṅkarāja quotes the following in his commentary on BS, II. 2, 28:

svapnamāyāmaricyudakagandharvanagarādipratyayā vināvā bahyenaḥ theṇa grāhyagrāhahakāraḥ bhavanti.

The author says in the kārikā that this view is of the Vedāntins. Śaṅkarāja follows it, but Rāmānuja with others is of the opposite opinion saying (B.S., I. 1. 1) : jagad api pāramārthikam eva ādīyate.

The following two kārikās show the conclusion:

32

na nirodho na cōttattir na baddho na ca sādhakahā
na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity esā paramārthaḥ

‘There is no disappearance, nor origination; no one in bondage, no one who works for success; no one who is esārious of emancipation, no one who is emancipated.—This is the highest truth.’

This is what is the essence of Mahāyāna Buddhism. For the wording of na nirodho na cōttattir cf. the opening kārikā of Nāgārjuna’s MK, p. 3: aniruddham anutpādam. See also BA, IX. 150:

evaḥ ca na nirodha ‘sti na ca bhāvo ‘sti sarvadā
ajātam aniruddham ca tasmāt sarvam idaṃ jagat

LA, p. 191: aniruddha anutpannāḥ ca bhagavatā sarvadharmā deśyante.

See also LA, II. 1. X. 1:

utpādaṇaḥ garahito lokāḥ khaṇḍasannibhāḥ

1 Lit. 'suppression.'
For bandha and mokṣa compare the following: ČS, 179:

casyacit kṣetacit sārdhām bandho nāma na vidyate
pāreṣa saha bandhasya viprayogo na yuyate

LA, 79b:

nātra kaścin mahāmate badhyate na ca mucyate.

Op. cit. X, 275:

na mokṣo na ca bandhanaṃ

See also the Āryaratnakūṭa quoted in MV, pp. 49, 339 and the Chapter called Bandhanamokṣaparīkṣa of MK with MV, XVI from which we quote the following (5):

atrāha. yady api tvāyā saṃśāranirvāṇe pratiṣiddhe tathāpi bandhamokṣau vidyete. na cāvidyamānasya bhāvasvabhāvasya bandhamokṣau sambhavataḥ. tasmād bandhamokṣasadbhāvād
vidyata eva bhāvanāṃ svabhāva iti. ucyate. syād bhāvanāṃ svabhāvo yadi bandhamokṣāv eva sāyām. na tu sta ity āha—

na badhyante na mucyanta udayavyayadharmīṇaḥ

Āryaratnakūṭa in MV, p. 49:

ahāyusmān subhūtis tāṃ bhikṣu etad avocat kutrāyuṣmanto
gataḥ kuto vāgataḥ. te vocan. na kvacid gamanīṣya na kutaścid āgamamāya bhadanta subhūte bhagavatā dharmaḥ dēśitaḥ.
āha. ko nāmāyuṣmatāṃ fāstā. āhuḥ. yo notpanno na parinirvāyati. āha. kathaṃ yuṣmābhīr dharmah śrūtaḥ. āhuḥ. naandhanāya na mokṣāya.

Cf. Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 62:

tasmāna badhyate nāpi mucyate nāpi saṃsārati kaścit
saṃsārati badhyate mucyate ca nānāträya práktiḥ

We read in the MSA, VI. 2 (p. 22):

na san na cāsan na tathā na cānyathā
na jāyate vyeti na cāvahiyațe
na vardhate nāpi viśūdhyațe punar
viśūdhyațe tat paramārthalakṣaṇam

II. 32-34]

The present kāikā is widely quoted in minor Upaniṣads and other religious and philosophical works of the country sometimes with slight variations. For instance, see Avadhūtopaniṣad, 8; Ātmopaniṣad, 31; Triparāṇapanyupaniṣad, V. 10; Brahmābindū-
paniṣad, 10.

The reason for what is said above is advanced in the following kāikā:

33

bhāvār asadbhir evāyam advayena ca kalpitaḥ
bhāvā apy advayenaiva tasmād advayata Śiva

'It is (ātman) imagined in the form of things which are really non-existent through that which is non-dual, and the things (themselves), too, are imagined through what is non-dual. Therefore non-duality is blissful.'

The word advaya 'non-dual' means 'one free from both the perceivers and perceptible (grāhyagbhāhakarahita).'

The imagination of ātman as different things, such as prāṇa, etc., which have no existence, is through the advaya. For the imagination mainly depends on it, just like the imagination of a snake on a piece of rope; no imagination of a snake is possible, if there is no rope. Similarly things are imagined through the advaya, ātman. It is the advaya through which there are both the imaginations, the imagination of ātman as different things, and the imagination of the things themselves. Thus advaya 'the state of non-duality' being real is blissful.

34

nānyabhāvāna nānedaṃ na svenāpi kathaćcana
na pṛthāḥ nāprthāk kīcchit īti tattvāvādo viduḥ

'It (the world) is not manifold either through its own nature
or through that of another; there is not either the different or the non-different—the knowers of truth know this.'

Here in the beginning of a I should like to propose to read nātyabhāvena as I have done, for nātmaṁbhāvena accepted by all, though the former is not supported by any edition or MS. known to me. My reason is this: The words ātmabhāvena (a) and svēna (b) are in fact, one and the same in sense; they do not convey any difference in their meanings which is evidently required here. I am afraid, S's explanation can hardly be accepted being unwarranted and far-fetched, as it seems to me. Here ātmabhāvena appears to be inexplicable.

Having modified the reading as above, I think the words anyabhāva and svā are actually the same as parabhāva 'nature of other' and svabhāva 'nature of one's own' respectively, as thoroughly attacked, discussed, and finally refuted in MK and MV, XV (saṁbhāva-parāṅga), pp. 259 ff. Cf. Nāgārjuna's pratiyāsamaṁtyāṁḍa which is (MV, p. 3) anekārtham anānārtham. Candrakirti comments: ekaṁ caसवारथस caikārtho bhinnārthaḥ, pāthag ity arthaḥ. See MK, X. 16:

atmanāś ca satatvām ye bhāvānām ca pāthak pāthak 1
nirdhāanti na tān manye śasana-yārthakāvidan II

See our text IV. 91 with notes.

1 ātmabhāvena paramāṁkhaṁ satatavām, svēna prāṇadyāṁtmanāṁ.

35

vitarāgabhāyakrodhāṁ munibhir vedapāragaṁ 1

nirvikalpo hy ayaṁ drṣṭāṁ prapaṁcōpaśama 'dvayaṁ II

'VeThis cessation of the expansion of the universe, devoid of duality and imagination, is seen by the sages who have reached

the other shore of the (ocean of the) Vedas and are free from attachment, fear and anger.'

The word prapaṁcōpaśama is nowhere found in the pre-Buddhist Brahmanic works. It is met with only in later and minor Upaniṣads (NPU, 4. 1; NUU, 1; RUU, 2; for prapaṁcā see SU, 6.6; KIU, 17), including the MaŪ, 7, the existence of which before Ś is doubtful.

The word prapaṁcā of prapaṁcōpaśama is from pra-vāpa or vāpa 'to spread out, make clear, or evident.' With this is connected vāpaṁ whose from prapaṁcā 'a commentary.' Rājaśekhara writes in his Kāvyamimāṁsā, GOS, 1916, p. 5: viṣamapadabhaṁjikā paṁjikā; and we read in Hemacandra's Abhidhānācārāṁdā, II. 168, 170: niruktam padabhaṁjanam, paṁjikā padabhaṁjikā. From this it appears that paṁjikā is from bhaṁjikā (from vāpaṁ: cf. viṣamagā from this root in the sense of 'thorough explanation' used in Buddhist Sanskrit and Pali works). But philologically it can hardly be supported.

Let it be as it may, the meaning of prapaṁcā used frequently in subsequent Vedantic works is, according to that system, 'expansion of the universe' or the 'visible world' (prapaṁcāya iti prapaṁcā). But in accordance with the Buddhists it means 'verbal designation,' 'expression,' 'word' (prapaṁcāya 'nena or prapaṁcāyattī prapaṁcā). Thus anything that is expressed by a word or the word itself is prapaṁcā according to the Buddhists. (See The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, pp. 48, 91, 156, 209.) Candrakirti writes in his MV, p. 373:

prapaṁcā hi vā prapaṁcāyata iti kāttā. prapaṁcācay prapaṁcācitaṁ (MK, XVIII. 9) vāgbhir avyaktaṁ ity arthaḥ.

These words (vāca) are naturally various as said in the same work, p. 350. See the passage quoted in our text, I. 17.

prapaṁcōpaśama which is the same as prapaṁcōparaṇa (MV, p. 11) and prapaṁcāvailaya (discussed by Ś in his commentary on BS, III. 2. 21) is mokṣa of the Vedāntists belonging to the school of Gauḍapāda followed by Ś, and nirvāṇa of the
Mādhyaṃkās, and the object in view of Nāgaratna in writing his MK as said in MV, p. 4: sarvaprapaścāpamāṣivalaṃśasīraṃ nirvāṇaṃ śāstrasya prayogānaṃ nirūgatam. He himself says (MV, p. 11):

anirōdhām anutpādām anuccitam
anēkapārtham anānātam anāgānām anirūgatam
yaḥ pratītyasaṃutpādantamaṃ prapaścāpaśaṃśaṃ śīvāṃ
dēṣāyāśā bhūmāṃs tamaṃ vande vaidatāṃ varaṃ

For a fuller explanation of prapaścāpaśaṃ (and śīva, MāU, 7) from the Buddhist point of view see MK, XXV, 24 with MV, p. 538:

sarvapalambhah prapaścāpaśaṃ śīvāḥ

īha hi sarvaṃ prapaścānaṃ nimittānāṃ ya upaśamam pravṛttiṃ tan nirvāṇam sa eva copaśaṃ, prakṛtya copaśaṃ cītāya pravṛtvā cītāya, vācām apravṛtvā prapaścāpamāśaṃ cītasyāpravṛtvā śīvāḥ. kleśapraśānaṃ vā prapaścāpaśaṃ niravāsāvāsanā- prahāṣaṇaṃ śīvāḥ. jēyānupalabdhyā vā prapaścāpaśaṃ jēnānupalabdhyā śīvāḥ.

LA, X, 230 (p. 295):

sarvaprapaścāpaśaṃ bhṛṃto nābhīpravartate
prajā kā yāvād vikalpante bhṛṃto tāvā pravartate

For nirvikalpa see MV, p. 374:

nirvikalpaṃ hi tat (referring to tatvat, MK, XVIII, 9). vikalpaṃ cītāpracarāḥ. tadāhitaṃvā tattvāṃ nirvikalpaṃ. yathoktaṃ sūtre. paramārthaṃ satyāmat. yatra jēnānaya pracarāḥ kaḥ punarvādo ṇāraṇāṃ iti. evaṃ nirvikalpaṃ.

It is to be noted that it is vikalpa from which spring up rāga, dvēśa, mohā, etc.

The word vedapārāga in the text may be taken here as vedapārāga and not vedapāraṇa as above meaning 'one conversant with Vedānta (Veda-pāra).’ Cf. vedānteṣu vicākṣaṇātha (II, 31).

II. 36] ĀGAMAŚĀTRA

36
tasmā devaṃ viditvān na advaite yoyat saṃrūtim
advaitaḥ samanuprāpya jādaval lokam ācāret

‘Therefore having thus known it (i.e., prapaścāpaśa) one should fix one’s memory on non-duality, and having realized non-duality should behave as a fool among people.’

The word saṃṛūtim, Pali sati, means one of the five balas ‘strengths or powers,’ or one of the seven requisites for attaining supreme knowledge (bodhyaṅgas, Pali bōjhaṅgas). See DS, LXVIII, XLIX; MVT². §§ 38, 39. Cf. ChU, VII, 26. 7: āhāratuddhau sattvāuddhā, sattvāuddhā dhruvā saṃṛūtiḥ. saṃṛūtam lambhe sarvagrasānasā vipramokṣaḥ. Here 5 explains dhruvā saṃṛūtiḥ as continuous absence of forgetting (avicchinnā avismarṣaṇa). This is nothing but dhyāna ‘meditation.’ Rāmānuja in his commentary on BS, 1.1.1 (ed. Na rāśiṁhācārya, Ananda Press, 1909, pp. 9ff.), supports it; and Vācaspatiṃśra, YS, 1. 20, expressly says that saṃṛūti is steady and undisturbed meditation (saṃṛūtī dhyānam anākulaṁ avikṣiptam). The word saṃṛūti in the present kārikā should be taken in this sense.

For d see 5 on BS, III, 4, 50, where he says: ‘Let him be free from guile, pride and so on, not manifesting himself by a display of knowledge, learning and virtuousness, just as a child whose sensual powers have not yet developed themselves does not strive to make a display of himself before others (SB).’ He quotes here the following from a work (saṃṛūti):

gūḍhadharmaśīrito vidvān ajñātacaritaṁ care; t
andhavaj jaḍavac ca pi mukava ca mahīṁ care

See Jabala Upl, 6; Āśrama Upl, 4; Minor Upaniṣads, Adyar Library, 1921, Vol. I, pp. 154, 161, 184.
37

nistiśi nirnamaskāro niśvadhākāra eva ca

calacalaniketaś ca yatir yadṛcchiko bhavet

'Giving no praise, paying no homage, nor pronouncing svadāh, with an unfixed home and acting at random, one should become an ascetic.'

The word svadāh (originally svadhā 'self-position,' 'self-power,' 'inherent power') is a Vedic exclamation mostly used in offering food to pitiṣ 'deceased ancestors.' It also means the food for pitiṣ. In this case svadhākāra would mean 'offering food to pitṛs.'

Calacalaniketa is, in fact, aniketa of BG, XII. 9, and anilaṃ of BA, VIII. 29, 88, both meaning 'homeless.' Cf. apūrva iva sarvatra in BA, VIII. 16; anāgāra 'homeless' or 'a homeless wanderer' in Buddhist literature, and in Jaina works (Aupapātikasutra, ed. Leumann, 183, §§, 27, 57, etc.).

Here calacala in the compound calacalaniketa is taken by 5 as two words cala- and -acala; and consequently he has fallen into a great confusion in explaining it. The fact is that calacala is one word meaning cañcala 'intensely moving' i.e., 'absolutely not fixed.' See the Vārttika, 6 ('caricāli') in the Mahābhārata on Pāñjīni, VI 1. 12. For example, the following may be quoted: Śitapalavadha, XVII. 53: calacalair anupadām āhataḥ khuraīḥ; Kīrātārjuniya, XI. 30: janminī 'syā sthiṃś vidyād laśyām iva calacalaṃ; Cūṇakṣyamitiścaraṇa (Bombay, 1867), V. 20: calacale ca saṃsāre dharma eko hi niścalaḥ.

The word yadṛcchika does not imply absolutely unrestrained movements, for that is impossible for such a man. See 5 on BS, III. 4. 28-31, 47-50. Mark the significance of the word yatı lit. 'one who strives to restrain one's passions.' The following occurs in the NPU in the Minor Upaniṣads, Adyar, Vol. I, pp. 147, 153:

nirdvandvo nirnamaskāro niśvadhākāra eva ca
kasyāpi vandanaṃ akṛtvā na-namaskāra na-svadhākāra na-svadhākāra na-nindastūtī yādṛcchiko bhavet
tattvam ādhyātmikaṃ dṛṣṭvā tattvaṃ dṛṣṭvā tu bāhyataḥ
tattvibhūtas tadārāmas tattvād apracyuto bhavet
tāti gauḍapādiya āgamaśāstre vaśatāḥkhyāṃ
dvitiyaṃ prakāraṇaṃ samāptam.

'Having realised the truth inward, having also realised the truth outward, one becomes the truth (itself), delighting therein and being such one should be unmoved from it.

Here ends in the Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda Book Two called Unreality.'

The tattvā referred to in the kārikā is nothing but prpaścena-pasama (II. 35) and this is for Vedantists mokṣa and for Buddhists nirvāṇa = pratītyasamutpāda = śūnya.

The words ādhyātmika and bāhya are two opposite terms and can respectively be translated by 'subjective' and 'objective', or in some cases by 'inward' and 'outward' respectively, atman meaning 'body' and, according to those who believe in the existence of a separate soul, 'soul' as well. Here bāhyataḥ is an adverb, and so ādhyātmika, too, may be taken as such. Or both of them are to be construed as adjectives.

For the thought and wording of the kārikā see the following couplet quoted as a speech of Bhagavat in MV, p. 348 (Poussin JRAS, 1910, p. 137):

śūnyaṃ ādhyātmikam paśya paśya śūnyaṃ bahirgatam
na vidyate sō 'pi kaścid yo bhāvayati śūnyatām
BOOK III

I

tapasanaśrito dharma jāte brahmaṇi vartate I
prāg utpatte ājaṇ sarvaṇa tenāsau kṛpaṇaḥ śṛṣṭaḥ II

‘The dharma ‘duty’ relating to upāsana ‘worship’ arises when Brahman is born, but before birth all is unborn; therefore, that (dharma) is regarded as miserable.’

Ś takes dharma to signify a worshipper (upāsaka, sādhaka). A simply follows him explaining: dehasya dhāranād dharma jīvaḥ.

Upāsana depends upon the duality of an upāsaka ‘worshipper’ and an upāsya ‘one to be worshipped.’ This duality also in its turn is possible only when that one Brahman is jāta ‘born’, i.e., manifests himself in the form of this universe. His jāti or prajāti ‘birth’ or ‘growing forth’ or bahubhāva ‘becoming many’ is often found in the Upaniṣads: TU, II, 6: so ‘kāmayaṁ bahu syāṁ prajāyaṇa; ChU, VI, 2.1-3: tad aikṣata bahu syāṁ prajāyeṇa, 3.23: syeṣaṁ devaikṣata hantāham imāṁ tisro devatā anena jivenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi. See BS with Ś, I, 1.2, 5.

Upāsana literally means ‘sitting near,’ i.e., ‘sitting near one who is to be worshipped.’ In fact, upāsana, as Ś explains it, is a continuous course of thought (i.e., meditation), not disturbed by any other dissimilar thought upon an object supported by the scripture. So says Ś in his Introduction to ChU, I, 1.1: upāsanāṁ tu yathāatra samarṣamhitam kṣicid ālambanam upādāya tasmin samācattvattvāntānākaranam tad-vilakṣaṇapratyayānantarāṁ. See his Com. PU, 5, and BS, I, 1.11.

1 This phrase, prāg utpatteḥ, is used not less than eight times by Ś in his comm. on the ChU, VI, 2.1.

III. 2] AGAMAŚĀSTRA 49

2

ato vakṣyāmy akārpanyam ajāti samatām gatam I
yathā na jāyate kīcchā jāyamānaṁ samantataḥ II

‘I shall, therefore, so speak of that state of non-miserableness in which there is no origination (jāti), and which (on that account) is the same throughout, as to show that the things which are (apparently) being born on all sides are none of them born at all.’

The highest truth (paramārtha), according to our author and the Mādhyamikas as well, is that there is nothing that comes into being (jāyate, III. 48). This ajāti or anutpāda (so frequently used in Buddhist texts) ‘non-origination’ is the main subject which the author takes up and discusses the remaining portion of his book. See II. 32; III. 20, 38, 48; IV. 5, 71.

The word ajāti occurs nine times in the work: III. 2, 38; IV. 4, 5, 19, 21, 29, 42, 43.

The sameness (samatām gata, samatā, sānya) of things is owing to their common quality of non-origination (ajāti). The following is from the Āryasatyayadagāvatāra quoted in MV, p. 374: paramārthaḥ sarvadharmanutpādhasamataya paramārthaḥ sarvadharmaṁyaṁāntājātisamataṁ paramārthaḥ samāṁ sarvadharmanāṁ; tat kasmād dhetōḥ. paramārthaḥ nirvāṇaṁ (nānā) karāṇaḥ hi devaputra sarvadharmaṁ atyaṁanītupadātm āpādāya. tad yathāpi nāma devaputra yac ca mādhyānasāhyābhyantram ākāśam yac ca ratnabhadrasyādhyāntaram ākāśam ākāśadātūr evaivaṁ. tat paramārthah na kīcchā nānākaraṇaṁ. evam eva devaputra yāḥ saṁ śa[k+h sa] paramārthah ‘tyāntā- nutpādaṁ. yad api vyavādāni tado api paramārthah ‘tyāntā- nutpādaṁ. saṁśāro ‘pi paramārthah ‘tyāntānutpādaṁ. yāvān nirvāṇaṁ api paramārthah ‘tyāntānutpādaṁ. nātā paramārthaṁ nānākaraṇaṁ. tat kasmād dhetōḥ. paramārthaḥ ‘tyāntā- nutpādatvāt sarvadharmanāṁ. See SP, IV. 83 (p. 143):

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This is further explained in the following kārikā:

4

gaṭādīṣu pralīṇeṣu ghaṭākāśadayo yathā
tākaṃ sampralīyante tadvaj jīva ihātmani

‘As the jars, etc., being destroyed the spaces of jars, etc., are completely merged into space, so are (completely merged) the Jivas into Ātman.

This kārikā is quoted by Śāntirakṣita in his commentary on MAK, 93, and it runs as follows in its Tibetan version:

 bum.pā.la.sogs.shig.1 pa.ni
[bum. pahi. nam. mkha’la.sogs. pa’i]
ji.ltar. nam mkha’ bdu. lgyur. ba
de.bshin. srog kyiā. ‘nes.pa.yin

The second line of the verse is left out in Tib., and is reconstructed from Sanskrit by Walleser: Der älter Vedānta, p. 20.

1 Read bshig for shig.

The following kārikā meets the objection that the Ātman that springs up as different Jivas being one, if one jīva feels happiness or suffers pain, all the Jivas should have the same state of mind. But in fact it is not so:

5

yathaikasmin ghaṭākāśe rajodhūmādibhir yute
na sarve samprayujyante tadvaj jīvāḥ sukhādibhibh

‘As one ghaṭākāśa ‘space occupied by a jar’ being connected with dust, smoke, etc., not all (ghaṭākāśas) are connected with them, so are the Jivas with reference to happiness, etc.
The kārīkā is quoted by Bhavā in his MHK, VIII. 13, the Tibetan version being as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ji.ltar.bum.pahi.nam.mkha\textbar h.gcil} & \\
\text{rdul.da\textbar da.bas.bsgribs.pa.na} & \\
\text{thams.cad.de.bshin.ma.yin.ltar} & \\
\text{bde.sogs.de.bshin.bdag.la.min} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Literally reconstructed it would read in Sanskrit:

\[
\begin{align*}
yathāaikasmin ghatākāse rajodhūmaiḥ [sam]\ävite & \\
na bhavanti tathā sarve na sukhādi tathātmāni & 
\end{align*}
\]

The present kārīkā is quoted with the reading na ca sarve prayujyante for c and is attributed to the ViP by Vijñānabhaṅgū in his comm. on the SaS, I. 152; but it is not to be found there. See S's comm. on the VSN, p. 16.

\[6\]

\[
\begin{align*}
rūpakāryasamākhyāś ca bhidyante tatra tatra vai & \\
ākāśasya na bhedo 'sti tadvaj jīvesu nirnāyāḥ & 
\end{align*}
\]

‘Indeed forms, functions and names differ here and there, but there is no difference of the space; similar is the conclusion with regard to jivas.’

There are different things, earthen pots, cloths, etc., their forms, functions, and names all differing from one another, yet the ākāśa intercepted by them is in itself not different in fact. In the same way though jivas corresponding to ghatākāsas, etc., are different, Ātman corresponding to ākāśa or mahākāśa, etc., is not different.

Cf. TJ. VIII. 12:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ji.ltar.bum.sogs.tha.dad.kya\textbar h} & \\
\text{sa.la.tha.dad.bgah.ya\textbar med} & \\
\text{de.bshin.lus.ni.tha.dad.kya\textbar h} & \\
\text{bdag.la.tha.dad.bgah.ya\textbar med} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[7\]

\[
\begin{align*}
nākāśasya ghatākāśo vikāravyayavau yathā & \\
nāvātmānaḥ sadā jīvo vikāravyayavau tathā & 
\end{align*}
\]

‘As the ghatākāśa is neither a transformation, nor a part of the ākāśa, so is always a Jiva neither a transformation, nor a limb of Ātman.’

\[8\]

\[
\begin{align*}
yathā bhavati balanāḥ gaganāḥ malināḥ malaḥ & \\
tathā bhavaty abuddhānāḥ ātmāpi malino malaḥ & 
\end{align*}
\]

‘As the sky appears to be soiled with dirt to the ignorant, so appears Ātman, too, with impurities to those who are not enlightened.’

For a and b see S on BS, I, 1, 1: ākāśa bālās talamalanatādy adhyasānti.

This kārīkā is quoted by Śāntirākṣita, loc. cit. The Tib. version is as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ji.ltar.byis.pas.rnams.la.ni} & \\
\text{nam.mkha\textbar h.dri.mas. dri.can. bgyur} & \\
\text{de.bshin.mi.mkhas.rnams.la.ya\textbar h} & \\
\text{bdag.ni.dri.mas.dri.can. bgyur} \\
\end{align*}
\]

1 Such as dust, smoke, etc., See III. 5: rajodhūmādhiḥ.
9

marāṇe sambhave caiva gatyāgamanayor api
sthitaḥ sarvaśarirñesa ākāśenaśvilāsaḥ

In death and in birth, in moving forward and backward, (Ātman) in all bodies exists just like the space.

In the origination and destruction of the ghaṭākāśa the mahākāśa is not affected. So is the case with Ātman in regard to death, birth, etc., which are connected only with the bodies. See ChU. VI. II. 3: jivāpetam vāva kiledaṃ mriyate na jivo mriyate.

1 This is found in only one MS., the reading which is generally known is sthitau 'in standing.'

10

saṅghātāḥ svapnavat sarve ātmamāyāvisarjitaḥ
ādhikye sarvasāmye vā nopapattir hi vidyate

'All conglomerations (of limbs, etc.) are like dream being projected by the illusion of Ātman. As regards their superiority or the equality of all of them there is no ground.'

The saṅghātās, i.e., the bodies, having which Ātman is born in the form of Jivas, are like the ghaṭas of ghaṭākāsas. These saṅghātās have, however, no real existence, nor is there, therefore, any ground for thinking of their superiority or equality among them.

In discussing what Jiva is the author says further:

11

rasādayo hi ye kośā vyākhyātas taittiriyake
teṣām ātmā paro jīvah sa-yathā samprakāśitaḥ

'The seaths such as consisting of the essence (of food) are described in the Taittirīya, i.e., Taittirīya Upaniṣad (II. 1-6), the supreme soul of them is Jiva, as it is made there clear.'

'There are five kośas 'seaths,' viz., annarasamaya or simply annamaya, prāṇa, mano, vijnāna, and ānanda, i.e., consisting of the essence of food, breath, mind, understanding, and bliss respectively. These are explained in the ĒU, II. 2 ff. According to the five divisions of kośas Ātman is also divided into five and are called after them, the last of them i.e., ānandamaya, or in accordance with a different authority (see BS. I. 1. 12-19), the one on which rests the last of them is real Ātman. This is referred to in the present kārikā by para ātman. And the author says that this is Jiva.'

1 With some MSS. I read sa-yathā for khaṃ yathā accepted by S and found in other MSS. In favour of the second reading compare d of the next kārikā, which is in fact identical. The word sa-yathā, Pali sa-yathā, in the sense of tād yathā, is often used in Brahmapās and Upaniṣads. See PU. IV. 7, VI 5; MuU. III. 2. 8; SB. I. 2. 5. 24; 7. 3. 2; BU. II. 1. 20. Cf. in this connexion sa-yadi (=tād yadi), PU. V. 1, and Pali sa-ce for sa-cet (see p. 72, I. 2) in the same sense (Skt. tāc cet).

12

dvayor dvayor madhujñāne paraṃ brahma prakāśitam
prthivyām udare caiva yathākāśāḥ prakāśitāḥ

'In the madhuvidyā (i.e., the Madhubrahmāṇa section of the BU. II. 5) in each of the pairs, (such as) the earth and the inside (of the body), the supreme Brahma is made manifest, as is made manifest the sky (III. 3 ff.).'

BU. II. 5 is called Madhubrahmāṇa owing to the fact of its dealing with a particular Brahmavidyā which is named madhuvidyā or madhujiñāna (as in our text) on account of the frequent use of the word madhu which is very important
in this connexion. Here there are some pairs of things, such as the earth and all beings (prthivī and sarvāṇi bhūtāni), and in these pairs it is shown that the person outside the body in the earth, etc., and the person inside the body are identical with Ātman. Brahman. Let the following passage be quoted here (BU, II. 5. 1):

iyāṁ prthivi sarveśāṁ madhuv asayai prthivyayi sarvāṇi bhūtāni madhuv. yaś cāyaṁ asayai prthivyayā tejomaṁ 'mātāmayāḥ puruṣo yaś cāyaṁ adhyātmam śārira tejomaṁ 'mātāmayāḥ puruṣo 'yam eva sa yo 'yam ātmedām āmātām idāṁ brahmedām sarvām.

'This earth is the honey (madhuv, the effect) of all beings, and all beings are the honey of this earth. Likewise this bright immortal person in this earth, and the bright immortal person incorporated in the body (both are madhuv). He indeed is the same as the self, that immortal, that Brahman, that All\(^1\)

---

\(^1\) Tr. Max Müller, SBE.

---

jivātmanor ananyatvam abhedena praśasyate\(^1\)
nānātvam nindvate ya ca tad evaṁ hi samaṁjasam\(^1\)

'That the identity without any distinction of Jiva and Ātman is praised, and that their distinction is censured, this becomes reasonable only on this hypothesis.'

As regards the identity of Jiva and Ātman see CHU, VI 8.7 (tat tvam asi); BU, I. 4. 10 (aṁ bhūmāsmi), II. 5. 19 (ayam āṁ brāhma); MU, III. 2. 9 (sa yo ha vai tat paramāṁ brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati). As for the difference see BU, I. 4. 2 (dvitiyād vai bhayam bhavati), IV. 4. 19, KU, IV. 10, 11 (mānayo sa mānunām apnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati); TU II. 7 (yadā hy evaṁśa eiturmin u dārāṁ āntarāṁ kurute atha tasya bhayaṁ bhavati).

---

jivātmanoḥ prthaktvam yat prāg utpatteḥ prakṛtittam ।
bhaviṣyadvṛttiyā gauṇam tan mukhyatvam na hi yuṣyate ॥

'The difference of Jiva and Ātman before creation, which is declared (in texts\(^1\)), is attributive with reference to the future state; its primary sense is certainly not reasonable.'

It is only after creation that there is a distinction between Ātman and Jiva, but before it there is no distinction whatsoever. When there is no production of ghāṣa 'jar,' and consequently no ghāṣākaṣa, there is no distinction between mahākāṣa and ghāṣākaṣa. Yet, one sometimes speaks of that distinction at that time, simply anticipating what is going to happen in the near future, that is, thinking of the imminent production of the ghāṣa.

In his explanation of the kārikā Ś gives an apt example. He says that it is like the use of the following sentence which is very common: odanaṁ pacati. The word odana means 'cooked or boiled rice.' Therefore literally the sentence means 'one cooks cooked rice.' But the rice which was already cooked or boiled does not require to be cooked again. Yet, the people say, 'He cooks cooked rice.' Clearly here this use is attributive and has reference to the future state of the unboiled rice. The people assume the future state as present. So here is the statement of difference of Ātman and Jiva.

Ś says that in passages of the Upaniṣads about evolution and dissolution it is the unity of Ātman and Jiva, which is sought to be established. This unity will be demonstrated in the text. First there is shown difference and then unity which is the conclusion. It is, therefore, in view of this future

---

\(^1\) Such as RV. X. 121.1:

sa didhāṁ prthivīṁ dyāṁ utemāṁ ।
kasmāi devaṁ haviṣaṁ vidhema॥

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sense or state that the difference is stated. Thus it is only in its secondary, and not in its primary sense.

The author wanted (III. 2) to show that there is no origination (jāti), nor is there anything that comes into being (jāyate). Having done so to some extent he now meets, in the next kārikā, the objection that may be raised against this view, showing thereby also that there is, in fact, no distinction between Atman and Jīva:

\[
\text{mṛlohapsphulīngādyaḥ śśīr yā coditānyathā́}
\]
\[
\text{upāyaḥ so 'vatārya nāsti bhedaḥ kathācāna} \]

'The creation which is urged in different manners with the illustrations of earth, metal, sparks, etc., is only a means for an introduction (to the truth). There is in no way any distinction (between Atman and Jīva).'

For details see IV. 42.

For the creation referred to see ChU, VI. 1. 4-5; BU, II. 1.20, VI. 2. 14 ; MuU, II. 1.1; MU, VI. 26.

As to how that creation and consequently the distinction between Atman and Jīva, though unreal, are a means for introducing one to truth is explained in the next kārikā:

\[
\text{āśramaḥ trividhā hinamadhyamotkāśadrṣṭaṁ} \]
\[
\text{upāsanopadiṣṭeyam tadartham anukampayā} \]

'There are three spiritual stages, viz., of lower vision, of middle vision, and of higher vision; and this upāsanā 'worship' is laid down for them out of kindness.'

In fact there is no distinction between Atman and Jīva, yet some distinction is attributed there, only to help people in realizing the truth by prescribing different upāsanās according to their respective powers of vision. See III. 1.

The word āśrama in the text is explained by Ś as āśramin 'one with āśrama or religious state of life,' i.e., adhikṛta 'an entitled one.' In all probability the original word was āśraya 'a recipient, a person or thing in which any quality or article is inherent or retained or received,' i.e., an adhikārīn or adhikṛta 'an entitled one.' See the use of the word in the following line from MSA, XVI. 69:

\[
\text{nikṣatramadhyottamaviryoḥ anyad} \\
\text{yānatraye yuktajanāśrayeṇa} \\
\text{atra āśrayabhedena viryabhedena nirdiṣṭaḥ.} \\
\]

The author now mentions the opinions of the dualists, such as the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṅkhya, etc., and shows that the decision arrived at by him, i.e., non-distinction (abheda), does not conflict with the views held by them:

\[
\text{svasiddhāntavyavasthāsu dvaitino niścitā dṛḍham} \\
\text{parasparaṁ virudhyante tair ayam na virudhyate} \]

'The dualists are firmly fixed in their own distinctive conclusions and contend with one another, but this (our view) does not conflict with them.'

\[
\text{advaitaṁ paramārthen hi dvaitaṁ tadbheda ucyate} \\
\text{teśāṁ ubhayathā dvaitaṁ tenāyaṁ na virudhyate} \]

'The supreme reality is non-duality, and duality is said
to be of it a particular state or effect of it,\(^1\) while according to them (i.e., dualists) there is duality in both ways.\(^2\) Therefore it does not conflict.'

So far as mere duality is concerned, it is not that we do not admit it at all, as you do; we do accept it. Hence there is no conflict. Between cause and effect there is, in fact, no difference (kārayārānaṇaḥ abhedāḥ), the effect being merely a particular state of its cause. So there is no independent existence of the effect apart from that of its cause. In the same way duality is a particular state or effect of non-duality, being an illusion (II. 10). The only difference between us is that according to you duality is in both ways, in reality and also in appearance, while we say that though there is duality, no doubt, it is not in reality, it exists only in appearance.

See next kārikā.

\(^1\) Cf. bheda with bhidyate in the following kārikā.
\(^2\) Ś: paramārthaś cāparamārthaś ca 'in reality and not in reality,'

19

māyāyā bhidyate hy etan nānyathājān kathaṇcana

\(\text{tattvato bhidyamāne hi martyatām amṛtaṃ vrajet} \parallel\)

'It (advaita) becomes different only through illusion, as the unborn (aja) can in no other way become different, for if it becomes in reality different the immortal would become mortal.'

See IV. 6.

20

ajātasyaiva bhāvasya jātim icchanti vādinaḥ

\(\text{ajāto hy amṛto bhāvo martyatām katham esyati} \parallel\)

'The disputants seek to establish the birth of an unborn

III, 21-23]  

thing. Now a thing which is unborn is immortal, and that being the case, how can it become mortal?

See IV. 6.

21

na bhavaty amṛtaṃ martyāṃ na martyāṃ amṛtaṃ tathā

\(\text{prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathaṇcid bhaviṣyati} \parallel\)

'The immortal does not become mortal, nor likewise the mortal immortal. In no way can nature change.'

See IV. 7, 29.

22

svabhāvenāṃtto yasya bhāvo gacchati martyatāṁ

\(\text{kṛtānāṃttaś tasya kathaṇ śthāsyati niścalat} \parallel\)

'How can he, according to whom a thing which is naturally immortal becomes mortal, maintain that an immortal thing, when it becomes artificial, will remain changeless?

See IV. 8.

23

bhūtato 'bhūtato vāpi śrīyamane samā śrutīḥ

\(\text{niścitam yuktīyuktam ca yat tād bhavati netarat} \parallel\)

'As regards creation there are equal sacred texts (stating
creation to be) from the existent\(^1\) or from the non-existent.\(^3\) But that which is ascertained and reasonable is (acceptable), and not the other.\(^2\)

See IV. 3.

It says that in reality there is no jāti ‘origination’ either from the existent or the non-existent, though there are śrutis supporting both the views equally. Therefore the author says that what is reasonable is to be accepted, as certain And what is reasonable is pointed out in the next kārikā.

According to Śaṅkara bhūtataḥ is paramārthataḥ, and abhūtataḥ māyā. But in IV. 3 he explains the same words saying bhūtasya vidyamānasya\(^4\), abhūtasya avidyamānasya.

---

1 sad eva somyedam agra āśit\(^*\). ChU, VI. 2.1.
2 asad vā idam agra āśit. tato vai sad ajñyata. TU, II. 7. 1.

24

neha nāneti cāmnāyad indro māyābhīr ity api
ajñyamāno bahudhā māyāyā ājyate tu saḥ\(^4\)

‘From the sacred text ‘‘there is no plurality here’’\(^2\) and also from ‘‘Indra through māyā, etc.,’’\(^3\) (it is to be known

---

1 In the original āmnīya means śrutī.
2 neha nāñciti kīścana. BU, IV. 4. 19; KU, IV. 11.
3 rūpam-rūpam pratiriṣṭupā bahāvī
tad asya rūpam pratiṣṭupakṣaṇīya\(^*\)
indro māyābhīḥ puruṣaṇa śyate
yuktiḥ by asya harāyaḥ saṁtā datā\(^*\)

RV, VI. 47. 18; BU, II. 5. 19.

III. 25]

that) it is through illusion that he\(^4\) is variously born, though (in fact) he does not take birth.\(^5\)

4 It refers to Puruṣa, Prajāpati.
5 The sentence ajñyamāno bahudhā ājyate in the text is taken from the VS. XXXI. 19 (=TA, III. 13.1) which runs as follows:

Prajāpati caratī garbhe antar
ajñyamāno bahudhā ājyate

The preceding stanza (18) is:

vedāham etam puruṣam mahāntam
ādityaveṣa tamasya parastāt

tam eva viditvatīṁtyum eti
nānyaḥ pantiḥ vidyate yānāya\(^\ast\)

25

sambhūter apavādac ca sambhavaḥ pratiṣṭhidhyate
ko nā eva janayed iti kāraṇat pratiṣṭhidhyate

‘By the denial of sambhūti ‘‘birth’’ (in the śrutī)\(^1\) birth is negativéd; and (by the śrutī) ‘‘who indeed would produce him’’\(^2\) the cause of birth is denied.’

Here for the first time we have the oldest interpretation of the words sambhūti or sambhava and asambhūti or asambhava in IU, 12, 13, 14, which are so differently explained

1 tato bhūya iva te tamo ya u sambhūtyaṁ ratāh, IU, 12. This is the second half of the verse the first half being: andhaṁ tamaḥ praviśanti ye sambhūtir upāśate.
2 āmānaḥ eva na ājyate ko nā eva janayet punaḥ. BU, III. 9. 28.
by Ṣ and others. Evidently Gauḍapādā takes here sambhūti (sambhava) in the sense of utpatti or jāti, 'birth,' 'production,' 'origination.' This origination is negatived (ajāti) here, and that is one of the main points of the work of Gauḍapādā. For his use of the word sambhava see III. 9, 48; IV. 16, 38.

The following may be read with interest. Here the meanings of the words asambhūti, etc., are given according to Ṣ and others.

The figures refer to the stanzas of BU, while those in brackets to the stanzas of the VS.

**Saśkara**

12 asambhūti
   prakṛtiḥ, kāraṇam avidyā avyāktaḥ kāya
   sambhūtiḥ, kāryabhāmaṇaḥ
   asambhavaḥ, avyāktaṃ

13 sambhavaḥ
   vināśat kāryam.
   avyāktaṃ, avyāktaḥ kāyam.

14 (once taken as asambhūtiḥ)
   Uvāta

12 (9) asambhūtiḥ
   muñasya sataḥ sambhavaḥ nātī.
   mtśa ātmam 'bhāvaḥ.
   ātmasthitvān

13 (10) sambhavaḥ
   sambhavam pariṇāmaṃ (= sambhūtiḥ)
   0

14 (11) sambhūtiḥ
   vināśat
   jagataḥ sambhavaikaḥ khetuḥ param brahma.
   vināśati farīram.

**Mahīdhara**

12 (9) asambhūtiḥ
   asambhavamḥ muñasya punaḥ sambhavam
   nātī.
   ātmā

13 (10) sambhavaḥ
   kāryabhāmaṇaḥ
   avyāktaṃ

14 (11) sambhūtiḥ
   paraṃ bhramaḥ
   vināśadharmaṃ farīram.

For the explanation given by the followers of Rāmānuja and Madhvacārya see their respective works: commentary by Rāga rāmānujāna, Anandashrama Sanskrit Series; by Madhvacārya, in the Sacred Books of the Hindus.

III. 26-27]

26

sa eṣa neti netti vyākhyaatam nihnute yataḥ 1
sarvam agrāhyabhāvena hetunājan prakāśate 1

'(The śrutī) "This is No, No." denies what is explained. Therefore by the reason of incomprehensibleness it is evident that all is unborn.'

The śrutī 'This is No, No.' refers to sa eṣa neti neti atmano ātmanā na hi ghyate (BU, III. 9, 26; IV. 2, 4, 4, 22, 5, 15) —'That (Ātman) is (to be described by) No, No. He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended.' But it appears, as thinks also the commentator himself, it alludes to the following śrutī, too: athā ādeṣo neti neti (BU, II. 3, 6) 'Now follows the teaching by No, No.' For it is that śrutī which denies both the forms of Brahman, viz., that which has form (mūrti) and that which has not form (amūrti). These two forms have already been described or explained in the text (BU, II. 3, 1). Things are either with or without a form, so when both of them are denied they cannot be comprehended. Thus it becomes evident that there is nothing that may have origination, in other words, all is 'unborn' (aṣa 'without generation').

1 dve va vā brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtiḥ caiva mūrtiḥ ca.

Now jāti or origination may be either of the existent (sat) or of the non-existent (asat). But both the cases are impossible. The author shows it in the next kārikās:

27

sato hi māyāyā janma jāyate na tu tattvataḥ 1
   tattvato jāyate yasya jātāṃ tasya hi jāyate 1

'The birth of that which exists can be reasonable only 1201B—9
through illusion, but not in reality. He who holds that one is born in reality has to accept (the position) that what is born had, indeed, been born.

See IV. 58. See also IV. 13 with its explanation. Cf. CS, XI. 10 (260) with the note:

sambhavah kriyate yasya prak so stiti na yuyjate
sato yadi bhavej janma jatasyapi bhaved bhavah

28

asato mayyay janma tattvato naiva yuyjate
vandhyaputo na tattvena mayyay api jayate

'The birth of that which does not exist is not reasonable at all through illusion or in reality. The son of a barren woman is not born either through illusion or in reality.'

The author now proceeds to show that the birth of the existent is possible only through maya as said before (III. 27):

29

yathay svapne davyabhasam spandate mayyay manah
tathay jagrad davyabhasam spandate mayyay manah

'As owing to maya the mind in dream moves with appearance (or image) of the two (viz., the percipient and the perceptible, or in other words, the subject and the object), so owing to maya the mind in the waking state moves with the appearance of the two.'

See IV. 61.

1 See IV. 40.

III. 30-32

advayam ca dvyabhasam manah svapne na samasyah
advayam ca dvyabhasam tathajagran na samasyah

'There is no doubt that in dream the mind which is without a second is with the appearance of the two; so there is no doubt that in the waking state the mind which is without a second is with the appearance of the two.'

See IV. 62.

30

manodhyayam idam dvaitam yat kiicit sacaracaram
manaso hy amanibhave dvaitam naivopalabhya

'This duality in whatever form, comprising the movable and the unmovable is perceived by the mind, but when the mind becomes non-mind (i.e., when it loses its own function of thinking, manana) duality is not experienced.

See IV. 47, 48, 72. It means that the appearance of duality is nothing but the vibration of the mind (citta- or vijñana-spandita), and when this vibration is stopped there is no duality at all.

When the state of non-mind is reached is said in the following kārikā:

31

atmasatyānubodhena na saikalpayate yadā
amanastau tādā yātī grahyābhave tadagrahath

'When by the knowledge of the truth of atman it (the mind) ceases from imagining it goes to the state of non-mind being non-cognizant in the absence of the things to be cognized.'

