THE NYĀYAKUSUMĀNJALI OF UDAYANĀCĀRYA
(ENGLISH TRANSLATION)

Vol. I—Books i and ii
THE NYĀYAKUSUMĀNJALI
OF
UDAYANĀCĀRYA

(A presentation of theistic doctrines according to
the Nyāya system of philosophy)

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH
BY
SWAMI RAVI TIRTHA

Vol. I—Books i and ii

ADYAR LIBRARY
1946
FOREWORD

The publication of the English translation of the great work on Indian Theism by Udayanācārya, called the Nyāyakusumāṇjali, was taken up in February, 1941 through the Adyar Library Bulletin. On account of the restrictions imposed on printing during the war, the size of the Bulletin had to be considerably reduced, and the publication had to be suspended when only the first two of the five Books of the work appeared in December 1943. As it will take some time more to resume the publication of the remaining portion, it is now proposed to issue the first two Books as the first volume, with very brief notes.

Some mistakes were observed after printing and they are shown in the notes. It has been the practice of the Adyar Library to print the text and the translation side by side, in the case of such works. But we had to depart from that practice in this particular case since we propose to print the whole text of the Kusumaṇjali with the commentary of Varadarāja, for which a complete manuscript is available in the Library. As soon as printing facilities will be available, this publication will be taken up. It will be a little inconvenient to give the text, a commentary and the translation one
below the other on the same page. Therefore we have
to defer either the commentary or the translation to a
separate place; we felt that inconvenience can be
avoided best by having the translation separately and
by giving the text and the commentary together. In
the text edition, the same paragraph division followed
in this translation will be adopted. A complete glossary,
explanation of technical terms and such material will
appear when the translation will be completed. A more
detailed introduction with a full synopsis of contents
which will enable the readers to lessen the fatigue of
wading through the rather strong torrent of dialectics,
has been promised and will also appear in the next
volume of the translation.

Such a translation may not be understood by those
who are not acquainted with Sanskrit works and with
the methods of Indian authors. But it is sure to be of
help to those who can understand the original only with
some such aid. In course of time when, with the expla-
nations in English of the text by those who have under-
stood the text and who can express the ideas in
English, the students of Indian philosophy will become
accustomed to the vocabulary of Indian philosophy
and to the general trend of treatment in Sanskrit, it
may be possible to have access to the subject through
such a translation independently. Till then, this
translation can at best be only an aid to the under-
standing of the original.

If the translation appears unintelligible, one must
realise that the original is not particularly easy to

understand. The difficulty is inherent in the work
itself. The original is one of the profoundest works
in Sanskrit literature. Every sentence in the original
needs explanation even for those who are supposed
to know the Sanskrit language well. Similarly, the
English translation too must be explained. The trans-
lation can be only a basis for such explanation for
those who do not know Sanskrit.

Adyar Library
1st February, 1946

C. Kunhan Raja
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book II</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The Nyāyakusumānjali of Udayanacārya is perhaps the most outstanding work in Indian philosophy, dealing with the problem of God. In his other work called the Ātmatattvaviveka, Udayana establishes that there is a permanent self in man, which endures after the death of the individual, which carries with it the residue of its actions in the past life to a later life and which, after a series of such lives, attains final release in course of time.

In this work, the attack is against the Mīmāṃsakas who hold that there is a settled order of things in this world, which needs no God either for its establishment or for its maintenance. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, there is neither a creation nor a dissolution of the world. There may be higher beings in the world, who when propitiated by man, may help man, may guide man in his life. But they are all subordinate to the Law of the world which is eternal, unmade, unalterable and unending. In their own philosophy, they do not accept intelligent beings called divinities. The divinities for whom the various sacrificial rites are performed according to Vedic prescriptions are only of the form of the names given in the Vedas. In a
Mantra, “Offerings to Agni (Agnaye Svāhā)”, the divinity is only the name “to Agni (Agnaye)”. Thus in their scheme of the Universe, there is no room for God either as creator or as the regulator of the moral order in the world.

The present work attempts to prove that there is a God who is the creator of the Universe and who is also the regulator of the moral order in this world. As a matter of fact it is the moral order in the world that is taken as the proof for God, in this work. The work is in five Books called Stabakas (bunches). This terminology fits in with the name of the book, namely, “a handful of reasoning-flowers (Nyāya-kusumāñjali)”. In the first two Books, which are contained in the portion in this volume, the author establishes his main thesis, namely, that there is God who has created the world and the moral order in it and who controls and regulates that moral order. In the remaining three sections, he gives his reply to possible objections against his thesis. In the first Book he maintains that there is a regular current of cause and effect in this world and that apart from the visible elements in the causes there is also an invisible element which settles the nature of the effect. In the second Book, he argues that it is only from scripture that we can know the moral law of the world and that God is the author of the scripture and gives it the validity it holds.

In the Third Book he takes up the question of how God is not within the field of our experience if He is there. In the fourth Book he refutes the position that God cannot be the source of the validity of scripture, since valid knowledge is knowledge of what was not known before and since God's knowledge cannot be the knowledge of what was not known to Him. In the fifth and last Book, he deals with a number of evidences which tend to show that there is God.

It is not the real thesis of the author that God comes legitimately within the scope of logical proof. He recognises and acknowledges that God has to be realised and experienced directly. But there are philosophers who hold that there are no means of valid knowledge beyond perception and inference and that God does not come within the scope of these two means; they hold further that, as such, God does not exist. If God is to be realised and directly experienced, there must be various methods of achieving that direct contact like worship, contemplation and concentrated meditation. When there is a doubt in the mind of man about God, how can there be worship and contemplation? Perception and possible inferences of the contrary are obstacles to faith, and these obstacles can be removed only by reasoning. Thus taking his stand on the very reasoning process which is resorted to by atheists to show that there cannot be a God, Udayana tries to show that even from a purely rationalistic point of view, the preference is in favour of there being a God as against the denial of God. The first stage in God-realisation is to hear about God from the scripture and also from those who know. Then, in order to develop faith in the validity of such testimony, it is
necessary to apply one's reasoning faculty to remove the obstacles from the way. The next stage it is to worship and to contemplate upon God. It is the second stage that is attempted in this work.

It must not be supposed that there is any quarrel between the Mīmāṃsakas and Udayana. To attack the nihilists, the method adopted by the Mīmāṃsakas is not adequate. That is the only way in which we can view the position taken up by Udayana against the Mīmāṃsakas. The nihilists must be attacked and defeated on their own grounds. Rationalism is the position taken up by the nihilists, and so Udayana takes up the position of an ultra-rationalist and shows that even from the point of view of an uncompromising rationalist, we have to accept theism.

The text is a very difficult one and a translation cannot obviate the difficulties of the original. Even to a good Sanskrit scholar the text is a hard nut to crack. There is not even a good edition. There are two important commentaries known. One is called Makaranda (honey) and is by Vardhamanopādhyāya, son of Gaṅgesopādhyāya who is the author of Tattvachintāmaṇi which is the basic text on neo-Logic in India. On this there is a gloss by Rucidatta and is called Prakāśa. The other commentary is by Varadarāja and is called Bodhini. Only the portion for the first three Books are available in print for this latter commentary, published in the Saraswati Bhavan Texts, Benares. A manuscript for the whole work is available in the Adyar Library. This commentary is very simple and lucid. There are also some other less known commentaries available.

Apart from the importance of the theme, the work has an interest as a masterpiece in dialectics and as also a masterpiece in style. Much of this is lost in a translation. There are many associations for the Sanskrit expressions; there is a background for the whole treatment known only to those who are acquainted with Sanskrit works. When the work is taken out of that background, it loses much of its force and appeal. Yet it is hoped that even in this garb, the work will have an appeal to scholars interested in Indian philosophy. A fuller treatment of the subject is reserved for the Introduction to the second volume of the translation, when the whole work would be finished.

Translator
THE NYĀYAKUSUMĀṆJALI
OF
UDAYANĀCĀRYA
FIRST BOOK

1. May this handful of reasoning-flowers whose good petals move, whose festivity has been determined by the arousing of good fragrance for the virtuous, which does not fade even when it is crushed and which is the source of honey identical with the flow of the essence of nectar, may this faultless handful of reasoning-flowers placed at the pair of feet of the Lord rejoice my revolving mind which behaves like a bee.

2. Here is being considered that supreme self whose worship the wise regard as the path to heaven and to beatitude.

3. Now, even though this is the position:
Keeping in view some particular goal of man, the Bhava whom the followers of the Upaniṣads worship as eternal, pure, awakened and liberated by nature, the followers of Kapila as the first knower, the followers of Patañjali as the one who is untouched by afflictions, action, their fruits and their residues, who shows the
traditional path and who blesses occupying an artificial body, the followers of Mahāpāśupata as the independent one untainted by even what are opposed to secular and scriptural laws, the Saivas as Śiva, the Vaiṣṇavas as the Highest Person, the followers of the Purāṇas as the Pitāmaha, the ritualists as the Sacrificial Person, the Digambaras as the unshrouded, the Buddhists as the Omniscient, the Mīmāṃsakas as the one shown as he who is to be worshipped, the Logicians as he who will be established by what is set forth (in this work), the Materialists as the one who is established by worldly experience, why say much, whom even artisans worship as the architect of the Universe, in respect of that Lordly Bhava, whose greatness is famous so long as there is the world, like caste, family, sub-family, Vedic School, race, duty etc., whence can there be a doubt? What is it that is to be considered?

Yet,

this investigation of the Lord through reasoning, which assumes the name of ratiocination, is undertaken only as worship, which comes in the wake of hearing.

Indeed, the Lord, who has been heard of many times in scripture, law-texts, ancient lores and epics, is now to be ratiocinated; because there is the scripture—"he is to be heard of, to be ratiocinated"; and because there is also the law-text:

✓ One attains to the highest yoga by cultivating his intellect in the three ways, through scripture, through reasoning and through the enjoyment of repeated contemplation.

4. Here, indeed, the points at issue are briefly as follows: (There is no God), because of the absence of a supernatural means for the world beyond; because of the possibility of resorting to other means for the world beyond; because of the presence of means of valid knowledge which make known His non-existence; because of His not being a source of valid knowledge and because of the non-existence of means of valid knowledge for establishing Him.

5. Of these it cannot be the first point; because, on account of dependence, on account of beginninglessness, on account of universal observance and on account of the experience (of the result of action) being confined to the same individual, there is a supernatural means.

Indeed, the world constituted of many kinds of miseries does not deserve to be non-dependent. If that were so, either it can only be or it can only not be; if cannot sometimes be. If it be said that it is not produced from something, it is not so.

6. It cannot be a denial of the cause or of production; nor can it be a postulation of itself or something incomprehensible (as cause). To describe it as nature is not in this way, since there is invariableness of limits.

7. If it is a denial of the cause, since production does not depend on anything, there will be production
always, as there is no difference. If it is a denial of production there will be no existence later just as (there was no existence) prior, as there is no difference. Since what itself was non-existent prior to its production, is incompetent for its own production, there is unreasonableness for the alternative of (production) from itself. And the relation of cause and effect is the rule of being prior and posterior. And the same cannot be both the prior and the posterior, because being such rests on difference. If the cause is something incomprehensible there is the possibility of existence (of the effect) even prior and there again results eternality.

8. Let it be so. By “not from something”, it is not merely a denial of cause, nor a denial of production, nor itself being the cause, nor the cause being something incomprehensible, that is meant to be conveyed, but that something, without being dependent at all, has a definite period (of existence) by nature, just as it has a definite (place in) space by nature.

9. We reply. If there is no limit, or if the limit is not invariable, there is the break-down of its existence only sometimes. Indeed, existence only sometimes is not merely being found at a particular time, but (being so) when it did not exist prior. And if there is a limit, that itself, when prior, is called the cause.

10. If it be said, “Let the prior non-existence itself be the limit”, it is not so; because at that time there are others also. For, otherwise, it itself cannot be thought of. And as such it cannot be the sole limit, since there will be no difference. For, if prior non-existence, without anything to depend on, is the limit, even prior to that limit, there is occasion for the effect to exist.

11. If it be said, “Let there be some sort of limits; but they are not depended upon. This is the meaning of (saying it is by) nature,” what is meant by “they are not depended upon”? Is it that they are not invariable? Or is it that, though invariable, they are not contributory? In the first alternative, the smoke can have a donkey as limit as well as fire, since there is nothing to regulate. And in the second alternative, what other contribution is wanted? For dependence means only invariableness; that itself is the nature of cause and such a theory of nature is acceptable.

12. If it be said, “This is like the rule of the nature of eternal things. It is not proper to ask why the being itself of Ether cannot pertain to all, in so far as it is not produced from something,” it is not so. For what pertains to all cannot be being itself. Indeed the same thing cannot surely be the nature of more than one, since there is contradiction.

13. Now here too the explanation is the same, in that there is contradiction in what exists always having the nature of what exists only sometimes. It is not the same; because if there is no limit or if the limit is not invariable, there is contradiction to existing only sometimes. And if there is a limit which is invariable, there is the adoption of the doctrine of causation.
14. Let it be so. Let there be a prior limit for the later; a posterior one for the earlier; and both limits for what is in-between. For there can be no denial of what is seen.

15. This has to be admitted by you too. There are not, indeed, both the limits for non-existence as in the case of positive things. It shall be so even for such positive things for which the one or the other limit is not observed.

16. It shall not be so. For there is beginninglessness.

This course (of cause and effect) is what has no beginning and is not what is differentiated and (at the same time) having a uniform potentiality. One must put forth effort in respect of the true nature of concomittance and non-concomittance.

17. If it be said, “Indeed prior non-existence has a posterior limit and is without a beginning. Even a positive thing like a jar can be so. This is not unacceptable in respect of such jars and other things for which a prior limit is not observed,” it is not so. For if by nature such alone be the limit, then the result would be that just as on that day, even on the prior day, taking that as the limit, its effect can come into existence, since there is nothing else to depend on. Similarly (it can exist) even prior and still prior. In respect of positive things, this itself is eternality.