See IV. 72, 79, 99.
Mark here that d (grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt) is identical with that of Tk. 28. See Vis. p. 584; LA, p. 169; and the note on III. of our text.

The next kārikā says that the mind which becomes non-mind 38 as described above, is, in fact, identical with Brahman:

33

akalpakam ajāṃ jñānāṃ jñeyābhinnam pracakṣate

brahma jñeyam ajāṃ nityam ajenājaṃ vibudhyate

'The jñāna that does not imagine (i.e., indeterminate) and is (consequently) unborn is, they say, not different from the knowable. The knowable is Brahman, the unborn and eternal one. So the unborn (Brahman) becomes manifest through the unborn (jñāna).'

Here jñāna which the commentator explains as jñāptimātra is in reality viṣṇāra or citta ‘mind’ as spoken of above. See Vk. p. 3: cittaṃ mano viṣṇāmaṃ viṣṇāptiṃ ceti paryāyāḥ; MV, XVII. 1 (p. 308): cittaṃ mano 'tha viṣṇāanam iti tasyaiva (=cittasyaiva) paryāyāḥ; AK, II. 34: cittaṃ mano 'tha viṣṇāanam ekārtham; DN, I. 121; SN. II. 94. See III. 38, IV. 96.

For ajāṃ vibudhyate cf. I. 16: advaitam budhyate tadā; III. 26: ajāṃ prakāśate. For the whole thought see III. 35, 46, ajenājaṃ vibudhyate ajena jñānena (=cittena) ajāṃ jñeyam (Brahman) vibudhyate prakāśate. The unborn knowable Brahman is manifest through the unborn knowledge (i.e., the mind when it ceases from its function), there being no difference between them. See III. 46, 47.


For jñeyābhinnas ‘not different from the knowable’ see IV. 1.

The author now goes to speak about the state of the mind described above:

34

nighātasya manaso nirvikalpasya dhīmatāḥ

pracārah sa tu viṣṇeyah suṣupte 'nyo na tartsamaḥ

'That state (pracāra) of the mind of a wise man which is suppressed and (thus) indeterminate is to be known: (the state of the mind) in deep sleep is different from that, it is not like that.'

It is said here that the state of the suppressed and indeterminate mind is different from that in suṣupti. Why it is so is stated in the following kārikā (III. 35).

The word pracāra which is the same as vihāra or bhūmi, as the yogins and the Buddhists would express, means in such cases avasthā ‘state.’ Our author uses (IV. 80) for it also viṣaya.

By nirvikalpa manas ‘indeterminate mind’ we are to understand that it recognises no such distinction as that of subject and object, etc.

In Buddhist works dhīmat is a synonym for Bodhisattva (MSA, XIX. 73).

The reason for what is said above is now offered as follows:

35

liyate hi suṣupte tan nighitaṃ na liyate

tad eva nirbhāyam brahma jñānālokaṃ samantataḥ

'For in deep sleep it (manas) falls into a state of oblivion, but it does not so do when suppressed. Indeed, that is

1 Or, into a sleeping state, laya, see III. 41, 42.
Now, there are two kinds or stages of samādhi, upacāra samādhi and arpana (Pali appanā). In the first the mind is concentrated on its object, but not uninterruptedly, for now it is so and the next moment it is not so. Simply moving near (upacarati) the object just like a bee sitting gently inside a lotus in search of its honey. In the second, the mind is firm and uninterruptedly fixed on the object. Because this state of samādhi 'gives (arpayati)' the one-pointed mind to the object it is called arpana, as B and h o s a explains in his AS, p. 142: ekaggam cittaṃ ārammaṇaṃ appeti appanā. Cf. p. 143: upagantvā vicarānasena upavicāro. Cf. also vicāra as explained in the Vibhāvani Tīkā on the AAS, I. 17:

santavuttī vicāro cittaṃ nātipphandabhūto ākāse uppatitassa sakuṇassa pakkhasārayam viya, padumassa uparibhāge paribbhaṇṇam viya ca padumābhisthāpatitassa bhāmarassa.

The difference between upacāra and appanā is thus shown in VM, p. 126:

duvīdho hi samādhi upacārasamādhi ca appanāsamādhi ca. dvīhi śākehi cittaṃ samādhiyati upacārabhūmiyam (=upacāra-vattthayam—Tīkā) vā parilabhambhūmiyam (=jānavatthayam—Tīkā). dvinnam pana samādhihāma idam nānāriṇaṃ. yathā nāma daharo kumārako ukkhiptvā ādiyaminī punappuna bhūmiyam patati evam eva upacāre uppanne cittaṃ kālena nimitthā ārammaṇaṃ karoṭi kālā bhavaṁ oratari. yathā nāma balavā puriso āsanā vuttihāya divasampi tiṣṭhayya evam eva appanāsamādhih uppanne cittaṃ saki bhavaṅgaśrāmaṇa keśditya kevalam'pi rattiṃ kevalam'pi divasam tiṣṭhati.

The d of the kārikā may be explained in another way. Brahman is described here by such words as aja, aniḍha, etc., but being beyond speech and mind it cannot be done so. This is said: nopacāraḥ kathācanaḥ 'But in no way there is any figurative (or metaphorical) expression (upacāra). See BS, p. 44:
III. 37

sarvābhilāpavigataḥ sarvacintāsamuttithaḥ
supraśāntaḥ sakriyāyōhi samādhīr acalo 'bhayaḥ

"It is intense abstract concentration (samādhi) which is beyond all expression, and above all thoughts, very calm and full of light burning once for all, unwavering and without fear."

In Buddhism there is a particular samādhi called acalo (MVt. 580).

III. 38

graho na tatra natsargaś cintā yatra na vidyate
ātmasaṃsthāṇaḥ tadb jñānam ajāti samatāṃ gataṁ

"Where there is no thought there is neither apprehension or abandonment (of any object). At that time the mind rests in itself, is unborn and attains to the state of sameness."

In this state the mind does not apprehend or abandon any of its objects and as such rests in itself (atmasaṃsthā).

The word atman in atmasaṃsthā here means 'itself' (svarūpa) and not 'soul' (paramātmā or Brahman) as distinct from the mind (jñāna).

The word vijñānapradātra or vijñānamātrā of the Buddhist Vijnānavādins. The word vijñānamātra means 'simply vijñāna,' and the state of being so is vijñānamātrātā. When the vijñāna does not apprehend any object whatsoever and as such rests only in itself this state is called vijñānamātrātā. Says V asub 166 (Tk. 28, ViS, p. 584):

yadā tv ālambanaḥ jñānānāi nāvopalabhate tādā
sthitam vijñānamātratve grahyāḥhāve tadagrahātā

LA. p. 169:

yadā tv ālambya artham nopolabhate jñānamatādā
vijñānapratyavasthānām bhavati. vijñānāpi grahyāḥhāvād
grahalakṣyāhāvāh. tadagrahaṇān na pravartate jñānām.

This is referred to in the following stanza of the KU. II. 3.10:

yadā paścāvatiśhante jñānāni manasā sāhā
buddhiś ca na vīceṣṭate tām āhuḥ paramām gatīṁ

1 See III. 32, IV. 96, with notes.
2 See III. 2; IV. 77, 80, 93, 95, 100. It is to be noted in these kārikās that ajāti or anumātī and samsa, or sūmya or samātā are always used together. Cf. this with the quotation of MV in the note on III. 2

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AGAMASÄTRA

In the Upaniṣads it is well-known that Brahman is viṣṇāna (BU, III. 9. 28; TU, II. 5. 1, III. 5. 1, etc., viṣṇānamaya = viṣṇāna) or jñāna (TU, II. 11). This viṣṇāna or jñāna is ātmasaṁstha jñāna or viṣṇānamātra. For ātmasaṁstha jñāna see Chu VII. 24. 1-2:

"Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite (bhumān).

'Sir, in what does the Infinite rest?"

'In its own greatness,—or not even greatness.'

It is to be noted that in the beginning of the present chapter (III. 2) the author proposed 'ato vakṣyāmy akārpayam ajāti samatāṁ gatam,' here in the present kārikā he concludes the subject.


That samādhi which is nirvikalpa is further described in the next kārikā:

39

asparśayogo nāmaśa durdarśaḥ sarvayogibhiḥ
yogino bibhyati hy asmād abhaye bhayadarśaḥ

'This is what is called 'contactless concentration' (asparśayoga), very difficult to be realized by all yogins; the yogins shrink from it seeing fear where (in fact) there is no fear.'

For asparśayoga see IV. 2.
The Commentator explains the second half of the kārikā saying that though there is no fear in this yoga yogins (of lower order) are afraid of it thinking it to be one's own destruction

III. 40-41]

(ātmanāśarūpa). These people have no discrimination (avivekān), and so they have fear though there is no fear.

Vidyāraṇya quotes this kārikā in his PD, II. 29, introducing it (II. 28) thus:

gauḍācārya nirvikalpe samādhāv anyayogīnāṁ
sākārabrahmaniṣṭhānāṁ atyantāṁ bhayam uci re

Now the author proceeds to say that for the yoga referred to the control of mind is absolutely necessary, on which depend the absence of fear, and such other things:

40

manaso nigrūhāyatam abhayāṁ sarvayogīnāṁ
duḥkhahṣayaṁ prabodhaś cāpy akṣayā śānti eva ca

'The absence of fear, the destruction of misery, the awakening, as well as the eternal peace of all yogins depend on the control of mind.'

The next kārikā shows how the mind can gradually be controlled without difficulty:

41

utṣeκa udadher yadvat kuśāgrenaikabindūnāṁ
manaso nigrumāḥ tadvad bhaved aparikhedataḥ

'The control of mind without great pains is like the draining out of a sea by drops with the point of a kuṣa grass.'
The first half of the kārikā refers, according to Madhūṣūdana Sarasvatī (BG, VI. 23) and Rāmakṛṣṇa, a commentator of PD (XI. 109), where this
kārikā is quoted, to an old story. (cf. Tīṭhīhopākhyaṇa, HU, pp. 78-79) which runs, as given by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, as follows:

Once upon a time the sea carried off with its waves the eggs of a bird which were laid on the beach. The bird got angry and determined to dry it up. He began to take out the water drop by drop with the tip of his beak and he could not be dissuaded from it by the birds related to him. In the mean time the divine sage Nārāda came there. He, too, asked him to turn back, but in vain. The bird said that anyhow he would dry up the sea either in this or in the future life. Fortunately Nārāda became very kind to him, and sent there Garuḍa, the lord of birds, for his help. Owing to the wind produced by the flapping of the wings of Garuḍa the sea began to dry up and thus being frightened gave back the eggs to the bird.

The substance of the kārikā is that it is with determination and perseverance that mind is gradually controlled.

The author now suggests the means for controlling the mind:

42

upāyena nigṛhiṇyād vikṣiptam kāmabhogayoh
suprasannam laye caiva yathā kāmo layas tathā

‘By the means’ one should control it (mind) when it is distracted in desire and enjoyment, and also when it remains at ease in the sleeping state, for the sleeping state is as (bad) as desire is.

Kārikās III. 42-46 are quoted and explained by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in the commentary on the BG.

VI. 26, and III. 44-45 a-b by Sadānanda in his VeS, §§32-33. According to the former kāma ‘desire’ is the state of thinking of, or longing for enjoyment (cintyāmānāvasthā), while bhoga ‘enjoyment’ is the state of enjoying the desired things (bhūyiāmānāvasthā). Layā ‘sleeping state’ is, in his opinion, deep sleep (susuptī), as supported by Gauḍapāda himself (III. 35), but Sadānanda explains it by ‘sleep’ (nīḍā). Layā causes mental inactivity, and corresponds to the state called mūḍha ‘infatuated’ in the yoga philosophy. See Vyaśa on YS, l. i.

The means referred to above are as follows:

43

duḥkhaṁ sarvam anuśmṛtya kāmabhogāṁ nivartayet
ajaṁ sarvam anuśmṛtya jātaṁ naiva tu paśyati

‘Repeatedly remembering that all is misery one should turn back (one’s mind) from desires and enjoyments.’ Indeed repeatedly remembering that all is unborn one does not see anything born.

The second half of the kārikā implies that when everything is unborn and consequently has no existence in reality there is no object for one’s desire and enjoyment.

1 Or we may write for ‘one should, etc.,’ ‘one should keep back (from the mind) desires and enjoyments.’ Thus, as says Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (BG, VI. 26), kāmabhogān in the kārikā may be explained as accusative plural or ablative singular.

44

laye sambodhayac citteri vikṣiptam śamayet punah
sakaśāyaṁ viṣṭāya chamanapraṇaṁ na cālayet

‘One should awaken the mind when it is in the state of
sleep; when distracted one should pacify it again. One should also investigate if it is with the evil passions (sakaśāya). And (finally) when it reaches the state of equipoise one should not cause it to move."

As regards the control of mind there are four impediments enumerated in our kārikās (III. 42-45) of which viśeṣa ‘distraction’ and laya ‘sleep’ have already been mentioned also in kārikā 42, the other two being kaśāya and sukha, or according to some (VeŚ, §33) rasa-āsvāda. The last term will be explained in the next kārikā (45). We are concerned here with kaśāya. It means here stabdhibhāva ‘becoming stiffened’ of mind as Madhusūdana Sarasvati and Sadānanda would explain (loc. cit.). The primary meaning of kaśāya is ‘decoction,’ so to say, of evil passions (rāga, dveṣa, moha). Saṅkara explaining mirdatākaśāya in ChU, VII. 26. 2, writes: vārksādir īva kaśāyo rāgadveśādīdosoḥ. It causes the stiffness of mind, owing to which it cannot be fixed on the object. Thus the kaśāya, i.e., the evil passions, being the cause of stabdhibhāva, is explained by those authors to mean stabdhibhāva. We may, however, take the word in its actual sense, i.e., the evil passions.

Cf. MSA, XIV. 9c-d—10a-b:

līnaḥ cittasya ghojīyā uddhataḥ śamayet punaḥ
śamaprajātam upekṣeta tasmin nālabane punaḥ

See also XIV. 11.

For śamaprajāta in d which gives better sense (cf. śamayet in d of the kārikā) and is supported by VeŚ, with its Tiṅga Vīdoanmanoraśiṇi, §33 and MSA quoted above, the reading found in editions and a very large number of MSS is samaprajāta. It means one that has reached the state of equipoise. Madhusūdana Sarasvati takes the word sama in the sense of Brahman.

[Ill. 45-46]

nāsvādayet sukhaṁ tatra niḥsaingaḥ prajñayā bhavet
niścālaṁ niścaraṇa cittam ekikuryāt prayatnataḥ

‘There (in practising yoga) he should not enjoy happiness. By wisdom he must be (then) free from all attachment. If the mind which is (thus) fixed goes out, by endeavour he should so do as to make it remain only in itself.’

On ekikuryāt ‘should make one’ the Commentator says: citsvarūpasattātāt kṣam evāpādayet. Cf ekībhavati, BU, IV. 4.2; ekībhūta, MaU, 5.

1 There is a feeling of happiness from that condition of mind in practising yoga, and it should be avoided as it is an impediment.

2 Or, discrimination.

The next kārikā says that when the mind is thus completely controlled or suppressed (ni+ruddha) and as such is free from all movements and does not perceive anything it becomes Brahman:

yadā na liyate cittam na ca viśkṣipate punaḥ
aniṅganaṁ anābhasaṁ niśpannaṁ brahma tat tadā

‘When the mind is not in the state of sleep, nor is distracted again, and as such has no movement nor any sense image, then it becomes Brahman.’

See III. 35.

The first half refers to two states laya corresponding to muḍha and viśeṣa corresponding to viśiṣṭa in the Vyaśa’s commentary on YS, I. 1. See III. 42. See also anidra and
asvapna in III. 36. The Commentator explains anābhasa saying that it does not appear in the form of any of its objects which are imaginary (na kenacit kalpitena viṣayabhāvenāvabhāsate). Ābhāsā is pratīcchāyā ‘reflection’. See BAP, V. 36. Or it may be taken in the sense of ‘appearance,’ namely, the appearance of any object.

On d the Commentator says: yadaivaṃlaṅkāraṃ cittaṃ tadā nispapānā brahma brahmavārūpena nispapānā cittaṃ bhavatī ti arthaḥ. Cf. IV. 77 where he writes: cittasyeti yā mokṣākhyā-nutpattiḥ and on IV. 80 cittasya niścalā calanavajjiti brahma-

śvarūpaiva tadā sthitir yaśā brahmavārūpā sthitīti cittasyādvaya-vijñānaikarasaghanalakṣaṇa.

In this connexion the following may be quoted from the BA, IV. 15: cittasya brahmātidiṃ kā which BAP explains: cittasya phalaṃ brahmabhyādikām.

It is said here that the anūgana and anābhasa citta becomes Brahman. With this compare the following:

MU. VI. 24 (p. 143):

māṇase ca vilīne tu yat sukham cātmakṣikam |
tad brahma cām̄taṃ sukr̥aṃ sat gati loka eva ca ||

Mṛtyujitdhatāraka as quoted in ŚV, p. 99:

nirābhāsam padaṃ tat tu tat prāpya vinivartate |

LA IV. 16:

cittamātraṃ nirābhāsam vihāro buddhabhūmi ca |
etad dhi bhāṣitaṃ buddhaire bhāṣayanti ca ||

X. 105 (p. 278).

cittamātraṃ atikramya nirābhāse sthitam phalam ||

X. 110 (p. 279).

cittamātraṃ atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet ||

nirābhāsaśthito yogi mahāyānaṃ na paśyate ||

X. 257 (p. 299).

III. 47] AṬAMAŚĀSTRA 81

tadā yogi hy anābhāsam prajñāyā paśyate jagat ||
nimittāṃ vastu vijñāaptiḥ manovipanditaḥ ca yat ||
atikramya tu putrā me nirvikalpaḥ caranti te ||

X. 94 (p. 277).

etad vibhāvyaṃ yogi nirābhāse pratīghate ||

X. 235 (p. 296).

ālambalambayvitaṃ yadā paśyati saṃskṛtaḥ ||
nīcitaṃ cittamātraṃ hi cittamātraṃ vaḍāmy aham ||
mātrāsvabhaṃvaṃśthānam pratyayair bhāvavajjitaṃ ||
niṃghābhāvaḥ paraṃ brahma etāṃ māтраṃ vaḍāmy aham ||


See also LA, p. 126: matpravacane punar mahāmate vikalpasya manovijñānasya vyāvṛtā nirvāṇaṃ. S a n k a r a on BU, IV. 3.7 (p. 587): vijñānasya nirvāṇaṃ puruṣārthāḥ.

See III. 35, IV. 29 (comm.: ajātaṃ yac cittaṃ brahmaiva jayate), 48, 77, 80.

The citta that becomes Brahman is described in the next kārikā:

svastham śaṃtaṃ sanirvāṇam akathyaṃ sukham uttamām ||
ajaṃ ajena jñeyena sarvakām paramākṣate ||

The word nirvāṇa has different meanings, such as ‘delight’, ‘extinction’, ‘cessation’, ‘disappearance’, ‘calmed’, ‘quieted’.

1 Here svastha is atmaśāstha, III. 38.

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We may take it here in the sense of 'extinction'. The extinction of mind means the disappearance of its function of thinking (manana or cintana), in other words, the amariighba of manas referred to above (III. 31), and in MU, VI. 34, or vilaya of manas in MBU p. 12. This is also called unmaniribhava (BBU, 4), vritikasa of citta (MU, VI. 34, p. 178), and the nirodha of vijina (= nirvina) in DN, I. 223 (viinanaassa nirodhena).

Cf. YV, III. 67.8 :
spandad bhavati citsargo niispandad brahma savatam
See also MU, VI. 24 (p. 143) :
mangse ca viline tu yat sukha ca atmasakhikam
tad brahma campta sukrana sa gatir loka eva ca

For sarva thea see III. 36.

The author proposed in the beginning of this chapter (III. 2) to speak of non-origination (ajtiti). Now having done so mainly with regard to Jiva and partly also to other things he concludes thus :

48

na kasca jayate jiva samhavo 'sya na vidyate
etat tad uttama satyam yatra kincin na jayate

iti gaudapadaya agamastra 'dvaitakhyam tityam
prakaraaam samaptam.

' No individual soul is born, nor is there any possibility of it. This is that highest reality where nothing is born.

Here ends, in the Agamastra of Gauda pad a, Book Three called 'Non-duality'.

1 See IV. 71.

BOOK IV

The proposition was enunciated (III. 2), discussed (III), and finally established in the last line of the last karika of the last Book, and it will further be affirmed later on (IV. 71) that there is nothing that originates, and this is the highest truth. In order to further elucidate this view the author now begins the present Book of his Agamastra.

Its first two karikas form what is known in later Sanskrit works as mangalacarana 'salutation, benediction, or prayer for success.' The first karika is as follows :

1

jnenaakaakalupe a dharmam yo gaganopaman
jnayabhinnena sambuddhas tam vande dvipadam varam

'Who has perfectly understood the elements of existence (dharma) that are like the sky, through the knowledge (jnana) which is not different from its object (jnena) and is also like the sky, to him, to the greatest of men, I pay my homage.'

The author here pays his homage to dvipadam vara 'the greatest of men.' Who is this dvipadam vara? The word dvipada (RV. X. 165.1: sam no astu dvipade sam catuspade) or dvipada literally 'biped' means in such cases 'man.' Words such as dvipadam vara or dvipadanaam uttama (or agra) or dvipadottama (Pali dvipadvettama) in compound are all synonymous. They are used both as adjectives and nouns.

1 IV. 96 with 5.
2 IV. 91.
3 III. 33; IV. 68.
As an adjective *doipadāṃ vara* is found in MB, Vanapravar, 51.45 (*naīṣadho doipadāṃ varaḥ*) and also in Ādiparvan, 220.36 (with reference to Dhiṭarāṣṭra: abhiṣaṃsu ca yat kṣatthu samiṣ te doipadāṃ varaḥ). In Buddhist literature, both Sanskrit and Pali, *doipadottama* or *doipaduttama* in Pali or any one of the synonyms mentioned above is used to mean the Buddh dха (AP, 1; MST, p. 60, l. 25; SNt, 83, 995, 998; MVt, § 267; SS, p. 8, 57, here in the last place not less than thirteen times). *Narottama* (Pali narʿuttama) and *puruṣottama* (Pali purisʿuttama) are also used specially for the Buddh dха [SNt, 544 (see DP, 78) 1021; MVt, § 1,40; MVu, Vol. II, pp. 194, 199, 232, 266].

On the other hand Ś takes *doipadāṃ vara* to mean puruṣottama in the sense of Nārāyana. Now, which of them, the Buddh dха or Nārāyana, is really meant by the author himself can be decided if we consider the subject matter of the kārikā.

There are mainly two points to be discussed here. First, jñāna ‘knowledge’ is said to be ḍkāṣaṅkalpa ‘like the sky,’ and again it is not different from the jñeya ‘the knowable,’ i.e., the object of knowledge. And second, the dharmas, ‘elements of existence’ or ‘things or objects,’ are also gaganopama ‘like the sky.’

What are we to understand by the statement that jñāna is like the sky? One characteristic of jñāna, according to both our author and the Vijaññānavīdins, is that it is asaṅga (IV, 72, 96) ‘having no attachment, contact, or relation,’

4 Such instances are there many. See l. 50.27.

It may be noted that so far as I know no word compounded with doipad or doipada is found in Brahmanic literature to mean Nārāyana. But thanks to a friend who points out that doipadāṃ varaḥ which, in fact, is the same as doipadāṃ varaḥ is applied at least once to Nārāyana (MB, Śantiparvan, 343. l). But it is to be noted that though here it refers to Nārāyana, no doubt, this Nārāyana is not God (Īśvara), but a sage (rṣi) and hence a man, though an incarnation of the former.

6 Sometimes there is made a difference between jñāna and viṣṇāna as the following passages of the same work (LA) will show saying that jñāna is asaṅga: p. 157: tattvānunapurāṇavāsī, viṣṇānam anutpānnapradhvasī jñānam; asaṅgalakṣaṇaṃ jñānam viṣṇavoicyitraṣaṅgalakṣaṇaṃ ca viṣṇānam; asaṅgavābāvalakṣaṇaṃ jñānam; aprapālaṇaṃ jñānam; ASP, p. 399: asaṅgalakṣaṇaḥ subhute prajñāpāramitāḥ. See also MV, p. 533; nimittalambanaṃ viṣṇānam, jñānaṃ hi tūnayatālambanena bhavitaśvayaṃ, tācanyatāpāram eveti. See IV, 96, notes.

8 As the editor, Poussin, has pointed out, this reading is supported by the Tibetan version where we have: lhag pa.med.pa(asaṅga). gnas.med (anāśpada).

i.e., it does not relate itself to its object, it does not cognize any object (agraha, III, 32), there being no object whatsoever. See IV, 26, 27, 72, 96, 99, and the following from LA, p. 157: asaṅgalakṣaṇaṃ jñānam. Now jñāna being asaṅga is compared here with the sky which is also asaṅga. See BAP, p. 359: evam’ nisprapanca-vādā śāśvad asaṅgām anāśpādam aṣeṣāṃ visām utpāyāmaḥ.

7 As regards the absence of difference between jñāna and jñeya it is a well-known fact that this view is maintained by Vijaññānavīdins. According to them there is no reality in external things. Knowable is, in fact, inside being the transformation of viṣṇāna, and only appears to be outside. Dīnāga says in his Alambanaparikṣa, 6 (quoted by Śaṅkara in his commentary on BS, II, 2, 28 and by Kamaśila in his Pañjikā on TS, p. 582: yad antarjiyeyarūpaṃ tad bhavāryad abhāhāṣate. And Dharmaṅkriti formulates it in his PV, fol. 274a, l. 7 in the following

9 The other half runs as follows: so ’rtho viṣṇānārūpaṃ tatpratyayatvayāpya ca. See also TS, p. 582:

|hath| satyam ato nāsti viṣṇeyam tattvato bhāh ||

10 The book in its original Sanskrit is not yet found, but there is a Tibetan translation called *Tsad.ma.rnam.par.ṛsza.pa* (*Pramāṇaviniścaya*) in Tanjur, Mdo, G, fol. 250b. 6—329b.1. Cordier, III, p. 437.
line which is widely quoted in Brāhmaṇical works in discussing viññāṇavāda, a common subject for philosophical discussions found in them:

sahopalambhānīyamād abheda nilataddhiyōḥ.

‘On account of the regularity of the simultaneous perception of the blue and its knowledge there is no difference between them.’

This theory is based on such utterances of the Buddha as the following:

cittamātmāṃ bho jinaṃ putrā yad uta traṇḍhātakam.

‘O the sons of Jina, the three planes are only mind.’

The following may also be quoted in this connexion: Vī. I: vijñānāptimātram eva tada; L.A. X. 77: vijñānāptimātraṃ tṛiḥavam.

etc. And from this it follows that in reality there is no external object as the foolish imagine, it being nothing but the transformation of the mind (viññāṇaparipāraṇa) owing to vāsanā.

In this kārikā jñeyya ‘object of knowledge’ is to be taken in its ordinary sense and not in its particular significations, as in III.33, and IV.90.

We are now to discuss the second point, i.e., the dharmas ‘elements of existence’ are gaganopama. From the absolute point of view (paramārthaḥ) the external things appear only in their imposed forms having no reality at all. They have not their intrinsic existence (niḥsvabhava) and as such are void (śunya) like the son of a barren woman. Hence they are gaganopama. Śāntideva says in his BA, IX.155:

sarvam ākāśasaṅkīsām parīghṇantu madvīdhaḥ.

‘Let those who are like me accept the doctrine that all is like the sky.’

Why is it like the sky? Prajñākaramati explains: because it is imposed and devoid of reality (samāropitatattvā-sūnātvaḥ). We read the following in ASP, p. 297:

evam eva subhūte sarvadharmā ākāṣagatikā anāgatikā agati-kā ākāśasaṅkāmāḥ. yathākāśam anāgatam agatam akṣam avikṣaṃ anabhisamskṛtam asthitam avayavasthitam anupannaṃ aniruddham evam eva subhūte sarvadharmā anāgataḥ agataḥ akṣaṃ avikṣaṃ

LA, p. 285:

bhyo na vidyate hy artho yathā balāraṃ vikalpyate |
vāsanair udātman cittam arthabhāsāṃ pravartate ||

Tk, I:

ātmadharmpacāto hi vidvihdo yah pravartate |
viṣṇāṇaripīrīmovasau ||

Sthiramātī writes here in his bhāṣya: dharmāṃ atmanāṃ ca viśeṣnāṃ anāgatāṃ mahābhāvaḥ.

BAP, p. 503 (with regard to anu) : aha ‘bhūniṣṣhidhāḥ saṃvabhāvātaḥ ākṣaṃ śūnyam eva: See pp. 504-505.
anabhisaṃskṛtā asthitā asaṃsthitā avyavasthitā anutpannā aniruddhā ākāśakalpatvad avikalpāḥ.

See BAP, p. 395, quoted above, and specially our text, IV, 93.

Or because the dharmanas are beyond enumeration (gaganāsamatikṛanta), they are gaganopamaṃ.¹⁸

Or, it may be that as jñāna is asaṅga and is thus like the sky, so are asaṅga the dharmanas, and as such they are like the sky. See IV, 96. That the sky is asaṅga needs no explanation.

One of the grounds on which this theory is based is that the things are niḥsvabhāva, i.e., without their own nature and condition or state of being (svabhāva). And that which has not its own state of being is nothing but the sky and void (ākāśa, śūnya).¹⁹

Or again, as in fact the things have naturally neither origination nor suppression, they are like the sky. See I, A, X, 172:

aniruddhā anutpannā prakṛtyā gaganopamāḥ

Ṣ does not explain here as to how jñāna is ākāśakalpa and the dharmanas are gaganopama. He would, however, explain the non-difference of jñāna and jñeya saying that jñeya refers to ātmān (or strictly ātmanas), and jñāna is not different from ātmān.

¹⁸ ASP, pp. 278-279: sarvadharmā api subhūte 'cintyā atulyā aprameyā asanmukhyeyā saṃsamamāḥ.' sarvadharmā api subhūte 'saṃkhyeyā gaganāsamatikṛantavāt. rūpam api subhūte 'samasmam evaṃ vedanā saṃśā a bhījanam api subhūte 'samasmam evaṃ sarvadharmā api subhūte saṃrasmā ākāśasmatikṛantarbhūtī sarvadharmāmāḥ.'

¹⁹ BA, V, 12: durjanān gaganopamān on which BAP writes patravo hi gaganasamatośvad api saṃpratīcyāt.

See BAP, p. 503: atra 'bhūnīkṣyāmāno niśvabhāvavatāyā skāśam śūnyam eva; pp. 504-505: tat iṣṭā kāyaḥ, śūnya pratyavakṣamāpaśya bhavati—skāśaṃ sam āyaṃ kāyaḥ.' sarvam etat skāśam iti paśaṭi ²⁰

IV, 11] ĀGAMASĀSTRA

Now the word dharma used here in this kārika and not less than twenty-two times in this Book,²⁰ requires some explanation. It is very widely used in such cases as the present one throughout Buddhist literature in Sanskrit and also in Pali.²¹ Figuratively it means a thing or object, a thing of which the senses or mind takes cognition and as such, it is synonym of such Sanskrit words as artha or padārtha or viśaya or prameya. Literally it has among others the sense of nature, character, peculiar condition or essential quality, in Sanskrit svabhāva or svalakṣaṇa. It is derived from śāyā 'to hold, maintain, preserve, keep.' Because a thing in whatever form it may be maintains its own characteristics or essential quality (svalakṣaṇa or svabhāva), it is called dharma. So we read in AKB, p. 6: lakṣaṇadhāranāḥ dharmaḥ (ra. gi. matshanā. šīd. hozīn pābī. phyīr. chos. te). See MV, pp. 304, 457. B u d d h a g h o s a (AS, §94, p. 39) explains the term in the following words: (i) attano pana sabbhavam dharentiti dhammad, (ii) dhāriyanti va paccayehi, (iii) dhāriyanti va yathāsabbhavato'ti dhammad.²² According to it rasa, sparśa, etc., are dharmas. Only these are there and not also dharmins 'those endowed with or having a dharma,' as the Buddhists hold unlike such non-Buddhist philosophers as Nāyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, according to whom earth, or jars, etc., are dharmins, while their qualities, i.e., hardness (kāthina), etc., are dharmas. In Buddhist philosophy it is only the quality of tangibility called 'hardness' (kāthina, sparśa) that is regarded as existent, but

²⁰ IV, 1, 6, 8, 10, 21, 33, 41, 46, 53, 54, 58, 59, 81, 82, 91, 92, 93, 96, 98, 99. It is used also in II, 25 and III, 1, but evidently in a meaning different from that in Book IV.

²¹ For instance, ASP, p. 39: sarvadharmā api devaputra mayopamaḥ svapnopamaḥ; DP, 279 (Maggavagga, 7) sabbe dhamma anattataḥ.

²² It is thus translated in Ex., p. 50: "Dharman may be defined as those states which bear their own intrinsic natures, or which are borne by causes-in- relation, or which are borne according to their own characteristics."
there is no entity excepting it that we call earth, or the element of earth. 

Aryadeva says in his Cś, 309:

kahini dhyan bhumi sa ca kayena ghyate

tena hi kevalam spsan bhumin ese te kathyate it. 23

'It is seen that the earth is hard and that is perceived with one's body. Therefore it is said that the earth is only the quality of tangibility.'

Thus, as says Stcherbatsky in his Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 26, "If we say "earth has odour, etc.", it is only an inadequate expression; we ought to say "earth is odour, etc." since beside these sense-data there is absolutely nothing the name could be applied to." 24

It is also to be borne in mind in this connexion that in the absolute truth there is nothing as avayavrin 'one having portions' as in other systems. It is owing to this fact that expressions like the following are found in Buddhist works:

nastha sattva atmā vah dhammāstv ete sahetukā. 26

This theory of dharma seems to be exactly the same as that of the tattva of the Saṁkhya. The word tattva (tat-tva) literally means 'thatness,' i.e., 'the state of that (referring to a thing)' and hence it signifies 'nature (soabhava)' or 'true nature.' Thus, in fact, tattva is a gūṇa, yet each of the twenty-five categories in the system is considered a tattva (pañcaviśātī tattva), and not tattvavat 'having tattva.' When the three gūṇas, viz., sattva, rajas, and tamas, are in equal condition (sānyavastha), they are collectively called prakṛti. It is itself a tattva, it has no tattva. 26 It consists in the three gūṇas, it has no gūṇa, though sometimes even in authoritative works it is loosely said that it has three gūṇas. Thus it is a well-known fact that teachers belonging to other systems say that in Saṁkhya there is no difference between a gūṇa and a gūṇin or dravya 27 (gūnadravyayos tātāmyam), or between a dharma and a dhamma (dharma-dhammān abhedā). 28

Says Āsāvaghoṣa (BCK, XII, 76):

gunino hi guṇanāma ca vyatirekā na vidyate i

rūpoṣābhyyam virahito na hy agnir upalabhyate. 21

23 This is a reconstructed verse from Tibetan which runs:

sa ni. brtan. shes bya. bar. mthoñ |
de. yas. lus. kyi. bdzin. par. byyur |
des. na. reg. pa. ḍbab. shig. ḍi |
sho. sesh. ni. bya. bar. brjod

See V, 82; AK and AKVI, I, 35 (p. 69): "prthividhātah katamāt.
hakkhaṭavam iti vistarē | MV, pp. 60-67: ita tu kāhyādyavirata-prthiṣṭhyādasyambhāve sati na yuktā vīśayavatipprabāvāḥ. evam prthivyādiṣṭhān yadi api kāhyādyvairata-sākṣeyamānān laksyamānāt, laksyavati-rekṣena ca lakṣyamānaṁ nītāryam tathāpi sānyajvītā eva. YB, 16: "hakkhaṭavam katamāt, prthiṣṭā. This view is found also in the Garbhapaṇṇaḍ, I: tatra yat kāhyāmānāt prthiṣṭā.

24 He quotes here the following from AKV, IX p 717: prthiṣṭa gandhaavatīt yakte rūpa-gandha-pratyabhijna nānyad darśayitum śakyate. Cf. Soul Theory, p. 742.

25 Quoted in MV, p. 355 as a saying of the Bhaṭavat.

26 See Tattvoyādyatīhādyadipani included in the Saṁkhyaśaṅkara (Chaukhamo Sanākrit Series), pp. 72-93: tattvānity tāntrikā nityā, tadarthā cātmanātmaścātekparateṣyamoyañyo vigānas tattpatakartha. teṣām bhavaḥ tattvapadānātāni pūrṇaṃvapaṇñakātvakādhi dharmadharma-abhedān vyaktaḥ "pi tattvānitya ucyate.

27 Vāsuvanda ṇh отзывает (AK, IX, 290) the following definition of dravya rejecting that of the Vaiśeṣikas: vidyamānāḥ dravyān iti. Yā tō m i t r adds: yat svalokaniṣṭo vidyāmānaṁ tad dravyaḥ. He does not accept the position that sūkta, samākāra, icaha, etc., are gūṇas as held by Vaiśeṣikas (ibid). See AK, III, 109-11. But Viṣṇuṣaṭhākṣaḥ who is undoubtedly much influenced by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems writes in his following in his commentary on SS, I, 61: ayam ca pracārvātkaraka gṛdo dravyāpya eva dharmadharma-abhedāt tu gū Campos amāṇānādīnām atraṃtābpāvāḥ. Cf. I, 62: dharmadharma-abhedād dravyāpyām api tamārtha sūktā.

28 See Vījānabhiṣkā on SS, II, 5 where the following is quoted:

faktifaktimānto bhūdṛṣaṇaṃ praramānāt | abhedan cāṇuṣaṇiyo vigānas tattvacintakah
It may be noted in this connexion that V asubandhu in his Vijñānamātrāsiddhī applies the term dharmā to the tattvas of the Sāṅkhya (O. Rosenberg).29

It is not that in Brahmanical works the word dharmā is not used in the above sense. For instance, see KU, I. 1. 21: aṣūr eṣā dharmā.30 Yāksa (Nt., I. 20) writes sākṣātktadharmāyaḥ. Here the word dharmān differs from dharmā only in form and not also in sense, as the former, too, means artha or padartha 'a thing.' Vācaspati explains in his Tātparyaṭīkā the word sākṣātktadharmān used by Vātsyāyana (NS, I. 1.7), saying sudhāhena pramaṇavadhārī artha yena sa sākṣātktadharmā. Evidently he takes here dharmān in the sense of artha. Vāśa in his commentary on YS, II. 17, explains dṛṣṭya by buddhissatvopārdhāṃ sarve dharmāḥ.

In our present Book here and in other places S takes dharmā to mean ātman. But this seems to be forced. To imply ātman our author uses in every case ātman or jīva.31 Why should he employ in this chapter dharmā for it? Undoubtedly these two terms are well-known in their meanings. So there is no ground for giving preference to such a word as dharmā in the sense of ātman. In all the twenty-two cases in the present Book dharmā is easily construed in the sense of 'a thing,' literally 'an element of existence' as in Buddhist literature. But while in some of them S takes the word to mean ātman, in others he could not do so. In some cases he did not explain the word at all, and certainly the meaning ātman cannot be accepted in them. For instance, in the text sarve dharmāṃ paścavāpne (IV. 33) the word dharmā can in no way mean ātman. In two cases he explains it saying hastyādīn bāhyadharmān (IV. 41), and bāhyadharmāh (IV. 54). Once he writes ātmano 'nye ca dharmāḥ (IV. 58). In one case (IV. 82), however, he gives the actual sense, i.e. vastu 'thing.'32

It can further be shown from the words of the author himself that in meaning dharmā and bhāva (= vastu = padartha) are identical. See the following passages:

(i) ajātasyaiva bhāvasya (III. 20°) and ajātasyaiva dharmasya (IV. 6°).

(ii) ajāto hy amṛto bhāvah (III. 20°) and ajāto hy amṛto dharmah (IV. 6°).

(iii) svabhāvenāṃto yasya bhāvaḥ (III. 22°) and svabhāvenāṃto yasya dharmah (IV. 7°).

It is to be noted that while bhāva is used only in the second and third Books33 of the work, dharmā in the above sense is used only in Book IV, and this is very significant indicating the Buddhist relationship of the subject dealt with in it.

There is one thing more. It is said in the kārikā that he to whom the author pays his homage perfectly understood the dharmās. Here if he is meant to be Nārāyana one would naturally ask: What is the authority for it? Where is it found that he actually did so? This question demands a reply from those who hold that Nārāyana is referred to here. Not only what we have seen above with regard to the first kārikā, but also the whole chapter, as can be shown, is in favour of the Buddha.

29 Stecherbatsky: The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 27, n. 2.
30 The commentator, S, explains the word dharmā here saying ātmākhyā dharmā. Undoubtedly ātman is a dharmā as we have seen. But certainly it is not the actual meaning of the word though it may be implied with reference to the context. See also KU, II. 1. 14: eṣām dharmāṃ pthak pakpaṇ.
31 See for ātman I. 12; II. 12, 17; III. 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14; for jīva I. 16; III. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 48; IV. 63, 68, 69, 70.
32 The text is: yasya kasya ca dharmasya, and S explains: yasya kasyacid vastuṣṭaḥ. This reading is in the MS ca of Anandavasudeva ed., the other readings add doṣa- before vastuṣṭaḥ.
33 Kārikās II. 1, 13, 16, 17, 19, 29, 33; and III. 20, 22.
In the second kārikā the author salutes the teacher of the asparśayoga:

asparśayogā vai nāma sarvasattvasukhō hitaḥ
avivādo 'vīruddhaś ca desitas taṁ namāmy aham

'I salute him (who has) taught the asparśayoga which conduces to happiness of all beings and is beneficial and free from dispute and opposition.'

I construe the kārikā taking yena 'by whom' as understood, thus differing a little from the commentator, Ś, who says that it is the asparśayoga that is saluted here.

In the kārikā avīśāda refers to the fact that our theory is not contradicted by theories of other schools, and avīruddha implies that it involves no self-contradiction or is not against any other position held by us.

Now what is the asparśayoga, by whom and where has it been taught? The word does not occur in the Upaniṣads, though Ś says on III. 39, where also it is described, that it is well-known in the Upaniṣads (prasiddham upaniṣatsu). See also III. 37, 38. The following is found in KU, II. 3. 10:

yadā pañcāvatiṣṭhante jāññāmi manassā saha
buddhiṣ ca na vicēṣṭate tām āhuḥ paramān gatim

'When the five (instruments of) knowledge stand still together with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state.'

Similar statements are met with in other Upaniṣads.1 But though they in fact may point to what is called asparśayoga, as will presently be explained, it is not termed asparśayoga.

For instance, BBU, 4.6; MU, VI. 34. See kārikā, III. 38.

The word asparśayoga literally means the yoga in which there is no contact, or the faculty of perception by touch. The author himself says (III. 37) it is a samādhi 'profound or abstract concentration,' it is very difficult to realize. It points to what is asamprajñāta samādhi (YS, I. 2. 18. 51 with the scholiast Vyāsa),2 or nirvikalpa samādhi (PD, II. 28) of yogins. But nowhere in their systems, so far as my information goes, it is called asparśayoga.3 Why is it that the word asparśa is used here?

I am inclined to think that it refers to the ninth or the last of the nine dhyāṇas or meditations called anupūrvaśīrṣā (Pali anupubbavirihiṇa) or the successive states of dhyāna which the Buddha taught and are found frequently in Buddhist texts.4 They are as follows:

I. Four rūpa dhyāṇas or the meditations of which rūpa 'matter' is the object, viz.—

(i) prathama dhyāna or the first stage of meditation.
(ii) dvitiya dhyāna or the second stage of meditation.
(iii) tṛṭiyā dhyāna or the third stage of meditation.
(iv) caturthā dhyāna or the fourth stage of meditation.

II. The four arūpa dhyāṇas or the meditations of which the object is not matter, viz.—

(i) ākāśanantīyāyatana (Pali ākāsānaññāyatana) or the place of infinity of space.

1 Vyāsa explains (YS, I. 2) it: na tatra kīrtit samprajñāyata ity asamprajñātāḥ 'as nothing is known there it is called asamprajñāta.'

2 Cf. asparśasamorāditprāpti used in explaining svarūpalabhā in the following line of the VV, p. 42: svarūpalabhā samastakalanorottātāk akṛttakā nirvānānāstānām-apakā nirvikalpa-asparśasamorāditprāpti bhavati. This is kindly pointed out to me by Dr. S. N. Sen Gupta of the Lucknow University. The following occurs in the same work (p. 4) in the course of the explanation of mahāśīlāntāyāvadavatva: kulasuvikālapadojihito vṛpayadeya-mahāśīlāntāyāvadavatva-vyayaveda-niruykto varṣṇavarṇānyāvottātāḥ svarūpa-pratihārā prāparināvarjanātā paramāksātyabhidhāmakṣā abhidhiṣṭate.

3 AN, Vol. IV, pp. 410-448: nava yime bhikkhave anupubbavīraṁ "nava yime bhikkhave anupubbavīraṁ assamāpattiyā desissami, taṁ susahā,
(ii) viññānāntaryatana (Pali viññānaññācā) or the place of infinity of pure consciousness.