18. If it be said that its nature is that it is to be produced only on that particular day, it is not so. For even for that day, there is the occasion, according to the previous argument, for existence prior too. Therefore for that also there can be that as prior; similarly even for what is prior to it. Thus there is eternality, rather; but not that there is the production of something without a prior, there being no production by what has not a prior.

19. If it be said, “even so let there be an invariability in respect of individuals, but not in respect of classes,” it is not so. For that will occasion the breakdown of the nature (of a thing being) of a definite class. Indeed, if something, even being produced from a mere anything, can have the nature of belonging to a particular class, anything can belong to all classes or to the same class. Similarly, if it be its nature that being of that particular class, it should be produced from something or other definitely, even then there can be produced from everything things that belong to any class or to the same class.

20. How then is it that fire produced from grass, drill or lens belongs to the same class?

21. If it be said that it is due to (the causes) having the same potentiality, it is not so. If even in things belonging to different classes there can inhere the potentiality for the production of things belonging to the same class, in no place can there be the inference of a particular cause from an effect. Nor can from the non-existence of the cause, be concluded the non-existence of the effect of the same class. For even in its non-existence, there is the possibility of its production
from another having the potentiality (for the production) of a thing of that class.

22. If it be said that there can be a regulation (only) in so far as what are seen are concerned, it is not so; because (what determines) causality is not seen and what is seen is not (what determines) causality. By this is refuted the argument that it is from what belongs to a subtle class. For even from what is not fire there occasions the production of smoke, on account of the subtlety of the class.

23. "If it be said, "For the difference and non-difference of the class of the effect, what decides it is only the difference or non-difference of the material cause, not the efficient or the incidental cause," it is not so; because that will lead to their becoming other than a cause. That (i.e., being a cause) is not merely the presence (of the effect) when it is there, but its presence only when it is there.

24. And in determining the class (of the effect), what decides it is not merely the material cause, but the aggregate (of causes). Otherwise, for substance, quality and action, there cannot be a difference in class, since they have substance as the common material cause.

25. By this has been refuted the rule of the doctrine of difference (from what it is not); because there will be adversity for statements like:

"From the relation of cause and effect" etc.

26. Therefore, since there will be a breakdown for the nature of things belonging to definite classes, it cannot be that the rule is only in respect of individuals. For there can be the difference in the class of the effect manifested even by the differentiation of the modes (of production) just like the differentiation (in the production of fire) by blowing only from grass, by drilling only from drills and by the sun’s reflected rays only from lens.

27. And it is seen that even though there is no difference as fire, a lamp produces an illumination that pervades the apartment of a mansion, not so the fire from burning wood though possessing tongues of a cluster of flames, and still less so the cow-dung fire.

28. But he who will not admit this, can merely infer the cause from the effect in general and as such what is there that is not logical?

29. "If this is the case, there can be in smoke and other things, some particularity even which cannot be detected, for which it is that there is dependence on fire; therefore, there is no establishment of fire in general etc. from (the presence of) smoke in general etc. By this has been explained the converse. And thus, when there is the breakdown of the absence of the effect as a probans (for the inference of the absence of cause), there is also the non-establishment of identity also (as a ground for the Universal); therefore inference has to go away." If it be so argued, this blow falls on the head of the Buddhist who says that what produces the effect is a particular class which is the sphere of non-cognition by preception. But in our case, if there are two things falling within two particular classes which have either
concomitance or non-concomitance, then as between them, their relation of cause and what is caused is determined only through those (classes). And so, even when there is the existence of sub-particularities, there is no contradiction in our case.

30. What, after all, is what produces fire in general in cases like fire from grass etc., since grass etc. is confined to only particular fires?" If this be asked, (we reply), "In the production of mere fire, wind is the incidental cause, the combination of parts (of fire) is the efficient cause, and the parts of fire form the material cause. This same causal aggregate, along with substance possessing weight, is (the cause) of solidified fire. This same, depending on produced touch existing in fire starts burning fire; and even there, conjoined with water, there is the atmospheric fire; conjoined with what is earthly, there is terrestrial fire; and conjoined with both there is the gastric fire. Thus things must be conjectured by oneself.

31. If it be said, "Even then let there be a cause which is the same (for all effects) or which belongs to one and the same class; differentiation (in the cause) can be done away with. Indeed a thing without any differentiation is found to produce more than one effect different (from one another); for example, a lamp, being quite the same, is the remover of darkness, is the producer of modification in the wick, and is the producer of worldly experiences about different colours," it is not so, because there is differentiation in effects.

32. Nowhere is there a succession for what is (only) one; and there can be no differentiation for what is uniform. And it is not (due to) a difference in potentiality, since this is not different (from the substratum). One's own nature can hardly be transgressed.

33. Now, from the same thing, which does not depend (on anything else) more than one cannot be produced; for it is unreasonable that there should be effects in succession from what has no succession.

34. If it be said that in respect of that (i.e. the same cause) it (i.e. production of more than one effect) is like that (i.e. in succession) because it is its nature to produce such and such effects in succession, just like simultaneity, this too will be a reply against destruction after a moment, not against the doctrine of the contributoriness (of causes); for when there is no dependence on what is prior and still prior, there is contradiction to even succession. But if there is a definite succession, there is unreasonableness for non-dependence.

35. Nor can what is more than one be devoid of differentiation. Indeed if the cause of fire can, with nothing taken away from it and with nothing added to it, also be the cause of what is not fire, this is not what is not fire; it may be fire or it may be of the nature of both. And it cannot be so.

36. If it be said that this position is free from defect since there is difference in potentiality, it is not so; for that is unreasonable because of the difference
and non-difference of the substratum. If (again) it be said that this position is free from defect because it is its nature to produce both which are (mutually) exclusive, it is not so. Indeed, its being other than fire is not based on itself; but on the contrary it is based on the nature of what produces it. And that being, who can prevent the fire too being that (i.e. other than fire), having been produced by that (i.e. the cause of what is other than fire)? Indeed it cannot be that when one is to be produced, something does not have that nature (i.e. of producing that one).

37. Therefore, because of the differentiation in effects, the causes also must be different. And this is not so by its own nature. Therefore there is the introduction of the differentiation in the contributories. And a moment too does not deserve to be so (differentiated from other moments) without depending on this.

38. If it be said, “Let this circle of contributories be what can be seen. Why should there be the assumption of some unseen effect?” it is not so; because there is universal observance.

39. Universal observance cannot be without a fruit; nor can it have suffering as the sole fruit; nor can it have the acquisition of seen things as fruit. Fraud too is not of this nature.

40. Indeed, if what determines the posterior and the still posterior is just merely the succession of the prior and the still prior modification of elements, no-one will engage himself in sacrifices and benefactions for the sake of the world beyond. Even a single person, who acts with forethought, will not associate himself with what has no fruit or what has suffering as the sole fruit; far less so the whole world.

41. If it be said that it may be for profit, for worship or for fame, then what is it that determines profit and other things? Indeed, this activity, by its very nature, is not the cause of such things. He from whom one should receive a profit, or he who should worship one, why should he (do so)?

42. If it be said, “It is for fame and for favour. A man is attached to a giver and to a worshipper. Prosperity indeed is produced from the attachment of men,” it is not so; for gifts and other things for such purposes are established only in respect of political councillors and councillors in amusements.

43. If it be said that those who perform austerities with their lore of the three-fold (scripture) are only fraudulent storks (i.e. a kind of birds), it is not so; for they have no use of seen wealth. If it be said that he acts thus for the sake of pleasure, it is not so, because that will lead to nihilists also acting in that way, as in the case of conjugal union, since it is established by the experience of the world.

44. If it be said that even actions devoid of fruits are done because they are established by statements in the scripture, as the morning and evening ablutions, this is the doctrine of the Teacher (i.e. Prabhakara) and not the doctrine of our teacher. Therefore it is
not proper even to mention it at this inopportune moment.

45. If it be said that (such actions are done) because younger people are duped by the elders, it is not so; for the elders too do it. And dupes do not dupe themselves also. If it be said that they too (are duped) by still elder people and thus this is without a beginning, indeed, here there is no one who has the intention of duping, in respect of whom we can suspect duplicity.

46. If it be said that some fraudulent person, for the first time, caused others also to act thus, performing it himself, is he really the greatest person in the world who, through giving away all his possessions, through giving up all his relatives, turning his face away from all enjoyments, through celebacy, through austerities, or through faith, out of the sole interest in duping others, mortifies himself throughout his life? And how can even persons who act with forethought follow this single man? And through what mark has this man of such nature been determined to be fraudulent by you with your intelligence surpassing all humanity? Indeed the pleasure of duping is not superior to the host of sufferings of such an extent.

47. If it be said (that it is) because such things are seen even among those acceptable to heretics, it is not so; for there is the difference in so far as there is seen or there is not seen a source. And when performance of this nature without a beginning continues to proceed, there can be a duplicity even by resorting to another method through the expenditure of immense wealth, through immense labour and through mere preaching, not through actions which are the sphere of his performance. Otherwise, unless there is opposition to authority, there would be no determination of their being heretics.

48. If it be said, "Let gifts, study and other things be the variegated causes for the variety in the world," it is not so; for they are momentary and what is sought for is what will happen at a later period.

49. An action destroyed long ago is not competent to produce the effect except through some transcendental factor. There can be no enjoyment by (souls) devoid of distinctive qualities even through elements that are (purificatorily) modified (by the unseen factor).

Therefore there is some transcendental factor (even in the souls).

50. If it be said, "These (elements) of even the same nature (constituting the physical body) have been produced by the potentiality of their causes, whereby they are the means for definite enjoyments," is that factor a supersensual form of these or is it a variety of the contributories? Now, the form of what is within the scope of the senses cannot be supersensual, because there is contradiction. And in the second (alternative) there is the establishment of an unseen effect.

51. Let there be established (something which is) merely an attribute of the elements which is supersensual, like weight and other things. Inevitably this
(i.e. supersensual attribute) must he accepted by you too. How otherwise can there be counter-action through charm and other things?

52. Thus indeed: From which contact of the hand with fire burning has been observed, from that same contact no burning is produced where there is counter-action like that of charm and other things; but it is produced when it is not there. In this case we do not get any seen differentiation. Nor can an unseen differentiation be possible when there is a seen consistency; for the purpose of that (i.e. the unseen) is only for this much (i.e. to make seen things consistent). Otherwise, even in rites there will be no classification at any time.

53. And the cause is not the aggregate as qualified by the non-existence of a counter-acting agent, because non-existence is not a cause—indeed, this (non-existence) is a mere nothing; and because at the time of (the presence of) a neutralising agent of the counter-acting agent, there is produced the effect even without that (i.e., the absence of the counter-acting agent); and because there will result non-invariability for the causes on account of the alternatives of prior non-existence), (non-existence through) destruction etc.; because what is not capable of doing something is not reasonably a counter-acting agent and because in case it is something that can do something there is the acceptance of a supersensual potentiality; and because when charms and other things are applied there is no effect produced even though there is the presence of reciprocal non-existence.

54. Therefore there is presumed in fire something that is supersensual, that is conducive to burning and that is contributory; it is reasonable that what destroys it is a counteracting agent. When it is free from defect the effect is produced; since it is of the same class, there is refuted (the charge of) non-invariability for causes.

55. To this the reply is:

Like a positive thing, similarly non-existence is accepted as a cause, just as (it is) an effect. Counteraction is a defect in the (causal) aggregate. Its cause is the counter-acting agent.

56. Indeed, there is no authority in respect of non-existence not being a cause. Indeed, because it is a nothing from the point of view of a positing, it is not so even in its own nature; for it would result that in relation to non-existence of the nature of negation, a positing too would be a nothing. If it be said that in as much as causality is pervaded by positivity, one (i.e., causality) would recede when the other (i.e. positivity) recedes, it is not so, since there is the possibility of (the argument) being turned against (the other); also because the uniformity of concomitance and non-concomitance, which is the ground for determining causality, is equal in respect of non-existence as much as of positive things.

57. If it be said that the proximity of non-existence is as an inevitable factor and not as cause, this is equal (in respect of positive things also). If it be
said that the proximity of it (i.e., non-existence), which pushes away its counter-correlate, is brought about by another, this (also) is equal (in respect of positive things). If it be said that the pushing away of non-existence is the very nature of positive thing, the pushing away of the positive thing by non-existence is not anything different from its own nature.

58. Therefore just as it is unreasonable to postulate a rule that a positive thing is the cause only of a positive thing, similarly is it that only a positive thing can be a cause. Indeed, what is the difference between the two?

59. At the time of the employment of the neutralising agent of a counter-acting agent, there will be deviation (only) then when there will be the production of the effect in the presence of even that in the presence of which itself there was the non-production. But this is not the case, because, even then there is the absence of the opponent (i.e., the counter-acting agent). Indeed the charm accepted as the counter-acting agent is the opponent, (only) when it is without the presence of (its own) opponent. And it does not surely exist in that nature. But that which exists is not an opponent.

60. If it be said, "Even then, in this case, there is the absence of merely the attribute, when the substratum is even there; and that is the charm itself which neutralises; therefore the causal aggregate is quite different," it is not so, because there is the absence of the qualified also. Indeed, it is not reasonable that when there is the presence of one with a stick there is no absence of others without sticks, but only of the mere non-existence of the stick. Indeed, just as in the presence of the mere stick, in the presence of both or in the absence of both, the absence of the mere person is not different in all these cases, similarly, in the presence of the mere neutralising agent, in the presence of the counter-acting agent and of the neutralising agent, or in the absence of both, the absence of the mere counter-acting agent is not different. So must one consider.

61. Then why is even a threefold aggregate of this nature not accepted? (It is) because of the deviation in respect of the affect; also because there is no authority for assuming a difference in class; also because there is reasonableness even through what has been said.

62. Or in the case of positive things, let it freely be. What harm is there for us? The division too into prior (non-existence), (non-existence through) destruction etc. does not bring about the cause being non-invariable; for in respect of the rule that the effect is produced only when it is not there, in the presence of which the effect is not produced, what brings about this is only the relational non-existence.