(iii) akīrcanayatana (Pali akīrcaññā) or the place of nothingness.

(iv) naivasaṃjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana (Pali nevasaṃjñāsaññā) or the place neither of consciousness nor of consciousnessness.

And the ninth is saṃjñāvedayatiprodha (Pali saññāvedayita-nirodha) or the cessation or complete suppression of consciousnessness and sensation.

As in the ninth or last stage of yoga or meditation not only sensation or consciousness, but also all the mental properties or mental states (citta or caitasika dharmas), headed by spāra (Pali phassa) 'contact,' are restricted or suppressed with the citta or mind itself, it is called asparīyoga. It is to be noted that the word spāra employed here implies also the other mental states or mental forces which are first. The cessation of vedāna is possible only when spāra ceases, as is clearly shown in the SN, IV, p. 220 (XXXVI. 15.4): phassasamudayā vedāna-samudayo phassanirrodhā vedanānirrodho. It means that spāra is the cause of vedāna, so when there is spāra there is vedāna, and when there is no spāra there is no vedāna. The fact that in this state of nirodha (which is the same as asamprajñāta or nirbija or nirvikalpa samādhi) the mind and its properties (citta and caitasika) completely cease to work is clearly described by Buddha in his VM, p. 552. It is said (III. 39) that asparīyoga is very difficult to realize. From this very fact the word asparīyoga may be explained as meaning 'to make the mind and its properties (citta and caitasika) cease to work.'

5 AAS, II. 2: phasso vedanā saññā cayitā cetasikā sabbacittarādhaṁ nāma.

For its explanation see Sthiramati on Tk, p. 20, II, I, 2, 7, 9, 10; p 28, I, 18.

6 kā nirodhasampatīti ye anupabhanirvānasena cītacetasikānām dharmān appattati. See also SN, Vol. IV, p. 217 (=XXXVI. 11. 5): saññāvedayitiprodha samampannaṁ saññā ca vedanā ca niruddhā honti.

quite in a different way. In Buddhist Sanskrit works there is frequent use of such words as spāravāhāra (MV1, 8349, 8351; Tk. p. 28, II. 18). spāravāhāra (MV1, 6288), and asparīyoga (AAA, p. 326; Tk. p. 28, II. 17, 19; p. 30, II. 15, 20). Sthiramati explains the last word in his commentary on Tk, p. 28, I, 18, saying: spāraṁ sukhāṁ tena sāhito vihāraṁ spāravāhāraṁ, na spāravāhāraṁ 'spāravāhāra. He says that spāra means sukkha 'joy, content, ease, comfort'; spāravāhāra is a state with it; and asparīyoga is its opposite. In Tibetan spāravāhāra is translated by bde.gnas.pa, literally the Sanskrit equivalent to which is sukhasthitī (or sukhamāṣṭhitī) 'pleasant state.' In Pali spāravāhāra is phāsuvihaṁ in the same meaning. In this light asparīyoga in sense is nothing but asukhayoga (a-suukhayoga) meaning thereby 'a yoga which is not one that can be attained with ease.' This explanation is fully supported by what we know of it in III. 39: It is very difficult to realize and yogins shrink from it seeing fear though in fact there is no fear.

We read in the present kārikā that this yoga conduces to happiness of all beings (sarvaśattuvaśukha). This is found also in Buddhist works where it is said (SN, Vol. IV, p. 228 =XXXIV. 19, 20) that the highest bliss is felt in the saññāvedayitiprodha (or saññāvedayitaśca) according to the Chinese version. saññā = samyag.

5 It is, however, to be noted that, strictly speaking, Pali phassa is not from Sanskrit spāra the Pali form of which is phassa. In Northern Sanskrit Buddhists, Pali phassa is wrongly translated into Sanskrit by spāra. See the Pali Dictionary of Childe rs, p. 982. Sometimes in Buddhist Sanskrit spāravāhāra is found for phāsuvāhāra. It clearly indicates that the writers of the former did not think that mere spāravāhāra could imply the sense of phāsuvāhāra.

6 idānām dharmakākṣhānāmane nevasaṃjñāsaññānāṁ sāmattikānām saññāvedayitiprodhānāṁ upasampajjā viharam, idāṁ kho anānāt etam sukkha aśaṁ sukkhaṁ abhikāntarānam ca paśītarānaṁ ca. See also the next paragraph (21) for the reply to a question raised here. Cf. AN, Vol. IV, pp. 414-418.
We know from it that in the stage of nirodhasamāpatti the citta or mind is completely suppressed, hence there is no experience whatsoever. But in the stage called vyutthāna ‘rising up’ one has three kinds of sparśa ‘experience,’ known as ānimitya, ākīrcanaya, and ānimitta. The word sparśa in such cases means ‘experience’ or ‘that which is experienced,’ v sparś meaning here ‘to experience.’

Now, because in the yoga called nirodhasamāpatti there is no sparśa of anything, it is rightly named asparśayoga.

It is said (III. 39--40) of the asparśayoga that yogins or rather untrained ones shrink back from it, imagining fear where in reality there is no fear: yogino bibhyati hy asmād abhayē bhayadarśinaḥ. But what is the cause of their fear? Ś rightly says that the so-called yogins think that it will annihilate the very self. Indeed, there is hardly any difference between a yogin in this state and a dead person, their respiration being completely stopped. So when the Blessed One entered that state, i.e., saṅñāvedayitanirodha before his parinirvāṇa, Ānanda took him to be dead. But the venerable Anuruddha said to him that that was not the case, the Blessed one only having entered the stage of the dyāna called saṅñāvedayitanirodha. After a short time, however, He passed away. It is therefore quite natural that an untrained yogin should be afraid of it, as of death.

Yet there is a real difference between death and asparśayoga or saṅñāvedayitanirodha. And Budhhaghoṣa has explained it in his VM, p. 558, quoting a passage from the Suttapiṭaka. It says that all the conditions in both of them are one and the same excepting this that in the latter the heat of the body is not

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12 See KnU, IV.2: te hy enan nedāthām paspaṭuḥ. Ite hy enat prathamo vidāścakāra—this portion is grammatically defective and not in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa, Chapter X which forms the KnU) 3: sa hy enan nedāthām paspaṭa, sa hy enat prathamo vidāścakāra.

13 ātmanāsaṅgāram imam yogam manavānā bhayaṃ kuruṇti,

There are two classes of teachers: one (i.e., the followers of the systems of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta) holding the doctrine of actual existence of an effect in its cause (satkāryavāda), and the other (i.e., the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas) maintaining the theory of non-existence of an effect in its cause (asatkāryavāda). The author refers to these two views in the third kārikā which runs as follows:

bhūtasya jātīm iechanti vādinaḥ kecid eva hi
abhūtasyāpare dhīrā vivadantaḥ parasparam ॥

‘There are only certain disputants who maintain that jāti ‘origination’ is of a thing which is already existent, while there are others of firm resolve who hold that it is of a thing which is non-existent.’ Thus they dispute with each other.

1 See SK, IX; BS, II, 1. 14-18 with §; § on BU, I. 2. 2, (p. 20): kāryasya hi satō jayāmānasya kāraṇe saty utpattidartanat. Among the Buddhists the Vaiśeṣikas maintain satkāryavāda. See CS, IX, 15 and our text, IV, 11, note 1.
2 See NK, pp. 143 ff. Among the Buddhists Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras hold asatkāryavāda. CS, IX, 15.
3 The interpretation of the words bhūta and abhūta by § in the text here is quite different from that in III, 23, and it is very remarkable.

The Ācārya now proceeds to mention in the next kārikā the doctrine of the Buddhists who subscribe to neither of these two views asserting absolute ‘non-becoming’ (ajāti) of things:

bhūtaṃ na jāyate kiṃcid abhūtaṃ naiva jāyate
vividanto ’dvayā hy evam ajātiṃ khyāpayanti te ॥

‘That which is already existent does not come into being, and that which is non-existent does not also come into being;
disputing thus the followers of the doctrine of *advaya* assert absolute non-becoming (ajāti).

Before discussing the meaning of the kārikā it is to be noted that the reading that can reasonably be accepted in *c* is not *vivadanto dvaya* as in many editions, but *vivadanto ‘dvaya* with our MS. M4, and some editions.1 It is supported also by the commentary in those editions, as well as by the MS. Ka used in the Anandasammlung edition of 1900.

The word *advaya* in the kārikā is, in fact, identical in meaning with *Advayavādin*, which is well-known even to an ordinary reader of Sanskrit as one of the names for the Buddha.2 Some of the commentators of Amk explain *advaya* in *advayavādin* as *advaita*.3 But there is a marked difference between the two terms *advaitavāda* and *advayavāda*; while the former literally means the theory of non-difference, i.e., the non-difference between, or identity of (according to the school of Ś) Jīva and Brahman, the latter means the theory of ‘non-two’, i.e., neither of the two extreme views.

The two (*dvaya*) or the two extreme views are as follows: The Buddha does not hold that anything exists, nor does he hold that it does not exist. He rejects both of these two extreme views and propounds his view taking a middle path (*majjhima pratīpadā* or *madhyamā pratīpadā*). So according to

4 So says Nāgārjuna, MV, p. 11:

| aniruddham anupādam anucchedam asāvataṃ | anekārtham anānārtham anāgamanam anirgamanam ||
| yaḥ pratītyasamutpādam pratītyasamudgataṃ śvāṃ ||
| bhāvānāśa sambuddhas tān vande vadhānām vasantām ||

5 astīti kāyapa ayam eko ’nta nātātā yām dvitiyō‘ntaḥ, yad aṇaya dvayaḥ anātātā mahāyānā iyam ucyate kāyapa mahāyāna pratīpadā dhammānam bhūvatratayakeṣā. KP, 60 (p. 90). See MV, p. 270.

| yad bhāyastā kāyānāśa ayam loko ’ntaḥ vābhinnīvṛto nātātā ca tena na parimucyata. Kāyānāśa vādā quoted in MV, p. 269. |

So writes Nāgārjuna:

| kāyānāśa vādā cāst[i]u nātātā cehaḥyām |
| pratītyasamutpādam bhāvabhāvavibhāvaṃ || MK, XV, 7.
| astītaṃ ye tu paitāntā nātātā cālaṃ budhāhayaḥ ||
| bhāvānān te na paitāntā draśṭāvayopasamāṃ śvāṃ || MK, V, 8.

| sammadhistha sammadhistha bhante vuccati, kāyapa nu kho bhante sammadhisthī hotiti, dvāyanisīte kho ayam kācchāraya loko yeheyyaṃ atīhaṁ cāva na’tiṣṭhaḥ ca SN, II, p. 17 (XII, 15). lokamudayaṃ kho kācchāraya yathābhūtaṃ sammapattīṣaṃ āpatte yā lokā na’tiṣṭhaḥ sā na hoti. lokānirodhaṃ kho kācchāraya yathā- bhūtaṃ sammapattīṣaṃ āpatte yā lokā atīhi sā na hoti. saṃsāraḥ aṇaṃ kho kācchāraya ayam eko ato, saṃsāraḥ aṇaṃ kho kācchāraya ayam dūra atiṣṭa, ete te kācchāraya udhaṃ ante anupagamam maṅghenena tathāgato dhammaṃ desetih. SN, II, p. 17 (XII, 15). |

nityam iti kāyapa ayam eko ‘ntaḥ, anityam iti kāyapa ayam dvitiyō ‘ntaḥ, yad etayor dvayaḥ nityānityayor mahāyānām tad anūpyayo-addhānām.4 atimeti kāyapa ayam eko ‘ntaḥ, nārātyam iti dvitiyō ‘ntaḥ, yad aṭṭhānaśayor mahāyānām tad.” saṅkṣeṣaṃ iti kāyapa ayam eko ‘ntaḥ nyavādām iṣyām iti ayam kāyapa dvitiyō ‘ntaḥ, yo’syāntadvayāyānuṣpago (Text anūgamabhotu but see
further be perfectly clear to anyone when one considers that in the preceding kārikā two classes of teachers are referred to, who hold the theory of origination (jātialāda). According to one of them the origination is of the existent, while in accordance with the other, it is of the non-existent. These teachers are duaitins 'advocates of dualism', viz., the Sāṅkhyaśas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. The teachers alluded to in the present kārikā are, however, quite of a different view. They do not discuss as to whether the origination is of the existent or of the non-existent, but assert that there is no origination at all (ajātim khyāpayantī te). Thus the teachers alluded to in kārikās 3 and 4 are different, though 5 takes them to be identical.

As is evident, the main subject of this chapter is the theory of non-origination (ajātialāda). In different systems of Indian philosophy it is held that things around us have their origination; in other words, they are produced; they have their causes, they themselves being their effect. But it is the Buddhists who hold quite a different view emphatically denying the origination of anything in the world. Thus the first sentence of Nāgārjuna’s MK begins with aniruddham.

Tib. version: khas, mi. len. ciṇa) 'nudhāhro pravyāhāra iyaṃ ucyste kāṭyapa madhyamā prātipad dharmamā bhūtpatrayevakte. KG, pp. 86-88.

asthitī nāstītī ubhe'pi antā
fuddhi asuddhi ite 'pi antā
rasmād ubhe anta vivarjāgyātā
madhye 'pi bhāṣam na karoti paṃpita
asthitī nāstītī vivāda eja
fuddhi asuddhi ite ayaṃ vivāde
vivādapratyā ca dukkhaṃ prāṭamya
āvivādapratyā ca dukkhaṃ nirodhyate
er, pp. 30, quoted in MP, pp. 135, 270.

bhāvabhāvadāna-advayaprasaṅga yāvat tāvat saṃśāra ity avetya mamukṣubhir etad-dārāna-devananirāsena sadbhir madhyamā prātipad bhāvanāṣā yathāvad iti, MV, p. 276. See the whole of chapter XV.

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anupādam 6 having neither origination nor suppression.' This anupāda is thoroughly discussed and established in that work as in others. Let here be quoted only a few lines in translation from that book together with the commentary of Candrakīrtti (MK, I. I with MV, p. 12):

'Now...the Ācārya, thinking the facility in refuting nirūdhya, after upāda is refuted, begins first with the refutation of the latter. Utpāda of a thing may be supposed by the opponents from a cause which may be either it itself, or something other than it, or both, or again, from one which is no cause at all. But in no way it can be justified. So he (the Ācārya) says:

"Nowhere and never are such things as are produced either from themselves, or from some other things, or from both, or from what is no cause at all." 

This non-origination is asserted again and again in the same work and sometimes in identical words:

na svātā jáyate bhavāḥ parato naiva jáyate
na svātā parato caiva jáyate kutaḥ


'A thing does not come into being from itself, nor from other (=not-itself), nor from both, itself and other. How can it come into being?

6 For the order of these two words see Candrakīrtti (MV, p. 12):

atra ca niruddhasya pūrvaṃ pratiṣedha utpādaniruddhāya pauravaparyayavasthāyaḥ siddhiḥbhāvam dhotaitum. vakṣyati hi (MK, XI. 3; MV, p. 221): pūrvaṃ játi yaḥ bhage jātāmaṃsaṃ cetuttamam. * Our author, Gaṇḍapāda, too, has followed the same order in his widely quoted kārikā (III. 32): na niruddho na cātāpyātā.

7 idānīm utpādaniruddhena niruddha-pratiṣedhena sarvamaniṃśa ācārāḥ prathamaṃ evaṃ upādaniruddhām ākriṣṭe utpāda hi parihaḥ kalpa-

mannāḥ svato parā parikalpyeta paraḥ ubhayato 'hetuva parikalpyeta. sarvathā ca nāparyātata iti niścita aha:

na svato nāpi pariha na dvābhāyam nāpy ahetu

utpānaḥ játi vidyante bhavāḥ kriyāca kecaḥ

MK, I. I; MV, p. 12.
Compare this with the following line from our kārikā, IV. 22 which speaks for itself:

śvato vā parato vāpi na kīcchad vauṣṭu jāyate t

'Nothing is produced either from itself or from other.'

For further details one may be referred to MK, I and XXIII with MV; CS, XV. See also our kārikā, IV. 22.

That there is no jāti or utpāda 'origination' is thus maintained also in a short line of the BA, IX. 106:

evaṃ ca sarvadharmanām utpattir nāvasyate 1

'Thus the origination of all things is not known.'

The first half of the present kārikā is undoubtedly based on such statement as the following of Nāgarjuna (MK, I. 6):

nāvāsato naiva satat pratyo 'rthasya yuṣyate t

asatā pratyāyah kasya satā ca pratyayena kipa 2

For the wording in b of the kārikā (abhūtam naiva jāyate) see CS, 373 4 (XV, 234): nābhūto nāma jāyate. See here also Candrakirtti on CS, 366 (XV, 16): atraha: jāto na jāyate aśvāto 'pi na jāyate. 34 It may be noted here that in this book, too, the doctrine of non-origination is fully discussed.

Ś explains the first half of the present kārikā as follows:

bhūtam vidyāmāṇam vauṣṭu na jāyate vidyāmānāt vād eva 5

tatha' abhūtam avidyāmāṇam avidyāmānātvān naiva jāyate śāsvājanavat.

'The thing which is already existent does not (again) come into being owing to its very existence. And the thing that is

1 RAP runs here: evam eva yathādhanītyayaṃ sarvadharmanāṃ sarva-

bhävānāṃ upattir utpado nāvasyate na pratyayate. See the same work, pp. 355 ff.; na ca svaparabhadhūntuḥsandhanam ahetunicbandhanam vā bhāvāya jámatīpalelām upadipyate. Here the subject is discussed to a great extent.

2 See MA, VI, 58; MV, pp. 82-83.

3 Reconstructed from the Tibetan version: 'bdir. smar. pa | skyes. pa. mi. 

skye. la. ma. skyes. pa. yas. mi. skye. etc.'

4 Buddha pālita quoted in MV, p. 14: na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ, 
tadutpādavyaṃhṛtyat itiprasātyet ca. na hi svāmāṃ vidyāmāṇāṃ 
padārthānāṃ punarupāde prayojanam asti. atha sānna api jāyeta na kācin na 

jāyeta.
the non-origination doctrine of the Advayavādins can be approved.

Having thus introduced his readers to the subject he has to deal with, the author now proceeds in the following kārikās to offer his arguments as to how the doctrine of jāti cannot be justified. He says:

6

ajātasyaiva dharmasya jātm i cchanti vādinaḥ
ajāto bhāvo dharmaḥ martyatāṁ kathāṁ ēṣyati

‘Disputants are of opinion that there is birth only of that thing (lit. ‘element of existence’) which is unborn. But how is it that the thing which is unborn and (consequently) immortal should become mortal?’

It means that the teachers of both the classes referred to in kārikā 3 are agreed upon the point that birth is possible of what is unborn; for what is already born does not take birth again, and so it is useless to think of the birth of such a thing. Our author says that the birth of an unborn one cannot be justified, and he offers the following arguments: It is accepted on all hands that what has no birth (ajāta) has also no death (amṛta). Now when you say that birth is of an unborn one, you have necessarily to admit that it has death; and so it follows that you also admit the death of an immortal

1 The kārikās 6, 7, and 8 of this Book are identical with the kārikās 20, 21 and 22 of the Book III respectively excepting only this that in kārikā 3, 20 and 22 there is the word bhāvo, while in IV. 6 and 8 the reading is dharma.

For the words jāta and ajāta see MK, XX. 12-14.

1 According to § the second half of the kārikā (‘But how is it that the thing which is unborn and immortal should become mortal’) means, in fact, that how it should take birth in reality. He writes: svabhāvenāṃ bhāvo martyatāṁ gacchati paramārthato jāyate. III. 22.

IV. 7] ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA

one. Now an unborn one is by its own nature immortal. And this death of the immortal one is utterly absurd.

The author continues in support of his above statement:

7

na bhavaty amṛtaṃ martyam na martyam amṛtaṃ tathā prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathaścid bhavisyati

‘The immortal does not become mortal and a mortal one does not also become immortal; for the change of nature can in no way be possible.’

The second half of the kārikā is repeated in kārikā IV. 29, and seems to have mostly been taken here from Nāgārjuna’s MK, XV. 8, which runs as follows:

yady aṣṭiṣṭam prakṛtyā syāṁ na bhaved aṣya naśītaṁ prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jātupapadyate

The author having shown here that nature does in no way change says in the next kārikā that if a thing which in its own nature is unborn (ajāta) and hence regarded as immortal (amṛta) comes into being (jāyate) and thus becomes mortal (martya), then owing to this very fact it cannot remain changeless. The point is that which is unborn or immortal by its own nature should remain always so. But if you say that the unborn takes

1 See III. 21, and the note 1 on IV. 6.

2 The following may also be quoted here from the same work:

prakṛτau kasya cāsyaṁ anyathāvāṃ bhavisyati | prakṛτau kasya ca satyaṁ anyathāvāṃ bhavisyati || XV. 9.

kasya sāyāṁ anyathābhāvam svabhāvam cen na vidyate | kasya sāyāṁ anyathābhāvam svabhāvam yadi vidyate || XIII. 4.

kaḥ svabhāvam prabhāṣyati | XXIII. 24.

sva-vāpyānyathābhāvāsambhaṭ.

Candrakīrtti on C5, VIII. 4 (179)
birth, or the immortal becomes mortal, evidently it undergoes a change. But no change of nature is possible. The kārikā runs:

8

svabhāvenāmto yasya dharma gacchati martyatām
kṛtānāṁśat asa kathāṁ sthāyatī niścalaḥ

‘How can he, accoding to whom a thing which is naturally immortal becomes mortal, maintain that an immortal thing, when it becomes artificial, will remain changeless?’

The following may here be quoted from Nāgārjuna’s MK, XV, 1-2 in which one should note the word kṛtākā:\n
na sambhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktah prayayahutubhiḥ
hetupratyasambhātuḥ svabhāvah kṛtakho bhavet
svabhāvah kṛtakho nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham
ākṛtramāh svabhāvo hi niraṇekṣaḥ paratra ca

1 See III, 22.
3 That is, takes birth. See note 2 on IV, 6.

1 The word kṛtakā in the kārikā ‘ai is to be explained taking it as noun, i.e., kṛtakatvā, just as the word anadi in IV, 14 is evidently for anādittvā. Ānandagīri lends his support writing (III, 22) kṛtaketi, kṛtakatvāsa, yat kṛtakam tad anityam iti. Cf. Sāyaṇa who explains manasaśpati (TA, VII, 6) as ‘patita.’
4 It seems that our author had these kārikās of Nāgārjuna in his mind while writing his own and so he has unconsciously written kṛtakā instead of kṛtakato as is required.

9

sāṃsiddhiḥ svabhāvīkā sahajāpya akṛtā ca yāḥ
prakṛtīḥ seti vijñeyā svabhāvam na jahati yā

‘That is to be known nature (prakṛti) which is self-existent, natural, innate, not artificial and one that does not give up its own being.’

As regards svabhāva Candragīrtti explains it following Nāgārjuna in his MV, pp. 264-265, that it is nothing but always non-origination (sarvadūnatūpaṇā eva). He says that by svabhāva we are to understand that which is independent of other (paranirapekṣa) and as such not artificial (ākṛtrima), and thus having no existence before it does not come into being (not abhūto bhavaḥ). Therefore the svabhāva of fire is nothing but its non-origination (anutūpaṇa), and not its heat, because it depends on its cause and conditions, and comes into being after having no existence at first.”

1 The word sāṃsiddhiḥ may also mean that which comes into being simultaneously (sahā-utpanna) as illustrated by Gaṇḍapādā and Māthara (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 296) in their commentaries on Sk, XLIII of Iśvarakīrti: tatra sāṃsiddhiḥ yathā bhāgavataḥ kapilasyādīrga upadhyāya-māṇasya ca tāravā bhavah sahotpannāḥ. The explanation of śūnas as follows: sanyāk siddhiḥ sāṃsiddhiḥ tatra bhavaḥ sāṃsiddhiḥ, yathā yoginām animāyavāyāya-śrāvyapratipaḥ prakṛtī sa.*
2 MV, p. 265: sarvadūnatūpaṇā eva hi agnyādīnām paranirapekṣavād ākṛtrimatvāt svabhāvā ity ucyate.
Now having shown that there is no origination of anything the author proceeds to say in the next kārika that there is also neither decay nor passing away:

10

jarāmarananimuktah sarve dharmaḥ svabhāvataḥ 1
jarāmaranam icchantas cyavante tanmaniṣayā 2

‘All things are by nature free from ‘old age’ (decay) and ‘death’ (passing away). So the persons who believe in ‘old age’ and ‘death’ are reborn owing to their that very thought.’

That there can be neither jarā nor maraṇa is very elaborately established by Nāgārjuna in his MK, XI. 3 ff. from which we cull the following two couplets (3 and 4):

pūram jatir yadi bhavej jarāmaranam uttaraṁ 1
nirjarāmarañj jātir bhavae jāyeta cāmāttha 2
paścāj jatir yadi bhavej jarāmaranam aditaṁ 1
ahetukam ajātasya syāj jarāmarañj katham 2

For further details readers are referred to the original text of Nāgārjuna with MV.

The author attacks the doctrine of jāti from different points of view and refutes it in the following way referring first to the followers of the Sāṃkhya system who hold the theory of actual existence of an effect in its cause (satkāryavāda). 1

11

kāraṇaṁ yasya vai kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ tasya jāyate 1
jāyamānaṁ katham ajāṁ bhinnam nityaṁ katham ca tat 2

‘(It is to be admitted by him) according to whom the cause itself is the effect, that it is the cause that takes birth (i.e., is produced). And in that case how is it that the thing which takes birth and is thus different (from the effect) can be regarded as unborn (aja) and how it can be permanent? 1

In the Sāṅkhya system prakṛti or pradhāna is held to be the first or original cause (mūla kāraṇa). It is ‘unborn’ (aja) and permanent (nitya). From it other things are gradually produced. This view is criticized in this and the following kārikās by our author.

1 The point is that there must be some difference between that which is produced and that which is not produced (jāyamana and aja).

S explains the word bhinna in a different way saying that it means ‘rent assurer’, ‘divided into parts’ or ‘opened’ (vidīra, sphaṭita) implying thereby ‘subject to some change.’ And that which admits of any kind of change cannot be permanent.

The identity of cause and effect may be viewed from two different points, viz., the cause is not other than the effect (kāryābhinnam kāraṇam), or the effect is not other than the cause (kāraṇabhinnam kāryam). But in neither case can the Sāṅkhya system be defended. The object of the first viewpoint is shown in the present kāriķa which says: If the cause is not different from the effect then it is to be admitted that it is the cause (and not the effect) that ‘takes birth’ (jāyate) and thus, if you accept it, the cause cannot be regarded as ‘unborn’ (aja), as you hold it to be.

Now, in order to avoid this difficulty one may follow the second point of view saying that the effect being not different from the cause the former is as aja as the latter; and thus one cannot say that the cause is not aja. The author, however, says in the next kāriķa that this argument, too, cannot be accepted:

1201B—15
kāraṇād yad' ananyatvam ataḥ kāryam ajām yadi 1
jāyamānād dhi vai kāryat kāraṇam te katham dhruvam 2

‘If you hold that the effect is also ‘unborn’ (aja), for
there is no difference of it from the cause (which is aja), then,
how is it, in your opinion, that the cause is permanent when
the effect is produced?’ 2

1 The reading should be here yad and not yadi as discussed elsewhere.
2 S explains c saying that how it is that the cause being not different from
the effect, that i.e., being produced, can be permanent: jāyamānād dhi vai kāryat
kāraṇam ananyan nityam dhruvam ca.

The author offers further grounds:

ajād vai jāyate yasya dṛśtaṃ tasya nāsti vai 1
jātāc ca jāyamānasya na-vyavasthā prasajyate 2

‘There is no illustration (to give) for him who holds that
a thing is produced from what is unborn’. (On the other
hand, if it is maintained that) a thing is born from what is
born, then there follows no finality, it leads to an endless series
of causes (anavasthā).’

Here in the text in d na is to be taken with vyavasthā
(as na-vyavasthā = avyavasthā = anavasthā) and not with
prasajyate. S explains: na vyavasthā prasajyate anavasthānāṃ
syād ity arthāḥ.

The second half of the kārika means that if A is
produced from B which you take as produced (jāta), by
the very fact that it is produced it must have been produced

1 That is, existing from all eternity.

from one C, and C, too, in the same way must have been
produced from one D, and so on. Thus it is impossible to
ascertain the ultimate cause of a thing. 2

2 Cf. Candraśīrtī (MV, p. 15): na ca vidyamānasya punar utpattau
prayaṇaṃ paśyānaḥ, anavasthā ca paśyānaḥ; AKV (quoted in MV, p. 13):
uppannasya punar utpattu kalpyamānāyaḥ anavasthāparyasagāḥ; MA (quoted
in MV, p. 13): jātasya janma punar eva ca naiva juktaḥ; SS, p. 262 (from
ASP): kīṃ punar āyuśman subhūte utpanno dharma utpatsyata utāṇupannah,
subhūtur āha, nāham āyuśman sāriputra utpannasya dharmasyotpattim icchāmi
na cāṇutpaṇnasyetī. ČS, 260:
sambhavaḥ kriyate yasya prak sāttitā na yujyate |
sato yadi bhavej janma jātasyāpi bhaved bhavaḥ ||

In support of this ajātikāda the author offers further
arguments:

hetor ādiḥ phalaṃ yeṣām ādir hetuḥ phalasya ca 1
hetoh phalasya cānadiḥ katham tair upavartyate 2

‘How can those who hold that the antecedent of a
cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its
cause, describe that there is no beginning of the cause
and the effect?’

In c anādi means ‘absence of beginning’ (āder abhāvah).
S explains it by anādītvo. Cf. kṛtaka in IV, 8c.
Let us take here an example (IV, 20). As regards a
seed (bijā) and its sprout (āṅkura) it is said that they have
no beginning, for it cannot be ascertained as to whether
the seed was first and then the sprout, or the sprout was first
and then the seed, each of them being dependent on the other for
their existence. Yet, they say that the antecedent of the sprout is the seed and that of the seed is sprout. This cannot be justified.

The point is further dealt with in the following kārikās:

15

hetor ādiḥ phalam yeṣāṁ ādir hetuḥ phalasya ca
tathā janma bhavet teṣāṁ putrāj janma pitur yathā
tathā jānma bhavet teṣāṁ putrāj janma pitur yathā
tathā jānma bhavet teṣāṁ putrāj janma pitur yathā
tathā jānma bhavet teṣāṁ putrāj janma pitur yathā
tathā jānma bhavet teṣāṁ putrāj janma pitur yathā

To those who maintain that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, the production of a thing would be just after the manner of the birth of a father from the son.

The point is that if it is held that the antecedent of a cause is its effect and vice-versa, then it would follow from it that as a cause produces its effect, so an effect, too, produces its cause; and if one accepts it one would also accept that a son begets his father. But it is absurd.

Cf. Nāgārjuna in his ViV, 50:

pitrā yady utpādyah putro yadi tena caiva putreṣa
utpādyah sa yadi pitā vada tatrātājaya kal kam

Here in the second half yadi, though supported by the Tibetan text, seems to be redundant.

See NS, II. 1. 41, IV. 1. 39; BA, IX. 114:

pitā cēn na vinā putrāḥ kutaḥ putrasya sambhavaḥ
putrābhāve pitā nāsti tathāsattvam tayor dvayoḥ

As regards the relationship between hetu 'cause' and phala 'effect' see MK, XX, specially XX. 20:

ekatve phalhetvoḥ syād aikyaṁ janakajanyayoḥ
prthaktve phalhetvoḥ syāt tulyo hetur ahetunā

1 Candrakīrtti introduces it (MV) saying: ato eva samāsābhāvaj
jarāmarṣaṇaṁ phurpurāsahakramā api na sanātyaṁ.

The following may be quoted here from MK, XI. 3.5:

pūrva jātir yadi bhave jārāmarṣaṁ uttaraṁ
nirjarāmarṣaṁ jātir bhave jāyeta cāṃtāṁ
paśca jātir yadi bhave jārāmarṣaṁ āditāṁ
ahetukam ajanātya syāj jārāmarṣaṁ kaihāṁ
na jārāmarṣaṇaiva jātīr ca saha yuñyate
mūryeta jāyamānaḥ ca syāc cahekatobhayoh
Op. cit. XI, 6:
yatra na prabhavantyete pūrvaparasahakramāḥ

For details the reader is referred to the whole of the chapters XI and XII.

In the kārikā under discussion Gauḍapāda referring to the krama of cause and effect refutes their simultaneity saying exactly what is said by Nāgārjuna (MK, XX. 7) and his commentator Candrakirtti:

phalaṁ sahaiva sāmagryā yadi prādurbhavet punah |
ekakālau prasajyete janako yaś ca jāyate ||

'Should an effect come into existence just with its cause in its entirety then that which produces and that which is produced become simultaneous.'

Here Candrakirtti adds: na ca ikkākalāyōh savyetaragoviśaṃyār janyajanakatvam dēṣṭhaṃ vamadakṣiṇakarayōḥ caraṇayōḥ vā. 'But it is not seen that between two simultaneous things there is any such relation as between the producer (janaka) and the produced (janya), just like between the right and left hands or feet.'

This order of cause and effect has again been referred to later on (IV. 19) by the word kramakopā 'incompatibility of order.'

1 Sometimes the female breasts are cited as example in such cases.

2 See Candrakirtti (MV, XI, 7.8): tatra yadi pūrvaṃ kāraṇam paścat kāryaṃ syād akāraṇaṃ kāraṇaṃ nirhetukam syat, atha pūrvaṃ kāryaṃ paścat kāraṇam evam api kāraṇaṃ pūrvaṃ kāryaṃ nirhetukam eva syat, atha yugapat kāraṇaṁ kāraṇaṁ evam ubhayam apy a[hetu]kam syat.

IV. 16-17]

Now, according to these three orders (krama) of cause and effect there may be three propositions respectively. viz., (i) the cause produces its effect, (ii) the effect produces its cause; and (iii) the cause and its effect produce each other.1 Of these three propositions the second2 is taken up in the following kārikā:

phalād utpadyamānaḥ san na te hetuḥ prasidhyati |
aprasiddhaḥ kathant hetuḥ phalam utpādayisyati iti

'Your cause coming into being from the effect cannot come into existence; how will, therefore, the cause that has not come into existence produce the effect?'

The argument of our author seems to have been based on what Nāgārjuna has said (MK, X. 10):

yo 'pekyāya sidhyate bhāvas tam eva-pekyāya sidhyati |
yadi yo 'peṣṭi avyāya sa sidhyatām kam apekyāya kah ||

1 See here Nāgārjuna with Candrakirtti, MK, XX. 5-7, and specially the following line (MV, p. 395, II, 5.6): yady evam phalasya hetor utpayate dṛṣṭa evam sati sahopannatva samagri phalasya janikātu tat yatā pradipaprabhāyāḥ.

2 It appears that a kārikā dealing with the first proposition is now lost between kārikās 16 and 17. For, as the second and third propositions are discussed (IV. 17, 18), one may naturally expect to have the discussion also of the first proposition, but it is not to be found. Can we think that the author himself has omitted it?
Candraśīkti explains it thus (MV, p. 208):

tatra yadi yo 'gnyākhyo bhāvo yam indhanākhyaṃ bhāvam
apekṣya siddhyati, indhanākhyaṃ ca bhāvo yo 'gnināṃ satiddhyārtham
apekṣitavyaḥ, sa yadi tam evaṃ gnyākhyāmaṃ padartham
apekṣya siddhyati, kathyaṃ idāniṃ siddhyātām kām apekṣya ka
iti. yadā cāgyābhāve satiddhanasya siddhir evaṃ nāti tadā
kāraṇasyendhanasyābhāvātt kutas taddevaṃ kānaṃ gnyā prasetyati.

It says that if the fire is exerted having regard to its
fuel and the fuel is exerted having regard to the fire, neither
of them can be exerted. See also the next kārikā (MKX. 11):

yo 'pekṣya siddhyate bhāvo so 'siddho 'pekṣate kathan l
athāpya apekṣate siddhas tv apekṣāṣya na yujyate l

Mark here the use of the root śidh with or without
the prefix pro- by Gaḍapāda, Nāgārjuna and
Candraśīkti.

This point is further discussed in the following kārikā:

18

yadi hetuḥ phalāt siddhiḥ phalasiddhiś ca hetutāḥ l
katarat pūrvam utpannam yaṣya siddhir apekṣayā l

‘If the coming into being of the cause is from the effect
and that of the effect is from the cause, which (of the two)
has first come into being,—the coming into being of which is
dependent?’

Read here the following quoted from Nāgārjuna’s
MKX. 8:

yadindhanam apekṣyāṃgir apekṣyāṃnāṃ yadindhanam l
katarat pūrvanippanam yaddapekṣyāṃgir indhanam l

MV (p. 207) runs here as follows:

asyendhanasyāyam agnir dhākaḥ kartety evan evam indhanāṃ
apekṣyāṅgir vyavasthāpyate. asyāṅgir idam indhanāṃ karmety-
evam agnim apekṣyaṃ yadindhanam, tat katarad anayoḥ pūrva-
nippannam. kim indhanāṃ yad apekṣyāṅgir suḥ, utāṅgir yam
apekṣyendhanāṃ suḥ.

Mark the wording of c in both the kārikās quoted above.1

1 See Poussin: JRAS, 1913, p. 139

The author proceeds to show very clearly in the next
kārikā as to how the Buddhas have explained the theory of
ajāti ‘non-origination’:

19

āsaktir aparījñānaṃ kramakop’ tha va punah l
evam hi sarvāḥ buddhār ājātiḥ paripāta l

‘As there is absence of capability, or complete ignorance,
or, again, incompatibility of orders, the Buddha has elucidated
(the theory of) absolute non-origination (ajāti).’

Against the theory of ajāti there are given three reasons
in the present kārikā, viz., (i) aśakti ‘absence of capability’,
(ii) aparījñāna ‘complete ignorance’, and (iii) kramakopa ‘incom-
patibility of orders’. Of these three the third, i.e., kramakopa
has already been discussed in kārikā 16.’ But what do the
other two terms aśakti and aparījñāna signify? The answer
will be found in Buddhist works. In regard to aśakti it

1 On this as well as on aśakti ‘asamathya’ one may be referred to the
kṣaṇabherga-vāda in the Buddhist section of the SDS.
refers to IV. 3 where two classes of teachers are mentioned, one holding *satkāryavāda* and the other *asatkāryavāda*. It has already been shown (IV. 4) that the Buddhists subscribe to neither of these two views. Nāgārjuna says (MK, I. 6), as has once already been quoted:

naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyayo 'rthasya yuyjate ∥
asataḥ pratyayāḥ kasya sataḥ ca pratyayena kim ||

It says that one cannot be a cause of either an existent or a non-existent thing, for, how is it that there is a cause of a thing which is not in existence? And what is the use of a cause of that which is already existent?

The opponent may say here: Well, when we speak of the cause of a non-existent thing we thereby mean to say that the cause is of a future thing. Candrakirtti replies (MV. on MK, I. 6) to it by quoting the following half of a verse in his MA (VI. 58) which is now available only in its Tibetan version edited by Poussin in BB (IX):

bhaviṣyatā ced vyavahāra īṣṭāḥ
saktim vinā nāsti hi bhāvītaśya |

It means that if you want to say that the cause is of a future thing, then owing to the want of energy that thing cannot come into being.

1 In Tibetan

gal. te. bhyu. bā. hgyur. bas. bestad. ḫod. na ∥
nus. pa. med. par. ḫi.yi. bhyu. ḫgyur. med ||

The other half of the verse in Tibetan runs:

phan. tshun. don. la. bten. paḥi. grub. pa. ni ∥
grub. min. sid. ces. dam. pa. rnam.s. khyis. guis ||

It may be translated into Sanskrit as follows:

parasparārthārāyāni ca siddhiḥ ∥
siddhiḥ bhaven neti hi sadbhīr uktam ||

The point here is this that in the coming into being of anything there must be some *sakti* 'energy', otherwise everything is possible from everything, or nothing is possible from anything. But the existence of such a *sakti* cannot be established. For, as discussed by Candrakirtti in his MA, VI. 57, it cannot be said that the *sakti* belongs to a thing that has come into being (*ajita*), or to one that has not yet come into being (*ajita*).

I think this *asakti* is referred to here by Gauḍapāda in his present kārikā.

Now *aparīṭhāna* in the kārikā seems to me to be nothing but *pūrva-aparīṭhāna* 'absolute ignorance of the first and last (points)' in kārikā IV. 21. And this *pūrva-aparīṭhāna* is in reality *pūrva-aparākṛti-aparīṭhāna*, that is, absolute ignorance of the first and last points, i.e., the beginning and the end of the world as well as anything in it. To this theme a whole chapter (XI) is devoted in the MK, owing to which it is called *pūrva-aparākṛti-parīkṣā* 'the Examination of the First and the Last Points.' Let here be quoted the first kārikā of it (XI. 1):

pūrva praṇāyaṭe kojīr nety uvāca mahāmuniḥ ∥
saṃsāro 'navarāgrodhi nāpi paścimaṃ ||

* The great sage said that the first point (of the world) is not known, for it is without the first and last points owing to the fact that it has neither the beginning nor the end.*

Candrakirtti comments: kojīr bhāgo deśa iti paryāyāḥ, *pūrva* kojīh purva deśa ity arthaḥ, yadi hi saṃsāro nāma kaścit

3 skyes. la. nus. pa. srid. pa. yod. ma. yin ∥
ma. skyes. śo. bo. laṁa nus. yod. min. ni ||

The Sanskrit rendering in prose may be: jāte saktir na sambhavati, *ajitāsabhāve* pī saktir nāti.
It has been shown before that causation (hetupalabha) in cases of origination is not possible. But one may meet the objection offering the example of seed and sprout (bijā and aṅkura). For it is evident that a sprout comes into being from a seed and a seed from a sprout. There is an endless series of it yet the fact cannot be denied. Thus by dint of the example causation is established. The author, however, says that the example does not establish any causation, though it may appear to do so, according to you. Therefore until it is established to the satisfaction of both the parties this example cannot be cited. Thus he says:

20

bijāṅkuraṅkhyo dṛṣṭāntaḥ sadāśadhyasamo hi naḥ
na ca sadhyasamo hetuḥ siddhau sadhyasya yuṣyate

'To us the illustration of a seed and its sprout is always like a thing that is yet to be proved (sadhyasama). And a reason (hetu) which is like one that is yet to be proved (sadhyasama) cannot be used for establishing a thing in question'.

Nāgārjuna has discussed (MK, X) the point thoroughly taking the example of fire and fuel (agni-indhana) and has arrived at the conclusion that there cannot be any causation (hetupalabha) of anything. Let us cite here only the following few lines from this work:

yad indhanām sa ced agnir ekatvam kartṛkarmaṇoḥ
anyaś ced indhanād agnir indhanād api tē bhavet

nityapradipta eva syād apradipanahetukaḥ
punār ārambhavayarthāyam evaṃ cāke maḥaḥ satī∥ X, 1-2.
agāndhanābhīṣṇa vaśāhṛtya atmopādānayoḥ kramabh | sarvā niravasēṣeṇa sārdhāṃ ghaṭapaṭā dibhīḥ || X. 15.

Candrakirtti says on CS, IX.8: tasmād evaṃ hetu- 
phalabhāvyavasthābhāvād dvayaṃ api (hetu and phala) 
svārūṇaṇa na sidhyati. 1

śādhyasama hetu is one of the fallacies of a reason (hetva- 
hāsā). It is an assertion identical with the point to be proved, 
petition principii. See NS, I, 2, 4, 8; V. I, 4.

The word hetu has been used here in the kārikā in the sense 
of dirśānta, as says Ś.

1 The Sanskrit text has not yet been discovered hence it is reconstructed (see 
my edition) from the Tibetan version which runs: deśi phyir de ltar na rgyu, 
dar phras bu dās pa rnam par gnas pa med pab phyir gāi ga raā gī, 
āo bos grub pas yod pa ma yin no || See also the kārikā and MA, p. 150.

The opponent says referring to kārikā IV. 19:

1

pūrvāparāparījñānaṃ ajāteḥ paridīpakam 1 
jayamānaḥ dhi vai dharmāt kathāṃ pūrvam na gṛhyate ||

The absolute ignorance of the first and the last (points of a 
thing) is elucidator of non-originiation; but how is it that the 
first (point) is not known (of a thing) which actually comes into 
being?

The word pūrvāparāparījñāna has already (IV. 19) been 
explained.

To the question raised above the author gives his reply in 
the following kārikā actually in the words of Nāgārjunā and 
his followers:

IV. 22]  

svato vā parato vāpi na kiṃcid vastu jāyate 1 
sad asad sadasad vāpi na kiṃcid vastu jāyate ||

′Nothing is produced either from itself or from other than 
itself, nor is anything produced which is existent, non-existent, 
or both existent and non-existent′ 1

The author wants to say here that should there be a thing 
that originates (jāyate) one may say that it has its first point 
(pūrva koṭi), i.e., the state of its becoming or being produced, 
but in reality there is nothing of the kind. For the first half 
of the kārikā see Nāgārjunā:

na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate || 
na svataḥ parataḥ caiva jāyate jāyate kutāḥ ||

MK, XXI. 13, see also XXIII. 20.

′A thing comes into being neither from itself, nor from 
another, nor from both, itself and another; and that being the 
case, how can it come into being at all?′

na svato nāpi parato na dvābhūṃ nāpyaheṭu tuḥ | 
uptampā jātu vidyante bhāvaḥ kva ca kacanā ||


′There are nowhere and never such things as are produced 
either from themselves or from others, or from both, or from one 
that is no cause at all.′

1 Here the point ′not existent-and-non-existent (na sād-sad)′ may also be 
added. See IV. 83.

For the second half of the kārikā the reader is referred to the following line of Nāgārjuna (MK, I.7):
na san nāsan na sadasaṁ dharmo nirvartate yadā
kathāṁ nirvartakta hetu evaṁ sati hi yuyāte
dīn.

When nothing existent, non-existential, or both existential and non-existential, comes into being, how is it reasonable to say that a cause brings about a thing?

8 See:
na san nāsan na sadasaṁ na cāpuṇaṁ nubhāyaṁ tātmakaṁ
catuṣṭaṁ vinirmuktaṁ tattvaṁ mādhyamikāṁ vidhūḥ

This couplet is attributed to Sārāhapāda in SS, p. 15 and found in a book Jñānasārasamuccaya, 28. The original Sanskrit of this work is not yet found, but there is a Tibetan version (Tanjur, Mdo. Thṣ.; Cordī. III, p. 29). Here the authorship of the original book is attributed to Aṣṭaevā. In Tibetan it is called Ye. s. s. p. k. l. t. b. p. a. The present kārikā is quoted in BAP, p. 359, and many other books both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. In this connection see IV. 83-84, and at sa-tattvaṁ sadasaṁ nubhāyaṁ atmahāyaṁ tātmakā- catuṣṭaṁ vinirmuktaṁ tūyaṁ eva in SDS (Buddhism sect). Bib. Ind., 1858, p. 14.

The next kārikā is a reply to those who maintain the theory of origination (jātiyāda) on the ground of the rule of cause and effect (hetuphalavyavastā) saying that both of them are without a beginning and as such cannot come into existence:

hetur na jāyate 'nādīḥ phalaṁ vāpi svabhāvataḥ
ādīr na vidyate yasya tasya jātir na vidyate

23

1 All the MSS. utilized for the Anandaśrama editions as well as those (not less than sixteen) collected from different provinces and examined by myself including different extant editions read 'nādīḥ for 'nādeḥ in a and 'ādīr for jātir in d. With these original readings the kārikā hardly gives any appreciable sense. What does the second half with that reading 'ādīr na vidyate yasya tasya 'ādīr na vidyate) mean? With the reading jātir for 'ādīr suggested by me the sense is quite clear and it is in one way supported by the explanation given by the commentator, Ś, who has twisted the text with the reading 'ādīr saying:

IV. 23-24]

'A cause as well as an effect having no beginning does not naturally come into being, for that which has no beginning has no origination.'

Compare BC, IX. 123:
heitur adīr na ced asti phalasya dīn kuto bhavet

'Should there be no beginning of a cause how could an effect have a beginning?'

yaṁad ādhār karāṇaṁ na vidyate yasyo loke tasya ādīḥ pūrvākā jaṭīr na vidyate. The reason for suggesting 'nādeḥ for 'nādeḥ is this that by doing so the meaning becomes quite clear and only as such is supported by the second half of the kārikā.

24

Now, a few words are necessary to introduce the words praṇāṭapī and samkleśa in the next kārikā. We say 'It is a tree', and by saying so we affirm the existence of the tree. We know thereby that in reality there is a thing which is called 'tree'. But some thinkers including a class of Buddhists would utterly deny the existence of such a thing. According to them there is nothing that can be called a tree. That which is known to us as a tree is nothing but a mere understanding (samkhya), a designation (samjñā); it is only making known to others (praṇāṭapī), that is, the practical denomination, simply a common use (vyavahāra), it is merely a name (nāman) and nothing else. And it is only on account of its having the branches, the leaves, etc., that it comes under the generally understood term of 'tree.' Similarly there is nothing in fact like a branch, a leaf, and so on, it being merely a current term, an enumeration, a designation, an expression or a distinctive mark of discourse.
The true literal significance of the word *prajñāpti*, 'practical denomination', is 'making known' (*bhavasādhana*); or 'that by which a thing is made known' (*karanaśādhana*), i.e., name or term. Or, again, it may mean what is made known (*karmaśādhana*). In the present case the word is used in either of the first two senses.

On the use of the word *prajñāpti* in Buddhist works Kumārila’s observation (TV, I. 3. 12, p. 234) is interesting: tākyādigrantheṣu punar yadapi kīcchid sādhuśabādbhirāpyeṣa-vi- naśaṃkureṣu pradyuktam tatraṇi prajñāpti-vijñāpti-pasyātāti- tiṣṭhitādiprayaśprayogāt kīcchid evaśiputra labhyate. kim uta yāni prasiddhāpabhraṣṭadesabhāṣāhyyo puna apabhraṣṭaraṇaḥ bhikkhave iteyamānāmi. See here its Tīkā *Nyāyasudhā*.

As regards *saṃkleśa* it has also a special sense in Buddhist works. It is well-known in Buddhist literature along with its opposite term *vijñādāna* and they mean ‘impurity and purification’ respectively. See BA with BAP, IX. 28. By impurity the mind (citta) becomes impure and by purification it becomes pure. This *saṃkleśa* is threefold: (1) *kleśa* ‘passion’ (i.e., rāga, dveṣa and moha), that can be avoided by right view (darśana) and meditation (bhāvanā); (2) *karma* ‘act’, bad (aṅkūla), and good-impure (kuśalaśravaṇa); and (3) *janman* ‘birth’ (or phala ‘fruit’, recompense, that projects the existence). See Vis, pp. 214 ff. Let the following be quoted here from Tk, p. 28:

\[
tatra kleśakarmajanmātmakas trividhāḥ saṃkleśaḥ.\]

nirākharaṇa by Pānḍita Aṭoka in the Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, Bib. Ind., pp. 78 ff. The well-known ‘Chariot Simile’ in the *Milindopāthā*, pp. 27 ff. (II. 1. 1) may also be referred to here. The *Avatāraśāstra* is established among others in the following works of Brahmanic authority: NS, II. 1. 33 ff., PB with NK on VSt., pp. 41 ff.

3 For *nimitta* see IV. 25, 27, 27, 75, 77, 78; LA, pp. 225-226: tatra nimittā punar mahāmāte jač ca kṣaṇasthitukṛṣṇāyābhāsām ugačchati rupasamjñākam, evaṃ varttāghaśajāhvākṣyamanvijñānānaśābdaśaṃkaraśaṃkaraśaṃsāṃjñākam, etām nimittam iti vaddām; p. 228: tatra mahāmāte nimittam yat saṃsthānakṣertiṣṭābhāsākārāpādaśāmaṃ dyātān nimittam.

The following occurs in MSBT, pp. 34-35:

[kleśa eva saṃkleśa iti kleśa] saṃkleśaḥ. evaṃ karma-[saṃkleśa] javanasamjñākāmaḥ. kleśa hi pravartanāmah svaparāty-
mor vyābādhatvatvāṃ saṃkleśaḥ. yathoktaṃ sūtra⁳ rakto hi rāga-papita atmavābādhaḥyāpi cetaya paravyābādhaḥyāpi cetayaṁ ubhaya-vābādhaḥyāpi cetaya. evaṃ dveṣamohayor api jātavyam iti. karma jānma ca saṃkleśapravartanād api saṃkleśaḥ.

3 This is, as pointed out by S. Yamauchi, from AN, III. 54.

Now, the opponent having his hold on the meaning of the word *prajñāpti* as well as *saṃkleśa* well-known among, and accepted by, Viśiṣṭadvīpas, who maintain that there is, in fact, only viṣṇu and the external word has no reality at all, proceeds to refute their views. The purpose thereof being that if the existence of external things is once established one will have to accept their jāti, too.

The kārikā runs thus:

prajñāptet śanīmīttatvam anyathā dvayanāśataḥ ||

saṃkleśasyopadbdeḥ ca parantarātta matāḥ ||

The practical denomination (prajñāpti) has its (objective) cause (nimitta), for otherwise there is the disappearance of the two; (owing to this fact) as well as the experience of

1 For *nimitta* see IV. 25, 27, 27, 75, 77, 78; LA, pp. 225-226: tatra nimittā punar mahāmāte jač ca kṣaṇasthitukṛṣṇāyābhāsām ugačchati rupasamjñākam, evaṃ varttāghaśajāhvākṣyamanvijñānānaśābdaśaṃkaraśaṃsāṃjñākam, etām nimittam iti vaddām; p. 228: tatra mahāmāte nimittam yat saṃsthānakṣertiṣṭābhāsākārāpādaśāmaṃ dyātān nimittam.
impurities (sāmkleśa-upalabdhi) (their) existence is regarded as dependent (paratantra).”

It says that it must be admitted that praṇaṭapī must have its nimitta; i.e., the objective cause; for otherwise there will be no notion of the (douya); i.e., grāhya and grāhaka ‘the percipient and the perceptible,’ in other words, the subject and the object—a fact that cannot be denied. And, again, owing to sāmkleśa-upalabdhi it is also to be admitted that there must be some things (for example, as the Buddhists would say, śkandhas, dhātus, āyatana) that are the causes of these sāmkleśas. Thus the things to which the praṇaṭapī and the sāmkleśa-upalabdhi owe their existence are external and have their origination (jāti).

The argument advanced here has two parts: first, owing to the existence of praṇaṭapī the existence of its cause, too, is to be admitted; and second, as there is the experience of sāmkleśas there must be also their cause. Both the parts of the argument are taken from Buddhist works. As regards the first let us quote here a few lines from the LA, p. 104:

punar aparām mahāmatir āha. nanu bhagavann abhīlapa-
saddbhāvāḥ santi sarvabhbāvāḥ. yadi punar bhagavan bhāvā
na syur abhīlapo na pravartate, pravartate ca. tasmād
abhīlapasaddbhāvād bhagavan santi sarvabhbāvāḥ. bhagavān āha.
asatām api mahāmate bhāvānām abhīlapap kriyate yad uta
śāsaviṇarkārmānabandhyāputradināṃ loke dṛṣṭo4 ṛhilapā, te
cā mahāmate na bhāvā nabhāvā abhīlapayante ca, tad yad avocas
tvam mahāmate abhīlapasaddbhāvāḥ santi sarvabhbāvā iti sa hi
vādāḥ praṇaṭaḥ.

1 For the word paratantra see IV. 24, 73, 74.
2 For douya see II. 14; III. 29, 30; IV. 24, 61, 72, 75, 79, 87.
3 The printed text reads ‘dṛṣṭo which is evidently wrong.

IV. 24] ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA

“Mahāmati says again: ‘Is it not, O Blessed One, that all beings exist, for they all have their expressions (abhīlapa). If, O Blessed One, there exist no beings there cannot be their expressions. Therefore, all beings exist on account of their expressions.’ Says the Blessed One: ‘There are, O Mahāmati, expressions also for those which are non-existent, for example, the horn of a hare, the hair of a tortoise, the son of a barren woman, and so on. These are O Mahāmati, neither beings, nor non-beings, yet they are expressed. Therefore, O Mahāmati, the theory, as you say, that owing to expressions all beings exist, is lost.”

The following couplet from the same work (LA. p. 105) supplies the gist of the above:

ākāśam ča śāmaṃ ca bandhnyāḥ putra eva ca |
asanto bhāvānāgtaṃ tathā bhāvān kalpanā ||

It is quoted in MV, p. 528, where occurs the following:

tatrāpi bhāvākalanpāpraṇaṭēdhamātram nābhāvākalanā
bhāvatvāsiddher eveti vijñeyam. bandhyāputra iti śādāmātram
evaitat. nāśyārthā upalabhyate yasyārthasya bhāvatvam abhāva-
tvam vā syād iti kuto 'nupalabhyamānasvabhāvāsa bhāvā-
bhāvākalanā yokṣyate.

The following is taken also from LA, p. 319 (X. 430):

asatu sarvadharmēnu praṇaṭaḥ kriyate mayā |
abhīlapo vyavahāra ca bālanān tattvavartitaḥ ||

It is to be noted that abhīlapa and praṇaṭapī are synonymous
with each other. See DSt, § 1308, quoted above, p. 129.

5 See III. 37: sarvabhīlapavigataḥ.
prajñapteḥ sanimitattavam iṣyate yuktidarśanat
nimittasya-nimitattavam iṣyate bhūtadarśanat

'Seeing the reason (advanced above) one wants (to say) that the prajñapti has its nimitta; but seeing the reality (we) want (to say) that the nimitta is no nimitta at all.'

The opponent says, as we have seen, prajñapti must have its objective cause, but the argument drawn from the real nature of things points to the conclusion that what is called by him a nimitta (cause) is in reality no nimitta at all. The reason hereof is advanced in the following kārikā:

cittaḥ na saṁspraṭyartham nārthabhāsāṁ tathaiv ca
abhūto hi yataś cārtho nārthabhāsas tatha pṛthak

'The mind does not touch (i.e. relate itself to) an object, nor does its appearance (arthabhāsa), for the object is unreal and its appearance is not different from it.'

The mind has no contact with its object owing to the absence of the object itself. For in this theory (of the Vaiśeṣika-vādins) there is nothing but the mind (citta). Now it goes without saying that the mind having no contact with its object has in fact no contact also with its appearance (arthabhāsa). The second half of the kārikā offers the reason hereof. It means that the object is unreal and it being so its appearance which depends on it is also unreal; and thus both of them being unreal the latter is in this respect not different from the former. This being the case the mind can in no way be related either to its object or its appearance. Therefore it cannot be said,

With regard to prajñapti the following may also be quoted in this connexion:

prajñaptiḥ nāmamātreyanā lakṣmaṇena na viḍyate
L.A. X. 23 (p. 267).

prajñaptimātraṁ tribhavam nāsti vastu svabhāvataḥ
prajñaptim vastubbhāvena kalpayisyanti tārīkāb

Now the author proceeds to give his reply to the above prima facie case:

Now, as regards the second part we should like to quote a few lines also from a Buddhist work. Candrapārti introduces the sixth chapter of the MK thus (MV, p. 137):

utraha-vidyata eva skandha[yatana]dhātavaḥ, kutaka-
tadāśrayasamklesopalabdheḥ. iha yan nāsti na tādā[stress]sam-
klesopalabdhir asti bandhyādhuhitur iva bandhyāśūnoḥ. santi ca
rāgadayaḥ klesāḥ samklesanibandhanām.

'Here (the opponent) says: "Verily there are the skandhas, ayatanas, and dhātus. Why? Because there is experience of saṁklesas arising from them; and because, on the other hand, there is no experience of saṁklesas arising from that which has no existence, as of a barren woman's daughter from a barren woman's son." ' And there are attachment and other passions, the cause of saṁklesa.

六大: rūpa, vedanā, saṁjñā, saṁskāra, and viśaya.

Twelve: six organs of sense and their objects, viz., six internal: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind; and six external: form, sound, odour, taste, contact and ideas.

Eighteen: six organs of sense, their six objects, and six kinds of consciousness arising from them.

Calcutta ed. has prajñaptināmamātredam.
as done in the first half of the preceding kārikā, that prajñapti has its nimitta. One must remember here that according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitins there is no reality of external things. Let us read here the following from the MVBT, p. 10:

["'athāvā cittacaitaskā rūpato dravyatā ca santītī yeṣāṃ dīśīśi
tēśatī prátiśedhārtam uktam] abhūtāparikalpa[{
"stītī}]. [tasmād] aṣṭi dravyatāḥ. nāsti rūpaṃ tadvyatātītām. [nāsti] dravyata iti-
kīṃ kāraṇam, yasmād dvaśaṃ tatra na vidyate. na hy
abhūtāparikalpāḥ kasyācidd grāhako nāpi kenacidd ghyate. kīṃ
tarhi. grāhyagṛhakatva [rahitam vāstumātraṃ. tathā hi viśiṣṭānād
bahir na rūpādi ghyate svapnādīvat viśiṣṭānāṃ hi rūpādyā]
bhāsaṃ utpadyate. tasmān nirabalamānam eva svapnādīv ivāniyatrāpi
svabjāparipākār arthābhāsaṃ viśiṣṭānām utpadyata ity eva śācyām,
grāhyā[bhāve grāhako na bhavatīti grāhyabhāve grāhakabhāvo
na yujyate. ato rūpaṃ abhūtāparikalpāṃ na pṛthagbhūtām].

The opponent may argue here: Well, according to you there are no external things. But you cannot deny that there is an appearance of things round us. It may be a false one in your opinion. Yet, it must have some cause. What is it? It is nothing but the contact of the mind with an object. Thus even for a false notion or impression (viparītāsa) the existence of an object must be postulated.

The author rejoins that it is quite true that even false impressions are possible only when there is a contact of the mind with an object, but when that contact itself is never and in no possible way there is no possibility also of them. How to explain, then, the false impressions? He would reply that it is the nature of the mind itself that even in the absence of any object it transforms into various objects under the influence of viśiṣṭānās. For it is the seed of all (sarvatīta) having possessed the power of producing everything. Says Sthiramati (Tk, p. 36, l. 7 on kārikā 17: sarvatītaṃ hi viśiṣṭānām):

tatra sarvadharmpādānāśaktyanugamāt sarvabijaṃ.
Hence neither the mind (citta), nor that which is cognizable by it (cittadāśya) is originated. Those who see its (i.e., of the citta and cittadāśya) origination see the (foot-) mark (of birds) in the sky.

Hence (tasmāt) refers to the reason advanced above in 26 and 27: because there is no contact of the mind with any object.

The belief in the origination of things is as absurd as the seeing of foot-marks of birds flying in the sky.

For this simile compare DP, 93 (= TG, 92):

ākāse va sakuntānaṃ padaṃ tassa durannayanā |

This simile in our kārikā can be better explained by what Buddha has said in his DPA on the above line:

padaṃ tassa durannayan’i yathā ākāse gacchantānaṃ sakuntanāna māsamśa dhārehi akhāśya gata idam tānaṃ udāreṇa pahārtvā gata idam sīsaṃ idam pakkhehihi na sakā nātaṃ eva eva”

It says with reference to an Arhat that as in the case of birds flying in the sky it cannot be ascertained that they have gone away stepping on this spot with the legs and striking this spot with the wings, just so...

A similar verse is quoted by Ś in IV, 91. It runs:

śakunānām ivākāse gatir naivopalabhaye |

Cf. DP, 92:

ākāse’va sakuntānaṃ gati tesaṃ durannayaḥ |

The following is quoted by Ś in his commentary on MU, III. 2. 6:

śakunānāmīvākāse jale vārīcarasya ca |
padaṃ yathā na dhīyeta tatha jñānavatām gatiḥ ||

On such texts is based the following observation of Ś in his commentary on the BU, IV, 4. 6 (p. 637):

ta utsahante khe’ pī śākunaṃ padaṃ draṣṭuṃ.

For further details see IV, 91.

As regards the main proposition here the following lines from Āryaratnacittoparipṛcchā (quoted in BAP, IX, 18, p. 392; MV, p. 62; ŚŚ, p. 235) deserve to be cited:

sa cittāṃ parigāveṣaṃ nādhīyatmaṃ cittāṃ samanupasyati na bahīrdhī cittāṃ samanuṣyati.Ś sa cittamasanupasyan cittadhārāṃ paryeṣate kutaś cittasyotpattir iti. tasyevam bhavati. alambane sati cittam utpadyate. tat kim anyad alambanam anyac cittam. tadā dvicittā bhaviṣyati. atha yadevalambanam tad eva cittam. tat kathā cittena cittam sanupasyati. na ca cittam cittam sanupasyati. tad yathāpi nāma tayaivāsidhāraya saivāsidhāraya na śakyate chettum. na tenaivāsugulaṃ grena tad evaṅgulaṃṝaṃ śakyate spraṣṭum. evam eva na tenaiva cittena tad eva cittam śakyam draṣṭum.”

And the following is from KP, 149 (§102):

cittāṃ hi kāsyapa parigāveṣaṃ nādhīyante labhyate. yan na labhyate tan nopalabhaye. tan nātītam. nānāgataṃ. na pratyutpannam. yan nātītam nānāgataṃ na pratyutpannam tat tryadhvasamatikrātāṃ. yat tryadhvasamatikrātāṃ tan naivāsti naiva nāsti. yan naivastā na nāsti tad ajitaṃ. yad ajitaṃ tasya nāsti svabhāvaḥ. yasya nāsti evabhāvaḥ tasya nāṣy utpādaḥ. yasya nāṣy utpādaḥ tasya nāṣy utpādaḥ.Ś

1 See MV, p. 45 (KP-Ratnakīlasūtra): ŚŚ, p. 233; BAP, IX. 106 (p. 338).

2 On citta see the work, pp. 142-150.
Having shown that the citta does not originate the ācārya comes to his main thesis, the theory of ājāti 'non-origination.'

Says he:

29

ājātāṁ jāyate yasmād ājātāḥ prakṛtis tathā
aprakṛtēr anyathābhāvo na kathāṇcid bhaviṣyatī
t

'As it is one unborn (ajāta) that is born (jāta), non-birth (ajāti) is its very essence (prakṛti). And there can be in no way any change of essence.'

For a see jāta eva na jāyate, BU, III. 9, 25; and ante ājātasyāiva dharmasya jātim icchānti vādinaḥ, III. 20, IV. 6; and note on IV. 13.

If a man is born it must be said that before his birth he was unborn, and this state of being unborn before the birth is his essence. Now, if it is accepted, and it must be accepted, as his essence, there cannot be his birth which is a change, for essence can in no way change, as essence and change are two contradictory terms. Similarly before a citta is produced it must be considered as unproduced, and that being its essence which can never change it cannot be produced at all. This law holds good wherever there is the question of ājāti.

For the wording of the second half of the kārikā which is found also in III. 21 see MK. XV. 8:

prakṛtēr anyathābhāvo nahi jātūpaḍadyate.

On this point one may be referred to also:

kasya syād anyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvo yadi vidyate ||
tasyāiva nānyathābhāvo nāpy anyasyāiva yuyāyate ||
yuvā na jiryate yasmād yasmāj jirno na jiryate ||


30

anāder antavattvam ca saṃsārasya na setṣyati
anantatā cādimato mokṣasya na bhaviṣyatī
t

'It would not be established that saṃsāra is without a beginning, but has an end; nor would it be possible that liberation which has a beginning has no end.'

An advocate of the theory of origination has to admit that saṃsāra has its origination, and if it is so, it must have a beginning. And that being so, the tenet that saṃsāra has no beginning cannot be maintained. Similarly according to him liberation also has its origination, and as such it must be with a beginning, and consequently must have an end, and in that case one cannot say that it has no end.

The point discussed in the next few kārikās is this that it is only when there is the existence of saṃsāra that there arises the question as to whether it has or not a beginning.

1 khandhānaṃ paṁpaṭi ca dḥatu-ayatana ca ||
abhbhoṣchīnaṃ vattamānaṃ samśāra ti pavuccati ||

2 That saṃsāra is anādi is admitted on all hands. As for Buddhists see MK, XI. 1 with its viśeṣa:

pūrva prajñāyate koṁatī nety uvāca mahāmuniḥ ||
samśāra navaraṇgro hi nāsyādir nāpi paścīmaṇaḥ ||
or an end; but in fact it has no existence at all. Says the Ācārya:

31

ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne'pi tat tathā
vitathaiḥ sadṛśāḥ santo 'vitathā iva laksitāh

'That which is not at the beginning, nor at the end, is not also in the present, (i.e., in the middle); being like the unreal things still appear as not unreal.'

Compare here what Nāgarjuna says in his MK, XI.2:
naiśvāram nāvaram yasya madhyam tasya kuto bhavet.

'How should that which has neither the anterior point, nor the posterior one, have the middle?'

Candrakīrtti comments:

agṛmat iṣṭi ādiḥ pūrvaḥ prathamam ucyate. avarām iṣṭi
avasānaṁ vyavaccheda ucyate. yasya saṃsārasya ādir antaś
cā pratiṣṭhītāḥ tasya madhyam kuto bhaviṣyati. tataḥ ca
samsāmātātākam eva viparyāṣapaρavāmānamānasānaṁ saṃsāra
ādīmadhyāväsanāvivarhatvād ākāśavādālātācakravād itibhāvaḥ.

The following may also be quoted here:

yassa n'atithi purā pacchā
majjhaṁ tassa kuo siyā
ādāv ante ca yan nāsti
madhye pi ca na tat tathā

Nayopadesa, 14.

1 See II. 6.
2 yad ādāv ante ca nāsti vartamāne'pi tathā sadṛśāḥ nāsti niścitām
loke. So II. 6.
3 Cf. ādāv eva hi yan nāsti kāraṇāsambhavāḥ svayam |
vartamāne'pi tan nāsti nātraḥ sāyāḥ tat tatra kidṛṣāḥ

BP, XI. 28. 21.

That saṃsāra has neither a beginning nor an end is fully discussed in MK with MV, XI.

Now, there are two kinds of things, one kind experienced in dream (svapna), and the other in wakefulness (jñāna); and it has been thoroughly established in Book II (Vaitathya Prakaraṇa) that there is no difference between the states of dream and wakefulness, and so the things experienced in the latter are as false as those in the former. The author here puts forth the same argument in the same language with a view to show that the thing which is as false as that in one's dream cannot come into being in reality, and so the jñāti does not exist. He says:

32

saprayojanaṁ teṣāṁ śvapne'pi pratipadyate
	tasmād ādyantavattvena mithyāiva khalu te smṛtāḥ

'That the things have some purpose in dream is also known; hence owing to their beginning and end, indeed, they are regarded as false.'

One may object to the falsity of the phenomena of waking experience on the ground that they really serve some purpose; as for instance, water, when it is drunk, quenches one's thirst, while the phenomena in dream are not such. To this the author replies in the above kārikā. His point is this that the phenomena of dream are linked with one another by some purpose no less than those of waking experience. In dream also one drinks water to quench one's thirst. So the
phenomena like those in dream having a beginning and an end have no reality at all; for that which has a beginning and an end cannot be real, as the mirage.

This kārikā is identical with II. 7. See the note on it for a different reading.

It is said that the things seen in the waking state are false, because, as regards nature, they have no difference from those seen in dreams which are evidently false. But why the latter are so the author says in the next few kārikās as in II. 1-10:

33

sarve dharmā mṛṣā svapne kāyasyāntar 1 nidarśanāt 1
sāṃvēte 2 'smin pradeśe vai bhūtānām darśanaṃ kutaḥ 2

'All things in dream are false as they are seen within the body; for how can objects be seen in this confined space (of the body)?'

1 For a see II. 1.
2 II. 1a, 4d

34

na yuktam darśanaṃ gatvā kālasyāniyamād 1 gatau 1
pratibuddhaś ca vai sarvas tasmin deśe na vidyate 2

'(In dream) the seeing (of a thing at a distance) having gone (up to it) is not reasonable; for there is no fixed rule of time for the act of going (there), and no persons being awake exist in the place (where they dream themselves to be).'

1 Cf. adīrghatvāc ca kālasya, II. 2a.
2 Identical with II. 2e-4d.

35

mitrādyaiḥ saha sāmantrya prabuddho' na prapadyate 1
gṛhitam cāpi yat kiṅcit pratibuddho na paśyati 2

'When awake, he does not find his friends and others with whom he had deliberated, nor does he see all that which he had (then in dream) grasped.'

1 With a large number of MSS. I read this for sambuddha in printed editions.

36

svapne cāvastuḥ kāyaiḥ prthag anyasya darśanāt 1
yathā kāyas tathā sarvaṃ cittaḥ āvastuḥ avastuḥ 2

'In dream the (active) body is unreal, for (quite) a different body is seen (in the place where one dreams); and as the body so all the things which are cognizable by the mind are unreal.'

37

grahana jāgaritavat taddhetuḥ svapna iṣyate 1
taddhettuvāc ca tasyaiva sa jāgaritam iṣyate 2

'The experience (of dream) being like (that of) wakefulness, it (wakefulness) is considered to be the cause of dream; and that being so it is (also) considered that wakefulness is real only to him (i.e., the dreamer).'

It is a fact that cause and its effect must be of the same nature. Accordingly wakefulness and dream being the cause and the effect respectively must be of the same nature. So if a dream is false wakefulness is also false. And as a
dream appears to be real only to the dreamer, so wakefulness, too, is real only to an ordinary unenlightened man.\footnote{\textsuperscript{1}}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{1}} I think the logical order of the following four \textit{k\=arik\=as}, viz., 38-41 should be as follows: 39, 41, 38 and 40. For the \textit{k\=arik\=as} 39 and 41 with 32-37 form the same subject of discussion, i.e., the equality of the states of dream and wakefulness, while the \textit{k\=arik\=as} 38 and 40 are meant for showing the impossibility of origination directly. The traditional order is shown in the present edition by the figures in parenthesis.

38 (39)

\begin{quote}
asaj j\=agarite d\=r\=st\=v\=a svapne pa\=syati tanmaya\=h\=i
asat svapne \textacute{'}pi d\=r\=st\=v\=a ca pratibuddho na pa\=syati II
\end{quote}

'In the waking state one sees an unreal thing and being absorbed in it sees it (also) in a dream. And in a dream, too, one sees an unreal thing, but does not see it when one awakes.'

To see the unreal is common to both the states, dream and wakefulness; the only difference between them is, however as stated in the \textit{k\=arik\=a} itself.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{1} yathaiva k\=am\=an supin\=anti seviya
pratibuddhasetu\=h(?) puru\=so na pa\=yati I
SR, IX, p. 29.}

39 (41)

\begin{quote}
vipary\=asad yath\=a j\=agarad acinty\=an bh\=utatav spr\=st\=i I
tath\=a svapne vipary\=asad dharma\=m\=as tatraiva pa\=syati II
\end{quote}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{1} For the use of \textarcdegree spr\=st\=i in such cases see IV, 27.}

40 (38)

\begin{quote}
upt\=adasy\=aprasiddhatv\=ad ajan\=m sarvam ud\=aha\=tam I
na ca bhuta\=d abh\=utasya sam\=bhavo \textacute{'}st\=i katha\=cana II
\end{quote}

'As origination is not established all are said to be without origination. There is no way origination of the non-existent from the existent.'

The origination of the non-existent, such as the horns of a hare, etc., is in no way seen.---S.

In the next \textit{k\=arik\=a} the author says with regard to causation referred to just now that it itself is not reasonable:

41 (40)

\begin{quote}
nast\=y asaddhetukam asat sad asaddhetukam tatha I
sac ca saddhetukam nasti saddhetukam asat kutah II
\end{quote}

'\textquoteleft There is no non-existent arising from the non-existent, nor is there any existent arising from the non-existent; again there is no existent arising from the existent and where is the non-existent arising from the existent?\textquoteright
Here are four points:

(i) An unreal thing cannot have an unreal cause.
(ii) nor can a real thing have an unreal cause; again,
(iii) a real thing cannot have a real cause,
(iv) nor can an unreal thing have a real cause.

Let us read here the following from MK, XXI. 12:

(iii) na bhāvāj jāyate bhāvo
(ii) bhāvo 'bhāvān na jāyate
(i) [nābhāvāj jāyate 'bhāvo
(iv) 'bhāvo bhāvān na jāyate ]'

This is fully explained in MV. See the following from MK:

sadbhūtah kārakaḥ karma sadbhūtam na karoty ayam
kārako nāpy asadbhūtah karmāsadbhūtam ihaṃ VIII. 1.
satā ca kriyate nāsan nāsatā kriyate ca sat
karārā sarve prasajyante doṣas tatra ta eva ha hi
VIII. 8.
nāsadbhūto 'pi sadbhūtaḥ saddasadbhūtah eva vā
karoṭi kārakaḥ karma pūrvakta eva hetubhiḥ
VIII. 10.

These last two lines of the kārikā missing in Sanskrit are rightly reconstructed by Poussin from the Tibetan which runs as follows:

dāos. med. dāos. med. mi. skye. ste ]
dāos. med. dāos. las. mi. skyeṭo ]

This kārikā is identical with CS, 364 (XV. 14) of Ārya de v a.

Having thus refuted the ājītvāda and established thereby the ājītvāda of the Buddhists the author goes on to reconcile some statements made by the Buddhists themselves, which appear to be irreconcilable with the ājītvāda doctrine.

These statements, some of which are quoted in the foot-note,1 are in support of jāti. Besides, the Buddhists are found to have instructed their followers on causation, as their well-known pratītyasamutpāda ‘dependent origination’ itself shows very clearly.2 It must, therefore, be admitted that the Buddhists have not denied jāti altogether. The Ācārya takes up the point and gives his reply in the following two kārikās, the first of which runs thus:

42

upalambhāt samācārād astivastutavādinām
jātis tu deśa buddhār ajātes trasatāṃ sadā

'But jāti is taught by the Buddhists for those who from their perception and common practice hold that things exist (in reality) and are afraid of (the doctrine of) ajātī.'

These people who are intent upon the reality of things around them are of a lower order and are consequently frightened when they hear of the doctrine of ajātī and nairātya (absence of ātman, i.e., svabhāva ‘nature’) as taught by the Buddhists.3 The Buddhists are, however,

1 PSP, p. 9: buddhā bhogavanta utpannāḥ, p. 79: paścendriyāpi
utpatsante, p. 91: arhatamā saṃyak saṃbhūdā loka utpatsante; SN, IV, p. 14: yo bhikkhave cakkhusa uppādo tiḥiti abhinibbatti pāthubhavo; MV, p. 145: uktam hi bhogavānā triṇumāni bhikṣavaḥ saṃkāraṃ saṃkāraṃ lokaṃ
tsamsaṅgīti bhikṣava utpādo pi praśajyate vyayo pi sthityayathāvam apītī, na ca avidyaṃsāya kharaviṃśāvase jātiddilakṣānam asti. See also AN, I, p. 162.
2 SN, IV, p. 33: cakkhuḥ ca potica rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviṃśāgam.
3 advitiyam āvadvatām kudāṭhāṃ bhayaśākaram |
vijayaḥ sarvabuddhānāṃ iti nairātyam ucyate |
asya dharmasya nāmo pi bhayam utpadyate 'sataḥ
balavān nāma ko dṛṣṭaḥ parasya na bhayaśākaraḥ |

very kind-hearted and so in order to lead them easily and gradually to the truth (tattvavātāra) followed the disposition of their minds and preached to them of jāti, though in fact there is nothing of the kind. The author himself says elsewhere (III. 15) that the creation described differently in the Upaniṣads with illustrations of earth, iron, sparks of fire and such other things is meant only as a means devised for making one 'descend to', i.e., realize, truth (upāyaḥ so'vatāraṇa). This act is called avatāraṇasandhi 'intention of making one descend' of the Buddha. It has found its expression in Buddhist works from which some passages are quoted here in the foot-note.  

4 See MV. p. 340.

5 MS. XII. 16-17: tattvavātāraṇasandhiḥ śāva keṣu draśṭavyoḥ, sāsanāvātāraṇātham anuttarāṇya rūpdyasitvadvasānam. The word sandhi is here in the sense of abhisandhi.

6 lokāvatāraṇātma ca bhāva nāthena desītaḥ ||
trāso nārābhya te 'dṛśte dṛśte 'pati sa sarvavoḥ ||
nियममैव विनयिते तेन त्रासो विद्यिते || ČS, 283.

Candraśīvanī CS, 183:
tattvavātāraṇasandhitvāt pravyupadeta'pi kartavyaḥ,
lokāvatāraṇayatvāt sadasadādideśāṇām.


dharmadhātār asambhedaś yānabheda 'ati na prabhō |
yānatrīṣayaṁ akhyātaṁ tvayā sattvavātārataḥ ||

NSV, 21.

nīsavadhārāya yathārtham śunyatāṁ kaścī māttē saṁścita saṅgaṁ avadhāra nirvāṇapṛtham utpādaṁytic. sa ca śunyātthe jagatam ativartha karatvād aprīvāyavedānupapūraṇe ātībhāyāṁyaśopanavasthāt na-saṃna-

nyopāyadhananvayā kapāi yokti vidvānāvatāryāb. ČS, 6 p. 514.

astivānāṣṭadāśiṣṭīmāṁ teṣām utrīṣaṁ syād iti utrīṣāyamāṇā mahāmāte dūre bhavantī mahāsāṃū.

LA. p. 167.

etāti kiṁ api pāca bhūkaṣṭāṇīni dṛṣṭiprakhandhāniṣeṁ gambhīrāṁ dharmadeśaṁ nāvyataranti nāvadhiṣeṁ uttṛṣāyantī samṛṣṭiṁ apadyante. KP (= Rānakīśa) in MV, pp. 337-338.

IV. 42] AGAMASĀSTRA

As regards the different modes of teaching of the Buddhas he following couplet may be quoted:

desāṁ lokanāthāṁ sattvāśayaśaṁnaṁ ∥
bhidyaṁ bahudhā loka upāyaṁ bahubhīḥ kilā∥

'The teachings of the Lords of the worlds (i.e., the Buddhas) following the disposition of the people differ in the world in many ways according to the diversity of methods.'

That was their 'skilfulness in method (upāyakauśalya) by which all discrepancies in their teachings are explained.

tatra tathāgato mahaśravijñake lokātāsāpaparīhāraṁ vyavahāraṁ saṁyuktān uṭtāpyante niruddhante ca na ca tāsya dharmasyotpāda na nirodha iti. BAP, p. 589.

evaṁ ukte bhagavān āyuṣmantāṁ āśirūpam etad avocat. alam āśirūpam etenāṅkhaṁ bāhūṣena tāt kasaḥ hetoh. uttṛṣāyati āśirūpam saṁvedyo loko 'sminn arthe vyakṣīrṣitaḥ. SP, II, p. 36.

āha. yad etad utkāś bhagavātā samesḳta dāruma upādyante niruddhante cyt aṣṭaṁ tathāgataḥ bāhūṣitaḥ ko 'bhūpṛayaḥ. aha. utprādanadibhāṅgavijñaceta kulaṁ prāsūttisvam. tatra tathāgato mahākṣāṇīko lokasāyottāsadīparīhāraṁ vyavahāravaiśād uktāvān upādyante niruddhante ca na ca tāsya dharmasāyotpāda na nirodha iti. SS, p. 263.

See also MN, I. 136-137; SR, pp. 70-71.

7 Bodhicittavarttana (Tib. version) 97-98. It is quoted in the Buddhist section of SSD. See The Basic Conception of Buddhism, pp. 27ff. Sometimes there is in d of the kārika punaḥ for kila.

8 See kṣīva dharmasya avasthānam tattvam deśam yoginām |
tattvam prayāstatāmaṁ kṣīvaśākṣena varṣaṁ ||
dehi jñaputraśeṁ neyam kāśāna deśāṁ ||
vicitraḥ ityā māyā dṛṣṭe na ca vidyate ||
deśāṁ pāla citaṁ deśate vaśācāraṁ ||
deśāṁ hi yada anyasya tad anyasyāṁ aṣṭesāṁ ||
ātuore yadvad hṛsiṅ dṛṣṭaṁ pramācyate ||

LA. pp. 48-49.

Now, when there is in fact no jāti it is certainly no good to teach it and consequently some evil would result from such teaching. The author, however, says that in reality there would arise no evil, or if it actually does, it would be very small which can easily be overcome (by following the path of the truth):

43

ajātes trasatāṃ teśām upalambhād viyanti ye 1
jātidośā na setsyanti doso'py alpo bhaviṣyati II

Those who (being instructed of ajāti) go asunder owing to the perception (of things) and are afraid of (thinking) ajāti, are not affected with the evils resulting from (the perception of) jāti; (or if there be any evil) the evil will be a small one.'

The reality of a thing cannot be proved on the evidence of mere perception and common practice. For an elephant called up by illusion (māyāhaśitā) cannot exist in fact though we all may see it moving or carrying men. Thus the author says that it is only on account of perception and common practice that it is said of a thing that it exists, but in reality it does not:

44

upalambhāt samācārān māyāhaśiti yathocytate 1
upalambhāt samācārād asti vastu tathocytate II

As an elephant called up by illusion is said to exist owing to perception and common practice, so on the same grounds it is said of a thing that it exists."

1 For māyāhaśitin see L.A. X, 126:

māyāhaśiti yathā citraṃ patsāri kānakā yathā 1
tathā dṛṣṭaṃ naśīṃ khyāti citte ajānānvasīte II

1. IV. 44.45] AĞAMASAŚASTRA

TSN, 27-28:

māyāhaśiṃ mantravādāt khyāti hastāyatanā yathā 1
ākāśamātrāṃ tatnāthi hasti uasti tu sarvahā 1
svabhāvah kalpitā hasti paratantras tadakātā 1
yathā haṃ hastabhaṃ 'tau pariniṣpanno iṣyate 1

In the next kārikā the author says, as a Viśānavadin can say, that there is only vijnāna (=citta) 'mind', and nothing else, yet it appears variously:

45

jātyābhāsāṃ calabhāsāṃ vastvābhāsāṃ tathaiva ca 1
ajācālam avastutvāṃ vijnānāṃ sāntam advayam II

There is only vijnāna without the two (advaya), which is quiescent (free from all sorts of disturbances), it has no origin (aja 'unborn'), it does not move (acala), nor is it an object (avastuto), yet it appears to have an origin (jātyābhāsa), it appears to admit movements (calabhāsa), and it also appears to be an object.

It is to be noted here that vijnāna,4 citta and manas are synonyms. See L.A. X, 459:

cittaṃ vikalpo vijnānāt manā vijnānam eva ca 1
ālayas tribhavaś cetā ete cittasya paryayā 1

1 The word dosa refers to graha and graha-ka 'the percepent and the perceptible' respectively.
2 But truly speaking according to the Buddhist theory it cannot be described even as jāja. See IV, 74.
3 Literally, one that has no quality of an object.
4 Here in the Kārikā under discussion the word vijnāna does not refer to Atman or Brahma of the Vedāntin. The following Kārikā (46) using citta which alludes to vijnāna in the present Kārikā clearly refers it out. S takes here vijnāna as vijnānāt, but in the next Kārikā (IV, 46) he interprets it in the sense of atman (= evam eva yathoktaṃ vijnānam jātyābhāsāṃ advayasāṃ atmatattvaṃ vijnānataḥ).

1201B—20
Ak. II. 34:

cittam mano'tha vijnanam ekartham.

Cf. SN, II. 94.

What follows from this discussion is shown in the next karika:

46

evam na jayate cittam1 evam dharma ajah smtah 1
evam eva vijananato na patanti viparyaye 2

'Thus the mind is not originated, and thus the objects' are declared to be without origination. Those who know it in this way do not fall into error.'

1 Cf. YV, III. 13-15: evam na jayate kiscit.
2 See IV, 58.
3 S takes here the word to imply atmana, but in IV, 54 to mean external things (bahyadharma); and in IV, 58 he writes atmano 'nye ca dharmah.'

This truth is profusely illustrated in the next karika (47-52) by the simile of a fire-brand (alata). The author says, that as the different appearances of a fire-brand in motion, such as a circle or a straight line, do not come into existence from a thing other than itself, nor do they go out to a place other than itself when it is at rest, and at the same time they do not enter into itself, even so when the mind vibrates its appearances in the form of different objects they do not come into

47

rjvakradikabhamsam alata spanditam1 yath th
grahanagrahakabhamsam vijnanam spanditam tatha 2

'As a fire-brand being moved appears to be straight, or crooked, and so on, even so the mind when it moves appears as the perceiver (i.e., subject) and the perceptible (i.e., object).'</n

1 Comparing and considering all the readings in karikas 47-51 in connection with the use of vijnana and the derivatives of the root spand I think in the present karika one may incline to read alata spanditam and not alataspanditam, a compound word, though the former is not supported by any MS consulted by me. In either case the import of the karika is the same.
2 Cf. cittaspaditam (with the variant citta spandati vai sarvam) in IV, 72, with vijnanam spanditam (or vijnanaspaditam) in d of the present karika.

48

aspadamaman alatah anabhamsa ajah yath 1
aspadamaman vijnanam anabhamsa ajah tatha 2

'As a fire-brand when it does not move has no appearance (of its being straight, crooked, etc.), and is (thus) 'unborn', even so when the mind does not move it has no appearance (of any subject or object), and is (thus) 'unborn'.

For anabhamsa in the text cf. arupaka, III. 36.

In the text alata supported by many MSS, is, according to lexicons, another form of alata.
49

alāte spandamāne vai nābhāsa anyatobhuvaḥ
na tato ’nyatra nispandān nāḷatām praviśanti te

‘The appearances in a moving fire-brand are not produced from anything other than it, and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it (the fire-brand), nor do they enter into it.’

50

na nirgata alātāt te dravyatvābhāvayogataḥ
vijñāne ’pi tathaiva syur abhāsasya-viśesataḥ

‘They (i.e., the appearances) do not go out from the fire-brand, for they have no qualities of a substance (dravya), and with reference to the mind, too, they must be the same, for there is no difference in appearances.’

It is a substance, dravya, that can move from one place to another, but appearances are not substances, and hence they cannot move. The second half of the Kārikā says that as an appearance there is no difference whatsoever in the two cases, that is, the case of a fire-brand and that of the mind.