63. But he who without considering the difference between relational and reciprocal non-existence come-forward, taking up reciprocal non-existence, should be brought back to his senses.

64. If it be said, "Even then, since there is no genus in cases of non-existence, how can there be the
holding together of these three (kinds of non-existence)? And in respect of what have not been (so) held together, how can there be the understanding of causality?" (the reply is), "Let there be no genus. Indeed it is not only such as have been held together by that (i.e. genus) that can be a factor in worldly usage; for (in that case) there would result the giving up in all cases of the worldly usage about what have (indivisible) adjuncts."

65. By this is refuted (the view) that even in the presence of a counter-acting agent, since there is the possibility of the non-existence of another (individual) belonging to that class, there would result the production of the effect, and that if on the other hand there is no production, there is something even beyond that that is to be depended upon.

66. Indeed, when it is established that the effect is produced in the presence of something belonging to that class—by implication, it is not produced in its absence—just as it is not the case that even in its presence, since there is the absence of something of its class, the effect shall not be produced, so is this case also; for just as in the case of what is conducive, even in the presence of what is obstructive, the non-existence of other things of its class cannot do anything.

67. What has been said, "What cannot do anything (cannot reasonably be a counter-acting agent)" is also not true. A defect in the causal aggregate is the chief meaning of the term counter-acting agent. And here it is only charm and other things. But it is not what produces a counter-action. Then what is there by its not being able to do anything? Those who employ them are those who do the counter-acting. And they are really those who can do something. Thus what is it that is not satisfactory?

68. But in the case of those who explain that counter-action is the non-production of the effect, by them has been said that those who do not produce counter-action are the counter-actors. It is thus: The non-production of the effect must be either its prior non-existence or its coming into existence at a later time. It cannot be the former, since that cannot be produced. It cannot be the latter since for time there is no differentiation by its own nature. And its (differentiating) adjunct is dependent on its own cause, even irrespective of the charm. If it be said that the adjunct of time which demarcates the prior non-existence depends on it, it is not so, because it was there even before the charm.

69. Therefore it is not the proper course that since there is the rule of priority and posteriority in respect of the causal aggregate and the effect, there is assumed in a secondary sense a rule about the priority and the posteriority in respect of their non-existence also, and that really there is only simultaneity. If it be not so, what is the solution even in the acceptance of potentiality?

70. Thus: Through the counter-acting agent, either the potentiality is destroyed, or its attributes; or another attribute is produced or nothing is produced
—these are the alternatives. Of these, since what is not capable of doing anything cannot reasonably be a counter-acting agent, in the case of the production of a contrary attribute there can be the effect only if there is its non-existence, and thereby there is the acceptance of causality for non-existence; and (then) there is room for alternatives like prior non-existence.

71. In the case of its destruction or the destruction of its attributes, when there is its production again by the neutralising agent there is non-invariability for the cause; for first there was production from what was by nature a producer and now there is production from the neutralising agent.

72. And it is not proper that because they, possessing the same potentiality, belong to the same class, this is not the case (i.e. there is no non-invaribility of the cause); for there is the denial of similar potentiality in what belong to separate classes.

73. Nor is it proper that the neutralising agent only obstructs the potentiality of the counter-acting agent, but does not generate potentiality for production; for there would result its non-production. In the case of its production being from a particular time, that itself amounts to non-invariability of the cause.

74. Let this be so. Let there be no inherent potentiality. There can be an infused potentiality. Indeed there is seen the (purificatory) modification in grains etc. through springling etc. How otherwise can there be utility in respect of particular effects at a different period for them of the same nature?

75. Nor is it proper that they produce the effects only by securing charms etc. as contributories; for the effect is produced even when they are destroyed long ago.

76. nor are they such (i.e. producers of the effect) with (non-existence through) destruction as cooperator. Indeed if this be so, let the (non-existence through) destruction of sacrifices and other (actions) itself bring about heaven etc.; the assumption of an unseen effect can be done away with. If it be said that since they (i.e. cases of non-existence) are infinite (in number) there would result infinity for (the number of) currents of fruits, then even if an unseen effect is assumed, whence is it (determined) that the channels of fruits are only so many? If it be said that this is because of the nature of the unseen effect, this is equal here also. The only difference is that even with that (i.e. bringing about heaven) (non-existence through) destruction is not destroyed.

77. If it be said, “Let this be so. Springling etc. are only casual specifications and not qualifying specifications. And in that way, grain etc. casually specified by them (i.e. springling etc.) though not (then) existing (in grains etc.) will be of utility in all those places, as in the case of ‘Annotation by the Teacher’ and ‘A field (named) after Kuru,’ it is untrue. Indeed, no one accepts causality in a casual specification even in the absence of its form and its operation; for this will lead to (stepping) beyond the limits. But the mere worldly statement (of it) is
produced by the knowledge thereof, but not produced by it. The knowledge thereof too is dependent on its own cause, but is not produced by that (i.e., the casual specification), which was long destroyed without a link (left behind).

78. Or, there too, let some transcendental factor be assumed. What harm is there for us? Or let sacrifices etc., be casual specifications. Either time or the sacrificer casually specified by them can bring about heaven etc. The unseen effect can be done away with.

79. Nor is it proper (to say) that it is not (a case of) non-differentiation from the establishment of the unseen effect, through the force of (the syllogism) possessing concomitance: The body etc., of Devadatta assembled together by his own merits are (fit) for enjoyments, because they are the means for the enjoyments thereof, like a garland etc.; for (in this syllogism) there is the establishment of what is (already) established, through desire, volition and knowledge.

80. And it is not reasonable that there is enjoyment even for those devoid of these (i.e., desire etc.), whereby something more than this can be established. Nor can the meaning of the probandum be “what are generated by his own merits”; for there is non-conclusiveness in respect of mind. Nor is the probans to be qualified by “while it is an effect”; for even then there is establishment of what is (already) established through casual specifications. If it be asked how these, when they do not exist, can be producers, this (defect) is equal in the case of the recitation (of charms) etc.

81. Therefore, sprinkling etc., are capable of producing the fruit which comes into existence at a later time, only by generating an excellence of a positive nature, because they are accepted through authority for such a purpose, as in sacrifice, agriculture and medical treatment.

82. Otherwise agriculture etc. would turn out to be difficult to explain; for, because there is the break up of the seeds etc. to the final atoms, and because in them there is the absence of sub-classes, there is unreasonableness for the production of things belonging to specific classes.

83. To this it is replied:

A purificatory modification is accepted only for the person through spraying on, sprinkling on etc. For the final atoms, their attributes as produced by contact with heat etc. are their distinctive features.

84. Indeed, just as the offerings of oblations put into the fire along with charms, intended for particular deities, create a (purificatory) modification in the person (and) not in the fire nor even in the deities, similarly sprinkling etc. create a (purificatory) modification only in the person (and) not in that (i.e. grain).

85. And just as there is activity in the water-clouds in the form of movement and raining down water through their contact with the person that is the substratum of the (purificatory) modification created by the Kariri sacrifice, similarly grain etc. have their
such and such later activities. And just as in one case there is the absence of fruit through a defect in the doer, in the deed or in the means (employed for the deed), similarly is it in the other case also; for conformity with scripture is equal in both cases.

86. If this be so, just as in the case of sacrificial grass, (even) for grains etc. there will be no utility afterwards; or if there is utility, even another of its class can be made use of since there is no difference.

87. (This is) not (so). Indeed (purificatory) modifications are of variegated nature. Some are useful in respect of the effect only as co-operating with that for which is intended what is employed. What could be done here, since (scriptural) prescriptions cannot be transgressed?

88. And just as the (injury-working) modification by black magic produces sorrow only for that person who is related to a body and only resorting to that body with which body as the target that (black magic) has been employed, and not for another nor without resorting to that (body), (similarly) it cannot be that the (purificatory) modifications also, being of this nature, are not of utility. If it be asked how in that case, are grain etc. the objects for the (purificatory) modifications, (it is) only through relation with sprinkling etc.

89. Now that which is performed in respect of another must produce something in that other, as sacrifice on the birth of a son and sacrifice for the departed souls. And chanting etc. performed in respect of grain etc. are such. This is the inference.

90. If this be said, it is not so, because there is non-invariability in the case of offering oblations etc. Indeed they do not produce in the fire etc. anything conducive to the fruit generated on a later occasion. Or is it not seen that the functions of the sense-organs, of the probans and of the word, operated in respect of the objects of valid knowledge produce something only in the agent of the valid knowledge and not in the objects of valid knowledge?

91. If it be said, "Agriculture and medical treatment can also be of this nature," it is not so. For where there is explanation through the difference of colour etc. produced by contact with heat that is seen, there is no authority for assuming what is unseen. And in this way is explained the sprinkling of the solution of lac etc.

92. For this very reason, even though there is break up as far as the ultimate atoms for particular seeds, and even if there are no sub-classes in the ultimate atoms, the ultimate atoms qualified by particular contact with heat of a former time, produce such and such effects.

93. Indeed, just as paddy seeds differ from the seed of oats in class, the seed of man from the seed of apes, the cow’s milk from the buffalo-milk, similarly, their ultimate atoms too, which are the ultimate causes, differ from each other by what are produced by contact with heat. Indeed, there is no possibility that the cow’s milk is fragrant, sweet and cooling, while its ultimate atoms are the opposite.
94. Therefore the ultimate atoms are possessed of what are produced by contact with heat of such nature, by what are of which nature alone, can there be the first differentiation and the final differentiation in the form of the seed etc. Thus why should there be the assumption of a potentiality here?

95. Even in the beginning of a time-cycle, it is just like this. In the present stage there is the bringing together by people like us, of what is contained in the seed etc. In that stage what were kept apart were brought towards one another by the mere unseen merit in the soul. This is the difference.

96. And it should not be asked, "why should it not be just the same even now?" For if the activities of cultivation etc. are dispensed with there will result the dispensing with of the enjoyment that is produced by them. And for fear of there being no settled order, it is assumed that unseen factors are the means for enjoyment only through the settled order in actions that are seen.

97. Therefore ultimate atoms qualified by particular results of contact with heat and particular relative position, generate particular effects. And they (are qualified) by particular associations with fire, air and water. And they (are qualified) by actions. And this (is qualified) by push, impact, weight, velocity, fluidity, and contact with soul possessing some unseen merit in different appropriate ways. Thus there is nothing unreasonable.

98. And, differences of cause occur in contact with heat. It is thus. The flesh of harita bird soaked in a solution of turmeric and baked in turmeric-fire produces instantaneous death when eaten; ghee too kept in a bell-metal vessel for ten nights becomes poison; milk also kept in copper vessel becomes pungect; and so on.

99. Then when there is no particularity produced by contact with heat in water, fire or air, then how (can there be) production, non-production, fluidity, hardness and other particularities? Or how can there be merit through worship etc. when there is no particularity in images etc. made of earth though consecrated by installation etc., demerit in transgressing this and neither when there is no installation? And here, help for another cannot be accomplished by the merit of the performer, for one's merit is not of any avail in respect of another. Or if it is of avail, there results commonness.

100. To this the reply is:

Production, non-production etc. are due to association with different causes, or due to the presence of the Deity and due even to recognition.

101. Indeed, ultimate atoms, with the assistance of the unseen merit which brings them together, produce particular substances. On account of their particularities, there arise particularities like production. Similarly water, though fluid by nature, gets its fluidity obstructed by particular causes and produce hail etc. that are hard. This and such like must be guessed for oneself.
102. But image etc. having different Deities conceived of as abiding in them like Indra, Upendra and Mahendra, brought into presence there through this or that process, acquire eligibility to be worshipped in this or that case, just as in the case of the body of a king who is bitten by a snake and who loses his consciousness, but who has his life restored through the process of removing the poison. Presence there is the conceit of "I" and "mine" in them, just like that of a king who sees his likeness in a portrait etc. Such is our doctrine. According to others, being such has to be concluded in respect of what is an object of recognition as having been worshipped earlier and still earlier or in respect of an object of recognition as having been installed. By this has been explained water, tender leaves etc. on which charms have been chanted.

103. How is it about balance etc.? If it be said, "they are quite whole" it is not so. Indeed an apparatus cannot break up what is seen nor what is unseen since that is what leads to ascertainment. Nor can it produce what is unseen; for if merit is produced, there results the possibility of success always. In the opposite case there results the possibility of break down always.

104. To this the reply is:

The prescriptions of ordeals are accepted merely for bringing about the existence of the cause of success or otherwise which inheres in the one subjected to the ordeal.

105. Although our doctrine is that even here there is produced the presence of the Deities presiding over merits etc. and that they exhibit the indication according to the fund of his actions, still on account of the different views held by the opponent, we give the following explanation.

106. Indeed the cause of success or defeat manifested even by that process, exposes the effect. And the manifestation of an action is only the acquisition of the contributory. And that contributory is the recognition that I have ascended the balance according to this process, which I have done a sin or am free from sin. Thus it is said:

Them the gods see and also one's own inner person.

107. Or merit is produced by it depending upon the purity appropriate to the oath; because of the performance being for a cause and because there is the scripture about success being the fruit. And demerit (is produced) depending upon impurity; for there is the prohibition since there is shown the undesirable result in the form of defeat.

108. Then what is the authority for denying potentiality? There is none. Then is it even there? Quite so; it is not that in our system there is no category called potentiality. What is it then? It is causality. What is it? It is the fact of belonging to a class determined at an earlier time, or the non-production of the effect brought about by a defect in the contributory.

109. What about denying something beyond that? There is nothing. Then is it even postulating that?
This too is not; because there is no authority. Is it doubt? How can it be so since it is not cognised before? Is it then dispute? In respect of what? In so far as there is commonness in respect of being conducive, even with reference to contributories the term potentiality is used. In the case of a different contributory there is certainly something in excess even there, which is conducive to fire etc., which is removed by the obstructor. If this is the position, then we do not dispute. Even the Mimamsakas do not deserve to quarrel when they are deprived of their means, after accepting the helpfulness of non-existence etc., as put forward by us.

110. Therefore some people say that non-existence etc. are helpful; others (say) that (they are) not so. When there is such a position of dispute, their helpfulness has been substantiated. What more remains in respect of which authority has to be pointed out? Thus there is no need to continue further.

111. “Even then, whence is it ascertained that it is the sentient being itself that is purified and not the elements?” If this is asked, the reply is as follows. It is because otherwise there is no establishment of enjoyment as definite for each soul, since there cannot be determination by elements even as qualified, when the enjoying souls, that are eternal and all-pervading, occupy all bodies. Indeed there is no rule that a particular body, a particular mind and particular senseorgans, though qualified, belong only to a particular soul, since there is nothing to so regularise.

And as such there occurs the position of souls having bodies in common.

112. And a certain attribute of the elements itself is not special for a sentient soul, since there is seen the opposite. If it be said that it is like number two etc. it is not so, since that too, being similar to body etc. is only a minor term. Even for it the rule is only by association with definite attributes of the sentient soul, and not merely by being produced by that; because in itself there is no difference.

113. Even then, in respect of the explanation of the rule through being produced by that, what is the invalidating factor in the opposite case? If this is asked, the reply is that there is the occasion for the break down of the relation of cause and effect; because for body etc., there is found the production of the attributes only in association with the attributes of the sentient soul.

114. It is thus. Volition is produced in association with desire. Desire etc. are produced in association with cognition. Pleasure etc. are produced in association with them; and so on.

115. If it be said that even in the present context, cognition etc. abiding in the sentient soul can be the regulating factors, it is not so; because prior to body etc. they do not exist. And in that way, the sentient beings are devoid of any excellence, and the elements are common; and thus there is no regulation of enjoyment. By this the Sankhya doctrine is refuted.
116. Indeed it is thus. The Purusha is neither a cause nor an effect and is of the nature of immutable sentience. The Prakriti is the primeval cause, non-sentient and subject to modification. Thence is the creation of Mahat (intellect) and others. Indeed, the sentience in itself cannot be of the nature of being in bondage to objects, since that would occasion the impossibility of beatitude. Nor can the Prakriti in itself be of the nature of belonging to Him; because even then, since it is eternal, there occasions the impossibility of beatitude. Nor can it be through the channel of the sense-organs alone, since there is the occasion for admixture. Nor is it through the opening of the sense-organs and mind; because one, even being a man, who has the conceit of being a boar or a tiger etc. in the state of dream, cannot think of himself as a man. Nor is it through the operation of evolutes as far as egoism; because in the state of deep sleep, though there is the cessation of their operations, there is the continuation of the series of breathing-activity.

117. Therefore, that which persists as the same, having an activity in these states, and depending on which there is the residue of experience, an object which presides over such an internal organ becomes the conditioning factor for the Purusha. And because of the non-cognition of the difference, there is the conceit of being the doer in that Purusha though devoid of activity; and there is the conceit of sentience in that which is non-sentient. In that is the residue of the activities. The Purusha on the contrary is free from taint like the leaf of a lotus.

118. Apprehension is the activity of the sense-organs. And the activity of the mind is specification. Conceit is the activity of egoism and determination of volition, of the intellect. Indeed that intellect has three parts. The parts are the reflection of the Purusha, the reflection of the object and entering into the activity. Indeed it is of the form “by me is this to be done.” Among them, the reflection of the sentient being as “by me” is unreal because of the non-cognition of the difference, like the reflection of the face on the mirror. The reflection of the object as “this,” which is a particular modification through the channel of the sense-organs, is real like the dimness of the mirror when one blows his breath on it, also the setting up of activity abiding in these two.

119. Here, knowledge is of the nature of the reflection of the objects on the intellect, which has the nature of such activity. What is called cognition is the relation of the unreal reflection on the Purusha with this (knowledge), like the stain on the face reflected on a (stained) mirror. Then, in this way, the eight dispositions beginning with virtue are only for the intellect, because they are concluded as co-existing with that on a common substratum. And it is not reasonable that the intellect itself is by nature sentient, since it is subject to modification, and because Purusha is immutable and eternal.
120. This has been refuted even before. It is thus:

What determine (the experience) are the merits (and demerits) of the performer; and to us he himself is the sentient being. Otherwise there would be non-beatitude; or the non-origination of the world is certain.

121. Now it has been settled that virtue etc., established as co-existing in the same substratum with volition, are what determine (the experience). And the sentient being is the doer himself, because sentience and volition are experienced as co-existing in a common substratum. This is not an illusion, since there is nothing to sublate.

122. If it be said that what can sublate it is (the probans)—“because it is subject to modification, like a jar etc.”, it is not so; for even in the case of being the doer, it is the same. And thus volition too cannot be a natural attribute of the Mahat (intellect).

123. If it be said that since it is experienced, there is no defect, it is equal. If it be said that “being the product of what is insentient” is what sublates because there is identity between the cause and the effect, it is not so, because of non-establishment.

124. Indeed there is no proof for the doer being a product. On the contrary according to the dictum “because birth is not seen for one devoid of attachment” (Ny. Su. 3-1-25), what is established is only beginninglessness. And whatever form is noticed in the effect, if each of them is the nature of the cause, attachment and others too become necessarily acceptable in the Prakriti. And thus that in itself is the intellect, and is not the Prakriti, since it is endowed with the eight-fold dispositions.

125. If it be said that they exist in it in a subtle form, leaving off their grossness, sentience too can be there in a similar way. Thus too is the probans non-established.

126. It it be said that in such an event there is the occasion for the jar and other things too being sentient because of identity, the occasion for their having attachment etc. is also difficult to avoid. And being subtle is equal.

127. Therefore if from a cause of a particular class an effect of a particular class is found (to be produced), (a cause) of such nature alone can be inferred from (an effect) of such nature, but not that whatever attributes there are in the cause, all such attributes are in the effect, since there is deviation. Thus why should there be this irrelevant topic?

128. And if intellect is eternal, there occurs non-beatitude; for if the Purusha has this adjunct eternally, he cannot remain in his own nature. Now, if it perishes, then there being a beginning since there can be no destruction for what has no beginning, what is the determinant at the stage prior to its production, the Prakriti being uniform? And in this way there is the non-origination of the world.

129. If it be said that since there can be the persistence of the residues of the intellect which was prior
and still prior, (the Prakriti) though uniform can be multifarious, then there is contradiction to the doctrine in so far as there can be persistence for the residues of its attributes even after the retirement of the intellect.

130. If it be said that there is no such defect because of its being subtle, there is occasion for its subsequent operation even after beatitude. If it be said that this cannot be so since there is no competence, then let intellect itself, having the competence, but remaining in a dormant nature, be the Prakriti. There is no need to assume distinct categories corresponding to the terms Prakriti, egoism and mind.

131. Indeed that (intellect) itself, becoming the sphere of such and such statements, are designated by such and such terms, like the breaths in the body; thus scriptural statements also are justified. In this way too is the probans non-established.

132. The non-functioning of the intellect by the cessation of its competence is beatitude. Competence is association with residue. Thence arises the world.

When there is absolute difference between the attributes and the substratum, there is incompatibility for immutability. And the difference of the nature of superimposition of incompatible attributes is established through experience, like jar and cloth.

133. And through co-existence in a common substratum there does not arise non-difference too. Indeed that consists in being expressed by the same term, being the sphere of the same cognition, having the same substratum. The relation of the container and the contained, being the qualified, a mere relation, can be only in difference. And what is reasonable even in difference does not affect non-difference. Thus everything is clear.

134. Let this be so. If there is the existence of an experiencer who is eternal and all-prevading, then all this can be so. Whence is he himself? For it is the elements themselves that are sentient. Elements modified in the form of the body are such, since it is so obtained by concomitance and non-concomitance. But the residues of action and knowledge, confined to particular elements in all cases, can persist, whence there is the regulation of the re-cognition of experience.

135. If it be so said, the reply is—

Another one cannot remember what yet another one has seen. The element is not the same, since it drops off. There is no transference of the residue. And there is no other course in the case of eternity.

136. Indeed, sentience is not what abides in the aggregate of the elements; for when that is different day after day, there is occasion for the non-recollection of what was experienced on the previous day and on the still previous one. Nor is it what abides in each of them separately; for in the event of the loss of the hand, foot etc., there is unreasonableness for the recollection of what was experienced by them.

137. Nor is it that just like the residue of the musk in a clothe, the residue in one is transferred to
another through association; for there is occasion for recollection by the baby in the womb of what was experienced by the mother. And regulation through the relation of material cause and its effect is no recourse, because in the alternative of eternality, that is impossible for the ultimate atoms, and because in respect of a part of the whole, what are cut off are not material causes, and because there is destruction of the whole that existed before.

138. Then let there be destruction (of everything) after a moment. And there is no passing over the excellence; on the contrary since it is overcome by similarity, it is not even for a moment realised (as a savikalpaka cognition). It is inferred through the perception of the effect, like the excellence of the final (effect). And thus it is only the elements that are produced in such and such ways in which ways the regulation of the re-cognition etc. is also justified.

139. This can be so, when momentariness is established. But that itself has been refuted elsewhere.

140. Further

Without variety there cannot be that (momentariness). If it is there, inference is impossible. Without that there is no establishment of that. There cannot be (nirvikalpaka) perception without definitive (savikalpaka) knowledge.

141. When there is the acceptance of the fact that in the matter of production and non-production of what just belongs to a particular class, what determines is the acquisition or non-acquisition of the contributor, there is no establishment of momentariness. This can be the case for a single individual also, since there is no contradiction. For there is the rule that there is no difference whether that is itself or of its class. Therefore, without paying heed to them, variety has to be accepted even as devoid of proof.

142. And in this way, just as in the cause, in the effect also there can be some variety, which it is that is dependent on the cause, not what has a known class. On account of such a doubt there is no establishment of its production.

143. If it be said that what has a known class can be (produced) from nothing in particular, it is not so; for even there, there can be something quite different which can be what prompts and as such there is no contradiction.

144. If it be said that for an effect the differentiation is not obtained as produced therefrom and also that for effect in general there is not seen another prompter, then, is the particularity of the cause, abiding in it, obtained as prompting it, or, for cause in general, has another object of prompting been obtained, whence there can be the establishment of what is meant to be stated? And in both the cases, doubt is obtained in plenty.

145. If it be said that it is inferred from the production and non-production of the effect, it is not so, since there is reasonableness through the obtainment
and non-obtainment of the contributor. Or let it be so inferred; in the case of effects there can be doubt, since there is nothing to deny. Non-cognition of what is fit to be cognised is not competent to deny the particularity in smoke that has been generated by fire. Because there is no reasonableness for the determination of what can be determined only from the effect, merely out of its non-cognition; for there is the possibility of effects that are super-sensuous. And for this very reason, there is no room for another non-cognition also.

146. Thus there is no co-existence of two classes of a positive nature or of a negative nature, if there is contradiction (between them). And between two (classes) that co-exist there must be the rule of the relation of the higher and the lower; because there is no authority for the assumption of two classes existing in (areas) neither narrower nor wider, since in the absence of scope for contradiction through the non-existence of a difference between what are to be differentiated, a difference is not reasonable; and because in (the event of) the co-existence of two classes, that have mutual exclusion, there is occasion for cowness and horiness being so (co-existent).

147. If it be said that it cannot be so on account of the contradiction between causal aggregates, whence is this (itself)?

148. If it be said that it is on account of such a regulation at all times through mutual exclusion, (the reply is that) this too is not perceptible. But the co-existence of the causal aggregates is inferred from the co-existence in the same place (of the effects).

149. If it be said that it is from the nature of the two effects being mutually exclusive, then there can be no co-existence of shaking and simsapa tree, which have mutual exclusion.

150. If it be said that this then is seen, what hope is there that this will not be seen of cowness and horiness? Thus non-cognition as the probans is also gone, since nowhere can contradiction be established. Hence since there is no sublator for the opposite side, one's own nature as probans is also refuted.

151. Now, it (i.e., a sublator for the opposite side) is there. It is thus. The causal aggregate of the simsapa tree is included in leaves, stems etc., which constitute the tree. That (aggregate) will fall outside its own cause too, if it exists as falling outside the tree.

152. Thus, the designation of tree follows merely what has branch etc., and the designation of Simsapa tree follows the varieties thereof. How can it acquire its own form if it falls outside of that?

153. Then in this way, the causal aggregate of shaking is included within the causal aggregate of the samsapa tree. Hence if it exists as the form of shaking etc., falling outside that, it shall fall outside its own cause itself. Thus the designation of samsapa tree follows that variety of what has branches etc., and the designation of shaking follows the variety of that. How can it acquire its own form if it falls outside of that? This (difficulty) is equal.
154. If it be said that the nature of shaking is determined by casual factors like impact etc., but that it does not depend entirely on its particulars, (then) if impact etc. are of its own nature, they are its varieties. If they are not of its own nature, then they are only contributories. Hence the simsapa tree, with no particulars at all, generates the nature of shaking after acquiring them. And in this way, whence is momentariness established?

155. If it be said that they become certainly its own nature through the introduction of casual contributories, then in this way, a simsapa tree also is generated only through the introduction of casual contributories into the causal aggregate of the tree. Hence there is no difference.

156. If it be said, "Thus it is. Yet they are generators of simsapa tree only by taking up the causal aggregate of the tree; but they are generators of shaking not by taking up that itself, but (by taking up) tangibility in general, since it is so seen," it shall not be thus; for there is nothing to regulate that what generate shaking, even being the varieties that generate the simsapa, fall outside that, but that what generate simsapa tree, which are the varieties of what generate the tree, do not fall outside that.

157. If it be said, "What generate the simsapa tree are only the varieties of that, but what generate shaking are not so; on the contrary they are (only) casual contributories," then in this way, certain particulars, though of similar nature, are generators of shaking by taking them up; but when they do not take up the contributories, they are not so. And thus it may be that or similar to that; hence there will be no difference.