1 See IV. 52a–b.

51

vijñāne spandamāne vai nābhāsa anyatobhuvaḥ
na tato ’nyatra vijñānān na vijñānam viśanti te

‘When the mind vibrates the appearances are not produced from anything other than it and when it is at rest they are not in a place other than it (the mind), nor do they enter into the mind.’

52

na nirgata te vijñānād dravyatvābhāvayogataḥ
kāryakāraṇatābhāvād yato ’cintyāḥ sadaiva te

‘They do not go out from the mind, for they have no qualities of a substance, and as there is no state of cause and effect they are always unthinkable.’

All this is Buddhist, and so are also arguments and the words as the following quotations will show:

sa mahāśāja tāvān abdhātur utpadyamāno na kutaścid āgacchati" niruddhyamāno na kvacic gacchati.

Pitāputrasamāgamāstra quoted in SS, pp. 247.

evam eva kulaputra teṣāṃ tathāgatānāṃ kāyaparinipātattīn na kutaścid daśā diśā lokād āgata nāpi kvacic daśā diśā loke gacchati." tad yathāpi nāma kulaputra viṃśāh śabda utpadyamāno na kutaścid āgacchati niruddhyamāno ’pi na kvacic gacchati na kvacit saṃkrāmati.

ASF, pp. 515-516.

anyato nāpi cāyātaṁ na tiṣṭhati na gacchati |
māyātaḥ ko viśeṣo sya yan mūḍhaḥ satyataḥ kṛtam ||
māyāyā nirmitam ya ca hetubhir yac ca nirmitam |
āyāti tat kutaḥ kutra yāti ceti nirūpyatāṁ ||

BA, IX. 143-144.

Cf. āgacchati anyato nāgini indhane ’gnir na vidyate |


atha pañjitu kaś ci mārgate |
kuta ’yam āgatu kutra yāti vā |
vidiṣo diśa sarvi mārgate |
nāgatir nāsa gatiś ca labhyati ||

quoted in MV, p. 216; BAP, p. 533; SS, p. 240.

1 See IV. 50a-b.
AGAMAŚĀTRA

utpannasyāgatir nāsti niruddhasya gatis tathā
evāṁ sati kathāṁ naiva bhavo māyopamo bhavet

CS, 360.

This is reconstructed by the present author from the Tibetan text which runs:

skyes. pa. la. ni. ūs. ba. dañ
de. bzin. ḥags. la. ḥgro. ba. med
de. ḥtar. yin. na. ci. ḥta. bur
srid. pa. sgyu. ma. ḥdra. ma. yin

It is shown (IV. 14.18, 52) that there is no causation (hetu-phalābhāva or kāryakārāṇatābhāva). This is further explained in the following kārikā:

53

dravyāṁ dravyasya hetuḥ syād anyad anyasya caiva hi

‘A substance can be a cause of another substance; and a thing can be the cause of a different thing only; but it is unreasonable to hold that things can have substantiality or mutual difference.’

A substance must have three qualities, (i) origination (utpāda), (ii) change (tyaya), and (iii) continuance (sthitī). But in fact there is no such thing called substance, as the Buddhists hold. See MK with MV, VII; AN, I. 152. Again, it is well-known that from one thing a different thing is produced, and not the same thing from the same thing; for instance, from a seed there is the sprout. Thus there is a difference between a cause and its effect. But in reality this difference, too, cannot be maintained. See MK, X.1 and 15:

yad indhanāṁ sa ced agnir ekatvaṁ karṭkarmaṇoḥ
anyāś ced indhanād agnir indhanād apy śte bhavet
agnindhanābhyaṁ vyākhyāta ātmopādānayoḥ kramaḥ
sarvo niravāṣeṣaṁ sārdham ghātapatādibhib

IV. 54-55] AGAMAŚĀTRA

The author arrives at the conclusion:

54

evāṁ na cittaḥ dharmāṁ cittaṁ vāpi na dharmajam

‘Thus the things are not produced from the mind (citta-viññāna), nor the mind from the things. And thus the wise enter into (the doctrine of) the non-origination of cause and effect.’

Cf. IV. 46.

55

yāvad dhetupalāveśas tāvad dhetupalodbhavah

‘As long as there is a strong adherence to cause and effect, there is the origination of cause and effect, but when the strong adherence to cause and effect is lost there is no existence of cause and effect.’

Here and in the next kārikā (56) the word āveśa in the text is the same as abhiniveśa (IV. 75, 79) ‘strong adherence.’ These are synonyms (to which graha and graha, may be added). The latter is frequently used in Buddhist works in which it is clearly shown that not only cause and effect but everything round us owes its existence to one’s strong adherence to it. The following may be cited here:

tad yathāpi nāma mahārāja puruṣaḥ suptaḥ svapnāntare
piśācaḥ paritāpyamāno bhitaḥ saṁmoham āpādyate.

sa ṣayita-vibuddhas taṁ piśācaṁ taṁ ca saṁmoham anusmaret.

tat kim manyase mahārāja saṁvidyate svapne piśācaḥ saṁmohohā vā.
yāvad evam eva mahārāja bālo 'srutavān pīthagjanaś čakṣuṣā rūpāni dṛṣṭvā upekṣāsthāniyā abhinivisate 'bhinvistāḥ san muhyati mūḍho mohajanā kāmabhisaṃskaroṭi.

SS, p. 254.

bālo maṇjuśīrś aśrutavān pīthagjano 'tyantaparinirṛṣṭān sarvadharman aprajāṇāna ātmānaṃ paramaṃ copalabhate, upalabhī [abhinivisate abhnikivistāḥ san rajyate duṣyate muhyate. sa rakto duṣṭamūḍhaḥ san] trividham kāmabhisaṃskaroṭi.

MV, p. 296.

yas tu bhāvasvarūpam adhāropya tadvigamāvigamata etā dṛṣṭit utpādyābhviniviṣate. tasyām abhiniveso nirvāṇapurūrganāmān panthānaṁ viruṇaddhi, saṃsārikeṣu ca duḥkheṣu niyojatīti viṣṇeyati.


56

yāvad dhetupalāvēśe saṃsāras tāvad āyataḥ
kāśe hetupalāvēśe saṃsāro nopapadyate

'As long as there is a strong adherence to cause and effect the world is extended, but when that strong adherence to cause and effect is lost the world is not possible.'

Thus having propounded to some extent the viśñavāda our author proceeds incidentally to show also with the Buddhists that neither of the two theories, īśāvatāvāda 'the theory that everything is eternal' and ucchedavāda 'the theory that everything has annihilation' 1 can be maintained:

1 These two views are specially with regard to soul and world. See, for instance, DN, l. 13, 39; MK XXVII.

57

samvyātā jāyate sarvam śāśvatam tena nāsti vai
svabhāvena 2 hy ajam sarvam ucchedas tena nāsti vai

'In the practical truth (samvyātā) everything comes into being; hence there is nothing eternal. (On the other hand), everything is naturally without origination; hence there is no annihilation.'

It says that in the practical truth we say that a thing comes into being. In that case we cannot hold, so far as the practical truth is concerned, that there is any eternal thing. For that which has origination cannot be eternal, as an earthen jar. Again, as we have seen above, nothing has naturally any origination, and one that has no origination can have no annihilation also.

It is a fact that a sprout comes out only if there is a seed and not otherwise. Now the sprout is neither identical with, nor different from the seed. When there is a sprout the seed is not completely destroyed, nor is it absolutely in the same state as before. Hence it can be said that there is neither eternality nor annihilation. 3

1 See IV, 73.

2 All MSS. and editions examined by me read saṃbhāvena for saṃbhāvēna in c, yet I think the latter to be the actual reading. Everywhere in similar cases the author employs saṃbhāva (III, 22, IV, 8, 10, 23, 81) and not saṃbhava. In the same sense he uses also the word prakṛti (III, 21, IV, 9, 29, 91, 92, 93, 94). If one accepts the reading saṃbhāvena the meaning will be, according to S, 'in transcendental truth' (paramārthasaṃbhāvēna-pāramārthikaksaṃsāyoga). That the reading is saṃbhāvena is supported also by IV, 29 in which we read oṣṭhi prakṛti.

3 bijasya satya yathākuro na ca yo bija sa caiva nākuro ||
na ca anya tato na caiva tad evam anuccheda-sāśvatadharmaṁ ||
mudrā pratimudrād jāyate mudrasaṃkarāṇī na copalabhaye ||
na ca tatra na caiva saṃbhāvā evam saṃskāra 'nucchedadāvātāḥ ||

Some of the teachers hold either of these two theories, the śāvataṇḍa ‘the theory of eternity,’ and uccedaṅga ‘the theory of annihilation.’ But in the teachings of the Buddhhas who maintain the Middle Path (madhyamā pratipad), there is no room for any one of them. So his doctrine is said to be free from both the theories (anucceda asāvata). This view of the Buddhhas is too well-known to require here any particular treatment.

The Buddhhas also proclaim that there are two truths (satya) which they call saṃvytti satya ‘practical or empirical truth’ and paramārtha satya ‘absolute or supreme or transcendental truth,’ corresponding to vīyavahāranāya and paramārthānāya of the Jainas, and oṣavaharika satya and pāramārthikā satya of Ś respectively.

Ⅲ. 57-58]

It may be observed here that these two truths are not specified in the Upaniṣads and I am inclined to think that Ś has accepted them in his system from the Buddhhas through G a u d a p a d a.

satya ime duvi lokavidānāṃ diṣṭa svayaṃ śrutijātva pāreṣām l
saṃvytti yā ca tathā paramārtha satya na sidhyate kiṃ ca īṣṭyaṃ l

saṃvytti paramārtha ca satyadvayam idam mātām l BA, IX. 2.

On the explanation of saṃvytti see BAP, pp. 352 ff: saṃvytyata śvriyate yathābhūtapersajñānam svabhāvavaraṇād śvātprakāśanāc ānayaṃ saṃvytti, avidyā mohā viparyyā iti paryāyāḥ. MV, pp. 492-3: samantād varanām saṃvytti, ajñānam hi samantād sarvapadārthataitvavacchādānāt saṃvytti ity ucyate, atha vā saṃvytti sāmbhāto lokavahārāh ityarthāḥ. Sa cābhidhānaḥbhā- dheyājñānāśīdilakṣāṇāḥ, loke saṃvytti lokasaṃvytti. See MA, VI. 28;

mohā svabhāvavaraṇād dhī saṃvytti
satyaṃ tāyā khyāti yad eva kṛttimaḥ l
jaṅgāḥ tat saṃvyttisatyam ity asa
muniḥ padārthaṃ kṛtakam ca saṃvytti l
quoted in BAP, p. 353.

58

dharmā ya iti jāyante saṃvytyā te na tatvataḥ 1 janma māyopamaṃ teṣāṃ sā ca māyā na vidyate l

The things which are said as generated are so in the empirical truth and not in fact. Their generation is like illusion, and that illusion, too, does not exist.

The phrase ‘generation is like illusion’ may be explained saying that generation is like illusion, but itself is not illusion. The true sense is, however, not so. It says that generation is

1 See III. 27.
identical with illusion, there being no difference whatsoever between them (advayam advaitākāram).

As regards the non-existence of illusion see

yāvat pratayasyāmagri tāvam māyāpi vartate
BC, IX. 10.

See also 27, 28.

1 See ASP, pp. 39-40: kiṃ punar śraya subhūte māyopamāś te sattvā na te māyā, subhūtiḥ avacat. māyopamāśa te satvā iti māyā ca sattvā cādvaṣyam etad advaitākāram iti.

According to this Mādhyamika theory even the Buddha and nirvāṇa, and, if there is anything higher than nirvāṇa, that, too, are illusion, i.e., those things and illusion are one and the same thing.

59

yathā māyāmayād bijāj jāyate tanmaya 'ākuraḥ
nāsau nityo na cocchedī tadvad dharmeṣu yojanāl

'From an illusive seed comes forth an illusive sprout, and that (sprout) is neither eternal nor is attended with destruction. The same applies to all things.'

Cf. yathā hi kṣatīd bijāj jāyate tanmaya 'ākuraḥ

Cf. X. 28.1

1 This is the reconstructed text from the Tibetan which runs:
   ji. litar. sa. bon. byas. pa. las
   myvu. gu. byas. pa. skye. ṭgyur. ba

60

nājēṣu sarvadharmeṣu āśvatasāśvatabhīdhā
yatra varṇā na vartante vivekās tatra nocyatel

IV. 60-61] ĀGAMAŚĀTRA

When all things are without generation, there is no room for the appellations 'eternal' and 'non-eternal'; for where words fail discrimination cannot be expressed.'

The following may be cited here:

yasmat pravartate bhāvas tenocchado na jāyate
yasmaṁ nivartate bhāvas tena nityo na jāyatel

Cf. XI. 25.

Now the Ācārya takes up again the vijnānavāda of the Buddhists showing that there is nothing but the citra which is the same as vijnāna or manas 'mind' that is transformed into the external world. And in doing so he shows that there is no difference whatsoever between the experiences in the waking state and those in dream, as has already been shown (II. 1-10):

61

yathā svapne dvayābhāsaṁ cittaṁ calati māyāṁ
thāthā jagrad dvayābhāsaṁ cittaṁ calati māyāṁl

'As owing to illusion the mind in dream moves with the appearance of the two (i.e., the subject and the object, or in other words, the percipient and the perceived), even so owing to illusion the mind in waking condition moves with the appearance of the two.'

1 This as well as the next kārikā is the same as III. 29 and 30 respectively with a few variants.

2 See IV. 72: grāhyagrāhakarav daṇvam: IV. 75; 8 on III. 29, 30: grāhyagrāhakarapēpa dvayābhāsam. In Buddhist works in such cases the word daṇḍa is frequently used in the same meaning. For instance, advayārthena paśyati, MS. XIV. 32; dvayāvāśivasāyaṃkāṃ grāhyāgrāhakārakārakānāṃ, advayārthana niṣṭha grāhyāgrāhakār.thena, Ibid, p. 94. See II. 14; III. 29, 30; IV. 62, 72, 75, 87.

3 The word jagrad is to be taken here in the locative case. See IV. 39, note and 62.
advayam ca dvayabhassam citram svapne na samayah
advayam ca dvayabhassam citram jagran na samayah

'There is no doubt that in dream the mind which is without
the two has the appearance of the two, even so there is no
doubt that in the waking state the mind which is without
the two has the appearance of the two.'

See III. 30.

1 See IV. 61, notes.

63, 64

svapnadhik prarcan svapne diksu vai dasasu sthitam
andajan vedajan vapi jivan pasyate yan sadam
svapnadhikcittadhyayas te na vidyante tatah pthak

tathadhyaya evam svapnadhikcittam isyate

'The animals, oviparous or engendered by heat and moisture,
which a dreamer moving in dream sees at any time in any of
the ten directions, are visible (only) to the mind of the dreamer,
and do not exist apart from it (i.e., mind); and this which is
visible only to it (i.e., the mind) is to be accepted (lit. wished)
as the mind of the dreamer.

1 See IV. 77.
2 See IV. 65, 66.

65, 66

caran jagarite jagrad diksu vai dasasu sthitam
andajan vedajan vapi jivan pasyati yan sadam
jagracittekshanayastena na vidyante tatah pthak

tathadhyaya evam svapna jagratac citram isyate

'The animals, oviparous or engendered by heat and moisture,
which a waking one moving about in the state of
wakefulness sees at any time in any of the ten directions,
are visible (only) by the mind of the waking one and do not exist
apart from it (i.e., the mind of the waking one); and this which is
visible only to it (i.e., the mind of the waking one) is to be
accepted as the mind of the waking one.

In these four karikas (IV. 63-66) it is said that whatever one
sees in the waking state is nothing but one's citta 'mind', just
as the things in one's dream. This view has repeatedly been
expressed among others in LA, and specially in its Chapter X
where the Buddha is reported to have said again and again
that all the phenomena are citta (X. 483, 484, 692): citram tra
vadam yaham 'I say (all this is) only citta.'

The word cittadhya here (IV. 64) and elsewhere (IV. 28,
36, 77) of which the equivalent is cittekshaniya (IV. 66) is
found in frequent use in LA. pp. 56 (four times), 79, 84
(twice), 93, 94, 186 (twice), 338 (twice), etc.

1 See IV. 63, 64.
2 See also X. 101:

svacittahhinivetena citta vai sampravartate
bahirhdha nasti vai dhya am ato vai citram rakah
ubhe hy anyonyadṣya te kiṃ tad astiti cocyate
lakṣaṇāsūnyam ubhayaṃ tanmatenaiva gṛhyate

‘You say that the cognition of both of them is dependent on each other, but you do not say what remains then. Both of them have no characteristics, yet they are cognized owing to their (previous) thought.’

In the text ubha and ubhaya refer to ‘mind’ (citta) and jīvas or objects in general referred to in the preceding kārikās. Their cognition depends on each other; for no object is perceived without the thought of the object, nor is the thought of an object possible without the existence of the object. So they are interdependent in this respect. Owing to this interdependence neither of them is established as a real thing, and as such they have no characteristics and yet they are cognized owing to our previously existing thoughts of them.

The following may be quoted on this point:

atītāṃ subhūte cittaṃ nopalabhyate. anāgataṃ cittaṃ nopalabhyate. pratyutpannaṃ cittaṃ nopalabhyate. VC, 39.

uktāṃ ca lokanāthena cittaṃ cittaṃ na pāsyati |
na cchinnati yathātmānam asidhārā tathā manoḥ
dataṃ. BA, IX, 17-18.

sa cittaṃ gaveṣayamāno nādhyātmaṃ cittaṃ samanupaṣayati na bahirdhā cittaṃ samanupaṣayati na skandheṣu cittaṃ samanupaṣayati. na dhātuṣu cittaṃ samanupaṣayati. nāyatanēṣu cittaṃ samanupaṣayati. sa cittaṃ asamanupaṣayam cittaḥ dhāṛāṃ paryēṣate kutaḥ cittasyotpattīiti. śālambane sati cittaṃ utpadyate. tat kim anyat cittaṃ anyad ālambanam. atha yad

1 ṣ writes: na hi ghaṭamatīṃ pratyākhyāya ghaṭo gṛhyate nāpi ghaṭam pratyākhyāya ghaṭamatīḥ. tanmatenaiva taccītattayaśva.
yathā māyāmayo jīvo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca 1
tathā jivā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca 1

yathā nirmiteko jīvo jāyate mriyate 'pi ca 1
tathā jivā amī sarve bhavanti na bhavanti ca 1

'As a creature formed of dream, or made of illusion or supernatural power (nirmita'kā) takes birth and dies, even so all those creatures exist and do not exist.'

The word nirmita or nirmitaka in the above sense is frequently used mainly in Buddhist works. Among many others the following may be quoted here:

nirmitopamāḥ pratibimbopamāḥ satvadharmaḥ jñātavyāḥ. SR, p. 27.

acintiyan nirmita nirminotya-
detei dharma bahu prāṇakotiṇaṃ

Ibid., p. 23.

yathā nirmitakaṃ stātā nirmitardhisampadā 1
nirmito nirmitiṇayaṃ sa ca nirmitakaḥ punah 2

Ibid., p. 23.

tathā nirmitakākāraḥ kartā yat karma tat kṛtaṃ 1
tad yathā nirmitenānyo nirmito nirmitas tathā 2

MK, XVII. 31-32.

ekasmini bhāṣamānasmin sabbe bhāṣanti nimitta 1
ekasmini tuṣṭhim āsine sabbe tuṣṭhi bhavanti ca 2

dn, II. 212.

1 S. says nirmitaka mantravārdayabhir abhinipāditaḥ 'created by incantation, herbs, etc.'

2 Cf. śāntaśāpati as quoted by Poussin in a note on MV, p. 330.

IV. 70-71] ĀGAMASĀSTRA

The following is the Sanskrit version:

ekasya bhāṣamānasya sarve bhāṣante nimitteḥ
ekasya tuṣṭhim bhāṣasya sarve tuṣṭiṃ bhavante ca 1

Quoted as in Āgama in MV, p. 331; DA, p. 166;
AKV, p. 27.


The use of such words as nirmāṇa, nirmāṇakāya, and nirmāṇacittta occurs also in the Yoga system (YS, IV. 4, 5 with scholiasts).

The use of the word nirmāṇa in almost the same sense can, however, be traced back to Upaniṣadic texts:

sa yatra prasvapitaḥ asya lokasya sarvaveda prātādya svayaṃ vihātya svayaṃ nirvāṇa prasvapiti. BU, IV. 3, 9.

ya esa supeṣṭha jāgati kāman kāman puruṣo nirvīmaṇaḥ 1

KU, V. 8.

It appears, however, that it is the Buddhists who first used the word in that definite sense.

Now having thus established his thesis the author asserts his conclusion in the following kārikā, which is already found once more (III. 48):

71

na kaścij jāyate jīvah' sambhavo 'sya na vidyate 1
etat tad uttamanaḥ satyaṃ 2 yatra kiṃcina na jāyate 1

1 Cf. SR quoted in MV, p. 109: na hi kaścij jāyati na ca mriyate.

2 For the wording cf. etat tu paramaḥ satyaṃ, MV, p. 120.
'No Jīva of any kind takes birth, nor is there any possibility of it. It is that highest truth in which nothing originates.'

See III. 48.

Now it is affirmed in the next kārikā that the world consisting of the subject and the object has no reality at all, it being the creation of the movement of mind which in fact has no object at all, and as such it is held to be always free from any sort of attachment or relation to an object (asaṅga):

72

cittaspanditam evedāṁ grāhyagrāhakavad davyam |
cittaṁ nirviṣayaṁ nityam asaṅgāṁ tena kārttitaṁ ||

'This duality which consists of the subject and the object (lit. the perceiver and the perceivable) is only the vibration of the citta 'mind'. citta has no object, therefore it is said to be always asaṅga 'having no attachment (or relation to an object).'

See IV. 79 (niḥsaṅga). Cf. anābhāsa (=nirābhāsa), III. 46; IV. 48.

As regards asaṅga see LA, p. 157: asaṅgalakṣaṇaṁ jānaṁ viṣayaavicītyasaṅgalakṣaṇaṁ vijñānam, asaṅgasvabhāvalakṣaṇaṁ jānaṁ, aprāptilakṣaṇaṁ jānaṁ.

The following lines also from the LA may be cited here:

cittamātram idaṁ sarvaṁ dviḍhā cittaṁ pravartate |
grāhyagrāhakabhāvena ātmāṁ sva vimutāṁ na viḍyate ||
brāhmaṇidisthāna(?) paryantaṁ cittamātram vādāmy aham |
cittamātmānimuktāṁ brahmādir nopalabhyate ||

III. 121-122.

Cf. (i) spandāspandasyavabhāvaṁ hi cinnātram iha viḍyate |
khe vāta iva tat spandāṁ sollāsaṁ sāntam anyathā ||
cittvaṁ (?) cittaṁ bhāvitaṁ sat spanda ity ucye budhaiḥ |
dṛṣṭvabhaḥvitaṁ ca itad aspadanaṁ iti śmāṁ ||
spandāṁ svarūti citsargo niḥspandād brahmaśāvatam ||
jivakāraṇakarmādyā citspandasyabhādhiḥ śnītā ||

YV. III. 67. 6-8.

(ii) svabhāvād vyatiriktaṁ tu na cittaśāstī cetanaṁ |
spandāṁ rte yathā vāyor antaḥ kim nāma ceyate ||


Having shown that the duality consisting of the subject and the object is the creation of mind the author says in the next kārikā that its existence is only in empirical (saṃyogī) and not in absolute (paramārtha) truth. For a thing which is
dependent (paratantra) for its existence may exist in empirical and not in absolute truth:

73

yo 'sti kalpitasamvṛtyā paramārthena nāsty asau
paratantraḥ 'bhisamvṛtyā syān nāsti paramārthataḥ

'Whatever exists in empirical truth (samoṣṭi) which is imagined (kalpita) does not exist in absolute truth (paramārta), for one that is dependent (paratantra, for its existence or origination) may exist (only) in empirical truth which is the cause (of existence or origination), and not in absolute truth.'

For the first half of the kārikā see IV. 57a and 58a-b.

1 Here the actual reading in all the editions and MSS. examined is paratantaraḥ and not paratantraḥ as given above. The reading in c of the next kārikā (74), too, is paratantaraḥ in all of them excepting the MS. k of the Anandashram edition and the edition of Mahāśaṅdra Pāla, both of which read here paratantaroḥ. As the sense requires and is supported by Buddhist works, as we shall presently see, the genuine reading here in the kārikā (73) must be paratantaroḥ (See the discussion in the body). Here abhisamvṛti in this kārikā (73) in meaning is, as appears to me, nothing but abhinispetti samvṛti in kārikā 74. Now abhinispetti samvṛti means samvṛti which is the cause of existence, or appearance of things (abhinispettya 'napā). One should therefore read paratantaroḥ in 73 in accordance with the reading in 74. Otherwise the kārikās cannot properly be explained. One can hardly allow S who explains paratantaroḥ abhisamvṛtyā as paratantara-vyayahāreṇa and paratantaroḥ abhinispatyā as paratantara-siddham apekyeyā in 73 and 74 respectively. Whether one can read hi for 'bhi in c of the present kārikā may also be considered.

It follows from what is said above that a thing is to be regarded as having no origination (aja). Our author, however, says that this assertion can be made only so far as the empirical truth is concerned, but in absolute truth even this is not possible,

IV. 73-74] AGAMAŚĀSTRA

74

ajaḥ kalpitasaṃvṛtyā paramārthena nāpyaḥ
paratantrho bhinispettya samvṛtyā jayate tu saḥ

'One (held) to be unborn (aja) is so in empirical truth which is imagined, but in absolute truth it is even not unborn; for that which is dependent comes into being in empirical truth, the cause of appearance.'

The words samvṛti and paratantra in kārikās 73 and 74 are very important and require some explanation. The first of them has, however, already been discussed above (IV. 56, 57) to some extent and the following may be added thereto. In the Mādhyaṃika system as in the school of Vedānta samvṛti satya is called also vyayahāra or vyavahārika ('practical') satya. The two kinds of truth, samvṛti, or vyayahāra or vyavahārika and paramārtha are regarded in Buddhism as the means (upāya) and the end (upeṣa) respectively.¹

¹ MA, VI. 80 quoted in BAP, p. 372:
upayabhūtan vyayahārasatyam upayabhūtan paramārthasatyam

See also MK, XXIV, 20:
vyayahāram anārthasya paramārtho na dehyate
paramārtham anāgamyam nirvānāṁ nādhigamyate

In Pali Buddhism samvṛti satya is sammuti sacca (Skt. sammali satya) 'truth by general consent'. Poussin writes (JA, 1903, Tome II, p. 302): "vérifie confirme à l'assentiment universel mais erroné" ('truth conformed to universal consent but erroneous'). The literal meaning of the word samvṛti is that by which (the true nature of a thing) is 'covered' (svabhāvā-
varapāt) and it is regarded as truth because it brings to light what is covered (ārtapañcāsanat). See IV. 57, and BAP on IX. 2 (p. 352). The following may be quoted here from MA, VI. 23 as cited in BAP, p. 361:

samyaṃgaṁśadārṇalanalabhāvam
rupadvayam bibhṛati sarvabhāvam |
samyaṃgaṁśas yo viśayaḥ sa tatvam |
mṛdaṁśasamvṛtisatyam uktam ||

Now as regards paratantra ‘dependent’ it has a special significance as evident from Buddhist sources. In Buddhism there are three characteristics (lakṣaṇa) or natures (svabhāva) of a thing, viz., (i) parikalpita ‘imagined’, (ii) paratantra ‘dependent’, and (iii) parinippanna ‘perfect’. Sometime they are briefly called (i) kalpita, (ii) tantra, and (iii) nippana respectively. Any object, for instance, an elephant, according to Madhyamikas or Yogācāras is śīnya or merely a creation of mind, yet we know it as a particular object. This characteristic of it is an imagined one (parikalpita). Now the notion or imagination of the object depends on its being on its cause (or cause and conditions, hetu-pratyaya), and so the characteristic is called paratantra (= pratiṣṭhitasamputpanna). That the object is in fact always devoid of the imagined characteristics referred to above is parinippana. It is so also because there

IV. 74]        ĀGAMAŚASTRA

is perfect invariance or because it is free from any change. They are called ‘nature’ (svabhāva) owing to such practice of the people though in fact they do not exist. Vāsūbanda gives here an example in his TSN, 27, 28: Suppose one creates an elephant by dint of one’s spell. There the elephant appears, but there is only the form of the elephant, and in no way the elephant itself. Here the elephant is parikalpita; the form of the elephant is paratantra, and the absence of the elephant is parinippana.

Of these three lakṣaṇas or svabhāvas the first, parikalpita, may roughly be compared in the system of the Advaita Vedānta of Ś

4 Writes Sthīrāmata in MVBT, p. 19: sa punar dravyatva 'sann aspi vyavahārato tītī svabhāvo ucyate.
5 māyāktam mantranīvan khyati hastātmamānā yathā |
   ākāramātram tatra tāti hasti nasti tu sarvāthā |
   svabhāva kalpito hasti paratantras tadāśītī |
   yas tatra hastātm年末 sa parinippannā ācyate ||
6 Cf. MSA, XI, 19:
   tadāśītī ca tatra tātāśītī ca na vidyate |
7 For easy reference the following may be quoted here:
Tk, p. 39:
yena yena vikalpena yad yadvat vikalpate ||
parikalpita evaṁsa svabhāvo na sa vidyate || 20
(This is based on LA, p. 163: yad punar uktam bhagavatā yena yena vikalpena ye ye bhāva vikalpante na hi sa teṁ svabhāvā bhavati parikalpita evaṁsa.)

Sthīrāmata: adhyātmikakā许多人vikalpavastubhedena vikalpāntam ānantuṣṭa pradhāyanam aha yena yena vikalpaneti, yad yadvat vikalpate, adhyātmikam bhāyaṁ vāntaṁ yāvād buddhadharmā api parikalpita evaṁsa svabhāva ity ati kāmaṁ aha na sa vidyate ity yadvat vikalpaviṣayah tad yasmāt saṁtvabhāvaṁ na vidyate tasmod tad vastu parikalpitasvabhāvam eva na hetupracyatpratidhāsvabhāvām. parikalpitanāntāntam pratantrasvabhāvo vaktavya ity ata aha paratantrasvabhāvas tu vikalpāḥ pratayodbhavāḥ |
with prātibhāṣika satya ‘the truth that exists only in appearance’; as for example, mirage, or the appearance of a snake on a piece of string; paratantra with vyāvahārika satya ‘the practical truth’ (this is called by the Buddhists samyutta ‘pertaining to samyut’, or vyāvahāra satya), the phenomena in the waking state are its examples; and pariniṣpanna with paramārtha satya ‘supreme or transcendental truth’, e.g., Brahman of the Vedāntins.

Sthiramati: ātra vikalpa iti paratantrasvabhāvam āha pratyodbhava ity aneṇāpi paratantrabhādhanapravṛttiṇimittam āha, paraśa hetupratayayais tantrayata utpādyata iti paratantra ity aneḥ. (As the sense requires the order of the last four words is slightly changed. See MVBT, p. 19: grāhyaṃ grāhakam ca svabhāvānyatvāt abhiśītam api astitī paraśkalpe iti parikalpe ity ucyate, taṁ parah dravyata ‘yam api vyāvahārato ‘stitī svabhāva ucyate. paratanatra paravato hetupratayasyapihaddhajanmakaśtv. p. 20: paraśa hetupratayayais tantrayate janaye na tu svayaṁ bhavati paratanatraḥ:) svatō nyahetupratayayasprihaddhajanmakaśtv ity uktam bhavati. uktāḥ paratanatraḥ. pariniṣpannaḥ kathām ity atā āha

pariniṣpanna tasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitāt tu yaḥ

(MVBT, p. 19):

kalpitena svabhāvena tasya yāt yantāntyāntyaḥ
svabhāve pariniṣpanna ‘vikalpaṃ aṣṭāśocanaḥ’


pariniṣpanna tasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitāt tu yaḥ

IV. 74]

It is to be noted that samyutti consists in parikalpa and paratantra svabhāva and paramārtha in pariniṣpanna. Thus it is rightly said in the kārikā 73 that paratantra can exist only in practical truth (samyutti) and not in any way in absolute truth. This is fully explained by Prajakaraṇamati (in his BAP, pp. 354-355) saying that whatever comes into existence (jāyate) does so being dependent on the entirety of the cause and conditions (hetupratayayanāmagri) and that which is thus dependent for its existence has no existence in reality, like a shadow on a looking glass. Let the following be quoted here:

api tu hetupratayayanāmagri pratiyā māyāvad utpadyate, tadvaikalyata nirudhyate ca. hetupratayayanāmagri pratiyā jātasya parāyattāmatābhāsyā pratiyamaṇye sa kutaḥ satsabhvātā, na ca kasyacidd padarthāḥ paramārthāḥ hetupratayayanāmagriḥ samutpatīḥ sambhavati.

Let us quote also the following few lines :

māyāyā nirmitān yac ca hetubhir yac ca nirmitān |
āyāti tat kutaḥ kutra yāti ceti nirūpyatam ||
yad anyasāndhiśānaṇe deṣṭām na tadabhavataḥ |
pratiyamaṇye tasmin kṛtrite satyāt kutaḥ ||

BA. IX, 144, 145.

yaḥ pratyayair jāyati sa hy ajato |
na tasya utpādu sabhāvato ‘stī ||

yaḥ pratyayādhitu sa śūnya ukto |
yaḥ śūnyatāṃ jānati so ‘pramattāḥ ||

Anvavatadhikāśamkramanāsastra quoted in BAP, loc. cit. and MV, p. 239.

The subject under discussion is that nothing originates (etat tad uttamaṁ sātyaṁ yatra kūcic ca jāyate, III. 48, IV. 71). It has been shown in establishing it that the notion of origination is only in empirical reality and not in absolute reality in which we cannot assert the existence of a thing that is without origination. The author now says in the next kārikā
that the notion of origination is due to a strong adherence (abhiniyeṣa) to the unreal (abhūta) referring hereby to the two (dvaya), i.e., the percipient and the perceptible (grāhya and grāhaka):

75

abhūtābhiniyeṣa 'sti dvayaṁ tatra na vidyate ।
dvayābhāvaṁ sa buddhavaiva nīnmitto na jāyate ॥

There is a strong adherence to what has not been (abhūta'), for the two3 are not there. Just when he understands the non-existence of the two it goes beyond the range of its cause and does not come into being.3

The cause of origination is abhūtābhiniyeṣa. When one clearly understands the true nature of the two which have no existence at all that abhiniyeṣa goes away and consequently the notion of origination does not arise.

Ś explains the word he (sah) in the original (c) in the following way: dvayābhāvaṁ buddhavā nīnmitto nīrūttamithyādvayā-

bhiniyeṣa yāḥ sa na jāyate—'He who having understood the absence of the two is beyond the cause and (thus) whose strong adherence to the two which are false has turned back, is not born.'

This explanation does not appear to be proper when one reads the kārikā under discussion with the kārikā IV. 79, where the same phrase (dvayābhāvaṁ sa buddhavaiva, 75) occurs once more with a slight variation: 'vastabhāvaṁ for dvayābhāvaṁ, there being no difference of meaning (vastabhāva = dvayābhāva —Ś). Let the kārikā be quoted here:

abhūtābhiniyeṣad udi sadāse tat pravartate ।
vastabhāvaṁ sa buddhavaiva niṣasatāṁ vinivartate ॥

1 That is, ‘unreal,’ referring to the two (dvaya) that follows.
2 The percipient and the perceptible (grāhya-grāhaka), see IV. 72.
3 See IV. 79.

How is it to be explained? The meaning is simple and clear. It says that it is only owing to one’s persistent belief in unreality that it (citta ‘mind’) goes onward to a similar object (i.e., the mind relates itself to an unreal object), but as soon as one understands the absence of a thing it becomes free from contact and turns back.

But here is a difficulty regarding grammar. In accordance with Pāṇini, III. 4. 21, the agent (kartaḥ) of both the verbs buddhayā and vinivartate in the second half of the kārikā must be the same; but the fact is not so, for the agent of the former is sat, while that of the latter is tat in the first half.

This anomaly is however found in writings even of such great poets as Kālidāsa. He writes in his Raghuvaṃśa, 1. 77:

matprasūtim anārādyaya prajēti tvam śāṣāpa sa ॥

In defence of Pāṇini, or in other words, to meet the difficulty arising from his rule later grammarians say that such words as sthita and the like are to be understood in such cases, so that there may be the same agent of the verbs used.4

The use of the gerund in the Vedic language in this respect is not so strict as in the classical Sanskrit that follows Pāṇini. See the following sentences in which the verbs have different agents: striyaṁ drṣṭya kitavam tatāpa ‘having seen

4 Mallinātha attempts to explain it away taking anārādyaya in the causative sense (etavyagitas). Similar instances are many:

(i) yaj jātva neha bhūyo ‘nyaj jātavyam aṣṭāyate ॥ BG, VII, 2.

(ii) tac ca saṣmṛtya saṣmṛtya rūpam atyadbhutaḥ hareḥ ।

(viṣayo me mahān rūpak śesaṁ ca mohumahubh e RG, XVIII 72.

(iii) mṛtāṁ drṣṭvā duḥkham bhavati, (iv) priyam drṣṭvā sukaṁ suktam, sukaṁ utpadyate, etc.


Bhattācaryya, Calcutta, 1835 Saka, Kṛdveti, Sūtra 433.
a woman (it) pains a gambler’ (RV. X. 34. 11). Similar uses are found also in the Brāhmaṇas. The following is from the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa: te paśaṇa oṣadhir jagdhyā apāḥ pitvā tata eṣa rasaḥ saṃ bhavati ‘the beasts having eaten the plants and drunk water—then the vital sap arises’.

Following this the line under discussion (IV. 79) would be explained by a grammarian thus: sa (yada) vastvabhaṇaḥ buddhavaiva (bhavati tacā) tan niṣaṇaṃ vinivattate,—‘just when he understands the absence of things it (mind) turns back being free from relation’. Now in the kārikā (79) the word saḥ must refer to one (understood) whose abhūtabhiniveṣa is stated.

In the same way, I think, the kārikā 75, too, should be explained: It is the abhūtabhiniveṣa itself and not the person whose abhūtabhiniveṣa is alluded to, that does not arise (jāyate).6

Naturally one has a persistent belief in the abhūta or unreal things, i.e., the percipient and the perceptible which have, in fact, no existence at all. So when one clearly understands their non-existence there is no room for that persistent belief to come into being.

Now, as regards abhūtabhiniveṣa compare abhūtaparikalpa of the Buddhists. We read the following in the LA, pp. 149-150:

abhūtaparikalpa ‘bhūtaparikalpa iti bhagavann ucyyate. katamasya itad bhagavan dharmasyādhivacanaṃ yad utabhūtaparikalpa iti kṣīṃ vā prativikalpayan abhūtaparikalpo bhavati. bhagavān ahaśā sadhau sadhau mahāmaheṇa” nṛṣaṃ grāhygrāhakābhiniveṣabhinvishīṣṭān ca” bhāyavičārīthopalambhbhiniveṣvac cītarājacakalapo vikalpasamāśabditaḥ pravartamānāb pravartata atmātimyābhiniveṣat.

6 Or one may take here nīrimittas na jāyate with reference to go 'sti kalpita’ (IV. 73) and it may be explained saying that which is or originates in the empirical truth does not do so when one has no notion of the two (grāha and grāhaka), there being no cause (nīrimittas) for origination.

IV. 75-76]

The abhūtabhiniveṣa in our work (IV. 75, 79) is, in fact, abhūta-parikalpa of the Yogācāras. See the following line in the Madhyāntavibhāga (l. 22-4) of Maitreyaṇātha:

abhūtaparikalpo ‘stī dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate |’

From this it is perfectly clear that the first half of our kārikā under discussion is in reality taken from Maitreyaṇātha.

The word nīrimitta in nīrimittas ‘devoid of nīmitta’ has a special sense in Buddhist literature. There is a very common phrase: na nīmittagrāhi bhavati, Pali ‘ggaṇhi hoti, DS, §§1345-6. It means that when a nīmitta ‘specific appearance’ of a thing is grasped in the way such as a male, a female, pleasant, etc., a man is entangled in various worldly troubles, and so it is advised that he should not be a nīmittagrāhin ‘grasper of nīmittas.’ As the specific appearances are the causes of attachment, aversion, and delusion (rāga, dvega, and moha) they are called nīmittas.7 See AS, p. 400.

This special meaning seems not to have been intended in the present case. We may take the word here as well as in IV. 77 and 78 in the sense of ‘objective cause’ which is expressed by the word artha in IV. 24.

Having said as to how that persistent belief disappears, the author proceeds to discuss in the following kārikās how the non-origination (anutpatti) of mind is effected which is to be realized:

7 MVBT, pp. 9 ff. On h of the kārikā Sthiramati writes: svayam avidyāmanāna grāhygrāhakākāraya prakhyate [na vyaktaḥ bhūtāṅgāpattam].

8 AKV as quoted in DS, p 41: nīmittas vāstum vāstutvāni vījanavān nilatvādhi; Tr., p. 21, l. 3: nīmittas tad- (referring to vīṣaya) vījana nilāpitādyālamandavāyavasthākaraṇam. See AS, pp. 291, 308.

9 AS, p. 400: itthipurisanimittas eva subhānamittādikāṃ kaścasvathubhūtān nīmittas.
67

yadā na labhate hetūn uttamādhāmamadhyamānān 
 tada na jāyate cittam hetvabhāve phalam kutah

‘When the mind does not have any cause, superior, inferior, or middle, it does not originate; for how is there the effect in the absence of the cause?’

Here hetu is nothing but nimitta in the preceding kārikā. See IV. 77-78.

68

animittasya cittasya yānupattih samādvayān 
ajātasyaiva sarvasya cittadṛṣṭayām hi tad yataḥ

This kārikā seems to have been handed down defectively. For, evidently in the first half the sentence is not complete, as the conjunctive pronoun yad (in feminine ya) requires the pronoun tad in feminine (in any case-ending), but it is not to be found in either of the two halves. Nor is there the antecedent of tad in the second half which clearly shows to have supported something stated before. But what is it? The explanation of Ś appears to be far-fetched and far from satisfactory, nor has he explained the word tad which has altogether been overlooked. It seems to me, therefore, that the above two lines are taken by mistake from two different kārikās of which the other two lines are lost. I leave the present kārikā, as it is before us, untranslated, as it does not give any complete sense, so far as I can understand. The first half may, however, be explained thus:

The non-originating (anupatti) of the causeless (animitta) mind (citta) is the same (sama, i.e., unconditioned—always in the same condition) and free from the two (adhyāya, i.e.,

See IV. 75.

69

free from the notion of the grāhya ‘receptible’, and the grāhaka ‘recipient’.

See kārikā IV. 80. For the word sama or sāmya see III. 2, 38; IV. 80, 93, 95, 100 with the author’s explanation; and MuU, III. 1, 3. cf. BG, V. 19: nirdosah hi samaḥ brahma. See MV, pp. 374-75: maṇḍusīr āha. paramāthataḥ sarvdharmānupadā-samatayā parmāthataḥ sarvdharmāntajātisamatayā paramāthataḥ sāmāḥ sarvdharmāḥ.

For cittadṛṣṭya in the second half see III. 31, IV. 28, 36.

70

buddhva ‘nimmittatam satyas hetum prthag anāpnuvat’ 1 
vitaśokam tadā ‘kānam abhayam padam aśnute’ 2

‘When one understands its true state of causelessness it (citta) does not have any other cause, and as such reaches then a position which is free from sorrow, desire, and fear.’

I read with MS. D anāpnuvat for anāpnuvam in editions and other MSS., construing it with cittam referred to in the preceding kārikā (77). It is to be noted that it is cittam that is referred to in kārikās IV. 76-80. In kārikā 79 the pronoun tad refers to cittam, as says Ś, too, expressly. One may naturally expect to have its mention or reference also in the present kārikā. To introduce a person who reaches the position is rather abrupt. It is also to be considered that it is cittam and not the person that is concerned with the cause or causes (IV. 76).

In this case the grammatical difficulty is to be removed as in IV. 75.

See the Variants.

1 That is, of the cittam ‘mind.’ See IV. 25, 26, 27, 75, 77.

2 That is, the state of being without the objective cause.

3 See IV. 76.

4 padaśvhitam, IV. 80.

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Accepting the reading anāpnunan the kārikā may be translated thus:

'Having understood the true state of the causelessness and having no other cause one reaches then a position free from sorrow, desire and fear.'

79

abhūtābhīniveśād dhi sadṛśe tat pravartate
vastvabhāvaṁ sa buddhaiva niḥsaṅgaṁ vinivartate

'Owing to a persistent belief in what is non-existent it goes onwards to a similar object, but as soon as one understands the absence of a thing it turns back being free from relativity.'

The word sadṛśa means what is thought to be similar to one in which one has strong or persistent belief. niḥsaṅga means one beyond the reach of any connection with the object.

For c one is referred to IV. 75. See III. 45; IV. 72, 75, 96, 99.