158. Therefore, for two (classes) that are contradictory there is only absence of co-existence. And for the two that co-exist, there is only the relation of higher and lower. Those that are not of this nature are only adjuncts in the form of substance, quality, action etc. And they, when contradictory, do not co-exist on account of the difference of the individual. And for classes, it is on account of differences in substratum. And thus, whence is momentariness? And if variety is accepted, whence is this talk about inference?

159. If it be said, "Let there be no inference", it cannot be so. Indeed without that, it (i.e. momentariness) cannot be established. Indeed there is no perception in the case of momentariness, since it is not so determined and since it is authoritative only in respect of what has been cognised and determined, and since this will lead to (stepping) beyond the limit in the other alternative.

160. Now, the present moment is the sphere of perception. And this is not of the nature of moments existing prior or posterior. Therefore the determination of being different is itself the determination of being present. If it be so said, is that, in this case, acceptable to you of long life?

161. If black colour etc., are only the substratum of the attribute, there is nothing that is not
reasonable, since it is common to persistence and non-
persistence. If it is an attribute, what has happened to the substratum of the attribute, when the differ-
ence too has been determined, since it is other than that?

162. If it be said that being present and not being present are contradictory in the same thing, (then) if it is to be existent and to be not existent, that cannot be, because it is not admitted since the re-cognition is only in that form (as existent). If it is relation to what is existent and to what is not existent, what is it that is irrelevant; since that can be explained like cognition?

163. If it be said that the relation of the same to many in succession is unreasonable, it is not so, since that can be explained even in the manner of the cognition of (what is) approaching.

164. If it be said that re-cognition (itself) is not valid, yet it is there and hence must be considered. But there is no cognition of momentariness even as a delusion. This is the difference.

165. Let this be so. Let there be neither perception nor inference in respect of momentariness. Even then let there be doubt. Even by thus much can the ambition of the materialist be accomplished. If it be so said, this is the reply.

166. There is no doubt in respect of either persistence or its cognition, nor in respect of its validity, since there will be contradiction. By that (proof) by which there is determination of sameness in what is momentary, there is accepted (determination of it) in what is persistent.

167. Indeed neither in respect of what is persistent nor in respect of its cognition is there a legitimate doubt, since re-cognition cannot be set aside. Nor can it be in respect of its validity. Now indeed that (doubt) is not what exists everywhere, since there will be self-contradiction.

168. It is thus. If there is no establishment of validity, doubt too cannot be established; or if this (latter) is established, that (former) too can be established, since determination is dependent on that. And if there is no presence of the two alternatives, not being cognised, what is the object of doubt? And if they are cognised, how is there its non-establishment in all circumstances?

169. By this has been refuted (the position) that the designation of it is without authority, because if there is non-establishment of authority in all circum-
stances, that too is not established.

170. If it be said that in the context, the doubt about authority is because there is seen deviation in respect of hair cut and grown again and such other things, it is not so; for the determination of (its) being the same is acceptable to you also. Or if it is not acceptable, nothing can be established.

171. If it be said," Let it be established where there is freedom from contradictory attributes", by that itself is persistence too determined.
172. If it be said that here it is that that is doubted, this is the same. If it be said that there is determination too in certain cases somehow or other, the reply is the same.

173. Now if this causality is the nature of a positive thing, like black colour, then it will be common to all. Indeed black colour is nothing other than black colour in respect of certain things. If it is brought about by adjuncts, then in the case of the adjunct also being its own nature, there isoccasion for its being so (i.e., common to all). In the case of that (too) being brought about by adjuncts, there is infinite regression.

174. If the not being common is also only its nature, then it shall produce commencing from its generation, since what is persistent has the same nature. If this be said, this is the reply.

175. Without paying heed to the potency of the cause, even black colour etc. are not existent things. What is associated with it has potency in respect of it there. Hence why cannot it be common?

176. By one who explains the fanciful nature of the relation of cause and effect, in contrast with black colour etc., which are common to all, black colour etc. have to be accepted even as real; because otherwise the unreality of the relation of cause and effect, in contrast with that, is not reasonable. And in the event of the relation of cause and effect being unreal, black colour etc. do not deserve to be real, because that will bring about eternality. Therefore, if this is real, the other too is so. Or neither of them is (real).

177. How can the same thing produce more than one effect which are mutually contradictory? If it be said that it is on account of that being its nature, then commencing with its generation, it shall produce, since there is no difference.

178. This (objection) too is not reasonable; for, one's own nature has been established like this: when there is co-operation of such and such contributories, it produces such and such effects. And this is only common, since it is so cognised by all. Indeed, for black colour too, there is nothing else as common.

179. Let this be so. Let there be something eternal. Even then it is not reasonable that what is eternal and all-pervading is a cause. It is thus: causality is established through concomitance and non-concomitance, not merely by concomitance, because this will lead to (stepping) beyond the limit. And for what are eternal and all-pervading, there is no possibility of non-concomitance.

180. And it is not proper that it has this when it has an adjunct, because something of that nature does not deserve to have relation to an adjunct. It can have it either as generated by it or as eternal. It is not the first (alternative), as stated before; nor the second (alternative) just as stated before. And even in that case the non-concomitance is only for the adjunct, not for that (which is eternal).
181. If it be said that it is (also) for what has that (adjunct), since there is no difference, it is not so; for there is no object having that (adjunct) distinct from (the two), that and the adjunct. Or if there is, that itself shall be the cause.

182. To this the reply is:

Indeed, being prior which is causality, is known somehow or other even for an eternal object that is all-pervasive. Indeed there is no knowledge of the substratum of the attribute in any other way.

183. This would have been so if causality were only concomitance and non-concomitance. On the other hand, it is prior being, in relation to the effect. And that is concluded in certain cases through concomitance and non-concomitance; in certain other cases, (it is concluded) from means of knowledge that make known the substratum of the attributes.

184. Otherwise nowhere will there be the inference of the cause from the effect, since there can be no cognition of the association of that (cause) with that (effect). Or if there be such cognition, there is no scope for the effect to be a probans, since that is established only by perception. Since there is seen the association of what belongs to its class, its establishment in other cases too is not precluded.

185. If it be said that even in that case a cause can be established from the effect, only if (the cause) has concomitance and non-concomitance as associated in a narrower course, in so far as it is so observed in other cases, it is not so, because there is contradiction through sublation; and because there is non-pervasion through the absence of a sublator for the opposite side; and because of equality of eminence in respect of merely being seen. And of this the further elaboration will be given in respect of God.

186. If it be said that what sublates is the occasion of causality in respect of all for what pervades all, since there is no difference of concomitance and non-concomitance, it is not so; for this will not lead to (stepping) beyond the limit, in so far as they belong to the class of those that have concomitance and non-concomitance and in so far as there is something that sublates in the opposite side.

187. It is thus. An effect is seen as having an inherent cause; hence though the abode is not seen, it shall have something belonging to its class as cause. In the absence of (such) an abode, to what will the non-inherent cause be related? In its absence what will the accessory causes help?

188. And in this way there shall be non-production or production always or production everywhere. In this also, if the production is in a definite place, just by the efficiency of the accessory causes, that place itself will necessarily have to be depended upon. And in this way, when there is established a definite place in general, and when other things like earth etc. are sublated, who can prevent the establishment of something other than these? In this way the
non-inherent and the accessory causes too must be conjectured.

189. Whose peculiar contributory power has been spoken of as illusion through the impossibility of being correctly grasped, as Prakriti being the root (cause) and as necience through fear about (the possibility of) correct understanding, may that God, the serene, arresting the play of the waves in the form of the creation of the universe, and remaining as a direct witness, bring about joy in my mind.

SECOND BOOK

1. Thus when in this way a supernatural cause has been established, there must necessarily be something as a means to accomplish that. And that cannot be known by persons like us. And there can be no empirical statements with reference to things not known. Therefore there is occasion for one transcending the world and cognising all.

2. Now the tradition of religious duty can be through the channel of the Veda which is eternal and free from flaws, or through some one who has omniscience accomplished by Yoga and (virtuous) deeds. Why should there be assumed a supreme God? If such a question be asked, the reply is (as follows).

3. Since valid knowledge is dependent (for its validity) on something extraneous, since creation and dissolution are possible, and since there can be no rest anywhere other than in Him, there is no possibility of another course.

4. It is thus. A valid knowledge is dependent on a cause extending beyond the cause of the (bare) knowledge; because, being an effect, it is a particular thereof,
like invalid knowledge. And if it were dependent merely on thus much, invalid knowledge too can be a valid knowledge; indeed, there (too) there is the cause of the (bare) knowledge; otherwise it cannot be knowledge at all.

5. If it be said that even though that too is knowledge, it is an invalid knowledge by the introduction of defects which extend beyond (the cause of the bare knowledge), then in this way, it can be valid knowledge too by acquiring absence of defects, since it depends on that invariably.

6. “Let there be the absence of the defects as an additional factor; but a positive factor is not wanted.” If it be so said this too can be if invariably defects have to be of a positive nature. But it is not so; because non-cognition of particulars and other cases of non-existence are defects. How else can there be doubt and wrong knowledge from them? Therefore, their absence is positive (in nature); hence how can it be not wanted?

7. “Let it be so. Now, in respect of verbal testimony, the defects are only positive factors like a desire to dupe. Therefore in their absence the validity of knowledge through verbal testimony is intrinsic.” If it be so said, it is not so; for in inference etc., when fallacy of the probans etc. are defects which are certainly positive in nature, there is no production of a valid knowledge merely by their absence.

8. “Let it be as things are in other cases. But in verbal testimony merits of the speaker are not called for, when there is the absence of a desire to dupe etc.” If it be so said, it is not so. For it is quite possible to argue the opposite also, namely, that in respect of its invalidity the defects of the speaker are not called for, when there is the absence of merits.

9. If it be said that in respect of invalidity there is concomitance and non-concomitance for defects, it is not so; for in respect of validity too these two exist for merit.

10. “Let such a regulation exist in respect of human statement. But in respect of non-human statements, validity is through the absence of defects itself.” If it be so said, it is not so, since there is the possibility of invalidity through the absence of merits.

11. If it be said that its competence in respect of invalidity has not been recognised, whence is the competence of the absence of defects in respect of validity recognised? It it be said that it is in the statement of people, it is equal (for the other).

12. “For its invalidity, defects alone are causes. But absence of merits have their presence brought about as inevitable.” If it be so said, this is equal in merits also, with regard to validity.

13. If it be said that the presence of merits is prompted by the removal of defects, let it be that (the presence) of defects too is prompted by the removal of merits. If it be said that in this way, the Vedas, which are not of human origin, would turn out to be devoid of that nature, you must rebuke yourself.

14. Therefore, just as attachment and aversion have the volition of activity and withdrawal as causes
because of the invariable accompaniment of attachment and aversion, even when there is no non-existence without (the other) of the absence of aversion and attachment (respectively), but a distinction is not reasonable in the form—the volition of abstinence has aversion as cause and the volition of activity on the other hand has absence of aversion as cause, even when there is attachment accompanying—since there is no difference, similarly is it in the context also.

15. Even then, when the Vedas are established as not of human origin, their validity shall be established only through the absence of the defects of the speaker; when validity is established thence, it (i.e. validity) is certainly there even in the absence of merits. Thus the absence of defects alone is the cause (of validity). Merits are not causes (thereof)." If it be so said, it is not so. For there is occasion for (the defect of) the presence of a counter-probans through the absence of the merit of the speaker.

16. "The determination of validity is intrinsic. But by this is removed only the doubt, since (the latter) is absent in the absence of the former, in so far as it is conditioned by defects. Therefore this does not deserve to be utilised as a counter-probans present, as in the case of inference." If it be so said, it is not so, because a doubt is easily obtainable as conditioned by the absence of merits.

17. If it be said that since that (i.e. absence of merits) by itself is not a factor in invalidity, there is no doubt, it is equal in so far as the absence of defects by itself is not a factor in validity, and hence there is no removal of doubt thereby.

18. In this way validity is known intrinsically since a knowledge is of the nature of doubt in the stage of not being (confirmed by) repetition, as in the case of invalidity.

19. But if it can be known intrinsically, there can at no time be a doubt about validity, like doubt about its being a knowledge. For in respect of what is determined, there is no scope for it. Indeed it is not (generated) merely from the perception of common attributes etc., putting aside the absence of means for establishing or sublating. If it were so, it comes about that it cannot be removed.

20. Now the opinion may be that in invalidity too, as in validity, there is doubt by obtaining that knowledge and not by obtaining the particular thereof. Then is it that even when a valid knowledge is cognised its validity is not cognised, or is it that the valid knowledge itself is not cognised?

21. In the first case how is the determination of validity intrinsic, since even when the knowledge is cognised, it (i.e. its validity) is not cognised? In the second case, how can there be doubt in respect of it since the subject (of the doubt) itself is not cognised?

22. Now if the intrinsic nature of validity is postulated through the unreasonableness otherwise of instantaneous and intense fruitful volition, even this is not so since it can be reasonable even in other ways. Indeed instantaneous volition, not being reasonable
without the instantaneous accompaniment of its cause, 
calls for that. Intensive volition too calls for the inten-
sity of its cause. And desire is the cause of the volition. 
And its cause too is the knowledge of its being the 
means of what is desired. That too arises through the 
perception of the probans in the form of its being of its 
class. That too is generated by the contact of the 
senses etc. But there is no need for cognising validity in 
any case. Or if there is (such) a need, whence is it 
that it is intrinsic? Therefore the intensity of fruitful 
cognitions too can be from the intensity of validity or 
from the intensity of the cognition of validity. But 
where is its intrinsic nature required? Indeed, because 
there is volition in respect of water instantaneous and 
intense, in the case of those who are thirsty, its (i.e., of 
water) capacity to quench thirst is not perceptible.