80

nīvṛttaśyāpravṛttasya niṣcalā hi tadā sthitīḥ
viṣayaḥ sa hi buddhānāṁ tat sāmyam ajam advayam

'At that time when (the citta) has turned back from and does not go (again) onwards to its object, its position is firm (i.e., unwavering in the least). That is the field of activity of the Buddhāḥ, and that is the same, unborn, and free from the two.'

1 Cf. III. 34: pračāraḥ sa tu viṣayyaḥ.
2 See III. 2, 38. See also Veh. p. 41: api tu khalu puṇah subhūte samah sa dharma na tatra kaścid viṣayāḥ. tenocyate 'nutarasamyaksambodhiḥ. nirātmatvena niḥsattvatvena nirjivatvena nipudgalatvena sāmā sānuttara samyaksambodhiḥ.'
3 The perceptible and the percipient (grāhya and grāhakā).

IV. 80

In c viṣaya may be taken in the sense of the object of knowledge.

See III. 46 and IV. 77 from which it will be evident that this state is the summum bonum of both the Buddhists and the Vedāntists, which they call nirodha or nirvāṇa and brahman respectively. The Vedāntist commentator Ś. writes here very clearly that this state of mind is brahman:

cittasya niṣcalā ca bhūtābhīniveśād dhi sadṛśe tat pravartate
vastvabhāvaṁ sa buddhaiva niḥsaṅgaṁ vinivartate

'And again on IV. 77 he says:

animittasya caitasyeti yā mokṣakhyānatpattiḥ.'

That this state of citta is the field of activity of the Buddhāḥ is clearly said in Buddhist works:

cittamātraṁ nirābhāsam vihāro buddhabhūmi ca
etad dhi bhāśitaṁ buddhaṁ bhāśante bhāśyaṁ ca||

LA. X. 105.

arthābhāsā ca viṣayaṁ jñānaṁ tathāgocaram
parāvṛttāṁ nirābhāsāṁ āryānāṁ gocarō hy asau||


This state is the same as what we know from such lines as the following from Buddhist works: viṣayāpravṛttāṁ cītram avasthitam bhavati. Tk., p. 43.

For the wording of c (viṣayaḥ sa hi buddhānāṁ) see CS, p. 497: viṣayaḥ sa hi buddhānāṁ; V. p. 6: yo buddhānāṁ viṣayaḥ; p. 11: buddhagocaraḥ; SSP, p. 120. *Se: yatpramāno buddhāviṣayaḥ; MSA, XX-XXI. 26: buddhānāṁ viṣayād api; LA. III. 80: āryānāṁ gocaro yathā.

1 See cītram pravartate cītram eva vimucyate

This state of mind to which the Buddhas aspire is further described in the following kārikā:

81

ajam anidram avapnand prabhātaḥ bhavati svayam
sakṛd vibhāti hi evaṁ dharma dhātuḥ svabhāvataḥ

See III. 36.

‘It shines forth itself having no origination, nor sleep, nor dream. Indeed, this object (dharma), the fundamental element (dhātu), is naturally illumined once for all.’

The word dharma in the second half of the kārikā may be taken in its general sense, an element of existence, an object, thing. But considering the views of the Yogācāras, and specially what Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthiramati have said in describing this state of mind it is to be taken in the sense of a special kind of dharma, i.e., āśrayapaṇāṇīti ‘reverence or change of the recipient (i.e., ālayavijñāna which is the seed of all, sarvabija).’

A few words are here required with regard to the reading dharmadhātuḥ svabhāvataḥ. This reading is found in some of

1 See Tk, pp. 43-44: yadaivaṃ viśaṣṭam prabhātaḥ bhavati tada kathāṁ vyapāśiṣṭa ity aha:
   acicīt no-palamhī śānāṁ lokottaraṁ ca tat
   āśrayasya paṇāṇīti dvidha daśāḥ yathābhāvabhāvataḥ
   sa evāravāra dhātur anityaṁ kuśalo dhruvaḥ
   suḥku viyuktikāyaś ca śānāḥ dhammaṁy ahaṃ mahānaṁ

2 For paṇāṇīti in āśrayapaṇāṇīti we have sometime paṇāṇīti or parivartaṇa (Tib. gnas. gur. pa, or gna. yoids. gur. pa, or ghan. du. gur. pa. See Tib. translation of Tk, Tanjur, Mdo, Si, Fol. 190a). For āśrayapaṇāṇīti see among others Tk, loc. cit.: MSA, XIX. 54; LA, p. 338; DB, App. p. 27, pp. 190f.: tasya tathā parībhāvataṁ tāl laukikāṁ parīśuddhaṁ dhyāṇam āśrayaḥ āpāyikāleśaṁ ābhāvyaṁ āśrayaḥ apakahātati. aciraś ca tasya prahānāḥ āśrayaḥ svaḥ bodhisattvāya parivartate pāpakasyāpāyikāy agrañjyo ‘tyantam akrāṇatosi aparyāpamanaṁ tāyai ca. For its different explanation see Vīś, pp. 609.612.

the MSS. of the Anandashram edition and in some others, too, examined by me, while others read dharma dhātuvaḥ. Ś accepts the latter and Anandagiri supports it saying dhātuvaḥvāvata ity ekam padam gṛhītā vyācaṣe. This implies that the reading dhātuvaḥsva was also known to him. But neither of them seems to be very satisfactory and this leads the present writer to amend the reading as dharmaḥdātuḥsvabhāvataḥ. The reading dharmaḥdātuḥ appears to be due to the unfamiliarity of the commentators with the significance of the word dharmaḥdātuḥ which is quite appropriate here. Let us therefore explain the kārikā in this light.

In accordance with this reading the second half may be translated thus:

‘Indeed the essence of reality (dharmaḥdātuḥ) is naturally illumined once for all.’

See I. 14, 16; III. 36, 37. For c see Chū, VIII. 4, 1-2 which is the same. See also NUU, 9; MKU, 2-23.

We take the next three kārikās together. The kārikā 82 is incomplete and as such should be construed with 83.

3 The word dharmaḥdātuḥ may be translated by ‘the essence of reality.’ It is devoid of the characteristics of subject and object (teṣu kṣo gṛhyagṛhakakṣaṇo) or indifferentential into subject and object (gṛhyagṛhakakṣaṇo). It is a synonym for paramārtha or paramārthavatitation, MVī, xcix. 8; Tk, p. 41, l. 26; BAP, p. 354: parama uttamo ‘tahan. akṣiṁnām vairupāṇīm yadadhigaṁānānurūsusandhikleśaprahaṇam bhavati. sarvadharmam niḥsvabhāvaciṣṇuṣaḥ tathaḥ bhūtakotiḥ dharmaḥdātuḥ iyadparyāyaḥ.

Again, p. 421: bodhiḥ buddhavām ekānukṣaṇaḥvāvibhikām anupannam

We receive Mañjusripāraṇī: ṇvetaṁ asāvattanayaprapātāvijñānāh kṣaṇavatātānāmam dhammakhyātām paramārthaḥāvad naucet etad eva prajñāparāmītaḥ sūnyatā tathābhūtakotiḥ-dharmaḥdātuḥvādabrāhenānās etam upadāśvabhādvyat.

Write Maitreyaḥ—MVī, p. 41:

tathā bhūtakotiḥ cānīṁ māyāmyaṁ pa[r]āmārthakāḥ | dharmaḥdātuḥ ca paryāyaḥ śāntam samāstanāḥ |
ananyatūpāyapsitvān siehtantīrihāyaśocakaḥ |
het-ntvā cāyadharmam āvonām yathākramānām ī. 15.16.

As regards dharmaḥdātuḥ Vasubandhu says here (pp. 41-42):

śrīyadharmaḥdātuḥvād dharmadhātuḥ. śrīyadharmaḥdātuḥ tādalamandabrahavatvād, hetvābhīṣṭo atre dhāvaraḥ (see Tk, p. 44, ll. 20, 21). On the last words
82
sukham āvriyate nityaṁ duḥkham vivriyate sadā ।
yasya kasya ca dharmasya graheṇa bhagavān asau ॥

83
asti nāsty asti nāsti nāsti nāsti va punah ।
calasthirobhayābhāvair āvṛṇoty eva bālīṣaḥ ॥

84
kotyaś cataśra etāś tu grahāyā yāśaṁ sadavīṣhaḥ ।
bhagavān abhir āśprīya yena dṛśaḥ sa sarvādik ॥

"It is the adherence to (an idea of) a thing—whatsoever it may be," by which bliss is constantly covered and misery is unfolded. The glorious one (dharmaḥata)—

(i) is, (ii) is not, (iii) is and is not (i.e., both), or (iv) neither is nor is not (i.e., not both)—with these (notions) the childish obscure it (respectively /* in accordance with their own ideas of its being) (i) steady, (ii) unsteady, (iii) both, and (iv) the absence (of both).}

Sthiramati comments: svakṣaṇopādayatāpadhāraṇo 'py ayaṁ dhātutadbod varata ity aḥa hotvartho". The word dhātu also means one that supports its own particularity (svalakṣaṇa) and the secondary qualities of matter (upādāya or bhautika rūpa), including evidently, as observes Stcherbatsky (MVD, p. 50) also the primary qualities of matter (mahābhūta). Dharmaḥata also means the mental state considered as element (dhātu) owing to its ultimate reality. See Pali Text Society's Dictionary, e.v. dhamma; Compendium of Philosophy, pp. 254-255.

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4 This adherence is mainly four-fold as shown in the next kārikā.

5 In explaining calasthiro" in c of 83 sthira is to be taken first as required by the sense (arthakrāma) even discarding the order of reading (pathakrāma).

That is, permanent.

That is, steady and unsteady.

That is, neither steady nor unsteady.

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84

These are the four points by the adherence to which the glorious one is always covered, but (in fact) it is not touched by them. One who realizes it is omniscient.

In nāsti nāsti va in c of kārikā 83 take the first na with both asti and nāsti, as na asti and na nāsti.

These four points are maintained by four classes of disputants according to their ideas of the Absolute, as it is permanent, not permanent, both, or not both. But some of the Buddhists (Vijñānavādins and Mādhyamikas) do not subscribe to any one of these views, their point is quite free from all of them, while in the Vedānta the first point is avowedly held: e.g., KU, VI. 12 and 13:

asti bhruvato 'nyatra katham tad upalabhyaḥ
asti evoparahbhavyaḥ

TU, II. 6, 1:
asty brahmeti ced veda santam etām tato viduḥ

MU, IV. 4:
asty brahmeti brahmavidyāvid abhavit.

As regards the position of the Buddhists it is also very clear:

na san nāsan na sadasaṁ na cāpy anubhāyātmaṁ

CATUKSOTIVINIRUKTAM TATTVAṄ MĀDHHYAMIKĀ VIDUḤ

Sāraḥ in SS, fol. 17.¹

kāraṇaṁ pratyayaṁ cāpy yeṣāṁ lokaḥ pravartate

Catuskotikāyā yuktāna te mānayaśvādāḥ

Pāṇu aparāma mahāmāte bālapāṣṭhaganaṁ anādikālaṁ pravacitaḥ

TATTVAṄ TATTVAṄ SVAṢIDHĀNTAṆAYA DEŚĀṆAYA AKUSALĀṁ

SUCITĀDVAYABHĀVAṢIDHĀNTAṆAYA DHARMASUṆGHAŚIŚVADHIYAVIMITI

⁶ See Mūlakaṇḍa, 1903, IV, p. 389. This kārikā is widely quoted: JS, 28; SDS, Buddhadāsanaa; SSS, III, 7 (with the reading na cobhāyāṁ vīkṣetraḥ in c) catukṣotaviniruktam śūṇyām tattvam iti citdham—Ibid, 9; BAP, p. 359; SaS, I, 44 (Vijñāna ṛśikṣu); CBJ, BJS, II, 27 (=DN I, 27).
It is noted here that according to S the word bhagavat 'the glorious one' in 82d and 84c refers to atman. On the following grounds, however, I think, it is the dharmadhātu in 81c, which is alluded to.

The subject matter here in kārikās 80-84 is the unawakening or the firm state of the mind which has turned back from and does not go onwards again to its object—the state which is dharmadhātu and to which aspire the Buddhas. This is further dealt with in the following two kārikās (85-86). There is, therefore, no room for atmān to which the word bhagavat may refer.

An objection may be raised here that the word bhagavat is used with reference to a conscious or sentient being, and as such it cannot refer to dharmadhātu which is nothing but the niṣcalā sthiti of the mind. One can, however, meet it in the following way. Such common phrases as bhagavatī śrutih, bhagavatī vedah, bhagavatī bhavayatanā, etc., will show that the word under discussion is employed also to non-sentient beings. It is found that anything, irrespective of its being sentient or otherwise, that is powerful or commands respect, regard, faith, confidence, or reverence may be referred to by bhagavat.

It is also to be taken into consideration that this dharmadhātu is in fact Brahman of the Vedantists as shown in the clearest possible words by the author himself in III, 46 which we have already discussed. Again, the dharmadhātu is the same as what we understand by the word prajñāpāramitā. And it is very well-known that prajñāpāramitā is reverently mentioned with the epithet bhagavati. Besides, this dharmadhātu which is the same as prajñāpāramitā is nothing but advaya jñāna, i.e., the jñāna which is free from the subject and the object, and this is identified with Tathāgata as is evident from the following couplet from the PAS of Dīṇāga as quoted by Haribhadra in his AAA, p. 28.⁷

prajñāpāramitā jñānam advayam sa tathāgataḥ
sādhyā tādarthayogena tācchabdyam granthamārgayoh

The first half of this kārikā is based on such old texts as the following:
cittamātrāvatareṇa prajñā tathāgati matāḥ | LA, III, 43.

See Ibid., pp. 187-190 ending with yat sarvaprapācitaṁ sa tathāgataḥ. See also pp. 191 ff.⁸

⁷ See BAP, p. 421: etad eva ca prajñāpāramitā-sānyata-taṭhataḥ *ādīśabdahena* abhidhīyate. This passage is quoted once more. See IV, 81, note 3, p. 189.


⁹ Let us quote here another passage which is very significant, though a little lengthy, from the same work, i.e., LA, pp. 191-193:

na hi mahāmāte abhāvas tathāgatagato* kintu mahāmāte mahāmāte manomayadharmākāryasya tathāgatasyad adhivacanaṁ yatra (yat) sarvatirthakarasrāvaka-prayaṇakundhāsamapābhumiṣṭhitaṁ avajāy, so 'yo 'nupādaḥ tathāgata-syaitan mahāmāte paryayacaranaṁ, tad yathā mahāmāte indrah śakrah purandaraḥ hastah karaḥ pāśaṁ tanuḥ dehaṁ śāriṁ pṛthiḥvi bhūmir vasundhara kham ākāsāṁ gaganaṁ ity evamādyānāṁ bhāvāṁ ēkaikasya bhāvasya bhāvasah bahavah

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tathatākāraṇa tathāgataṁ paśyāmy avikalpākāreṇaṣṭupalambhaṁyena, evaṁ anutpādakāraṇa tathāgataṁ paśyāmi, yāvad abhāvākāraṇa tathāgataṁ paśyāmi.ŚP, p. 119.

For Tathāgata see also MK, XXII.

No objection can therefore be raised here with regard to the use of the word bhagavat.

It is said in the preceding kārikā that one, who realizes that truth, becomes omniscient. The present kārikā tells us that omniscience being realized, there is nothing that can be desired, for every desire is fulfilled thereby:

prāpya sarvajñatāṁ kṛtsnāṁ brāhmaṇaṁ padam advayam ānapānādīmadhyāntaṁ kim ataḥ param ihatē

‘Having realized the full omniscience and (therby) that state which is befitting a Brāhmaṇa, and free from the two, and has no beginning, middle and end, what may one desire beyond it?’

It is to be noted that the final aim is described here to be the realization of omniscience (sarvajñata, cf. sarvākṣara-jñata or bodhi) which can be asserted more preferably from the Buddhist point of view than from the Vedāntist.

unaham pavaRAM vrīmān mahesāṁ vijñātāṁ j
anejāṁ nāhitākān budhataṁ tam abhi brūmi brāhmaṇāṁ ||


It may be noted that according to Buddhists a Brāhmaṇa is so called because he is vāhitāpāpa ‘one whose sin is removed’ (Op. cit., XXVI, 6). This is, however, far-fetched. The following may be quoted here:

ey ca vāhitāpāpatvād brāhmaṇaṁ pāramārthikāṁ l
abhayastālamāramānāyaṁ te mumer eva śāśvate ||
ihaiva śramaṇaṁ tena caturdhā paripūrṇatate ||
sūyāḥ parapraṇavaḥ hi śramaṇaṁ brāhmaṇaṁ tathā || TS. 3589, 3390.

Kāma laśiṣa writes on it in his Pañjika: ata eva bhagavatoktam ihaiva śramaṇaṁ ihaiva brāhmaṇaṁ sūyāḥ parapraṇavaḥ śramaṇaṁ brāhmaṇaṁ iti.

The subject and the object.

The following kārikā says that this realization of omniscience is the object of vinaya ‘discipline’ and real sāma ‘quiescence’ and dama ‘introversion’ of the senses.

prāpniṁ vinayo hy eṣa śamaḥ prākta ucyate ||
damaḥ prakṣitāntatvād evaṁ vidvān śamaṁ vrajet ||

‘This is, indeed, the discipline of the wise, and is said to be the natural quiescence, and the introversion (of the senses) owing to (their) being naturally introverted. Knowing thus one should become quiescent.’

The reality set forth in the preceding kārikās (IV. 85-86) is further described in the next three kārikās showing that that is the lokottara ‘supra-mundane’ knowledge through the realization of which one becomes omniscient:
is met with in every system; and the last two are to be found in Yogācāra texts. For instance, MV 1, p. 19 :

paratantrasvabhāvo hi sūddhalaukikagocaraḥ |
Tāk, p. 40: nirvikalpalokottarajñānādijye pariniṣpanne svabhāve adgote apratīviddhe asaṃsātkēte tattvāgalabdhauddha-
laukikajñānānāgamyatvā parantarotṇyena jñānena na ghṛyate. na
punar lokottarajñānānāgalabdēhēnāpi jñānena na dhīyate.

In LA, p. 156, these jñānas are found as (i) laukika, (ii) lokottara, and (iii) lokottaratana respectively. The difference is only in nomenclature and as such is not important. The LA, p. 157, describes them very clearly in the following words which deserve here to be considered carefully :

(i) tatra laukikām jñānam sadasatpaksābhiniḥjñānam sarvatīrthakarabālaupathagjananām ca.
(ii) tatra lokottarām jñānam sarvasvāvakaprtyekabuddhānām svasāmānānālakṣaṇapattīsābhiniḥjñānam.
(iii) tatra lokottaratañām jñānam buddhabodhisattvānām nirābhāsadharmapracayād aniruddhāntupādadarānām sadasat-
paksāvagatām tathāgatābhūminationāmyādhigamāt pravartate.

This reality with which we are concerned here is described by V asubandhu in his Tāk, verse 29 in the following words which may be quoted here :

acitto 'nupalambaḥ 'sau jñānām lokottarām ca tat |

Sthiramati comments:

tad anena ślokaṃvayaṃ darānaṃāgarm āraḥbhottara-viśeṣāvyā phalasampattir udbhāvita viṣṇuṣaṁpratviṣavatvinaḥ. tatra grāhakacittabhāvād grāhyārthānupalambaḥ ca acitto

1 Generally in Buddhist works things are divided into two categories, (i) laukika, and (ii) lokottara (see MV, p. 501); as for instance, all mental states are laukika excepting only nine, viz., four paths (maggas), four fruits (mapphas), and one uncompounded element (asamkhataḥrāta), i.e., nibbāna, —these are lokottara. D ś, § 1093, 1094.
āgamaśāstra  

nupalambo 'sau. aparicitatvā loke samudacarabhāvā nirvikalpatvāc ca lokād uttinnām iti jānānā lokottaram ca tat.

So far as goes my information, such division of jānāna or jñeya is not to be found in Upaniṣads.

Ś explains the above three kinds of jānāna as the conditions of (i) waking, (ii) dream, and (iii) sleep respectively (jāgrat, svapna, sūṣuptī).

3 The printed text reads anucitato, but it does not give any appropriate sense. We should, therefore, read here aparicitatvā with the Tibetan version which has ḍris.par.ma.byas.po.

89

jānā ca trividhe jñeye kramena vidite svayam t sarvajñata hi sarvatara bhavatiha mahādhiyaḥ

'The threefold knowledge and knowable being gradually understood everywhere spontaneously evolves here the state of omniscience of a man of high intellect.'

That the jānāna is trividha 'threefold' is just now seen in the preceding two kārikās. According to its function, too, it is trividha. We read in the LA, p. 157:

tatra trividhaṃ jānānaṃ svasaṃjñayāvadārdhārakāṃ cotpāda-
vāyāvadārdhāraṇaṃ cānupādādvirodhāvadārdhāraṇaṃ ca: 2

The omniscience (sarvajñata) referred to is Buddhahood (buddhatva). 3

1 The word mahādhi is nothing but dhamat which is a name for a Bodhissatva. See MSA, XIX, 73; MVT, 1627.

2 As regards the nature of jānāna the following may be cited from LA, p. 157: asaṅgalakṣaṇaṃ jānānam. asaṅgaśavabhāvālakṣaṇaṃ jānānam. aprāpiłakṣaṇaṃ jānānam svapratyāśāya jñānāgati gocaram apraveśanirgamanavād udakacandravaj jale.

3 See BAP, pp. 44-8; ASP, pp. 42-3. Buddhhatva = sarvajñhatva consisting in (i) sarvakāraññhatā, (ii) mārgajññhatā, and (iii) vaśajññhatā.

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Ś explains sarvajñata as sarvaś ca sa jñāna tati sa sarvajñataḥ. tasya bhāvāḥ sarvajñataḥ.

In the next kārikā the author tells his followers to understand certain things:

90

heya jñeyāpyapākyāni viññeyāni agrayānataḥ
tesām anyatra viññeyād upalambhas triśu śnośaḥ

'That which is to be abandoned, that which is to be known, that which is to be attained, and that which is to be matured are to be understood from the Agrayāna. It is said that among them there is perception of the three, but not of that which is to be known.'

The Agrayāna in the text is nothing but the Mahāyāna, as is evident from a number of Buddhist works in which the word occurs as a synonym for Mahāyāna. 2

Now, what are we to understand by heyā, etc.? As regards heyā and jñeya, if we follow here Asaṅga, they are paratantra and parikalpita svaśāvīcas (see IV. 74-75) respectively. 3 Āpya (= pṛāpya) 'attainable' implies dharma

1 All the editions and MSS examined have *gāña instead of *gāna as expected.

2 MSA, p. 53: pātastrayām sātraviniyābhiddharmāḥ. tad eva trayām hina vāgnāgāvānabhedena dvayaṃ bhavati. See SP, III, 1, V, 61; MSA, p. 83; SRS (Rajendra Lal Mitra’s Buddhist Manuscripts from Nepal), p. 229; LV, p. 408; VCh., pp. 30, 33. Sometimes it is also called Srothapāya, VCh., p. 30.

3 Let us quote here the following from the MSA, XI, 13 (p. 58): where heyā and jñeya are explained:

tattvaṃ yat satāmaṃ dvayaṃ hritaṃ bhrūntaṃ ca saṃjñayā bhavyaṃ naiva ca sarvatābhipūpitam vac cāpaprādātikamakaṃ jñeyaḥ heyam aṭha vidyāyaṃ amalam yac ca prajñāyaṃ arunāca yasya kastasuvamāvāsāhddhi klesi vīdūdhir mataḥ
dhātu or dharmaḥātu already alluded to (IV. 81),⁴ which is parinippanna, and pūrya ‘to be matured’ refers to the act of maturing by discipline for the attainment of the Absolute. The last is not only for others, but also for one’s own self.⁵

The second half of the kārikā says that among these four things only three, i.e., heya, ōpya, and pūrya, can be perceived, but not the jīeya or vijīeya. For it is parikalpitā ‘imagined,’ and a thing which is only imagined owing to its very nature cannot be perceived, just like mirage, as it

sataṃ dhavayena ratataṃ tattvāṃ parikalpitāḥ svabhāvo grāhyagrahāka-
lakṣaṇaṇītyvantam asattvā. bhāvante saṃśīrayah paratantras tena tapati-
kalpanāti, anahālasyam aprapācātma kāh ca parinippannāḥ svabhāvaḥ,
tatra prathamaṃ tattvāṃ parijñeyam dviśīyaṃ prahāyaṃ tātiyaṃ vidhīyaṃ
cāgantukamāla vīdūtāh ca prakṛtyā. yasya prakṛtyā vīdūthayaḥ sās-
suvarnāvāśādhi cālaś vīdūthāh. na ha śkāśādhi prakṛtyā saukāndhāh. na cā
cāgantukamalapagāmād esām vīdūthāh nyayaḥ.

⁴ MSA, XIX. 56 : prāpyaṃ dharmadhātub.

⁵ MSA, XX-XXI 42 : satvaparipākacayā dvayor eva pariplayanaḥ.

paripācānaḥ hy atila vinayam, ; XVI. 3, 22, 36; XIX. 56; DA, p. 125;
BBh, p. 22. As regards the maturation of one’s own self (ātmāparipākha) the following may be quoted from MSA, VIII. 1 :

ruciḥ prasādaḥ prasāmo ‘nu kampamā kṣamātāma medhaḥ prabālabhatva eva ca | ahāyastikāyāḥ samupetāḥ bhāyaṃ jñātaniyaḥ tath pariplayanaṁ ||

ruciḥ mahābhikṣānāṃ. prasādas taddēlaś. prasāmaḥ kṣetraṁ.

anukampā sattvav. medhā grahaadāharpapradibheṣu. parabālabhā

adhibheme. ahāyastikāryāḥ samveṅgatiyam. bhāyaṃ iti rucādānām ahāyastikāravān darṣayati. eṣa maṃsena navapākāra

ātmāparipāko veditavyaḥ.

See also, VIII. 11 :

iti navavidhavastupacātma paripācācanyayog evām upetāḥ ||

ubhāmayaṣṭasparvādhihitam bhavati saha jagata harabhdhuhitab ||

KP, § 31 : tad yathā kāsyapa tejodhātuḥ sarvasayayā pariplayayayai evam
eva kāyapa bodhisattvasya prajā sarvasarvadharmā pari-

paripācyayai.* See also the stanza which follows it.

In BBh, a whole chapter named Paripākopaṇa (VI) is devoted to it giving paricīla.

Cf. lokaṃkārī ‘maturation of the world’ in the SB, XI. 5. 7. 1.

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has no existence, it is merely an imagination, simply a word, only a name; it is not perceived, and hence there is no perception.⁶

⁶ It may be noted that sometimes five jīyas are found (BAP, p. 447 ; jīyaṃ paścavādham), as says Sthiramati in MVT, p. 6, viz., (i) the worlds (lokadhāta), (ii) the living beings (sattva), (iii) the elements of existence (dharma), (iv) the discipline (vinaya), and (v) the means (upāya). These seem to have no connexion herewith.

In the next few kārikās the author gives some leading thoughts of the Āgṛyāṇa alluded to above:

91

prakṛtyākāśavaj jñeyāh sarve dharmā anādaayāh ||

vidyate na hi nānātvaṃ teṣāṃ kacana kiścāna ||

‘All the elements of existence are without beginning, and by nature they are to be known like the sky. Verily they have nowhere any variety.’

For the first half of the kārikā see IV. 1, where we have already seen that things are just like the sky as said in such texts as the ASP, p. 297 : yathākāśāṃ already quoted there.

For the second half where it is said that there is no variety of things see the well-known Upainadīcācāts : neha nānātā kacana, BU, IV. 4. 19 ; Ku, IV. 11 ; Ku, III. 8 ; NS, IV. 1. 34 ff (with Vātasyayana). See also our own text, II. 34, IV. 94, 100.

92

ādibuddhā bhaktā prakṛtyaiva sarve dharmāh sūnicītaḥ ||
yasyāvāṃ bhavati kṣaṇītiḥ so ’ṁtavāya kalpate ||

This one is to take adī here for adītah meaning ‘from the outset.’

See IV. 93.
‘By the very nature all elements of existence are well ascertained as originally knowledge. One who has such acquiescence is fit for immortality.’

The word buddha in ādibuddha means here bodha ‘knowledge,’ i.e., advaya jñāna which is called Tathāgata as we have already seen (IV. 82-84). See also SŚp, p. 124:

tathāgataṃ bhadanta tāradvatiputra paryēṣitukāmeratī paryēṣitavyāḥ. atmeti bhadanta tāradvatiputra bṛdhāsyaitsd adhivacanam.

All phenomena are only in their imposed or imagined forms, they being buddha, or bodha or jñāna.

Cf. here the well-known phrase in later Vedāntic works: nityasuddhabuddhamuktaśasyaviṣayabhāva for Brahmān.

As regards the meaning of the word ksānti a few words are required here. Generally, ksānti means ‘patience.’ In Buddhism there are different ksāntis of which the following three are often mentioned: (i) dukkhādikācaññaṃksānti ‘patience accepting miseries,’ (ii) dharmaṃdhyānaṃ ‘patience by meditating upon the elements of existence,’ and (iii) pānapākāramasānaṃ ‘patience bearing injuries done by others.’

Besides, in Buddhism it has other meanings. In explaining ksānti (Pali khanti) in AN, I. 94, the commentary, Manorathaprāṇi, writes: khamatīti adhiśoesakkhanti. It says that khanti means adhiśoṣana ‘acquiescence,’ ‘consent,’ or ‘acceptance.’ Again, we read in the AN, III. 118:

imesam avuso tiṇṇaṃ puggalānaṃ katamo te puggalo khamati abhikkantatara ca paśītataro ca.

5 Āgamaśāstra: [IV. 92]

The commentary explains khamati saying khamatīti rucaccī. Accordingly the passage quoted above may be translated thus:

‘Which of these three persons is, O friend, agreeable to you as the most excellent and exalted?’

Here evidently ksānti is ruci ‘pleasure,’ ‘liking.’ This is quite clear also from a passage of the SNT, 897, where the commentator in his MNs explains ksānti (kṣānti) in the text by pema (preman) ‘fondness, predilection,’ chanda ‘desire,’ and rāga ‘lust,’ which are in fact, the same as ruci. 6

Again, in Buddhist texts (CN, p. 164, see Vbh, p. 245) ksānti is described as synonymous with the following words: (i) dṛṣṭi (Pali dīṭṭhi) ‘view,’ ‘belief,’ ‘theory,’ (ii) ruci ‘pleasure,’ ‘liking,’ (iii) laṭṭhi (Pali laddhi) ‘view,’ ‘belief,’ ‘theory,’ (iv) adhyātaya (Pali ajjhāsaya) ‘intention,’ ‘thought,’ and (v) abhiprāya (Pali adhippāya) ‘intention,’ ‘opinion.’ It is therefore quite clear from the above that ksānti sometimes means dṛṣṭi ‘view.’ And so far as I can understand in the present case it is used in this sense.

See SP, p. 136; MSA, XI. 52; SRS, VII; DS, p. 63; Poussins: MV, pp. 362ff., and AK, VI, pp. 165 ff., as well as the works quoted herein; St. LA, p. 396.

7 yā kāc' ima sammatiyo puthujjāvabbhāva 'vā āpi na upeti vidvā

anupayo so upayaṃ kim eyya dīghhe sute khamiṃ akubbamanno

8 See SN, IV, 348: bhātabhātabhāna khanīte cattāro satthāro nānādītikha nānākhanīte nānāruciṭā; MN, I, 487, II, 43. See also the Samuhaagacīrīna on DN, I, 213: khamiṃ tathā katamā khamiṃ yā khamanāt adhivacanāt acañjikkaṃ anasuropano attamanāt cittassatā evam vutta adhivasanakhamiṃ.

9 It may be noted that in Sanskrit, too, kham is not always used in the sense of ‘to be patient,’ or ‘to endure,’ etc. Cf. UC, I, 14: tan no yad uktham sīvan na hi tat khamam te. Here kham has nothing to do with ‘patience’ or ‘forbearance,’ etc. In Pali (DhA, I, 40) khema is said to mean ‘to be fit,’ ‘to seem good, specially in such cases as vathā te khamaya ‘as may seem good to you.’
It is well-known in *Prajñāpāramitāśātras* and the works based thereon that all elements of existence are devoid of the characteristics of their own (*niḥsvabhāva*), they neither originate (*anutpanna*), nor disappear (*aniruddha*), and as such they are quiescent from the outset (*ādiśānta = prakṛtiśānta*), and by the very nature they are merged in *nirvāṇa* (*prakṛtiśīrytā*). This point is mainly described in the following kārikā:

93

ādiśāntāḥ hy anutpānnaḥ prakṛtyaiva sunīrytāḥ |
sarve dharmaḥ samabhinnā ajaṁ sāmyamā víśarañcamā ś.

'All elements of existence are quiescent from the outset, non-originated, and by the very nature perfectly merged in *nirvāṇa*; they are all equal and not different. (The absolute) is unborn, equal and fearless.'

Let us quote here the following from MSA, XI. 51:

*niḥsvabhāvatayā śiddhā uttarottaraniśrayāt |
anutpānnaṁiruddhādiśāntapraṇīrytāḥ ||

Here follows the commentary:

*niḥsvabhāvatayānuputtayanādayaḥ. yo hi niḥsvabhāvah so 'nut-
panno yo 'nutpannaḥ so 'niruddho yo 'niruddhaḥ sa ādiśānto ya ādiśāntaḥ sa prakṛtiśīrytāḥ.*

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1. *Tīb. gzod.ma.nas.shi.ba, lit. adiva tānta.*
2. See III. 2, 38; IV. 77, 80, 93, 100.
3. See the note on *voiśāraṇya* in the next kārikā. *Cf. nirbhaya* in I. 25, III. 35; and *abhaya* in IV. 78, and *Upaniṣads*, ChU, I. 4. 4, 5; IV. 15, 1. etc.
4. This is as reconstructed by L. v. according to the Chinese version. The original Sanskrit is lost. The scribe has, however, given here a corrupted kārikā and it is as follows:

*niḥsvabhāvatayā śiddhā uttarottaraniśrayāḥ |
anutpādo 'niruddhaḥ cādiśāntiḥ parinīrytīḥ.*

See MSA, Tome II (French Translation), p. 122.

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*Owing to the absence of nature there are no origination, etc. That which is devoid of nature is not originated; that which is not originated is not suppressed (destroyed); that which is not suppressed is quiescent from the outset; and that which is quiescent from the outset is naturally merged in perfect nirvāṇa.'

In the text *sānta* (connected with *ādiśānta*) and *nirvāṇa* (connected with *suniśīryta* = *parinīśīryta*) are actually nothing but *apraṇītā* meaning 'not coming forth,' 'not arising,' 'not originating.' Elements of existence are *ādiśānta* and *suniśīryta*; it implies that originally they do not originate, and so to speak, they are in *sānti* and *nirvāṇa*. For the above explanation of the two words see MV, p. 529: ya'praṇītīs tan nirvāṇam iti vyavasthāpayate; p. 538: ya upaśamo 'praṇītīs tan nirvāṇam.

*P. o. s. s. i n* observes (ERE, Vol. 9, p. 851): 'From an absolute point of view (paramārtha) there is no difference (nānābhāva) among things and the characters of things. Things are void (śānya) like the daughter of a barren woman; characters are void like the beauty of this unreal daughter. Things are void, because there is no real origination of things—if no origination, no destruction, an eternal non-existence. There is no difference between existence (sāṃsāra) and *nirvāṇa*. Not being produced (*anutpanna*), not being destroyed, things are from the beginning quiescent (ādiśānta), they are really, naturally (prakṛtya) in *nirvāṇa* (parinīśīryta).'

For the wording and thought of the first half of the kārikā the following passages, besides MSA, XI. 51 already cited (p. 204), may be quoted:

(i) *ādiśānta hy anutpānnaḥ prakṛtyaiva ca nirvāṇa |
dharmam te viśvāti nātha dharmacakrapravartatam.*

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5. See our text: *vidyate na hi nānātvam teṣām kavacāh kīcchana, IV. 91, and also II. 34; III. 24; IV. 93-94.
6. *Quoted in MV, p. 225, and SuS, p. 20 from Āryaratnamahārātra*. See *P. o. s. s. i n*: JRS, 1910, pp. 138-39; *S. v. l. e. v. i*: MSA, Tome II (French tr.), p. 122.
vaiśāradyaṁ tu vai nāsti bhede vicaratāṁ sadā ।
bhedanimnāṁ pṛthagvādās tasmā te kṛpaṇāṁ smṛtāḥ ॥

But verily those who always move following difference have no intrepidity. Those who maintain that a thing is diverse (pṛthaknaṁ) are prone to difference, and are, therefore, regarded as pitiable.

The word vaiśāraṇa in IV. 93 of which the noun, vaiśāradya, is used here requires some explanation. According to Ś they mean ‘pure’ (viśuddha) and ‘purity’ (viśuddhi) respectively. It is supported by Bhojarāja saying in his vṛtti on YS, I. 47 that vaiśāradya means ‘clearness’ (nairmaṇya). This exposition is based on that of Vyāsa on the same YS. The idea behind it may be explained in another way.

1 See IV. 91 and note 5 on IV. 93.
2 Viśuddhavrāsamāla-petasaya prakṣetāmno buddhisattvasya rajastamo- bhyaṁ abhaṁbhetabā svachabā sthitipravāho vaiśāradyaṁ. Wood translates it thus: ‘When freed from obstruction by impurity, the sattva of thinking substance, the essence of which is light, has a lucid steady flow not overwhelmed by rajas and tamas.’
3 As in India the season sārad ‘autumn’ is particularly clear, anything in that season (sārad ‘autumn’), such as the moon or water, is also clear. Thus sāraṇa with the prefix vi- which here simply emphasizes the idea might have gradually been employed in the sense of ‘clear,” its noun vaiśāradya meaning ‘clearness’. It is read in the group of adhāti (Pāñjika, I. 123), and Vār dh a-mān a explains it in his GM, p. 221, taking it in the sense of pṛavāṇa ‘skillful,’ ‘clever’: sāradāśādaḥ pṛavāṇa vṛṣṭiḥ yādā satāmsārdam udayakāṇṭham dṛṣṭānāṁ sahaṁ tasyā dinti-puruṣānam udayat. Tasyāḥ ca dṛṣṭih pāṇīḥ sakaṁ yādā sārdācaḥ sahaṁ pṛavāṇa-puruṣānam abhinavat vā dṛṣṭiḥ nāryāḥ sārdāḥ pṛavāṇaḥ pṛavāṇa-lakṣyaṁ. He himself is, however, not satisfied with it and goes on to say: athavā vyupātitanāṁ pṛavāṇa-puruṣānam udayaṁ, sārdāḥ pṛavāṇaḥ. The word udayaṁ is four-fold. Again, the following four-fold vaiśāradya is enumerated

The word vaiśāraṇa is, however, of doubtful derivation. The prefix vi- only intensifies the meaning of sāraṇa one of the meanings of which is ‘mature,’ i.e., ‘rich in years’ (sāraṇa ‘a year’), ‘old.’ Accordingly the secondary meaning with the prefix vi- is pṛavāṇa ‘clever.’ As boldness (pṛavāṇa) generally depends on one’s maturity vaiśāraṇa also means ‘bold’ (pṛavāṇa).

In both Sanskrit and Pali the word sāraṇa (Pali sāraṇa) means apratītta or apragālba ‘timid,’ ‘not bold,’ and vaiśāraṇa (Pali vaiśāraṇa) is used to mean ‘scholar’ (paṭidita) and ‘bold’ (pṛavāṇa).

In Buddhist writings vaiśāradya (Pali vesārajja) is explained as opposite to sāraṇa (Pali sāraṇa) which means ‘timidity.’ That vaiśāradya is ‘intrepidity’ (nirbhaya) is very clearly said in AKV, p. 646. 8 In Buddhism vaiśāradya is four-fold, viz., the vaiśāradya regarding (i) the highest knowledge of all things (sarvadharmaḥ-sambodhivaśāradya), (ii) the knowledge of destroying all the human passions (sarvāsava-kṣayajāna), (iii) right-guessing the impediments (antarākṣadharmā-nanartha-vāsanācchaya-kāraṇa), and (iv) the rightness of the way leading to salvation (nairājñavikapratītavattāto). 

⁸ It is read in the group of adhāti (Pāñjika, I. 123), and Vār dh a-mān a explains it in his GM, p. 221, taking it in the sense of pṛavāṇa ‘skillful,’ ‘clever’: sāradāśādaḥ pṛavāṇa vṛṣṭiḥ yādā satāmsārdam udayakāṇṭham dṛṣṭānāṁ sahaṁ tasyā dinti-puruṣānam udayat. Tasyāḥ ca dṛṣṭih pāṇīḥ sakaṁ yādā sārdācaḥ sahaṁ pṛavāṇa-puruṣānam abhinavat vā dṛṣṭiḥ nāryāḥ sārdāḥ pṛavāṇaḥ pṛavāṇa-lakṣyaṁ. He himself is, however, not satisfied with it and goes on to say: athavā vyupātitanāṁ pṛavāṇa-puruṣānam udayaṁ, sārdāḥ pṛavāṇaḥ. The word udayaṁ is four-fold. Again, the following four-fold vaiśāradya is enumerated
By modern scholars vaiśāradya is variously explained or translated. Childers says (Dictionary, p. 564) it is 'confidence or fearlessness,' evidently taking viśāraṇa to mean 'bold' (pragalbha). Lévi explains it as 'assurance' (MSA, French tr., p. 319). Kerr in his Eng. translation of SP (SBE, Vol. XXI), p. 246, interprets (referring to Būrṇaṇa: Lotus, p. 396; S. Hardy: Eastern Monachism, p. 291) it as 'absence of hesitation.' But to be consistent with the explanations offered by Vyāsa and Bhojarāja, Kerr's exposition of the word in his Histoire du Bouddhisme dans l'Inde (French translation by G. Huét in the Annales du Musée Guimet, Tome X), Tome I, p. 283, deserves to be consulted in this connection.

In the MVs, Vol. II, p. 261: (i) kāya, (ii) viśāraṇa, (iii) cītra and (iv) pūrṇa. The last term is not clear, and Senart supposes (p. 345) that it is pūrṇag. Still it is to be ascertained.

In Śīlākā's tīkā on Skr. XIV. 17, viśāraṇa (Pkt. viśāraya) is explained as pratipādaka.

95

ajeśv ajam asāmkrāntaṃ dharmesu jñānaṃ iṣyate
tato na kramate jñānaṃ asāigam tena kirtitam

"But only those who are quite certain about the ajā 'unborn' and sāmya 'same' are possessed of great wisdom. The people, however, do not penetrate into it." 1

1 For ajā and sāmya see IV. 77, 80, 93, 100.
2 It refers to ajā and sāmya in the text. S explains that taking it to signify the ośraman 'way' of the sages which an ordinary man cannot grasp. Here S quotes the following from the MB: sarvabhatāmabhātasya sarvabhatāhātasya ca | devā api mārga mhuṣyant apadasya padaiṣa | śakunām īvākāte gatiś naivopalabhyate. 3

The first two lines with some variations in a are quoted also by Śāyāna in his commentary on the TA. VIII. 2 (p. 547). For śakunām see S on BU, p. 637: tā utarahante he 'pi śakunām pādaṃ draṣṭum; DP, 92.93 (with Āṭhakathā): ākāśe 'va śakunānaṃ gati teṣaṃ durāgni; Again, antarikṣi śakunās

96

aṇumātre'pi vaidharmye jayamāne 'vipaścitaḥ
asāigatā sādam nāsti kim utavaraṇacyutīḥ

"If there be even the least difference (of elements of existence) in the mind) of an unwise man, there is no state of

1 It is to be remembered that all elements of existence are in fact non-different: sarve dharmāṃ samabhinnāḥ (IV. 93), as we have already seen.
(its) being always free from attachment (asaṅgata), not to speak of the disappearance of the covering.

The state of being always asaṅga of jñāna or citta is referred to in the preceding kārikā (96).

As regards āvarana ‘covering’ or ‘obstruction’, it is two-fold, (i) klesa-āvarana and (ii) jñeya-āvarana. Klesa literally means that which troubles one by the strokes of various kinds of misery, as Vācaspata Miśra would explain it (YS, I. 24). Accordingly, as sinful desires, vices, or passions are for misery they are termed klesa. For the same reason it also means ‘impurity’, ‘stain’. Sometimes the word stands for ‘lust’ or ‘sensuality’ (rāga), ‘aversion’ (dvesa), and ‘bewilderment’ (moha). There are also ten klesas, lobha, dvesa, moha, māna, etc. (DSq, §1548a). For further details see Pāli-English Dictionary, PTS, s.v. kilesa, and MV, p. 361. Klesa-āvarana thus means the āvarana ‘covering’ or ‘obstruction’ in the form of klesa. Until and unless they are destroyed (klesaprahāya) the truth is not manifested, nor can one attain to the highest bliss. Klesas are regarded as the mother of all miseries. Similarly jñeya is also an āvarana. The word jñeya means ‘knowledge’, i.e., the dharmas ‘elements of existence’ which are not substantial and thus have no reality. Yet one perceives them (jñeyopalabdhi). And as long as one continues to do so one is far from the goal. Thus jñeya is regarded as an āvarana.