23. "Let this be so. All this is reasonable when 
validity is cognised. And if it is not intrinsic it cannot 
be there at all, since the alternative of its being ex-
trinsic cannot make a stand, on account of infinite 
regress." If it be so said, it is not so. For everything 
becomes reasonable even from doubt about the thing, 
though it is not cognised. Nor is there infinite regress, 
since it is not accepted that validity should necessarily 
be cognised. Otherwise in the alternative of its being 
intrinsic too, it (i.e., infinite regress) will be there.

24. "Only a probans determined (as such) can 
lead to a conclusive knowledge. Then when another 
probans is called for to determine it (as such) there is 
infinite regress." If it be so said, then is it that a thing

which is not reasonable calls for something (else) to 
make it reasonable only when it is not determined, 
whereby there will be no infinite regress?

25. If it be said that since it can be determined 
through perception and since it determines by its mere 
presence, it is not so, (then) it is the same for me, 
since a probans is determined (to be such) through 
perception and since it determines it by its mere 
presence.

26. If it be asked how, in the absence of the 
determination of the validity of the knowledge of the 
probans, there can be its determination, it is equal 
(since I can ask) how in the absence of the determina-
tion of the validity of the knowledge of the thing that 
is not reasonable, there can be its determination?

27. "Indeed perception does not determine an 
object by its determination or by the determination 
of its validity. On the other hand, it is (merely) 
by its presence. This has (already) been said." If 
it be so said, it is equal (to me).

28. If it be asked what even then is the position 
if it shall be a semblance of probans, it is equal (since 
I can ask) what the position is if even the thing not 
reasonable, shall be a semblance.

29. "That too calls for validity—this is the 
general position. And in some cases it is removed 
by what can sublate it." If it be so said, it is equal 
to me in so far as it is so in the case of the probans too.

30. If it be said that in this case the doubt 
remains in the same condition even in the inference
of validity and hence the labour is fruitless, this too is of the same nature.

31. "This something of that nature is only a thing not reasonable, which even in dream cannot be a semblance. Hence there is no doubt." If it be so said, even in the case of probans, it is so; thus the the reply is the same.

32. Then what is this object which even in dream cannot be a semblance, by not cognising which there is room for error and by cognising which there is the regulation of its sublation? Indeed otherwise in the case of the deviation of even what is of that nature, that (i.e., doubt) itself will not be there. If it be said, "Let it not be there," it is not so. There must be a distinction between reality and unreality; otherwise there will be contradiction.

33. Indeed how can there be the ascription of the opposite even when there are cognised all the particulars that can determine it? Or similarly, in the case of their presence how can there be a sublator where there is not recognised a particular beyond that? But in its (i.e. of the sublator) absence, how can what has no sublator be an error?

34. Let this be so. Even if validity is extrinsic, Vedas are non-dependent since they are eternal and their validity is through acknowledgment by representative people. Where is the contradiction in this?

35. It is not so, since neither (of them) is established. Indeed, the sounds themselves now, are not eternal. It is thus. The sound ga heard before does not exist now; the tumult has ended—in this way even by perception, the destruction of sound is cognised.

36. Indeed the sound itself is not gone elsewhere, since it is not tangible. Nor is it concealed, since for the same reason a break of connection is unreasonable. Nor is the hearer unheeding, since even by heeding it is not cognised. Nor has the sense-organ become defective, since another sound is cognised. Nor is there the absence of some other auxiliary since such a thing, having concomitance and non-concomitance is not obtained. Nor has it become supersensuous, since there is no valid means for such a postulation; otherwise even in the case of a (destroyed) jar etc., there is the possibility of such a postulation. Nor is it reasonable that when the eternality of sound is established it is postulated, since that will be refuted (later).

37. But to that section (of the logicians) who do not accept this (i.e., the perception of the destruction of sound), this is the reply. The destruction of sound, taken up in the controversy, is perceptible by sense-organs because it is the non-existence of what is within the scope of sense-organs, like the non-existence of a jar.

38. If it be said that that is not so because it is not in contact with the sense-organ or because its substratum is beyond the scope of sense-organs, it is not so. Indeed, this should be bringing forward an extraneous adjunct or the existence of a counter-probans through the non-cognition of the pervader.
39. It cannot be the first (of these two), because in respect of capability by nature, the capability of the auxiliary cannot be an extraneous adjunct, in so far as it (i.e., perceptibility) is regulated in dependence of that alone (i.e., capability of the auxiliary in the form of contact with sense-organs).

40. Nor is the perceptibility of non-existence prompted by the substratum being within the scope of sense-organs, since the absence of virtue etc., would turn out to be so. For the very reason it is not prompted by both.

41. Nor is it the second, since the first is non-existent. Indeed, as between the ear and the absence of sound, there is the natural relation of subject and predicate.

42. “Since the subject is beyond the scope of the sense-organs, how can it be the sphere of a knowledge of what is qualified by something that is within the scope of the sense-organ? How can what does not regulate the subject in that way be a predicate?” If it be so asked, it is not so, since the regulation of the subject in that way is the consequence. But that itself is not what is (meant by) predicate; for it will result in self-dependence in the form: cognition of inherence and non-existence is through the relation of (subject and) predicate; the cognition in that way is itself what is (meant) by predicate.

43. Therefore, indeed, as between these two, there is only the nature of being coupled with them, without another relation. And that capability itself to produce the knowledge of something as qualified is (what is) called the relation of (subject and) predicate. And here, that is unavoidable because non-existence is by nature coupled with the substratum of the counter-correlate (i.e., that of which it is the non-existence.)

44. If it be said that even in that case that knowledge should arise through that (i.e., predication) only in that way (i.e., as having as sphere a subject as qualified by the contact), it is not so, because pervasion is determined by the nature of the subject as cognised. Otherwise it would lead to this that in so far as there is found the generation of a knowledge of a qualified determination in colour etc. through inherence in what is in conjunction, in smell etc. also there would be the same.

45. “Even then, perception of nothing is seen as qualification of the sense-organ, but (only) as qualification of what is related to the sense-organ. And this disappears therefrom.” If it be so said, it is not so, since this obstruction has as sphere what is related to an object that is in contact with the sense-organ. For, otherwise, there will occasion the non-perception of sound, in so far as perception is seen in the case of smell etc. through inherence in what is in conjunction and it is not seen through inherence.

46. Nor is there the presence of a counter-probans in so far as it is a non-existence while its substratum is a sense-organ, for pervasion is prompted by the absence of capability. And the absence of its capability is not merely its substratum being beyond the scope of
sense-organs, since its opposite by itself will turn out to be capability. Nor is it even thus, since there would occasion the perception of the destruction of virtue etc.

47. If it be said that its capability consists of even both, namely, having a perceptible substratum and having a perceptible counter-correlate, it is not so, since there is not accepted the rule of (its) being apprehended by both. Indeed, non-existence is apprehended through merely the counter-correlate. Otherwise, even the cognition "here on the floor there is no jar" will not be a perception. Indeed, here contact (it is that) is denied. And its non-existence is present in the jar, just as in the floor. Then, if there is utility for the floor as perceptible, it shall be there for the jar also, since there is no difference.

48. If the utility of the jar is otherwise, it shall be otherwise for the floor also, since there is no difference. If it be asked how it is otherwise, it is for the apprehension of the counter-correlate and (also) for the contact of the existence. Then, in so far as the apprehension of the counter-correlate, which is of the nature of recollection, can be through even what is not obtained, for this purpose there is no need to call for either of them being the sphere of perception; whence is it for both? But contact does not exist directly with the sense-organ for the conjunction of the jar and the floor. When there is with something, if the sense-organ is not contacted even with that, how can that lead to its cognition? Indeed the sense-organ is not in contact merely with what has been cognised or is being cognised, since there is occasion for mutual dependence.

49. Therefore we look forward to the position that when there is contact, the floor too is cognised through its capability, but that its being cognised is not a factor in the cognition of the non-existence. But in the context, its utility is not to apprehend the counter-correlate, since it is not to be apprehended through the substrate, as in the case of conjunction. Nor is it for contact, since its non-existence has direct contact with the sense-organ. If it is not thus, how can there be such a knowledge "the sound heard before does not exist now"?

50. If it be said that it is through inference, it is not so; for if sound itself is made the minor term, it is not the substrate of the probans. If non-eternity alone is the probans, there is not established definiteness of time for the non-existence. If ether is the minor term, not being cognised becomes non-conclusive as a probans, through its being possessed of that, since even at the time the sound was present, it was there. Similarly even if time too is the minor term, there is a defect.

51. If it be (like this)—I am at this moment in possession of an ear devoid of sound, since there is the absence of cognition of sound, like a deaf person—it is not so; for the example is devoid of the probandum and (also) it is contradictory. To be deaf and to have ears are contradictory. And even for his ear being devoid of sound, there is no means of knowing.
52. If it be said that the means of knowing it is the purposelessness of production of what cannot be utilised, it is not so, since it can be justified by the first sound. If it be said that their utility is in respect of producing another sound, (and) that for the last it is not in that way, it is not so; for a sound being the last is not established.

53. (It is also) because people like us cannot conceive of everything that is generated as having a purpose or as not having it and because it can be justified like the purpose of breathing in and breathing out in the state of deep sleep; also because there is the pervasion that if there is generation there is necessarily a purpose. But merely by the non-cognition of a purpose throughout, there is no disappearance of a generation. If it be so, in respect of him, there will disappear its production from ether only as determined by the ear-cavity, since for a deaf man, it has no utility. At the time of the controversy the ear of the deaf person has sound because the location which has capability is the hole of the ear-cavity that is not covered, like the hole of the ear-cavity of people other than him.

54. “Drum, harp and flute have no sound, because there is cognised capability for relation with a knowledge common to it while it is not perceived. That which is cognised even when what is capable of relation with a knowledge common to it, is not perceived, has the non-existence thereof; for example the floor which has no jar.” If it be so said, it is not so, because there is no capability for relation to a knowledge common to it since sound is heard and harp etc., are seen. If it be said that it is merely by conceit, it is not so; for even then, the destruction of sound is not in that location and since absolute non-existence has no restriction in time.

55. “Let it be so; indeed drum etc., like sound, are extraneous adjuncts for ether. Therefore sound produced in them becomes produced (only) in ether itself, and if denied there, becomes denied even there, like happiness in body etc.” If it be so said, it is not so. There (in the latter case) when the soul is established as having an extraneous adjunct by perception, the denial of pleasure etc. also are established by perception. And it is not so here too, since ether, defined by that extraneous adjunct, is not perceptible.

56. If it be said that (even) then the extraneous adjuncts are perceptible, it is not so, since non-existence is not apprehended through them. Or if there is (such) apprehension, there would occasion cognition even by perception.

57. And in this case it does not happen that non-existence is to be apprehended (only) through real substrates: and they too are not established by perception.; for in all cases even when the cause of the sound is hidden, there is the knowledge of the non-existence of an (already) cognised sound.

58. If it is said that there is such an empirical statement in respect of them, which are (really) within the scope of inference, it is not so, since there is non-conclusiveness for the probans not being cognised as
having that, and (also) since at the time of knowledge of the non-existence, the substrate is doubted. And (it is further so) since there is non-establishment in the alternative of the subject having been cognised and (also) since sound as probans is not established owing to the sense-organ being intercepted.

59. Further how is there the cognition of the destruction of substances, qualities and actions whose substrates (too) are destroyed? If it be said that it is not so by any means, how is it that there is the destruction of the effect by the destruction of the substrate?

60. If it be said that there is cognition in that way by inference, it is not so, since the reply has already been given by the same argument. If it be said that if even when the threads are destroyed the cloth is not destroyed, it shall be cognised in the same way, let what will support this counter-argument (reductio ad absurdum) be enunciated.

61. “What is cognised here does not have a series of effects, since when what is capable is not so cognised, it is not cognised.” If it be so said, it is not so; for if what is to be established is that the parts of threads are not the substrates of the cloth, it establishes what is (already) established. If what is to be established is their possession of the destruction of cloth, it is sublated, since it exists only in the space of the cause of its counter-correlate.

62. If it be said that what is to be established is that these fibres (i.e. parts of threads) have the non-existence of those threads that have the non-existence of the cloth, it is not so, because it is not reasonable to have it, in so far as the destruction of the cloth is after the destruction of the threads. And if only the capability is established, the destruction of cloth is non-established, since its destruction or non-destruction is equal.

63. “When there is the denial made of a qualified object, the non-existence of the qualifications is also become known as an inevitable course. Indeed the knowledge is (in the form)—the threads that are the substrates of the cloth are not in their (own) parts, like qualities and actions.” If it be so said, even then, it has to be said what substrate the destruction of qualities and actions and (also) of the cloth has.

64. If it be said that the substrates are the fibres themselves, then this is an error; for it has not them as location. “They too have that location, since they are not far apart, as determinants of the substrates; even with a location of this nature, there is its apprehension since there is no deviation of capability.” If it be so said, then there is no rule that the apprehension of destruction is only through the location in the inherent cause of the counter-correlate, since there is apprehension in another way also.

65. Therefore if a thing has a particular causal aggregate for cognition, when that (causal aggregate) is there without that (thing), its absence can be apprehended in any place or at any time whatsoever.

66. There is, however, this much difference. If that (the causal aggregate for the perception of
non-existence) is existent, it is (known) through perception. If it is known, not being existent at all, it is through inference etc. This is the position.

67. By this must be known to be remedied the conflict with the textual statement that non-existence is apprehended by the two (substrate and counter-correlate) that are existent; for it (the textual statement) has as object that which has as counter-correlate something that can be apprehended by the two (counter-correlate and substrate) and it is an object of inference. Otherwise, there is the occasion for the non-establishment of the substrate.

68. Even then there is no rule regarding cognition; what is, however, intended is only knowledge (in general), since what is useful for that is only thus much; for cognition somewhere comes in through the falling together of the causal aggregate.

69. And if the textual statement is very particular about the cognition of the substrate, there would have been no illustration like "its destruction is like the destruction of the fire after destroying the fuel," since that is non-established. Indeed the destruction of fire is not apprehensible in the series of its parts, through perception; for they are not apprehended. Nor is it to be inferred by elimination, in so far as there is no passing over to other places etc., since the probans itself is not capable of being apprehended, the substrate being not obtained. Nor is it proper that one can hope to prove all this at one stroke from the destruction of the cause, since it is non-conclusive.

70. If it be said that there is no defect in so far as it is qualified by fire, it is not so, since the pervasion is not established. Indeed nowhere has it been established that from the destruction of fuel, the substance fire has been destroyed necessarily; for the function of perception (there) is not accepted. Therefore it has to be admitted, even though unwillingly, that for such a thing by discarding which, passing over elsewhere is impossible, destruction is apprehended even by that place etc., which are the necessary causes etc., for there is no other course. For this very reason, even if darkness is perceptible, the venerable Teacher regards it as a non-existence. By this is explained the prior non-existence of sound.

71. When matters remain in this way, there is the inference stated: sound is non-eternal, because it has the attribute of production, like a jar. And this is not sublated by re-cognition; for it is not different from the re-cognition of a flame (of light) etc. If it be said that it is not so, since, being unsublated, it is intrinsically valid, it is equal.

72. "It does not exist in the case of a flame (of light) since it is sublated by the imposition of contradictory attributes. Otherwise, there is occasion for the elimination of the empirical usage of difference, since there is no cause for it. Or, if it is from nothing (in particular), there is stepping beyond (the limit)." If this be said, this is equal in the case of sound also; for there are (attributes like) loud, louder, low, lower etc.
73. If it be said that here it is not natural, it is not so; for the rule of determining a thing as naturally established in such and such places is equal even here. Indeed, in the case of the coldness and fluidity of water or of the heat and brightness of fire being natural, there is no authority other than perception.

74. “It is reasonable only in this way, because there is not obtained any other adjunct and because they are uniformly obtained as abiding in them.” If this be said, this (too) is equal. If it be said that even then there is doubt regarding its being the attribute of something else that is supersensible, this too is of that same nature.

75. Then is it that if a thing is obtained as abiding in another, the former is certainly the attribute of the latter? Now in this way cases like “the conch is yellow”, “crystal is red”, “the cloth is blue”, would be like that, since there is no difference.

76. No. For, their being errors is determined when yellowness etc., remain as attributes of other things and when conch etc., remain as having attributes opposed to them and since there is agreement with concomitance and non-concomitance with (the presence of) China rose (japā) flower etc.

77. And here, being loud, louder, etc., does not remain as attributes of anything else. Nor do the sound ka etc., of parrots and other birds have other attributes. Nor do they agree with the concomitance and non-concomitance with (the presence of) other things having those attributes.

78. If it be said that even then there can be doubt, then this (doubt) is so in all cases. And in this way, nothing can be established from anything in any case.

79. And this is not capable of being doubted at all, since there can be no residual impression of what is not cognised and since what is not brought about by residual impressions cannot be superimposed.

80. And they are not cognised at all as attributes of tone; for sense of touch etc., do not function in respect of positive things unless they are included in touch etc.

81. Nor are they cognised by the sense of hearing itself; for, not being made of air, it cannot cognise the attributes of air, like the sense of sight. Or (it would be that) being loud, louder etc., are not the attributes of air, being the object of the sense of hearing, like the sound ka. Or, (it would be that) air has not attributes that can be cognised by the sense of hearing, since it is tangible, like earth.

82. And if it is not like that, there would be occasion for the sound ka etc., too belonging to air. What of that? If it is an attribute of what has the parts (i.e. the whole), it becomes non-eternal; if it is the attribute of the ultimate atom, it cannot be cognised. Both of them are not acceptable to you. Necessarily, the sense of hearing must have an attribute of the class to be cognised (by it), since it is an external sense-organ, like the sense of smell.

83. “Let tones too belong to ether. And in this way, it would be reasonable that there is the cognition
of its attributes by the sense of hearing.” If this be said, it is not so; for in the case “this sound ga is loud or louder,” tones do not manifest. And a generality does not manifest except through a particular, since there is no cause. Indeed the causal aggregate for the manifestation of a generality is included in the causal aggregate for the manifestation of a particular.

84. Whence is this? (It is so) since it is no ascertained from concomitance and non-concomitance, because generalities are cognised only in jars etc., that are cognised by sense-organs, and because they are not cognised in super-sensible things like mind.

85. If it be said that in these cases the natural capability alone is the cause, and that the capability of the individual is not a cause, then in this case, since existence, substanceness, earthness etc., have natural capability, there is occasion for congning them even in ultimate atoms etc., and if they do not have capability there results their non-cognition even in jars etc. Therefore your effort is a wrong reply.

86. Therefore the capability of the generality to be cognised is certainly included in the capability of the particular to be cognised; hence when this (particular) is not obtained that (generality) is not obtained at all. And thus when, there being no possibility of loudness etc., being super-imposed, their being natural stands, difference becomes real through the imposition of contradictory attributes; therefore re-cognition is no authority; hence there is no sublation by that.

87. Nor is there the presence of a counter-probans; for, as between two things that are mutually contradictory, there cannot be in reality equal force. When we think of the defects of the parts of one of them, if there is defect for this one, that alone shall be raised. If there is no defect, your own (probans) alone must be defective. Hence what is inferior cannot be a counter-probans.

88. If it be said that even then, in a case like “sound is eternal, because it is a substance not having (another) substance (as cause)” something has to be stated even in the stage of establishing, (the reply is that) there is non-establishment (of the probans).

89. If it be said that it is established as: “sound is a substance, because it is cognised by a direct relation, like a jar,” it is not so; for this too is not established. Indeed, when its being an attribute of the sense of hearing or its being a substance is not established, there is no authority for sound having a direct relation.

90. “There is elimination (as authority). It is thus: when on account of non-difference in the matter of existence etc., there is exclusion of the three (categories) beginning with generality, by the denial of its being an action through the denial of inherence in a tangible substance, there remain substanceness and qualitiness; here there is the relation of either conjunction or inherence.” If this be said, it is not so; for on account of the strength of a sublater, when substanceness too between what remain is denied, there is occasion for the sublation of the means of valid knowledge that makes
known the probans. Or in case there is no denial of substanceness on account of a sublater, when there is occasion for the non-denial of its being an action etc., the elimination is not established. Therefore a partial elimination is not an authority, because it is a cause only to narrow down the doubt.

91. Then what is the sublater for its being a substance? This is the reply. "Sound is not a substance, because it is a cause for regulation of an external sense-organ, like colour." Since, on account of its being a quality by elimination, there is established something in which it inheres, there is no establishment of its being a substance as being cognised by a non-remote relation, since it is sublated by the means of valid knowledge which makes known the probans; and there is no presence of a counter-probans through what is not established, since what is not established is of lesser strength.

92. "Now in your treatment it has been established by yourself that sound is not at all a quality of the sense of hearing. And it is not a quality of the sense of hearing, since it is cognised by it. That which is cognised by a sense-organ is not the quality of that sense-organ, like the smell etc., that are cognised. Nor is the sense of hearing what cognises its own quality, because it is a sense-organ, like the sense of smell. Hence there is no establishment of its being a quality." If this be said, what of that?

93. Nor is it so; for in the non-cognition of smell etc., inherent in the sense of smell etc., its being its own quality prompts nothing. Indeed, non-capability is the adjunct there. Otherwise, there can also be doubts like: "pleasure etc., are not the qualities of the self, because it is cognised by it (the self), like colour etc.; nor is (pleasure) cognised by it (the self), because it is inherent in it, like the unseen potency; nor is the self what cognises its (pleasure), because it abides in it like a jar etc. that are the substrates of smell etc."

94. Therefore, whether it is its own quality or the quality of another, it is not cognised if it is not capable; but it is cognised if it is capable by the capable (agent). Then what is unreasonable here? Necessarily the sense of hearing must be what cognises a specific quality, because it is a sense-organ; for, otherwise, there is purposelessness for its creation, since whatever is other (than a specific quality) is cognised even by other sense-organs.

95. Nor is it purpose to cognise any particular substance; for a sense-organ is the cogniser of a substance only in dependence on its capability in respect of its quality; not merely by its capability in respect of the mere existence of the substance. Otherwise, because the lunar light is in itself capable, that too can be cognised. Or, the self, being cognisable mentally can be cognised even in deep sleep. Or, the sense of sight can function even in respect of non-produced colour. Therefore sense-organs take up the substances only in the wake of the capability of their qualities; it is not otherwise than this. Such is the position. For this
very reason, ether etc., are not cognised by the sense of sight.

96. "Then let sound be eternal since it is the sole quality in ether which is eternal, like the maximum grossness abiding in it. This is a counter-inference." If this be said, it is not so; for there exists an adjunct (in the form of) not being a product. Otherwise, it will be that the specific qualities of the self are eternal like the maximum grossness abiding in it.

97. If it be said that this is not a probans since it is sublated by perception, it is not so, since there is no scope for sublation where there is no adjunct; for if there is discarding of it (i.e. being a probans) when it is fixed by its own nature, there is occasion for discarding its own nature (as well). Therefore there is no difference whether an adjunct is assumed through sublation or otherwise.

98. By this is refuted (the inference) "because it is cognised by the sense of hearing like soundness;" for here too, that itself is the adjunct. Otherwise, smell, colour, taste and touch too will turn out to be eternal; for there is facility to apply (an inference) "because they are cognised only by a single sense-organ, like the sense of smell, like smellness etc." and others as well.

99. Contradiction and inconstancy are quiet impossible here; thus there remains non-establishment. That too does not exist. It is thus. Now, sound is obtained as having increase and decrease, through the condition of loud or low, in the comparative and superlative degrees, according to the previous argument. And this possession of increase and decrease is obtained everywhere as agreeing with particular causes. Eternal things that have no causes have only (maximum) increase, like ether etc., or only (maximum) decrease as ultimate atoms. But if they excel anything, they are not lesser than anything. Therefore, this, being excluded from eternal things, and abiding in what have causes, rests only on the acceptance of being produced. This is applied in establishing a counter-acting agent. Sound is produced, because it has both increase and decrease, like sweetness. Otherwise, if it exists without anything to regulate it, it can exist in eternal things also; for there is no cause for restriction.

100. If it be said that this course is only in cases other than sound, it is not so; for it is abundantly possible in all inferences to bring forward a counter-proviso "except what has the probandum as an attribute." For if the gradation of what is manifested is not due to a gradation in what manifests, there is occasion for its not being its nature. And to be one's own nature is regulated. And there is no agreement for anything else with what manifests and what produces. And there is no other mode possible with being one's own nature and having an adjunct.

101. "Let this be so. Even then, what is the conflict of production with eternality, whereby there can be the establishment of the counter-acting agent? And if this is non-established, what has the non-establishment of the pervader for you cannot prompt anything
for us. This probans has been set forth from the Buddhists, which is doubted and existing in the counter-subject." If this be said, it is not so. Indeed this (attribute of having) production, is excluded from eternal things that are opposed to the proximity of the causes of destruction when there is the exclusion of what pervades it, and it comes into rest in what has destruction endowed with the proximity of what produces destruction.

102. If it be asked whence it has been ascertained that there must necessarily be a cause of destruction for what is produced, it is not so. Indeed, its non-proximity now is not like that of ether etc., because there is opposition to one's own nature; for there is seen a relation between production and destruction. The non-proximity, however, of what are not opposed can be through separation in space, as the Himalayas and the Vindhyas.

103. The separation of the spaces too must be due to opposition or to non-existence of the cause. Even from what was said before, it cannot be the first. The second, however, shall be like cloth and safron. If just as prior to association with safron, the cloth shall perish even prior to association with what destroys, indeed just as there is no destruction without association with what destroys, similarly it will be that there is no destruction of cloth without association with safron; who can prevent their relation? Therefore non-relation of what are not contradictory is pervaded by the regulation by separation in time. And that, being excluded from this, turns away carrying along with it what is pervaded by it; hence there is the establishment of the counter-acting agent.

104. "Let this be so. If, in this way, sound is non-persistent, how is its relation to the objects obtained?" If this be asked, it is just like (the relation) of the non-persistent objects with it. If it be said that the denotation of the word is only the generality and not the individual, it is not so, since there is occasion for its not being understood from words.

105. If it be said that it is by pre-supposition, what then is this thing called pre-supposition? Now, it is not inference; for like relation with what are infinite, the cognition of existence not without (the other) too becomes impossible. Or, if it be possible, the relation too is easy to cognise even in the same way.

106. If it be said that the existence not without (the other) is (only) in respect of the form of the mere individual, it is not so, since there is no generality, individualness. Or, if there is, there is no pre-supposition of the particular even when that is pre-supposed. Or, let "being expressed" too be even like that. Why should there be pre-supposition since there is no opposition to relation?

107. If it be said that pre-supposition is (the means of valid knowledge called) presumption, it is not so. What is it that is unreasonable if there is no individual?

108. If it be said that it is the generality, it is not so, since it exists even in the stage of its (individual's) destruction and non-production.
109. If it be said that it is in the absence of the mere individual (in general), it is not so since there is no meaning of "mere".

110. If it be said that without the knowledge of the individual the knowledge of the generality is unreasonable, it is not so, since it arises even in its absence.

111. If it be said that its having generality as content is unreasonable without its having the individual as content, it is not so. Then in this way if they are the sphere of the same cognition, what is unreasonable? What shall it deal with?

112. If it be said that on account of the unreasonableness of relation with a generality, there is concluded a particular, it is not so, since there is occasion for mutual dependence.

113. "Let this be so. Just as even without counter-action, the probans culminate in a particular through the strength of its being an attribute of the minor term, similarly, even without a relation, a word culminates in a particular (individual) through a particular potency. This itself is called pre-supposition.

If this be said, then the cognition is not in succession; for since there is nothing to depend upon, functioning after cessation is unreasonable.

114. If it be said that it depends on the cognition of generality then the assumption of a potency for words can be done away with, in so far as by thus much that is established.