2 DS, CXV; MSA, IX, 3, 12, XX-XXI, 44; BA, IX, 55.
3 In YS, II, 3, 5-9, there are five kinds of klesa, viz., avidyā, asmitā, rāga, dvesa, and abhinivṛti.
4 See MV, p. 538: klesāntam aparāpratītya no pramanopāpanāh.
5 BAP, pp. 447: klesā eva vāyati, jñeyam ca vāyati āvaranam. Jñeyam eva samānopāparāpratītā iti avāyitaḥ. Sometimes jñeyāvaranam is explained as jñeya āvaranam (Tk, p. 15: jñeyāvaranam api sarvasmin jñeya jñeyapratibhandhāḥ samā*npām ajñānam, ‘the obstacle regarding the knowable’, i.e., the reality or the things in their true nature). See TSP, pp. 869-890. Sometimes (AN, III, 436; AK, IV, p. 201) there are three āvaranas, (i) klesāvarana, (ii) karmāvarana (5 śāntanyaḥ and 10 akṣara karmacetas), and (iii) vipakāvarana (8 akṣara).

IV. 97-98] ĀGAMAŚĀSTRA

and it must be removed (jñeyānupalabdhi) for the realization of nirvāna. Jñeya-āvarana disappears by one’s realizing the unreality of the elements of existence as separate entities (dharmanirātmaya), while klesa-āvarana goes away by the realization of the unreality of the individual ego (pudgalanirātmaya).6 Or both the āvaranas can be removed by the meditation on śūnyatā (BA, IX, 55).

6 LA, VII, p. 241: jñeyāvaranam punar mahāmate dharmānirātmaya

īrītāvaitā vāvānāvānā vāvā vanā śūnā vā pārdhaścānāścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścānā śūnā pārdhaścān

The removal of āvarana is referred to in the preceding kārikā, but in the next kārikā it is said that, in fact, there is no āvarana at all:

98

alabhāvaranāḥ sarve dharmāḥ prakṛtinirmalāḥ ।
adau buddhās tathā muktā budhyanta iti nāyakāh ॥

‘All the elements of existence have always been without any covering and asunder in their nature. From the beginning they are knowledge as well as in nirvāna (mukta)—this the Buddhhas understand.’

For āvarana see IV, 92,93. Because the elements of existence do not originate they are said as mukta, i.e., in sānti or nirvāna. On this see IV, 93, p. 205.

For prakṛtinirmala see IV, 91; MV, p. 539:

avāca naṃ sarva śūnyāḥ śāntādinirmalāḥ ।
y aṃ jānti dharmaṃ kūrā buddhaṃ sacyate ॥


ādiśuddham anupannam niṣvabhavam anāvālam ।
jagad bhavana sampāyan na baddho na ca muncyate ॥

In the kārikā the word nāyaka is a name for the Buddha, MVt, §1. 20; AP, 4, 725; BA, II, 31, 66; SS, p. 5, l. 8.

1 See Poussin in JRAS, 1910, p. 139.
Let us remember here that at the very beginning of the present Chapter (IV. I) the author has told us, that in the opinion of 'the greatest of men' (doṣpadāṃ vara), i.e. the Buddha, jñāna and jñeya are identical. He has also repeatedly shown above¹ and specially in IV. 96, that jñāna is asaṅga as it does not relate itself to the dharmas or objects which have no reality. The author refers now to this fact and concludes showing the supreme truth that according to the Buddha there is in reality neither the jñāna nor the jñeya or dharmas as he has said neither of them:

kramate na hi buddhasya jñānaṃ dharmeṣu tāyināh।
sarvadharmanās tathā jñānaṃ naitad buddhena bhāṣītām॥

'According to the Buddha who instructs the way known to him (tāyin),² jñāna does not approach the dharmas (i.e., it does not relate itself to the objects).³ But all dharmas as well as jñāna—this has not been said by the Buddha.

¹ See IV, 72, 79, 96. Cf. III, 32.
² The word tāyin is thus interpreted in BAP, p. 75; tāyinām iti. svādhigamamārgadānaṃ. yad uktam tāyin svādhigamamārgakāthā (PV, 2, 145). See my paper, Pramaṇavārttikā of Dharmakīrti, II, Vol. XIII, 1937. This explanation is partly followed by Udayanācārya in his Tātparātikā- paristaddhi, Bib. Ind., p. 8 in explaining tāyin in Vācaspati Mīra's Tātparātikā, 2 (ākṣāpyā prāyaścita): tāyin tattvāyavasāya samāskrāntaṃ sampradāya pravṛttavakāh. Prajñākaratmaḥ in his BAP, p. 75, offers another explanation: athavā tāyāḥ samāgraṃ. āsasāsām aprativṛttihinā nirvārasatya avasthāyānām. This word is widely used both in Buddhist (LV, p. 421; BAIII, 2; SP I, pp. 23, 57, 67, etc.,) and Jain (YS, Vol. I, pp. 1, 14; DV, p. 115) works and is misunderstood. Sometimes it is read as tāyin 'protector,' and tāpin (as in the present case, see Variants). The word tāyin as a name for Buddha is translated into Tibetan by ski.b.rpo (MV I, § I, 15) which suggests its Sanskrit equivalent trāyin 'a protector.' See JRAI, 1910, p. 140; JPTS, 1891-1893, p. 53; JAI, 1912, p. 243; Proceedings and Transactions of the Second Oriental Conference, Calcutta, 1922, pp. 450-1.
³ See IV, 96.
Thus the Buddha did not say anything in fact, yet the people according to their own dispositions think that he did so. We read therefore in a text, Tathāgataguhāyasūtra, quoted in MV, p. 539, just after the passage (ii) cited above:

atha ca yathābhūmikām sarvasattvā nānādhītvāyās tāṃ vividhām tathāgatavācaṃ niścarantāṃ samjñānantī. teṣāṃ evaṃ pūthak pūthag bhavati. ayam bhagavān asamabhyaṃ imaṃ dharmam deśayati. vayaṃ ca tathāgatasya dharmadeśānāṃ śūnumāḥ. tatra tathāgato na kalpayati na vikalpayati sarvakaś-pākāpākajalaśaśānāprapaścavigato hi tāntamate tathāgato iti vistarāḥ. 5

Continues MV:


The following may also be quoted here from the LA, p. 194:

na ca mahāmāte tathāgata akṣarapattānaṃ dharmam deśayanti. 6 punar mahāmāte yo śrāvatī tam dharmam deśayati sa pralapata, niraśaratvād dharmasya. ata etasmat kāraṇān mahāmāte uktaṃ desanāpātāyā maṇyaścī ca buddhabodhisattvair yathaikam api akṣaraṃ tathāgata nādāhārani na vyāhārantī. tat kasya hetor yad utanākṣaratvād dharmāṇāṃ. na ca nāthopasaṃhitānaudāhānti. udāhāranti eva vikalpaṃ upādāyāpadāyā mahāmāte sarvadharmaṇāṃ śasanalopaḥ svāt. 7

And the conclusion arrived at here that one should rest on the sense and not on letters, for one who rests on letters not only misnoneself, but also cannot make others understand:


5 In Buddhist Sanskrit texts we have often "saraṇa" for "saraṇa in such cases.

6 MV, p. 56: paramārtho bhī āryaṃ tuśanmabhavāḥ.

7 TU, II. 4. 1: yato vācno nivartante aprāpya manasi saha; KU, II. 3; BS, III. 2. 17; The Basic Conception of Buddhism, pp. 19 ff.
The second ground is this: The Buddha has said nothing, because what he is reported to have said was from the past. Nothing depends on the birth or absence of birth of the Tathāgatas, the true nature of elements of existence remains always the same. This is meant by the statement that the speech of the Buddha is no speech (avacanam buddhavacanam). Taking both the grounds together the LA, pp. 143-144, says:

yad idam uktam bhagavata yām ca rātrīṃ tathāgato bhismambuddho yām ca rātrīṃ parinirvāyati atrāntara ekam apy aksaraṇaṃ tathāgatena nodāḥtaṇaḥ na pravyaharīyati avacanam buddhavacanam iti. kim idam sandhāyoktaṃ. bhagavān aha. dharmadvaṃ mahāmate sandhāya mayaitad uktam. katamad dharmadvaṃ. yaduta pratyātmadharmatāṃ ca paurāṇasthitih-dharmatāṃ ca. utpādād vā tathāgatānāṃ anutpādād vā tathāgatānāṃ sthitaivaśāṃ dharmānāṃ dharmatā dharmasthiti dharmaniyāyātā mahāmate. tad yathā mahāmate kaścid eva pruṣo 'tvāyāṃ paryājan paurāṇaṃ nagaraṃ anupāṣyed avikalapathapraŚvaś. sa taṃ nagaraṃ anakhyātata satyāt. atma etasmāt kāśanāṃ mahāmate mayedam uktam yām ca rātrīṃ tathāgato bhismambuddho yām ca rātrīṃ parinirvāyati atrāntara ekam apy aksaraṇaṃ tathāgatena nodāḥtaṇaḥ nodāḥtaṇi.

The following may also be quoted here from the VCh, p. 243 just after the passage (vi) cited above:

tat kasya hetō. yo 'sau tathāgatenā dharmo 'bhismambuddho deśito va agrāhyāḥ so 'nabhiDapayāḥ. na sa dharmo nādharmah. tat kasya hetō. asamśktaprabhāvītaḥ hy āryapudgalāḥ.

It is thus quite reasonable that the author should declare at the end of his discussion the transcendental truth of jīva

and dharma which he begins the chapter with and discusses it throughout.

In the last kārikā of his work the author pays his homage to the highest truth to be realized, i.e., nirvāṇa of the Buddhists, and Brahman of the Vedāntins:

100
durdarām atigambhiram ajāṃ sāmyaṃ viśāradam t' buddhāṃ padaṃ anānātvaṃ namaskurmo yathābalam

iti gauḍapādiya āgamasāstrām 'lātaśāntyākhyāṃ caturthāṃ prakaraṇaṃ samāptam.

'Having understood that state which is difficult to be seen, very deep, unborn, equal, fearless, and free from variety, we salute it according to our power.

Here ends, in the Āgamasāstra of Gaudapādi,

Book Four called the Cessation of the Fire-brand.'

The word pada 'state' in Buddhist literature is used also to mean nirvāṇa. But though it cannot be taken as a peculiarity in that literature, for the word is employed in the similar sense, i.e., mokṣa or Brahman also in Brāhmaṇical works, one is inclined to take it in the sense of nirvāṇa considering all that is discussed in this chapter. The two epithets durdarāsa and atigambhira strengthen the view. In Buddhist literature

1 See IV. 93d which is the same as b of the present kārikā.
2 I. 16; III. 1, 19, 26, 33, 43, 47; IV. 11, 12, 13, 38, 46, 48, 57 10, 74, 80, 93, 95, 96.
3 III. 2, 38; IV. 77, 80, 93, 95.
4 IV. 93. Cf. abhaga, IV. 78; nirbhaya, III. 35.
5 III. 13; IV. 91; BU, IV. 4, 19; KU, IV. 10-11.
6 AP, 619: padaṃ śāne parittane nibhannami ca kārāe.
7 For instance, KU, II. 15, III, 7-9.

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sudurdśa (Pali sududdasa) is given as a synonym for nirvāṇa (AP, 7) and the words durśa (Pali duddasa) "difficult to be seen" and gambhirā "deep" are frequently used in connection with it.\(^8\)

The word bala ‘power’ in yatthābala refers to the well-known five-fold bala in Buddhism, viz., (1) śraddhā-bala, (2) virya\(^1\), (3) smṛti\(^1\), (4) samādhi\(^1\), and (5) prajñā\(^1\), or the power of faith, energy, recollection, contemplation, and wisdom respectively.\(^9\) By using the word it is implied that nirvāṇa is realized by the exercise of the five-fold power referred to.

In the colophon for alāta ‘fire-brand’ see IV. 47-50. The use of the word alātaśanti ‘cessation of the fire-brand’ is very significant and appropriate indicating the quintessence of what is discussed herein.

Poussin has traced (JRAS, 1910, p. 135) the simile of the firebrand (alātacakra) in the MU,\(^10\) VI, 24.\(^11\) But this simile can in no way be connected with the name of the present chapter, alātaśanti. For the use of the simile in that Up, is

\(^8\) See nirvāṇatīpo dharma gambhirō durśat ca, LV, pp. 509, 513, 515; gambhirām durśatām śūkṣmām dharmacakram, ibid, pp. 422, 436 (gambhirō durśatī māma); ASP, p. 341: gambhirām iti subhute ūnyaśa etad adhivacanam* virāgaśa nirodhasya nirvāṇasya vigamasyaad adhivacanam yad uta gambhirām iti; MVg, I. 5, 2. 8: ayaṃ dharma gambhirō dudhāsa. Cf. KU, II, 12 where durśatā is used as an adjective of the deva referring, according to the Commentators, to ātman.

\(^9\) AN, III, 12; DN, II, 120; etc., DS, XLVIII. These five are well-known also in the system of Yoga (YS, I, 20), though these are not described here as bala. According to scholiasts śraddhā implies the cleanliness (samprasāda, prasāda) of the mind. V asubhanda (AK, VIII, 9) is of the same opinion. See ibid, also II, 25.

\(^10\) Maitrīyana Brāhmaṇa Up. is another name for it. But it does not show any Vedic traces. From its style, it appears that it belongs to a considerably later period.

\(^11\) It runs: alātacakram iva sphurantam ādityavanam ūrjasvavat brahma tamasāḥ paryapasyant. Cowell (Bibl. Ind.) translates it: “he beholds Brahman flashing like the circle of a whirling torch, in colour like the sun, full of vigour.”

not for showing any unreality of Brahman but simply for indicating his splendour. On the other hand, here in our work, as well as in Buddhist works, frequently, and in every case, so far as goes my information, it is used as one of the numerous symbols of unreality.\(^12\) The following may be quoted here from ČS, 325:

alātacakraniṃśvapnamayāmbucandrakaśaḥ

dhūmakantahpratīṣṭhānyārṣaḥphalavat brahmrāḥ samo bhavah

Poussin observes (JRAS, 1910, p. 136) that the title of the fourth Chapter, alātaśanti, cannot be said so far to be Buddhist, as the phrase alātaśanti has not been traced in Buddhist books. We cannot however, think so. For, it may equally be said that it is not traced in any Brāhmaṇic work older than the ĀŚ.\(^13\) Now, it may not be traced in Buddhist works, but the word alāta as a symbol of unreality according to the Buddhists, of which their works are full,\(^14\) is very well-known. Gauḍapāda himself has used it as such in his ĀŚ not less than four times (IV. 47-50). He has shown taking the stand of a Buddhist, the unreality of the visible world comparing it with alāta, and finding out the cause of its appearance and showing thereby as to how it ceases. And if it is so, we cannot say that the chapter of the title is not Buddhist.

\(^12\) Such as marumaricchā, gandharvanasar, kālpaśca. See MV, 139. 21.

\(^13\) A similar phrase, maitrīyakalāśanti, occurs in YV, III, 6. 2.

\(^14\) See among others LA, pp. 9, 96, etc.

Finis.
MĀṆḌUKYA UPAṆĪṢAD

TEXT

1

om īty etad akṣaram idāṁ sarvāṁ tasyopavākyāhyānam
dhūtam bhavad bhaviyad iti sarvāṁ oṁkāra eva. yac cānyat
trikālātitaṁ tad api oṁkāra eva.

2

sarvāṁ hy etad brahmāyam ātmā brahma so'yaṁ ātmā
catūpaṇḍ.

3

jāgamasthāno bahiṣpajitaṁ saptāṅgo ekoṇavimśatimukhaṁ
sthūlabhug vaisvānaṁ prathamāṁ pādaṁ.

4

svapnasthāno 'nālprajitaṁ saptāṅga ekoṇavimśatimukhaṁ
praviviktabhuk tājasaṁ dvitiyaṁ pādaṁ.

1 ChaU, I, 1, 1 : om īty akṣaram tasyopavākyāhyam ; cf. TU, I, 8, 1 ;
om itidāṁ sarvāṁ.
2 Aṭ omission.
3 Cf. BU, III, 8, 3, IV, 6, 7 : yad dhūtam ca bhavac ca bhaviyac ca.
4 For īty etad Aṭ add.
5 Aṭ adds hiranyakarha after it.
yatrasupto\textsuperscript{4} na kañcana kāmam kāmayate na kañcana svapnam paśyati\textsuperscript{7} tat susuptam. susuptasthāna ekabhūtah\textsuperscript{9} prajānāghana eva\textsuperscript{8} nandamayo bh anandabhuk cetomukhaḥ prājñas tṣitiyaḥ pādāḥ.

\begin{itemize}
\item[6] eṣa sarveśvara\textsuperscript{10} eṣa sarva-jīva\textsuperscript{11} eṣa ‘ntaryāmy\textsuperscript{12} eṣa yoniḥ sarvasya\textsuperscript{13} prabhavāpyayau\textsuperscript{14} hi bhūtānām.
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item[7] nāntabhrajaṁ na bahisprajñāṁ nobhayatābhrajāṁ na prajānāghanaṁ na prajāṁ nāprajñāṁ adṛṣṭam avyavahāryam agrāhyam alakṣaṇam acintyam avyapadeśyam ekāṭmapratyaya-sārāṁ\textsuperscript{15} prapañcāropāmanām śāntaṁ ēvam advaitaṁ catuḥthaṁ manyante. sa ātmā sa vijñeyah.
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item[8] A\textsuperscript{4} susupto for suppto, adds tu before kañcana, and omits eva after āghana.
\item[9] BU, IV. 3. 19.
\item[10] Cf. ekibhūtā, PU, IV. 2; BU, IV. 4. 2.
\item[12] BU, IV. 4. 22: sa va eṣa mahāṁ aja ātmā yo ‘yam viśādānabhyāṁ pāpeṣu ya eṣo ‘nārādhyām ākāśas tiśmiḥ chete’ eṣa sarveśvarah’.
\item[14] BU, III. 7. 3: eṣa ta ātmantāryāmi.
\item[15] Cf. bhūtyaṁ, MoU, I. 1. 6: yad bhūtyaṁ pi rpaśyantī dhīrāḥ.
\item[16] A\textsuperscript{7} prabhau, \textsuperscript{D} prabhau* for prabhau,\textsuperscript{2} KU, II. 2. 11.
\item[17] A\textsuperscript{1} reads nāntahpraṇāṁ na bhābhrayaḥ after nāpraṇāṁ, and has na praṇāṁ nāpraṇāṁ na ghanāṁ na ghanāpraṇāṁ na praṇāghanām na na praṇānaṁ nāpraṇāṁ. A\textsuperscript{4} omits na praṇāghanām. After alakṣaṇaṁ A\textsuperscript{1} anigamanaḥ (a alīgama) adding to it bhābhrayaḥ (as reads in his commentary: alakṣaṇaṁ alīgama ananumeyam ityarthah) nāntahpraṇāṁ and reading cintyam for acintyam. D\textsuperscript{1} and D\textsuperscript{2} add alīgama before acintyam. A\textsuperscript{4} ekāntaṁ for ekānta-, T\textsuperscript{1} and V\textsuperscript{1} aikāṭmyapraśa for ekāṭmapraśa.
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item[8] so ‘yam ātmā ‘dhyaṅkṣaram oṅkāro ‘dhiṁatram pādā māтра ca pādā akāra ukāra makāra\textsuperscript{16} iti.
\item[9] jāgaritasthāno vaisvānaro ‘kāraḥ\textsuperscript{17} prathamā mātram ādīpi tiva tiva bhuvati ya evāṁ veda.
\item[10] svapnasthānas tajāsa ukāro dvitiyā mātratkarṣad ubhayatvād votkaraṇaḥ vai jñānasatatiḥ samānaḥ ca bhuvati nāsya-abhramavit kule bhuvati ya evāṁ veda.
\item[11] susuptasthānāḥ prajñā makāraḥ tṣitiyaḥ mātra miter apīter vā minoti ha va idam sarvam apītī ca bhuvati ya evāṁ veda.
\item[12] amātraḥ caturtho ‘vyavahāryaḥ prapañcāropāmanāḥ śivo ‘dvaita evam oṅkāra ātmvai. sanviśayā ‘atmanātmam\textsuperscript{18} iti evāṁ veda.
\item[16] A\textsuperscript{2} A\textsuperscript{1} IO ‘raṣ ceti for ‘ra li ti.
\item[17] A\textsuperscript{2} omits ‘kāraḥ.
\item[18] A\textsuperscript{4} prāṭerī, IO āptor for āptet.
\item[19] VS, XXXII, 11: ‘atmanātmanom abhi saṁ viveśa. A\textsuperscript{2} adds paśyati after ‘itmanam. K\textsuperscript{1} Ch M\textsuperscript{1} repeat ya evāṁ veda which follows.
\end{itemize}
B

TRANSLATION

1

Om, this syllable is all this. Its further explanation is: the past, the present, the future—all this is verily om. And whatever else that is beyond the three times, that, too, is verily Om.

2

Verily all this is Brahman; this self (ātman) is Brahman. This same self has four fourths.

3

The first fourth is the Vaiśvānara ‘common-to-all-men,’ i.e., universal, (active) in the waking state, cognitive outwardly, having seven limbs\(^1\) and nineteen mouths\(^2\) enjoying the gross.

\(^1\) According to Ś who follows here ChāU, V. 13. 2, these seven limbs are described thus: The very bright one (saṁjñā), i.e., the heaven is the head. One with various forms (citānuṣṭaya), i.e., the sun is the eye. That which has various paths, i.e., the wind is the breath. The extended space (bahuśa) is the body. Wealth (i.e., water) is the bladder. And the earth is the feet. In the ChāU the number is more than seven.

\(^2\) I.e., the means for experience of objects. According to Ś these are the following: The five organs of sense (buddhāṇāgīrī), the five organs of action (karmendrīṣṭa), the five vital breaths (praśāna), the mind (manas), the intellect (buddhi), egoism (aśīthāna), and thinking (citā). For an explanation of the last four one may be referred to the following:

\[\text{ mano buddhi aśīthāna cītān karāṇām āntāram }\]

\[\text{ saṁjñaya nīcāyat garvaḥ śrāvānām vikāyat āme }\]

These are regarded as ‘mouths,’ because these are the instruments with which one experiences the objects.

4

The second fourth is the Taïjasa ‘brilliant,’ (active) in the dreaming state, cognitive inwardly, having seven limbs and nineteen mouths, enjoying the subtle.

5

That is deep sleep in which one asleep desires no desire whatsoever, nor does he see any dream.

The third fourth is Prājñā ‘wise.’ He is in the sphere of deep sleep, and just unified, a cognition-mass, consisting of bliss and enjoying bliss having the mind as mouth.

6

This is the lord of all, this is the knower of all, this is the controller of all. This is the source of all, for this is the origin and end of beings.

7

Not inwardly cognitive, not outwardly cognitive, not bothwise cognitive, not a cognition-mass, not cognitive, not non-cognitive, not seen, not to be dealt with, not grasppable, having no distinctive marks, not thinkable, not to be defined, the essence of the consciousness of the oneness of the self, the cessation of the expression,\(^3\) quiescent, blissful, without a second—(such) they think is the fourth. He is the self. He is to be realized.

8

The same self is Om from the point of view of a syllable, and from the point of view of its measure, the fourths are measures and the measures are fourths, and they are A, U and M.

\(^3\) Or, the expansion of the universe, as explained generally.
Vaiśvānara ‘common-to-all-men’ who is (active in) the waking state is the first measure, A, on account of its obtaining⁴ (āptī), or on account of its being the first. Verily, indeed, he obtains all desires and becomes first, who knows thus.

10

Taijasa ‘brilliant’ who is (active in) the sleeping state is the second measure, U, on account of exaltation or intermediateness.

Verily, indeed, he exalts the continuity of knowledge, becomes equal,⁵ and none who does not know Brahman is born in the family of him who knows thus.

11

Prājña ‘wise’ who is (active in) the state of deep sleep is the third measure, M, on account of measuring and inmerging.

Verily, indeed, he measures all this and becomes (its) inmerging—he who knows thus.

12

The fourth is without any measure, with which there can be no dealing, it is cessation of expression, blissful, without the second. Thus om is the self, indeed. Enters he with his self into the self—he who knows thus.

Here ends the Upaniṣad called Māṇḍūkya.

⁴ Or, pervading.
⁵ See the note in Hume’s translation.

II

VARIANTS

Book I

1. a. All excepting A¹ bahisprajñā for bahisprajñā. d. A¹ PU¹ PU² smṛtaḥ, N Th mataḥ for sthitāḥ.
   2. a. A² daksināgni⁴, V⁵ daksinēkṣi⁴ for daksinākṣi⁴; D² "mukho for mukhe. b. T⁵ "ca for "ca tu. c and d are omitted in A².
   3. a and b excepting praviviktābhūk are omitted in A². d. A² adds tan before nibodhata.
   4. b. A² ca for tu which is omitted in A¹. c. A¹ A² K² IO ánandaṃ for ánandaś; V⁵ A¹ tu for ca; IO prājñāḥ for prājñāṃ.
   5. d. A³ trividhā for tridhā; A² tptam for tptim; A¹ A² K² vijnānata, KN vijnānatha for nibodhata.
   7. a. K³ bhūtānām for bhūtānām. b. D¹ D³ "īty eva nīcayah for "īti vinīcayah; D⁵ sa nīcayah for vinīcayah. c. D¹ sarve for sarvam; D¹ D³ prānā, A¹ prānāṃ for prāna; A¹ "ś cetoṁśūn for "ś cetoṁśūn.
   8. a. A¹ D³ vibhātī prā for vibhātī prā. Kn. vibhāvanam for prasavam; K¹ pradvadanty ane for prasavam tu ane. c. A¹ "sārūpeti for "svārūpeti. d. V⁵ vikalpyate, IO vikalpitah for vikalpitā.
   10. A² adds bhūtīm before bhūtānām. d. A¹ matyante, K¹ mānte for manyante.
10. a. A' nivṛttaḥ, T' nivṛtte for nivṛttaḥ. c. A' bhūtānām for bhūtānām. IO omits the kārikā here, but reads it just after kārikā 12.
11. a. A' A² A³ D¹ D² buddhau for buddhau. d. A' M' V' D¹ V' A' K' dvau tau, PU² and the MSS A B C D F of NSi (pp. 194, 246) dvau tu. A' A² D¹ dvaita, PU¹ dvaitam. K² PU² dvau tu for dvai tu, while for this line K² reads dvau turya na tu sidhyataḥ.
12. a. V² parat for param. b. V² vāṃ for cāṃ, PU¹ cāpi nāntam for nāpi nāntam. d. K³ A' A¹ A² A¹ D¹ D² V² turyaṇaḥ tat (cf. Ś), KN turiyaṃ for turiyaḥ.
14. c. svapnam tu for ca svapnam.
15. a. D¹ PU¹ grahataḥ for īhṛataḥ. c. A¹ 'nayoh for tayoh.
17. a and b. A¹ vidyate vivartate for vidyeta nivarteta. c. A¹ sarvam for doātām.
18. a. K³ na nivarteta for vinivarteta; K¹ omits it. b. K¹ viśālito for kalpitō.
19. a. A' 'syādīvōi for 'syātvāvāti'.
20. a. All excepting A' V¹ V¹ viśānē for viśāṇā. b. A¹ A² A¹ śpuḥah for śpuḥām. c. A² sapratī for sampratī. d. A¹ 'vidhīm for 'vidham.
22. a. All excepting PU¹ yat for yah supported by Ś. b. D¹ IO PU² veti, K² cetī for vetī; A¹ tadatāḥ, K² niścitaḥ, PU¹ niścitaḥ for niścitaḥ. c. M' sampū for sa pu. d. M' 'caīśa for 'caīva.
24. a. A¹ onkāro for onkāram.
25. a. prāṇavo for prāṇavo.

Books I, II] VARIANTS

26. a. For this K¹ prānavo brahmavaraḥ brahmaḥ. b. A' A² A² D¹ D² M' V² V² parah for paraḥ; IO paraḥ svātah for paraḥ svātah.
27. d. A' 'taraḥ for 'taram.
29. b. A' svātah for īsvah.

Colophon:
A¹ māṇḍūkyopaniṣat samāpta. D¹ D² māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-avyākhyāne gauḍapādabhagavatāṁ kītāu oṁkāraṁ añayaḥ prathamaṁ prakaraṇam. IO iti māṇḍūkyopaniṣat samāpta. K¹ iti māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-gauḍapādavyākhyāne oṁkāraṁ-prathamaṁ prakaraṇam samāptam. K² iti māṇḍūkyopaniṣat samāptam (sic). hare kṛṣṇa hare kṛṣṇa. PU¹ prathamaṁ prakaraṇam. PU² iti śrīgovindapūjāpyādasya paramahamsaparīvṛajāki-caryasya yākṣarabhaṅgovatāḥ kītāu āgamaṁstravigyanam prathamaṁ-prakaraṇe māṇḍūkyavākyāñcam samāptam.
V² māṇḍūkyopaniṣat samāptā. V² iti māṇḍūkyākhyāṃ prathamaṁ prakaraṇam.

BOOK II

1. a. A² bhūtānām for bhūtānām. c. A¹ A² Conc. bhūtānām for bhūtānām.
2. b. V² D² dehān for deśān. c. V² prabhuddhaḥ for prabhuddhaḥ.
3. Before this kārikā B² reads here the kārikā 4 once more.
4. b. A² A² B² IO K¹ M¹ PU² tasmāt for tathā. d. All samāptaḥ for samāptaḥ na: A² vidyate for bhidyate.
5. a. A² omits svātah; A² A² B² D¹ D² IO PU² V² V² riśasthānā for 'rite sthānā.
7. b. PU² svāpnaḥ for svāpne; V² ca pratiḥ, all others vipratiḥ for 'pi prati.
8. a. A³ A² B³ apūrvasthānīdharmo, A¹ B¹ D¹ Dº Mº PU¹ PU² Vº V¹ apūrvam sthānīdharmo for apūravasthānīdharmas. c. Vº mataḥ for gantrā. d. K¹ Vº yadāive for yathāive.º

9. a. A¹ "evttāv ayaṁ tv anta", A² "vatāv artheṣa ant", B¹ J Jh Vº "evttāv ayaḥ tv anta", Gh C "evttāpy anta", IO "evttāv ayaḥ anta" for "evttāv ayaḥ tv anta"; K¹ "svanta" for "tv anta". b. Vº kalitaṁ for kalitaṁ; B¹ D¹ Dº Gh J Jh K¹ asat, A² IO tad asat, A¹ tad idam asat for tv asat. c. A¹ A² B² C¹ D¹ Dº IO Jh K¹ N PU² Vº "ś cetasā for "ś ceto", A¹ A² B¹ IO add hi and C Jh N add ca after ghiṭam. d. Vº vaitathyaṁ ubhayor api omitting dīṣṭam, A¹ K¹ sadasatvā vaitathyaṁ omitting dīṣṭam, B¹ C¹ D¹ Dº IO Jh N sadasatvā vaitathyaṁ dīṣṭam, A² sadasatvā vaitathyaṁ yuktam.

10. a. A³ D¹ Dº anta", Vº hy anta" for tv anta". b. B¹ D¹ Dº Gh J Jh K¹ Vº asat, A¹ A² tad idam asat for tv asat. c. A¹ A² B¹ D¹ Dº Gh J Jh K¹ PU¹ PU² Vº "ś cetasā for "ś ceto", A¹ A² B¹ IO add hi, the last one omitting sat, C Jh N add ca omitting sad, A¹ A² B¹ Gh J Jh add hi after ghiṭam. d. A¹ A² sadasatvā vaitathyaṁ dīṣṭam, B¹ D¹ Dº Gh J Jh Vº sadasatvā vaitathyaṁ yuktam, K¹ satyadatvā vaitathyaṁ for yuktam vaitathyaṁ etayoh. IO and P omit the kārikā entirely.

11. a-b. A² adds tad after vaitathyaṁ, Vº bhedānāṁ vaitathyaṁ for vaitathyaṁ bhedānāṁ. c. Vº ekatān for ka etān.º


13. b. All except P uyavasthitaṁ for uyavasthitaṁ. c. A¹ A² B¹ IO "ś cittāṁ for "ś citta", B² first "ś cittāṁ then the anusvāra is struck off.


15. d. A³ viśeṣa mānyahetukāḥ (evidently for viśeṣo mānyahetukāḥ) for viśeṣas tv indriyāntare. After that reading the MS reads asti tv indriyāntare.

18. a. A¹ A² B¹ D¹ Dº PU¹ ātmāvī for ātmāvī.

33. c. A¹ atha dva³, A² artha dva³ for upa dva³. d. A² yasmā³ for tasmā³, śivaḥ for śiva.
34. a. A² nātmabhāvena, all others nātmabhāvena for nānyabhāvena; J nābhedam for nānedam. c. A² prthaktopt prthak kī³, A³ prthaktopt prthaktopt ca, D¹ prthān nāprthath kī³, D³ prthaktāprthāk kī³ for prthān nāprthāk kī³.
36. b. B² yojayat for yojayet.
37. a. PU² niṣṭruter for niṣṭutir, A² stuto for "skāro.
38. a. K¹ māttava³ for tattva³.

Colephon:
B¹ iti śrīgovindabhagavatpājyapādāśīgyasya paramahamsaparivrājākāracyasya śīśānkārabhagavatpādāśasya kṛtāv agamaśtravivarāghe dviyitaṁ prakaraṇaṁ vaitathyākhyam samāptaṁ.
K² iti śīmacādyopaniṣadgauḍapādavyākhyāyē vedaḥsā (sic) dviyitaṁ prakaraṇaṁ samāptaṁ.
PU² iti śrīgovindabhagavatpājyapādāśīgyasya paramahamsaparivrājākāracyasya śīśānkārabhagavatpāde kṛtāv agamaśtravivarāghe dviyitaṁ prakaraṇaṁ vaitathyākhyam samāptaṁ. V³ "agamaśtreat vaitathyākhyam dviyitaṁ prakaraṇam samāptaṁ.
V⁴ "vaitathyākhyam dviyitaṁ prakaraṇam.

**BOOK III**

1. a. A¹ upāśātri³ for upāsanātri³. b. A¹ A² A³ Gh N J jñāte for jñate.
2. b. D³ sajāti for "m ajāti; A¹ A² IO yathā for gatam. c. A¹ A² tathā for yathā.

In D¹ the leaf containing kārikās 2-7 is missing.
4. b. V⁴ kāśoda³ for "kāśada³. c and d are omitted in V⁴.

**VARIANTS**

8. b. A¹ gagaṃanan for gagaṃanam; A² malino for malinam.
9. c. All sthitau for sthitaḥ in V⁴. c-d. V⁴ Jh "śreṣu hu ākā³, A¹ V⁴ "śreṣu ākā³ (but on margin "śreṣu ākā") for "śreṣu ākā³. d. A² vīcaṅṣhaṇaḥ for vīcaṅṣhaṇaḥ.
10. b. A¹ A² B¹ (on margin visa") IO visarjitaḥ for visarjitaḥ; V⁴ ātmā for ātmā and "rijitaḥ for "rijitaḥ. d. A¹ bhidyate for vidyate.
11. d. A² svayam yā, A¹ B¹ B² IO PU¹ PU² V⁴ kham yathā for sa-yathā; A¹ A² kham sampakṣiḥ, D¹ D² V⁴ kham prakṣiḥ for sampakṣiḥ.
12. d. IO "kāśapra" for "kāthā pra"; V⁴ prakṣaṁ for prakṣaṁ.
14. c. Ch. gaṇaptaḥ for gaṇam tam. d. A¹ A² B¹ B² D¹ D² IO JN PU¹ PU² V⁴ hi na for na hi.
15. a. A¹ A² "śringais tu for śringādyaiḥ. b. A² voddita for coditā.
16. a. A¹ susī for svāsi; A² sumiddhāvadavāsthāṣu for a.
17. b. sad for tad. c. IO ubhayata for ubhayatā.
18. c. "māno for "māne.
19. b. yathā for tathā. See IV. 7³. 
22. d. A³ sthāṣya viniṣcitam for sthāṣyati niṣcalah.
23. a. K² bhūto "bhūta³ for bhūtato "bhūta³.
24. a. A¹ A² caṣṭiyāt for cāṃśyād.
25. c. A¹ A² kas tu evam for ko nu evam.
26. c and d are omitted in A². The examination of K² shows that the order of the kārikās Nos. 25, 26 and 27 is actually the same as in other MSS, but owing to a mistake of the scribe in copying the commentary that order has been changed, they being copied as Nos. 25, 27 and 26 respectively.
27. a and b are omitted in A².
28. c. A¹ C D¹ D² P V⁴ suto for "patro.
31. a. A¹ A² "mukha³ for "dīṣya³; B¹ sarvam for dvaitam.
32. a. A² manasā for manasā; B² unmāni³ for amani¹.
32. A² amanaskām for amanastām. D³ grāhyabhāv for grāhyabhā.
33. A¹ A² jñeyam bhī for jñeyabhī; pracākṣate for pracākṣate.
34. A¹ pravārah for pracārah.
35. A. Ch susuptau for susupta. B. V suṣuptasya ni for susupta tan ni; A¹ A² na ni? for tan ni.
36. K¹ sarvañapacārah for sarvañjīram nopacārah.
37. A¹ A² bhīmānavimathā, IO V suhīśṇavagataḥ for bhīśṇavagataḥ, B. V suṣujjītaḥ for muṣṭhitāḥ, d. A¹ bhavah for bhavah.
39. IO V yogo namāyam, A¹ A² yogi namāyam, PD yogo namāiḥ for yogo vai nāma. d. A¹ bhayadarśataḥ, A¹ tattvadarṣrinaḥ for bhayadarśinaḥ.
40. A¹ IO nigraho yat tad, A² nigraho yat tam for nigraḥayattam.
41. A¹ A² bhogam for bhogān.
42. B¹ samayet for samayet. D. B¹ samam prāptam, all others samapraṭpam for samapraṭpam (= "t sama") in VeS, § 33 and supported by Vidvanmanorajāni; C visālāyet for cilāyet.
43. VeS with Subodhini and Vidvanmanorajāni, loc. cit., rasaṃ for sukham. C. A¹ A² niścitam ci, IO niścitam ci, B¹ niścaranś ci for niścarac ci.
44. A¹ A² PU³ manah for punah. C. A¹ anīgīta, A² anāgīta, B¹ D³ alīgana for anīgana. d. K M tathā for tadā.
45. A¹ A² sa sarvajñāḥ parīkṣite for sarvajñāh parīkṣate.
46. B¹ sambhāvo for sadbhāvo.

Colophon:
B¹ PU³ iti śrīgovindabhaṅgavatāpyādāśyasya paramamahoparivṛṣajācyāsyo saikarabhagavatāḥ kṛtāv āgamaśastrāvivaraṇe advaitākhyam tītyam prakaraṇam samāptam.

Books III, IV]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIANTs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PU² iti śrīgauḍapādāśyaviracitam advaitākhyam tītyam prakaraṇam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V⁰ āgamaśastrād advaitākhyam tītyam prakaraṇam samāptam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V⁰ gauḍapādiye advaitanirṇayo nāma tītyam prakaraṇam.</td>
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BOOK IV

1. c. A¹ samuddha, A² sambhinna for sambuddha. d. PU² oṣṇaram for varam.
2. d. V⁰ dāsatā for dēṣātā.
3. a. V⁰ jātā for jātī. b. B¹ first sarva then corrected to kecid as in the text.
4. a. All excepting D³ GP M⁰ dvāyā for dvāyā. d. A¹ A³ na jātīm, V⁰ oṣṇatām for ajātīm.
5. d. A¹ marty nu for martyatām; A¹ A² iṣyati for iṣyati.
6. d. D¹ martyc for martyam. B. D¹ M⁰ mṛtyu for martyā;
7. A¹ A³ Jh V⁰ yatā for tathā. See III. 21⁸.
8. a. Nivābhāvika for svābhāvika. c. IO kṣa, B¹ B² K¹ GP Me V⁰ aṅkta, A¹ A² aṃtā; Jh kṣa, C ṛpy aṅkta for ṛpy aṅkta; Jh yatā for ca yā. c. A¹ ½ seti, A² sveti, A³ ½ seti for seti.
9. K¹ reads only d omitting other lines altogether.
11. It is to be noted that in D¹ kārikās from 10 to 53 are wanting.
12. d. B¹ nityam bhīnna for bhīnna nityam; A¹ A² yat for tat.
13. a. A¹ A² A⁰ B¹ B² M⁰ D⁰ V⁰ yady ananyatvam, A⁰ yāyam ananyatvam, V⁰ yad anityatvam for yad ananyatvam. As the word yadi occurs in b here in a one should read yad as actually found in V⁰ though it reads in b tava for yadi.
15. a. A² di samām for diḥ phalaṃ. IO omits the kārikā.
16. b. V⁰ aḥiket for aḥir hetuḥ; A¹ A² IO phalaṃ ca yat for phalesya ca. d. A¹ putra for putraṣṭ.
17. a. B\'i phalātanumā for phalād utpā. b. A\'i A\'ō to for te.
18. a. A\'i hetuḥ, A\'i hetuṣa for hetuṭaḥ; C Ḫ phalāsiddhiḥ for phalasiddhiḥ. c. A\'i A\'ō param tat for kataret.
B\'i gives the number of the kārikā as 16 instead of 18 and henceforth the scribe counts the following kārikās accordingly, i.e., 17, 18, etc.
19. a. A\'ō atriṇṭi for aṣakti; A\'i A\'ō paviśāṇām for ṣarvi-paṇi-jānām. d. A\'i A\'ō jāti for jātiḥ; A\'ō vāpiṭā for dīpita.
20. b. A\'i A\'ō tamo for ṣamyo; A\'i A\'i A\'ō A\'i B\'i B\'i D\'i IO PU\'i PU\'i V\'i V\'i saha for noḥ in C D\'i. c. A\'i A\'i B\'i B\'i IO PU\'i PU\'i V\'i V\'i hi for ca in A\'i A\'ō supported by ś.
22. a. IO omits vā after suato.
23. b. A\'i A\'i A\'i A\'i B\'i B\'i D\'i IO M\'i PU\'i PU\'i cāpi for väpi. d. PU\'i on the margin jāti for hy adir.
24. d. A\'i A\'ō paratam nāsti nāma tā (the former ṭāḥ for ṭā) for the line; V\'i matsam for mataḥ.
25. a. A\'i A\'ō prajñāpte for prajñāpete. b. A\'i bhukti for yuktiḥ; A\'ō anyathā daṇḍanāstāḥ for b; K\'i bhūta for yuktiḥ. c and d are omitted in K\'i.
27. a. A\'i saha for sodā. b. paīcasu for ty adhvasu. c. A\'i viṣayāṭṭha for viṣayāṣaḥ.
28. b. cītām for cītaḥ. c. A\'i jāti, A\'ō yānti for jātiḥ. d. V\'i te for khe and khe for te.
29. a. A\'i tasmād for yasmād. b. A\'i A\'ō D\'ō tathā for tataḥ.
C A\'ō nayathā for ṭr anyathā.
30. c. A\'i anantahāvaḍimato, A\'ō anantātā vādimate, CD\'i anantātā adinato for anantātā cadimato.

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31. c-d. A\'ō santyevi. A\'i D\'ō santo vi (in the latter between santo and vi there is an avagraha mark above the line and it seems to have been struck off) for santo viḥ; A\'i D\'ō lakṣīṭā for lakṣīṭāḥ.
32. b. All excepting D\'ō vipratipadyate for ti pratiṣṭhadate. See II. 7.
33. a. All sarve dhaḥ for sarvadhaḥ in A\'i; PU\'i mṛṣāḥ for mṛṣā. b. A\'i V\'i kāryasyaḥ for kāryasyā. c. B\'i B\'i M\'i V\'i samyutte for samyute.
34. a. A\'i jātātā for gataḥ. b. A\'i kūlaśāyaḥ for kūlaśyā. d. IO darśe for deśe.
35. b. A\'i A\'ō B\'i B\'i K\'i M\'i sambuddho for prabuddho. c. A\'i D\'ō väpi for cāpi.
36. b. D\'ō s tadārāṇāt for sya darāṇāt.
37. c. A\'i A\'i B\'i B\'i PU\'i V\'i tvāt tu for tvāc ca. d. A\'i A\'ō D\'ō saigāḥ for sajāgaḥ.
38(39). b. A\'i tanmayāḥ for tanmayāḥ. c. A\'i A\'ō drśc ca for dhṛṣṭa. ca.
42. a. A\'ō upalambhat for upalambhāt. d. A\'i A\'ō s ca satam. B\'i s trasatām for s trasatām.
43. a. A\'i s tu asatyaḥ. A\'ō s tu satam. D\'ō sasatām. B\'i s trasatām for s trasatām. b. A\'i D\'ō te for ye; V\'i first te then corrected to ye.
45. a. A\'i A\'ō vastavo bhāsaḥ for vastavo bāsaḥ. d. A\'i tānti, B\'i sāntam for sāntam; D\'i avayam, V\'i sadavayam for adāvanam.
46. a-b. B\'i cittacintāṃ for cittam evam. c. V\'i m anantaḥ. PU\'i jānāto for ṣatāno. d. A\'i tāṣṭati, A\'i A\'ō tapanti for patanti.
47. d. All excepting B\'i C Ḫ PU\'i viṣayāṇaśaḥ for viṣayāṇam śa'ām.
48. a. A\'i A\'i D\'i IO M\'i PU\'i PU\'i alātaṃ for alātaṃ.
In A\'i a and b are omitted. c. A\'i māna vi for māna viḥ.

64. a. D¹ swapne for swapna; A³ B³ 'kìm na, A³ D¹ 'kìtta for 'cítta'. b. A³ B³ bhidayante for vidyante. c. A³ na dśyā for taddhīya, A³ 'm etame for 'm evade. d. A³ 'kìm ta'. A³ 'kìm ta'. A³ D¹ 'kìtta' for cítta'; K¹ jātrata cì for swapadph cì.

65. a. A³ B³ varan for cara; a-b, V° tasmá dikṣu corrected to tác ca lāyākṣu for jāgrad dikṣu. b. A³ dasmuṭhitān for dálasu sthitán, c. D¹ cāpi for vápi.


67. c. 'dśyāca for 'dśya te. b. A³ A³ B¹ B² C Ch D¹ D² G IO K M° PU¹ PU² V° ca for na. After this kārikā D³ adds:

pramāṇayānah ubhaya ca cittaṁ tvayam dvayam yataḥ
tanmatena tvam cittaṁ tayośa ca tad ghyate

There are different readings for which see Ś's commentary (A¹) from which it is taken. Here d is defective of metre.

68. d. Kh Gh N Jh na bhavanti for bhavanti na.

69. A¹ A² omit it. In A³ it is not in the body but on the margin by a second hand. b. K¹ mṛyate jñāte for jñāte mṛyate. d. Kh Gh N J na bhavanti for bhavanti na.

70. A² V° omit the kārikā. a. A³ K¹ V° nirm̄ita[kyo, B² nirm̄ita[kyo for nirm̄ita[kyo. b. A³ D¹ D² M° va ca.

71. c. A³ ya cetas u' for cetat u'; A³ V° savam, K¹ pratapa for satyām.

72. a. For this A³ cittaṁ spandati me savam. b. D¹ D² grāhyāṁ gra for grāhyāṁ gra.

73. c. All parāntarābhī for parāntar 'bhī'. d. For this V° paramārthena nāṣṭi asau. Then again it has c and d.

1201B–31
74. a. A' soma for soma. b. A" ṛtho na for ṛthena. c. A" A<sup>ś</sup> A<sup>ś</sup> A<sup>ś</sup> B<sup>ś</sup> B<sup>ś</sup> D<sup>ś</sup> D<sup>ś</sup> V<sup>ś</sup> V<sup>ś</sup> parataṃtṛa for paratantro in K M'.
75. c. V<sup>ś</sup> dvayāḥsām for dvayāḥāvaṃ. d. A<sup>ś</sup>A<sup>ś</sup> tannimitto for nirmimitto.
76. a. PU<sup>ś</sup> labhyate for labhate. c. A" tām for tādā.
77. c. A" pūrva for sarvaya.
78. a. A<sup>ś</sup> satya for satyāṃ. b. For this A<sup>ś</sup> hetunapyagate bruban; V<sup>ś</sup> hetu thag, IO hetuprathag for hetum pthag; V<sup>ś</sup> nāpnuvat, others nāpnuvan for nāpnuval in D<sup>ś</sup>. c. All excepting A<sup>ś</sup> V<sup>ś</sup> tathā for tado; A" M<sup>ś</sup> kāmā for kāmām.
79. a. A<sup>ś</sup> nivesyāddhi for nivesadhi, c. A<sup>ś</sup> yas tvā, A<sup>ś</sup> yat tvā, B<sup>ś</sup> vastā, V<sup>ś</sup> doavyā for vasta; all excepting A<sup>ś</sup> and A<sup>ś</sup> sa buddhavā, A<sup>ś</sup> subhuddhavā, A<sup>ś</sup> subudhyeva for sa buddhavā, A<sup>ś</sup> adds ca after buddhavā, A<sup>ś</sup> na nīva, A" hi nīva, V<sup>ś</sup> ca nīva for nīva.
80. b. Gh nāścalam for nāścalā. c. A<sup>ś</sup> D<sup>ś</sup> V<sup>ś</sup> sā for sa; A<sup>ś</sup> A<sup>ś</sup> V<sup>ś</sup> tu for hi, K M<sup>ś</sup> svāmya for svāmya; V<sup>ś</sup> ādavayam for ājām adavayam.
81. a. A<sup>ś</sup> annidram for anidram. b. A<sup>ś</sup> prabhāvam for prabhātam. c. A<sup>ś</sup> vibhānto for vibhāto. d. A<sup>ś</sup> B<sup>ś</sup> V<sup>ś</sup> dharmo dhātusva. Gh dharmo dhātum svā for dharmo dhātuh svā.
82. a. A<sup>ś</sup> āsrayate for āvivaye. b. A<sup>ś</sup> va vriyate, B<sup>ś</sup> vriyate, D<sup>ś</sup> va vriyate for vīryate; A<sup>ś</sup> tādā for sado. c-d. For this A<sup>ś</sup> IO yasya dharmasya grahanāvāṃ bhavāvan api so ‘śnute.
83. b. V<sup>ś</sup> vai for va. c. A<sup>ś</sup> A" bhāsair for bhāvār.
84. a. A<sup>ś</sup> catasra for catasa; A<sup>ś</sup> A" s cas ca, B<sup>ś</sup> osu for os tu; C<sup>ś</sup> ca tatparāyā for os casra etā. b. A<sup>ś</sup> grahi for grahā; C<sup>ś</sup> os tāsam for ‘ś yāsam.
85. a. D<sup>ś</sup> kṛṣṇakālam (corrected by a second hand to saraṅgātam) sarūm for svarāgātam kṛṣṇām. b. A<sup>ś</sup> agrāyam, D<sup>ś</sup> D<sup>ś</sup> avayaṃ for advayam. c. A<sup>ś</sup> annā for anā.

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agra, first, 124, 141.
akṣara, imperishable, cxxviii.
akṣipuruṣa, eye-person, lxxxviii.
akṣipta, not distracted, cxxxvi.

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—abhāsa, appearance of, 135, 136.—krama, order of sense, 190.
arpaṇa, P., appaṇa, fixing of the mind on the object in meditation, 71.
alāta, firebrand, cxxvi; simile of, 154.156.—cakravat ādi-
madhyāvasānavirahita tvāt, 142, 308.—sānti, cessation of, lxxxi.
alina, not sleeping, cxxvi.
avatāra, descent, causing descent, 58.
avatāraṇa-sandhi, intention of causing descent, 150.
avayava, a part, cxxiv.
avayavina, a whole, 90.
avayavīdā, theory of the whole as distinct from the parts, 129, 130.
avara, last, 124.
avasthiti, enduring, cxi. See dhrauvya.
avikṣipta, cxxvi.
avyakta, the unevolved primordial element, 35, 36.
avyākta, unfolded, cvi.—nāmarūpa, name and form, cvi.
asākti, absence of capability (in regard to origination), 121-123.
āsāṅga, free from attachment, i.e., relation to objects, cxxvi, 68, 85, 209.—lakṣaṇa, characteristic, 68.

asat, non-existent, cxxi; it does not arise from the non-existent, nor from the existent, 147. nirupākyha asat, false, cvi.

asatkāryavāda, the theory that the effect is not existent (in its cause), 122.

asamprajñāta samādhi, a kind of yoga, 95.

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asambhūti, non-origination, 63.

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asparśa, absence of contact, 305.—yoga (Ṭib. mi. reg.pahi, sbyor.ba), a profound and intense abstract concentration of mind, cxxii, cxxvi 74, 94, 99; discussion on, 96, 100, 305.—vibhāra, unpleasant state, 97.—sānyās-prāpti, attainment of contactless consciousness, 95.

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asvapna, without dream, cxxvi, 70.

ahaṅkāra, 35.

ākāśaṅkalpa, like the sky, 83, 84, 88.

ākāścanyya, nothingless, 99.

āgama, 171.

ācāryasammati, concurrence of teachers, lxix.

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ātmīya, relating to ātman, 172. ādiśaṅkha, auspicious from the outset, 204, 205.

ādhyātma, to be preferable, civ. ādhyātmika, relating to self, inward, subjective, 47.

ānīnīya, immovable, 99.

animita, having no cause, 99, 189.

āpāya, obtainable, 199.

ābhāsa, appearance, image, 156.

āyatanavat, having an abode, c. āryagocara, the scope of the Āryas, 187. See buddha-gocara.

ālambara, support, 296.

ālaya or ālayavijñāna, receptacle intellect, cxi, 173, 188.

ālāta same as ālāta, q. v., 155.

āvāhana, covering, 209-211.


āveśa (=abhiniveśa), adherence to, 159.

āśrama, a stage of religious life, 36.

āśraya, recipient, cxxix, 59.

—parāśṛti, revolution or change of the recipient, i.e., ālayavijñāna, cxxix, 188;—parāśṛti, same as ‘parāśṛti, 188.

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uktarṣa, excellence, pulling upwards, 298.

uttāna, terror, 150, 151.

uttāna, birth, 39, 106.

uttapāda, birth, 105, 106, 147.

udāśāriva, an earthen vessel full of water, civ.

unmanibhava, absence of mind, cxxvi, 82.

upacāra, a stage of samādhi, a figurative application, 70-72.

upādhi, condition, cxxiv.

upāya, means, cii.

upāyakusāra, skillfulness in method, 151.

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uditahoma, a sacrifice after rise of sun, civ.

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upeya, object, cii.

ekāvṛt, to make one, 79.

ekāhīṅa, that which has become one, 79.

om, 9, 12-14.

karman, action, civ, cii, cii.

kalpita, same as parākalpita, assumed, supposed, 176.—sānyās, assumed practical truth, 174, 175.

kaśāya, evil passion, 78.

kāraṇa, cause, 114.—abhinna kāraṇa, the effect is not different from its cause, 113.

kāryakāraṇa-bhāva, causation, 158.

kāryabhinnā kāraṇa, the cause is not different from its effect, 113.

kāla, time, 3, 33.

kuśālasā, good-impure, 130.
kāsthanityatā, eternity as unchangeability, cxlii.
kāivalya, the state of being not connected with anything else, cxxvii.
koji, extreme, 141.
kośas, sheaths, cxxxiv.
krama, order, pūrva, prior, 177; para, posterior, 177; saha, simultaneous, 177.
—kopa, incompatibility of the order of cause and effect, 121. fl.
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καµµαβαµµαγάµµα, the theory of momentariness of things, 121.
καµµηκα, momentary, cxlii.
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ganopama, like the sky, 83, 88.
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—guṇin, one with guṇas not different from guṇas, qualities, 91.
grahaṇagrāhakābhāsa, with the appearance of the percipient and the perceptible, 155.
—grāhaka, percipient, 24.
—grāhya, perceptible, 24.
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chāyāpuruṣa, a person in the form of a shadow, lxxvii, lxxviii.
janmasaṃkleśa, impurity through the birth, 131.
janya-yanaka, to be produced and the producer, 118.
jāgātita, wakefulness, 145-147.
jāgrat, wakefulness, 165, 167.
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jyotimati, luminous, c. tattva, category, 30, 31, 35; truth, 37, 44, 47, 65, 66; same as dharma in Buddhism, 90-92; agrahaṇa, non-grasping of, 5; apratibodha, non-realization of, 6, 7; āvatāra, causing descent or leading to, 155; āvatāranabhishandhi, intention of leading one to, 150; pratyatma, knowable only by oneself, 151.

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tanmātra, a subtle and primary element, 35.

tamas, darkness, one of the three constituents of the primeval cause in the Sākhyas, 31.

taśyin, one who instructs the way known to oneself, 212.

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tratasa, being terrified, 149, 152.

tāra, terror, 150.

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trisvabhāva, doctrine of three characteristics, cxxxxv.

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parikalpatā, imagined—lakṣaṇa, characteristic, svabhāva, nature, 176-179, 199, 200.
parinirvāṇa, 99.
parināma, transformation, cxxxi; —nityātā, eternity as, cxxlxxii; —vāda, theory of, cx.
parinirvāṇa, perfectly merged in nirvāṇa, 204, 205. See su-nirvāṇa.
pairāsanna, perfect.—lakṣaṇa, characteristic, svabhāva, nature, 176-179, 197, 200.
paripāsā, maturation, 200; ātma, of one's own self, 200; sattva, of the people, 200.
paripācana, maturation, 200.
para, of others, 200.
pās, a person in bondage, 35.
pākyā, to be made mature, 199, 200.
Paśupata, a philosophical system, 35.
pāṭha, the order of reading, 190.
pāda, quarter, 9, 31.
pudgalanirāstmya, unreality of the individual ego, 211.
puruṣasthiti, the nature of the elements of existence, that remains from the past, 214.
puruṣa, person, 35.
puruṣaparākṣipa, examination of the first and the last points of the world, 123.
puruṣaparākṣiparījāna, absolute ignorance of the first and last points of the world and things, 123.
pāthak, different, 41.
bhāvanā, meditation, 130.

bhuvanakoṣa, the system of the world, 34.

bhūta, existential, cxii, cxxii; elements, cxxii, 30, 35; object, 17, 144. —koji, highest point of truth, 189, 194.

bheda, object, 17, 18, 22.

Brahman, is the cessation of the movement of the citta, 173; is the citta when free from movement and sense-image. 79; (creator) and others are nothing but citta, 172.

bṛ a h m a on a, befitting a Brahmana, 194, 195.

Mathurā, a city, ixvi.

majhīna paṭipada (P.), S. madhyamā pratipad, middle path, 102, 104.

Madhu Brahama, a particular section of the Bhadārāyaka Upanisad, 55.

Madhuvidyā, a particular Brahmadhvadvīḍa, cxxv, 55.

madhyamā pratipad, middle path, 102, 104.

madhyatva, standing on an intermediate position, 10.

manana, thinking, cxxi.

manas, 67, 68.—kṣaya, destruction of, cxxvii; —nāta, disappearance of, cxxvii; —parikṣaya, complete, destruction of, 293; —prāsamana, cessation of, 293; laya, disappearance of, cxxvi;—spanendita, vibration of, 26.

manovijñāna, ceasing to exist of the consciousness of the mind; this is nirvāṇa 81.

mantravāda, formulars of sacred texts or the science of magic, 34.

martya, mortal, 108-110.

mahat, the second tattva in the Sāṅkhya system, 35, 36.

mahājāna, with great wisdom, 208.

mahākāsa, cxxivi.

mahādhi, one with high intellect, Bodhisattva, 198.

Mahāyāna, 39, 199.

mātā, measure, 9, 12.

mānā, measure, 11.

māyā, illusion, cxxi, cxxix, cxxviii, cxxviii, 35, 62, 164, 165; has no beginning, 7; is seen, but does not exist, 151, 152—vāda, cxxiv;—hastin, an elephant called up by, 152, 153.

mārgajñāta, the state of the knower of the path, 198.

mukti, cxxvii.

mūḍha, stupefied, cxxvii, 77, 294.

nirākāra, one with passions removed, 78.
vidyā, one of the tattvas in the Pāśupata system, 35.
vipaśyāsa, false notion, 136, 137.
vipaśaśā, disappearance, 162.
vibhu; all pervading, 1, 4.
vibhūti, expansion, 3; manifestation, 35.
vivacana, synonym, cxxx.
Vivartavāda, the doctrine maintaining that the appearance of the universe is imposed on Brahman, cx.
viśāra, scholar, bold, 207.
Viśīṣṭadviīvāda, cix, cx.
viśā, the embodied self in the waking state, Ixxxiv-Ixxxviii, cii, cxiv, 1, 2, 4-6, 9, 11, 12, 31.
vibhā, field of activity, 69, 187; object of senses, 31.
vibhā, field of activity, 69, 187.
viśīṣṭa, loss of the action of the mind, 82.
viśdhasammati, approval of the old teachers, lxix.
veda-pārāga, 44.
vedāpāra-ga, 44.
vevacana (P.), S. vivacana, q.v. Vedānta, xlvi, Ixxxiv, 44, 101, 175, 214.
vaiśāra; P. vaishāra, q.v.
vaiṇāthya, unreality, ciii, 16, 47.
vaiśāra; P. vaishāra, intrepidity; derivation and meaning of; four-fold, 206-208.
Vaiśānara, belonging to all men, lxxxv, lxxxvi, c, ci.
vyāya, change, 158.
vyavadhana, purification, 103, 129.
vyaśāhāra, common use, 129.
—naya, practical point of view, 162;—satya, empirical truth, 162, as upāya, means, 175.
vyaśāhārika satya, empirical truth, 175, 178.
sākti, one of the tattvas in the Pāśupata system, 35; energy, 91, 121-123; cannot be established in the coming into being of anything 123.—mat, one with, 91. No difference between sākti and sāktimat, 91.
samkleśa, impurity, 129, 130.
sāna, equanimity, 77;—prāpta, one that has reached, 77.
sānti, peace, 75.
sārad, autumn, 207.
sārad, timid, not bold, 208.
sāradā, P. sāraja, timidity, 207, 308.
sāra; P. sāra, incorporated soul, lxxxii, lxxxviii.
sāstra, Chinese lun, Tib. bstan.bcos, lixi.
sāvata, eternal. always existing, cxxv, cxl, 160.—aśāvātābhidhā, appellation of eternal and non-eternal, 164.—vāda the theory of eternity, cxliv, 162.
sā, one of the tattvas in Pāṇḍapa system, 35; calm, 50. sādā, one of the tattvas in Pāṇḍapa system. Sūdhādvaitavāda, the theory of the Pure Monism, cx. sūdhā-sāuddhi, purity and impurity, 104.
sānya, 47.—tā, 47, 189, 211. —pravesa, mahā, 95.
sāmāna brāhmaṇa, 194.
sūtrīprasthāna, the Course of Revelation, ciii.
Sreṣṭhayāna, same as Mahāyāna, 199.
śaḍvimśa, consisting of twenty-six, the philosophical system of Patañjali, 35.
sāṃviṣṭi, consciousness, 86.
sāṃvīṣṭi, covering, i.e., empirical truth, 161, 163, 173, 175. —sātva, empirical truth, 162. See kalpa[sāṃvīṣṭi], sātva.
samsāra, 141, 143, 160, 162, 205.
sakṣāya, with passions, 77.
sakkāyādiṭṭhi (P.), sāt kāyādiṭṭhi, the theory of individuality, 26-27.
sāmkśēra, impurity, 129, 130, 131.—upalabdhi, experience of, 131, 132.
sāmkhyā, understanding, 129.
sā-če (P.), in the sense of tagnet. See sa-yathā, sa-yadi, 55.
sāmāṇa, consciousness, 96; designation. 129.—veditānirdha, a samādhi in Buddhism, 96, 99, 100. See saṁānāvedayita, saṁjñā, q. v., 96, 99, 100. According to Chinese P. saṃmā, sāmānayā for saṁānā.
sati (P.), s. smṛti, meditation, 45.
sat, existent, not arising from the existent or the object, cxxi, 147-148.
satkāyādiṭṭhi, P. sakkāyādiṭṭhi, q. v.
sātkāryavāda, the theory that the effect exists in its cause, 101, 102; Buddhist views on, 101.
sattva, one of the constituents of Prakṛti in the Sāṅkhya system, 31; people—avatāra, causing the descent of, or leading the, 150.—paripāka, the act of maturing the, 200.

Appendix XI INDEX OF SUBJECTS

satya, truth, 162; vyavahāra, practical; paramārtha or pāramārthika, transcendental, 162, 175, 178; prāthibhāsīka, existing in appearance, 176, 178; vyavahārika, 162, 175, 178; samvīṣṭa, empirical, 162.
sadbhāva, 161.
sanmitta, with (objective) cause, 131.
sanirvāṇa, extinct, cxxvi, 81.
santati, continuance, cxli, nityatā, eternity as continuance, cxliv.
sandhi = abhisandhi, intention, 150.
sama, always in the same condition, 73, 184, 185.—tā, 49, 72, 73, 194.—prāpta, 78.
S. sace samāprāpta.
samādhi, intense abstract meditation, 70-72, 74. vaipūya, thunderbolt like, 307.
sambuddha, perfectly understood, 83.
sambhava, origination, 63, 115; is not of the non-existent from the existent, 147; possibility, 171.
sambhūti, birth, 63; various explanation of, 64.
sammuti (P.), S. sammati, general consent, 162.—satya, truth by, 175.
saṁyātha, in the sense of tad yathā. See sa-če, sa-yadi, 55.
sa-yadi, See sa-če, sa-yathā, 55.
sarva, all.—jīva, knower of, omniscient, 70.—tā, tvā, 194, 195, 198, 199. sarvajñatva—vāda, cxxxv. sarvabija, seed of all, 136.—ka, 188.
sahaja, innate, 111.
samvīṣṭa, pertaining to samvīṣṭa, q. v., 178.
samsīddhi, self-existent, 111.
Sāṅkhya, 101, 102.
sādhyasama, that which is yet to be proved, 125.
sāmānyadharmā, common quality, 9.
sānya = sama, q. v., 208, 217.
sukha, sūtrīprasthāna, the Course of Sūtras, cīv.
sūtra, referring to Prājñā, cxviii; deep sleep, 34.—atha, one in the state of deep sleep, cxvii.
sūṣṭi, deep sleep, 34.
sūtra, sūtra, the Course of Sūtras, cīv.
śānti, creation, 37.
śānti, creation, 37.
stabdhhāva, stiffness, 78.
ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA

INTRODUCTION

P. xl, note 2. Certainly this reason dhāvatva is not in our text, but in Saṅkarā's own commentary (II. 4: dhāvatvā iti hetu). It may be noted here in connexion that in the later Vedāntic works dhāvatva is one of the main hetus for inferring that the outward world is false (Advaitasiddhi, Advaitamañjari ed., p. 2: vimatam mithyā dhāvatvā).

P. lxxix. As regards the commentary on the NUTU, I am thankful to Sāhardra Nath Ghoße of Benares for his kindly sending me a transcription of it made by himself in Bengali characters from a MS in the library called Mālatisāradasādana of Ray Govinda andji in Benares. It is not complete and runs up to pratyajkarasah of the original text in the ninth and the last section. Yet, it contains a separate loose page in which the last portion of the commentary is copied. Here in some of the colophons it is called Vivarana, while in others Vivṛti. According to the present MS this commentary is by Gaurḍapāda as is quite clear from the colophons, some reading Śrīgauḍapādiyā and others Śrīśukayogindrasāyasya Śrīgauḍapādācāryakṛti. It begins thus:

śrīgauḍapādiya namah. Śrīnṛṣimhāya namah.
nirastasakālanarthaparamāṇandarūpam
nṛṣimhāya namaskurman sarvadhivṛtiśaksī̄ṇe ||
And it ends thus:

tāpaniyarāṣṭhadīpikaṃ tīmiraṃphaṃ |
gurvanugrahalaṃdaśaṃ satam astu sukhāptaye ||
saccidānandapūrṇaṃ[āya] pratyajākarasesthamane |
tejase mahate bhūyaṃ namaḥ puṃsinvharpūpine |
yasya samsthitaṃtreṇa taranti bhavasāgaram |
tam nato 'smi gurum bhaktya dhiyā vāca ca |

karmaṇa ||

iti śrīmatparamahamsaparivṛjaṅkāryaśīrmacchukamunindraśya-śīrmaḍgaṇḍapādamuniviracite uttaratapaṇiyaṃvivaraṇe navamaḥ khaṇḍaḥ. śubham astu. śrī- |
laksmaṇiṃśiṃho rakṣatu mām. nṛśīmhāpaṃ astu. |
tāraṇe vatsare māsi śravaṇe 'sitapaksage |
paṇcamatrevattiṃkte tathau kumbhesāpattane ||
nṛśiṃhaṭapanyākhyatikāṃ gauḍābhidhaṃ satim |
vyaśeśvara 'likhat svast[Y]ai |
nṛśiṃhas tena nuṣthā(tuṣṭa[?])tām ||

It is interesting to note that the following passage from this Vivaraṇa (pp. 25-26) is identical with that in

Śaṅkara's commentary on the MaU, 11, excepting a few unimportant variations as noted in the foot-notes:

miyate iva hi viśvatajasau prājñena pralayotpattyoḥ |
praveśanīrṣambhāyāṃ prastheneva yavāḥ. tathoṅkara- |
Samaptaḥ punah punah1 prayoge ca praviṣya nirgataśv2 |
ivākārokārau makare 'ntye 'kṣare ekibhūtāvi kārokārau. |
tathā susupte prājñe viśvatajasau0.3 minoti jagradhi- |
yātātmyaṃ jānātity arthāḥ4 apitiś ca jagatkāraṇātām ca5 |
havatī.

5. cxxxv. Regarding the identity of citta and Brahman, see YV, III. 64. 31 ; 65. 3 ; 66. 14 ; |
96. 56, 66, 73; IV. 35. 20-23, 54. 20. From these verses we can gather that īva, cit, ātman, brahman, |
śūnya, nairātmya, etc., are the different expressions of citta. From the same authority (III. 122. 35) we also |
know that such names are made by the authors of śāstras in order to supply some terms required by them:

śāstrasamvyavahārāḥ tasyāsyatraivaśēkapāyē |
cidbrahmātmeti namāni kalpitāni kṛtātmabhī ||

5. cxxxvi, note 8. For manahkṣaya there is manah- |
parikṣaya in YV, III. 116. 13. It has also manonaśa |
(III. 95. 35-36) and manahpraśama (III. 122. 27).
5. It is quoted in ŚV, p. 27.

6. On the creation from Prāṇa see KtU, III. 3 and BS, I. 1. 23, 28. Here in the kārīka we have an Idealistic view (Vijñānavāda).

9. For apiḍakāma see BU, IV. 4. 6. For bhogarthāṁ srṣṭīḥ see Śrīdhārasvāmin on BP, III. 7. 4: avidyopādher jivasya bhogarthāṁ īśvarāṁ srṣṭyādi karoti.

10. See BU, IV. 2. 4; 4. 22; 5. 15.

12. The word sarvadvś in sense is the same as sarvajñā ‘omniscient’ (III. 36). His omniscience is, according to Śaṅkara (BS, I. 1. 4), on account of his capacity for all knowledge (sarvajñānāśaktimattvenaiva sarvajñāvatam abhyupagantavyam), or owing to the fact that he is never dissociated from his intelligence, i.e., all-embracing knowledge (Op. cit., I. 3. 42: sarvajñāvatvalakṣanāyā prajñāyā nityatam avyogat).

On this kārīka as well as on I. 15 see Upadeśasāhasri, XVIII. 26.

13. In this and the following kārikās nidrā in sense is, in fact, suṣupta. Here nidrā is said to be bija ‘seed’, i.e., origin, because nidrā being non-realization of truth is the cause of both dream and waking. See Upadeśasāhasri, XVIII. 26 as quoted in NSi, IV. 43: suṣuptakhyām tamo ‘jānānām bijaṁ svapnaprabodhayāḥ | ātmabodhagnidagdhaṁ syād bijaṁ dagdhaṁ yathābhavam ||

This explanation of bija slightly differs from the one given before on p. 6.

14. See I. 16; III. 35. 36; IV. 81. In the fourth state, Turya, there is no nidrā nor svapna. In such cases while nidrā means the laya or mūḍha ‘infatuated’ state of the mind, svapna indicates the state called viṣkṛpa ‘distraction’. This state of Turya is the state of Brahman.

15. For b of the kārika cf. YS, I. 10: abhāvapratyayālambanā vṛttir nidrā. This kārīka is quoted in NSi, IV. 42.

16. This kārīka is quoted in MnU, I. 13, with the reading ajanmanidram for ajam anidram in c.

17. The following is quoted as from Gauḍapāda’s Vīṣṇuhasranāma-bhāṣya, Mysore ed., p. 18:

>yad yad dvaitam prapañcasya tan nivartyam hi cetaśa | manovṛttimayaṁ dvaitam advaitam paramārthaḥ ||

19. The Prāṇava-upāsana referred to here is well-known in Upaniṣads, older and later alike (ChU, I. 1. 1, 4. 1; PU, V. 1-2; TU, I. 8. 1; MuU, II. 2. 6; Mu, IV. 4. 37). Here a few words are necessary for the real significance of upāsana (sometimes upāsana), which is enjoined (yuṣṭa pranave cetaḥ, I. 25) and described to some extent here by our author. The word upāsana is derived, as well-known to all, from upa-√ās literally ‘to seat near at hand (in order to honour or wait upon),’ and figuratively ‘to do homage, worship, be devoted to’, etc. But in such Upaniṣadic texts as mana brahmety upāsīta (ChU, III. 18. 1), or, sa yo nāma brahmety upāste (Op. cit., VII. 1. 5), it has some special meaning. The first sentence quoted above does not mean ‘One should worship the mind as Brahman,’ nor do we understand from the second sentence ‘He who worships the name as Brahman.’ In both of the cases upa-√ās
or upāsana gives the sense of meditation (dhyāna). It is in the words of Śaṅkara a continuous flow of one and the same idea having an ālambana 'support' recommended by the scripture, unmixed with other ideas. (BS, IV. 1. 7: upāsanaṁ nāma samānapratyayapradvahakaranāṁ. See ChU, I. 1. 1 and our text, p. 48). The best ālambana for the upāsana of Brahman, as in the present case, is Om. We read in the KU, I. 2. 17:

etad ālambanaṁ āsreṣṭham etad ālambanaṁ param |
etad ālambanaṁ jñātāv brahmaloke mahiyate||

The meditation of Om as Brahman, just as the meditation of an image (pratīma) as Viṣṇu 'the all-pervading one', is the means for the realization of Brahman. It is to be noted, according to Śaṅkara's school, that while Brahma-pūrṇa leads one immediately and directly to mokṣa, Brahma-upāsana does not do so, it helps one in gradually attaining to it and to prosperity. Śaṅkara says, it effects the purity of the mind and making the truth clear thereby helps us in acquiring the knowledge of Brahman. Besides, there being an ālambana 'support' it is easy to make an upāsana.

It is to be further noted that there are two kinds of upāsana, that involving the contemplation of the Self (ahamgrahopāsana), and that which is symbolic or concerned with external symbols (pratikopāsana). In the former, the Self, the Paramātmā, is contemplated in his conditioned form (saguna) with the idea that 'I am he'. For instance, we read in the TA, VII. 6:

sa ya esa 'nitarhdaya ākāśaḥ, tasmin ayaṁ puruṣo manomayo 'mṛto hiraṇmayah.

It is said that in an upāsana one thing is to be viewed as another thing; for instance, here the first measure of Om, a, is to be regarded as Viśva. It amounts to saying that these two things are identical. But how can this identity be possible? The answer is this that such identity is by no means actual, but owing to some common quality (sāmānyadharma) of the two the identity of which is intended. This is a well-known
practice among us. We say of a brave lad that he is a lion (śimho mānavakaḥ), though in fact he is not so. It is only on account of the common quality, bravery, of the lad and a lion that we identify them employing the phrase. Simply following this method of expression our teacher has shown some common qualities of the Puruṣa and Om (I. 19 ff.) owing to which their identity has been made possible. Let us remember here the following line of Yāska in his Nt. VII. 24: bahuḥbaktivadhī brahmaṇāni bhavanti. It means that the Brahmans have a great deal of bhaktivāda. But what is bhaktivāda? Durgācārya says in explaining the above line of Yāska: bhaktir nāma guṇaṃ kalpaṇa. Tena kenaś ca guṇena brahmaṇaṃ sarvaṃ sarvathā varṇayati. Tatra tattvam anvesyam. It says that bhakti means assumption or consideration of a quality by which a Brahmana describes all things in all kinds of way. But the truth must be investigated there.

I. 20. Evidently the meaning 'subsequence' of the word uṭkaraṇa as given in the translation (p. 10) is far-fetched. The explanation as offered in the Vivaraṇa attributed to Gauḍapāda on the NUTU, 2 (see pp. 291 ff.) seems to be better. Besides 'excellence', the word uṭkaraṇa means 'attracting' or 'pulling upwards'. Taking this last sense the Vivaraṇa says that among the three components, a, u and m of Pranava a is guttural and u is labial. So while a is pronounced from the lower part (throat) of the mouth, u is done from the upper one (lips). Such being the case, in pronunciation u is, as it were, pulled upwards.

Or it may be that u is higher than a, because the former is manifested on the lips filling completely or stepping beyond the throat, and because it is manifested with an effort more than that required for the latter. Let the passage be quoted here as it is in the transcription (p. 25):

akāraṃ uṭkaraṇa uḍhvaṃ ākṛṣṭa iva hy uṣṭa[h]
prāṇaṃ deṣyate. taijasaḥ ca viśvata[h]. svapnādiṣu
akāraṃ uṭkṛṣṭaḥ. uttamo vā uṣṭaḥ vyāptiyatiṣayād
balātiśayāc ca. akāraṃ uṣṭaḥ koṣṭhāṃ vyāpya ati-
kram[y]a oṣṭhasthāne hi tasyābhivyaktiḥ. tenakāraṃ
dhi-kavyāptimattvenokta uṣṭaḥ virāja iva hiranyagarbhaḥ.
balātiśayatvam ca kharaprayatnavyāgyatvāt prāṇa-
vasthokarasya mandaprayatnavyāgyaṃ akāram apeekya.

The uṭkaraṇa 'excellence' of Taijasa in this respect in relation to Viśva is this that the former is nearer by one step than the latter to Turiya.

26. See MU, VI. 5; PU, V. 2: etad vai satyakāma
param ca punar ca brahma yad omkaraḥ.

Note 2. Read 21 for 22.

BOOK II

1. The phrase, āhur maniṣṭaḥ, is often used not only in our text (II.5, IV. 54), but also in an Upaniṣad (KU, III.4) itself and the BG (XVIII.3).

4. It may be noted that samyutatva is referred to by S in his commentary on BS, III. 2. 3.
5. Cf. MnU, I. 8-11:
   antar asminn ime lokā antar viśvam idam jagat |
   bahirvān māyāyā bhāti darpana pratibimbam ||
   svapne svāntargatam viśvam yathā pthag avekṣyate |
   tathaiva jágratkāle 'pi prapañco 'yam vivicyatam ||
   svapne svasattaivārthānāṁ sattā nānyeti nisītā |
   ko jágrati viśeṣo'sti jaḍānām āśūnāśinām ||
   svapne prakāśo bhāvānāṁ svapraκāśān na hitaraḥ |
   jágraty api tathaiveti nischvinta vipāścītaḥ ||
   For prasiddha see Ś on BS, I.1.22.


24. P. 34, I. 16. Read jyoti or yoti.

32. P. 41, I. 1. Read kārikā for kāṇkā.

34. For anyabhāva see IV. 53.

A piece of crystal which is naturally white becomes red in contact with a red flower, yet, it cannot be said that it is red either in its own nature (svabhāva) or in the nature of other (anyabhāva). It is true that under the circumstances it looks red, yet it is actually not so, it only appears to be so, for its innate whiteness does in no way change. See Śaṅkara on BS, III. 2.11: na hi svacchāḥ san sphaṭikā 'laktakādyupādihiyogād asvaccho bhavati, bhramamātratvād abhiniveśasya, upādhiṇāṁ cāvidyāpratyupasthāpitavat.


For the Prapañcavilayavāda showing the relationship between the karma- and jñāna-kāndas in connexion with niyoga one may be referred to Hīrīyāna: Journal of Oriental Research, 1927, pp. 109 ff, and the original authorities cited therein.

36. The smṛti quoted here is Vasiṣṭhasmṛti or Vasiṣṭha-dharmaśāstra. Ś quotes here also the following couplet which is not traced:

   yam na santām na cāsantām nāśrutām na bahuśrutām |
   na suvṛttām na durvṛttām veda kaścit sa brahmāṇāḥ ||

38. For the stanza, Śunyam ādhyātmikaṁ see AK, IX. 250. For paśya the reading is also paśyan.

BOOK III

1. The upāsana mentioned here may refer also to Prapaccav-ūpāsana in I. 19 ff. See III. 16. For the true significance of upāsana or upāsana see pp. 295 ff., and modify the Annotation here in accordance with it.

3. See MnU, III. 9:
   ghaṭakāśo mahākāśo ghaṭopādhiṅktā yathā |
   dehopādhiṅktā bhedo jivātmaharakṣaṁtvaham ||
   and III. 25-26:
   dehendriyamanobuddhipaṇāhaṁkārasaṁhatam ||
   ātmasankalanād ajñān ātmataṁ pratipādyate |
   vahnidhiḥ kāṣṭhalohādau vahnisaṁkalanād iva ||

According to Brahmādatta, one of the Samuccayavādīn Vedantist, Brahma has both origination (utpatti) and disappearance (laya). See Proceed-
two statements in the scripture that which is with a reason is acceptable. Cf. Ś on BS, II. 1. 4:

yathā ca śrutinām parasparavirodhe saty ekavaśeneta-rā niyante evaṃ pramāṇavirodhe ‘pi tadvaśenaiva śrutir niyeta. dṛṣṭāsāmyena cādṛśam arthaḥ samarthayantī yuktir anubhavasya sampikṣyate, viprakṣyate tu śrutir aitihyamātreṇa svārthābhidhānāt.

On reasoning (tarka) see Ś on BS, II. 1. 11. With regard to yuktī we may remember here what is said in YV, II. 18. 2-4 about the two śāstras, āraṣa ‘derived from rśis’ and pauruṣa ‘derived from men’. The author says that a śāstra, though it is a pauruṣa, deserves to be accepted, if it is reasonable. One must follow reason. A speech, if reasonable, must be accepted even from a child, but that which is not reasonable should be rejected like a piece of straw though it might be uttered even by Brahman, the creator. That man is certainly not wise who rejecting the beautiful water of the Ganges flowing before him drinks from a well thinking only that it is to his father:

api pauruṣam ādeyam śāstram ced yuktibodhakam | anyat tv āraṣam api tyāyaṃ bhāvyaṃ nyāyaikasevinā || yuktīyuktam upādeyam vacanam balkād api | anyat tṛṇam iva tyāyaṃ api uktaṃ padmayoninā | yo ’smattātasya kūpo ‘yam iti kaupam pibaty apaḥ | tyaktvā gāṅgam purastham tam ko na śasty atigarhitam ||

27. Read yuyate for juyate.
29. P. 66. 1. 19. Add the after with,
30. Here is the Tibetan version:
   gnis. min. yid. ni. rmi. lam. na |
gnis. su. snañ. ste. the. tshom med |
del. bshin. gñid. kyis. ma. log. tshe |
gnis. min. gñis. snañ. the. tshom. med ||
P. 67, l. 5. Read the two for a second.
31. For manodśiyam see cittadśiyam, IV. 28, 36, 77.
P. 67, l. 13. Read perceptible for perceived.
   2. P. 68, l. 2. Read ViS for Vis. and add 38 after III.
   35. Note 1. Add 44, 46 after 42.
   36. Note 3. Add cf. sarvadśi, I. 12 ; IV. 84.
P. 70, l. 6. Read TĀk for TA.
   39. Read vai nāma for nāmaśa.
   46. P. 80, l. 24. Read buddhao for baddhao.
P. 81, l. 13. Shows here the Buddhist views. On
   the next line read 549 for 587.

BOOK IV

1. P. 86, last line. Read TA for TĀ.
P. 89, l. 6. Add a after is, and sva before laksanao
   on I. 14.
P. 91, II. 29, 32o. Read SāS for SS.
P. 92, note 30. On the word dharma quoted from
   KU see Glasenapp: Buddhism in Kathopaniśad in the
   New Indian Antiquary, Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 138 ff., and
   Stcherbatsky, Op. cit., p. 68 ff; SMV, pp. 136-7,
   See also MV p. 355: nāstiha sattva ātmā va dharmās tv
   ete sāhetukāḥ.

2. The word asparsayoga is found at least once
   in a Buddhist work. See Baudhā Gāna O Dohnā,
   Sāhityaparishad Granthāvali 55, 1323 B.S., p. 19. Here
   the Sanskrit tıkā which is not edited critically and full
   of mistakes reads referring to a yoga asparsayogottāt for
   which the Tibetan version (Tanjūr, Narthang, Rgyud,
   Tsī, 175o. 4) has mi. reg. pahi. sbyor. bahi. phyir. te
   clearly suggesting its Sanskrit equivalent asparsayogāt.
   The only notable difference between the two versions,
   Sanskrit and Tibetan, is this that while the former has
   asparsā the suggested reading in the latter is asparsā.
   But considering the uncritical way in which the edition
   of the Sanskrit text is prepared and the well-known
   occurrence of the word sparsā it naturally occurs to
   one's mind that the reading asparsā for asparsā is a
   misprint or a mistake of the scribe of the MS used for
   that edition. Another difference is the use of -tna in
   the Sanskrit text, which is not to be found in the
   Tibetan one. According to the former the latter should
   have been written sbyor. bahi. ñid. kyi for sbyor.
   bahi. But it is often found in Tibetan versions of
   Sanskrit texts that ñid for -tna- (or eva) is not used even
   when it is necessary; on the contrary, it is employed
   when it is not required at all.

4. P. 102, l. 6. For our MS. Me and some read
   Me and some other

11. P. 113, l. 5. Read kāraṇa for karana.
12. Note 1. Here 'elsewhere' refers to Variants,
   p. 237:
20. P. 125, last line. Read cākramakah.
23. Note 1. PU actually has jātir in the margin for hyādir in d. Read here edition for editions.
P. 130, l. 31. Read AS for ASh.
31. The first half of the kārikā is identical with that of YV, IV, 45, 45.
33a. In such cases (viz., IV, 10, 91-93) one may be inclined to read with some of the MSS (i.e., A¹, A², V) sarvadharmāḥ for sarve dharmāḥ agreeing with Buddhist works.
42. P. 150, note 5. Read MSA for MS.
51a. Read nispaṇḍat for viśjanāt.
58. For the first half see IV, 57. For d see LA, pp. 28-49: vicitrā hi yathā māyā cīṣyate na ca vidyate. See our text, p. 151, note 8. Read BA for BC on p. 164, l. 5, and kṛtaka for tanmayo on l. 19.
60a. See IV. 99.
71. Note 2. It is a speech of Bhagavat.
72a. See LA. II. 151-152: viśjaṇabijaṃ spandate.
74. P. 177, l. 16. Read nāsti for nāsti-
81a. Read vibhāto for vibhāti.
P. 188, Note 2. For the meaning of the word parāvēti see P. C. Bagchi: Studies in the Tantras, Calcutta University, 1939, pp. 87 ff.

83.". Read "asti-nāstīti nāstī-nāstīti" for "asti nāstīti nāsti nāstīti".
84a. For sarvadāś cf. savajña (I. 12, III. 36) and savajñatā (IV, 85, 89).

On this see E. Oberriller (The Doctrine of Prajñopāraṇīta, etc., p. 44): "When the Bodhisattva has attained the highest of the Unimpeded Paths in the Path of Concentrated Contemplation, he is considered to have terminated his course of training in the path. This last moment of Concentrated trance called the 'thunderbolt-like' (vajropama samādhi) is characterized by the removal of the most subtle forms of defilement and of ignorance. It is simultaneous with the final momentary Illumination (ekakṣaṇa-abhisambodha), and the culmination of the Bodhisattva's intuition of the absolute. All the factors for the attainment of the Omniscience of the Buddha are now brought to accomplishment. Owing to this, the representation of the Absolute appears in its full light: the differentiation to subject and object ceases to exist, the accidental obscurations which had hitherto separated the Germ of the Absolute in the living being now completely vanish, and the Germ now coalesces with the Unique Ultimate Essence which is personified as the Cosmical body (dharmanāa) of the Buddha."

1 "At the second moment we have the last Path of Deliverance (āśakti-mārga). At that time the double representation (i.e., of subject and object) disappears, and the object of Concentration (in its true aspect) becomes one with the knowledge cognizing it like one particle of water uniting with another (chu-la chu tshag-pa-ltar yale kholmikpepača). In the aspect of this intuition all the things cognizable in their varieties become directly perceived like a myrobalan (amalaka) fruit on the palm of the hand (karatalimalanakorpača)."
The special Omniscience which is peculiar only to the Buddha (sarva-ākāra-jñātā) is the knowledge of all the aspects of existence as being devoid of an independent separate reality and as not being liable to origination from the standpoint of the Absolute.

See Vācaspatimisra’s Nyāyakārikā (Reprint from the Pandit), pp. 110, 147, 205.

90. See MSA, XIX, 56: paścavidhāṃ hi vastu bodhisattvānāṃ aprameyam. paripācyāṃ vastu sat-tvadhātur aviṣeṣeṇa. viśodhyāṃ lokadhātur bhājana-lokasamgrhiṣitaḥ. prapyāṃ dharmadhātuḥ. paripācana-yogyāṃ vineyadhātuḥ. samyagdeśanāvastu vineyo-pāyadhātuḥ.

94. P. 206, note 2. Read W o o d s for W o o d. P. 207, l. 13. The word śāradya actually occurs in Sanskrit as in pariśacchāradya. It means saṅkoca ‘shrinking’. In Tibetan for it we have bskumps. pa from skum. pa ‘to contract.’ See MV, p. 46; ŚŚ, p. 296.

99. P. 212, note 2, l. 31. Read skyob. pa for skyb. pa.

100. For dūrdāra see KU, I. 2. 12.

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