115. If it be said "be so", it is not so, because it was already said that a cognition of generality not depending upon an individual is impossible and (also) because there comes about another means of valid knowledge.

116. If it be said that there is no defect in so far as it is recollection, it is not so, because there is occasion for non-relation with what has not been experienced.

117. If it be said, "let there be only one cognition", then the assumption of difference of potentialities can be done away with. And in this way, just as the potentiality having generality as sphere culminates in what has that (generality) though it is only one, similarly, relation which depends on a generality shall culminate in what has that (generality).

118. And sounds, even though eternal, shall not be related with objects unless there is a (regular) sequence of vowels etc. And to be qualified by these too is not eternal for them.

119. Therefore objects and words are related (mutually) only when they (the objects) are put together in the collection of things belonging to such and such generalities; not otherwise than in this way. Hence even according to this the eternality of sounds cannot (even) be doubted.

120. And when the sounds themselves cannot be eternal, what can be said about words of the form of the assemblage of sounds as qualified by sequence etc., depending upon the desire of the person to express (an idea)? And whence, further, is (the eternality) of a sentence of the nature of a particular arrangement of their (of words) assemblage? And whence, ultimately, is (the eternality) of their assemblage, the Veda?
121. If it be said that what we call eternity is absence of break in the course, depending on persons dependent on others, this too is not so, since creation and dissolution are possible.

122. How can this be so, since there is a rule of a day and night being preceded by another day and night, since, the time of fruition of the actions being different, their simultaneous suppression of functions is unreasonable, since the regulation of caste etc. becomes unreasonable, since there is occasion for the extinction of verbal communications in the absence of conventions (regarding the meanings of words) and since there is occasion for the breakdown of modes like a jar etc.?

123. This is the reply.

As in the case of the rainy season, the existence (of the universe in a finer state) is the conditioning factor; suppression of function is as in deep sleep; the caste is as in the case of herbs and scorpions; conventions are like an illusion (jugglary).

124. If what is established is only its being merely preceded (by another day), there is the establishment of what is established; if it is its being immediately preceded, (their being day and night) is of no purpose, since there is reasonableness as in the case of the breakdown of the rule about that day (being so) as preceded by a day of the rainy season (i.e., as in the case of a day of the rainy season not being a day of the rainy season on account of its being preceded by another day of the rainy season).

125. Indeed it (i.e., its being a day of the rainy season) is by the conditioning factor of the time in the form of the conjunction of (sun etc.) with particular divisions of the zodiac, since that (i.e., its being a day of the rainy season) ceases only in its absence (i.e., of such conjunction). Similarly here also since there is the regulation by the conditioning factor of time in the form of the existence of the universe (in a finer form), which is the cause of the reappearance of creation, what harm is there if that ceases only in the absence of the other? And that is neither non-created nor non-destructible, since it has parts.

126. For the suppression of function also, there is reasonableness as in the state of deep sleep. Indeed, the actions do not all of them turn away from being experienced, in so far as their fruition is not uniform. Indeed, for one who is not conscious, there is no experience.

127. What then is the use of the body at that time? For him there is none. Then why does it continue? It is for later experience, like the sense of sight etc., (when other sense organs are functioning). Why does he breathe? It is for a particular continuity of life through the series of breathing in and breathing out, since particular experiences are thereby possible.

128. If it be said that in the case of just one, it may be reasonable somehow or other, not in the case of the entire world, then, on account of the infinity of
actions, on account of the time of their fruition being not uniform and on account of their nature being for one to destroy another, what difference is there whether it is for one or for the entire world, whereby that will not be possible? And there is deep sleep for all.

129. If it be said that it is in turn and not simultaneously, it is not so, because the order of succession of the effect is dependent on the order of succession of the cause. And it is not necessary that causes arising out of the potency of their own causes should arise only in (a particular) succession, just because there is no regulation, as the eclipse of the whole. Even though there is no regulation of conjunction at other times, indeed for the planets it can once be in such a way that even though there is no regulation of parts, there can be eclipse for the whole disc.

130. Or it may be like the combination of the three defects (of humours). Indeed, just when there is the combination of (the humours called) wind, bile and phlegm, there is destruction of the body though there is no regulation of the order of succession of their increase, malignancy and abatement, similarly when on the combination of the lord of death, the fire (of final destruction), the wind (of final destruction) and the great ocean (that swallows the universe), there is the state of deluge for the body of the universe, if (all) the sentient beings simultaneously become devoid of experience, what is the contradiction here?

131. If it be said that even then there is incongruity in those having no bodies being endowed with action, what is the incongruity here? For, just like the suppression of experience, there is reasonableness for that even by the suppression of body, sense organ, objects and (other) causes.

132. The regulation of caste etc., is explained as in the case of scorpions, rice-flour etc. Indeed, just as the first scorpion is born of cow-dung though other scorpions are preceded by scorpions (themselves), just as the first rice-flour is made of rice pieces though the succeeding (finer) rice-flour is preceded by (grosser) rice-flour (when rice is milled) just as the first fire is produced from drill though later fires are preceded by fires—and so are milk, curd, ghee, oil, plantain-stalk etc.—similarly, although man, beasts, cows, and Brahmans are preceded by a similar, the first individual in each has as cause particular elements brought together by their respective unseen potency.

133. Because that same cause is uniform everywhere, everything generated in the series from that (first individual) has the same genus. What is unreasonable here?

134. Then we can get rid of (inferences) like “This (cow) is preceded by another cow, because this is a cow”. We cannot get rid (of them); because such (inferences) are confined to what are produced from a womb. What are produced mentally are otherwise.

135. If it be asked why (generation) is not like scorpion from cow-dung, even now, it cannot be so, since particular effects are regulated by particular
causes. Indeed, it cannot be asked why, because leeches are produced from cow-dung during rainy season, it is not so in cold season.

136. Convention too can be properly effected only by usage since it rests on a number of persons existing in the relation of who is taught and who teaches, just as by even a single juggler. Justs as a jugglar directs a wooden doll controlled by moving strings to bring such and such a thing, and that wooden doll does so, and then just as in the case of the activity of a sentient being, a child learns the meaning (of what the juggler said), similarly, can it be here too. The learning of work too is like this for potters, weavers etc.

137. If it be asked what the authority is for (accepting) creation etc., it is thus. The series in this world has been generated by material causes devoid of the visible series, because it is a series, like the series from the fire generated from drill. The ultimate atoms constituting the present are related to other (links in the) series of the same genus generated before, because, being eternal, they generate that (series), like the ultimate atoms of a flame.

138. If it be asked what contradiction there is in that creation and destruction can take place also by the introduction and withdrawal of parts, and that at the same time there is absence of a break in the series, it is not so. Indeed, in this way there can be the absence of a break in the continuity of a jar (even when it is destroyed). But it is the opposite that is experienced.

139. If it be said that this is brought about by the occurrence of particular experiences of the maker etc., it is not so; for it is absent in the case of binary atoms. And in that way, when, in the absence of the disruption of its parts, there is occasion for its beginninglessness, there is opposition to its being binary atoms.

140. Therefore if an effect has its existence dependent on another, that disappears on the removal of that another. If a thing has another thing as cause there is its production when that another is brought in. And what decides the existence of an effect cannot at all be eternal, since there is occasion for its eternal existence. And the eternal alone is not the cause since there is occasion for its not being (only) for some time. Therefore this (course of opposition) is devoid of much progress.

141. And when facts remain in this way, experience from actions should be brought about in this way alone, without transgressing the nature of things; thus, as in the case of binary atoms, even for the entire universe commencing with an ant's egg and ending with the Brahman's Egg, the course is this same one; in this way there is established the countering agent.

142. And in this way, when the universe (the Brahman's Egg) becomes reduced to ultimate atoms and when the ultimate atoms remain separately and independently (of one another), where will the hosts of living beings coming within that (Universe) remain?
It will be like the swarms of mosquitos that have got into a berry that has fallen into the jaws of an infuriated monkey, or like the heaps of worms struggling in the inside of a tree that is being burnt down by wild fire; or like the crowds of passengers that have fallen into the (world-consuming) Ourwa Fire that is blazed up by the storms of deluge.

143. Further,

Let the deterioration of the tradition be inferred from the experience of the deterioration of birth, purifications, education, etc., of power, of study and observance.

144. Indeed, formerly children were born through mere will; then they were born through conjugal union which had child-birth as sole purpose; then they were born as inevitable accompaniments of (sexual) enjoyment; now, mostly they are born of the law of beasts (i.e., law of promiscuity) without any regulation regarding place, time etc.

145. Formerly, purification was effected in the sacrificial vessels etc.; then in the body etc.; then in pregnancy etc.; but now, after the child is born, in dependence on the conduct in the worldly matters.

146. Formerly, Vedas were studied including the thousand branches; then as classified; then one of them with its six subsidiaries; but now, in some places there is (only) one (Vedic) branch.

147. Formerly Brahmins shone living on Rita (Truth); then, living on nectar; now, mostly they live on dead truth, non-truth, as grain merchants, and by dairy farming.

148. Formerly it was (only) with difficulty that a Brahmin could procure a guest; then they began to visit Kshatriyas too as guests; then they began to delight in going even to Vaisyas (as guests); now they eat the food of even Sudras.

149. Formerly they lived on Nectar; then they lived on the remnants of what is offered to gods; then they lived on (ordinary) food; now they live on sin.

150. Formerly, Dharma had four legs; then when penance began to decay, it became three-legged; then when knowledge began to dwindle, it became two-legged; now when sacrifice has begun to perish it has only one leg in the form of gifts. That one leg too, unsteady on account of a hundred dangers like difficulties in income, stained by the dirt of want of faith, endangered by a hundred thorns like avarice and anger, is now obtained as if stumbling in its movements here and there, since its strength is worn out day by day.

151. If it be said that, as at present, it is not desirable to assume more than what is obtained, it is not so; because break in Vedic branches are found, which can be inferred from Smritis and observances (of representative men); because for Smriti and for the observance (of representative men) an independent validity is not accepted; because for Manu and others there is no authority to accept power to see supersensible objects; because, in the case of the acceptance of beginninglessness on the position that the Smritis
(derive authority) from observance (of representative men) and observance (of representative men) from the Smritis, it leads to (the acceptance of) a blind series; and because what has not been traditionally handed from the beginning of the transmigratory world, cannot seasonably be inferred, since it is opposed to being scripture; or mere sounds not defined in point of origination, cognition or intention, are devoid of meaning.

152. And if it is inferred that such and such a thing is the means of what is desired or is what ought to be done, why should there be an inference of a scripture? For, that object has been accomplished even from inference. Nor is it that even this inference is (itself) the scripture to be inferred, in so far as it is the means for knowing Dharma; because it is established by perception and also because it is not of the nature of sounds.

153. Now if it be said that observance (of representative men) has an authority as basis, since it is observance (of representative men), then it (merely) establishes what is already established, because it is accepted as having perception as the basis, and because inference is possible even in the absence of that (scripture).

154. "That, being what does not convey a meaning in so far as it is eternally understood, how can that be inference? How can that be the basis (for Dharma)?" If this be asked, (let me ask)—"O supremely dull fellow, is the scripture the basis (for Dharma) as understood or as not conveying a meaning or as conveying a meaning, wherefore it is respected?" If it be said that it is only as understood since it is inferred, let the probans too be just of the same nature.

155. If it be said, "The cognition of the probans is required as preceding the inferential cognition, since that is the cause, not as following it," it is not so; for, the existence of observance (of representative men) being established by perception, there is no requirement for any other basis.

156. Therefore, since there is no perception in respect of what is to be done and since there is no room for the inference of the sound (of the Veda) in so far as they are not understood, and since there is no possibility of a perceptible scripture, (an act of Dharma) has to be inferred as what is to be done only in so far as it is the observance of a reliable person, and through that (i.e., as being what is to be done), there must be the inference of the sounds as basis (for Dharma). And in this way, what is the use of that, since that meaning has been established even prior? Then for this very reason, it has to be inferred as having perception and inference as basis.

157. If it be said that only what has a beginning is so, but that this is devoid of a beginning, then observance (of representative men) too will at first be so; but this will be beginningless even without scripture.

158. If it be asked, "Let the beginninglessness in this way be only for the observance (of representative men) being of the nature of what is to be done,
and for the inference of observance (of representative men). What has been lost to us?" first it is the position that Veda is eternally to be inferred; secondly the position that in respect of Dharma, scriptural injunction alone is the authority.

159. Now this may be your meaning: even scriptural observances like Rajasuya and Asvamedha are found to have a break, since they are not being performed at present. And they are not what were not being performed even prior, for the portion of the scripture having these as purport, would turn out to be non-authoritative, like the injunction to cross the ocean. And it cannot be that things may be just in this way, since there is parity of welfare with the injunction about new-moon sacrifice.

160. "In this way, such a time will come again when these will be performed; similarly other observances too will in future be broken or will in future be performed. Thus there is no break. Therefore, just like that, there is scripture as basis." If this be said, then in this way, at the beginning of the course (of the world), since, there being no probans, there cannot be an inference of the nature of being what is to be done in respect of something, and of scripture, and when there is no perceptible scripture, how can there be any talk of observance? Thus everything collapses.

161. Therefore a perceptible scripture alone is the basis for the observance (of representative men). And since that does not exist now, there is the break of a (Vedic) branch.

162. If it be said that it exists even now at some other place, how is it that it does not exist here? Is it because the families of the teachers have gone elsewhere, or is it that they themselves are extinguished, or is it because there is a break in the study? It cannot be the first and the second; for in the case of all having gone elsewhere, necessarily, there would result the complete break-down also of the observances of reliable persons in the Bharatarsha, since that has the same agent as the agent of study. If there is the conduct of the performance by persons coming from elsewhere, there can be the conduct of the study also (by themselves). It is not the third, since when there is no breakdown of disciples equipped with spiritual powers, that is not possible.

163. Therefore this is what we find to be reasonable: since there is the daily decay of powers like long age, freedom from disease, strength, vitality, faith, serenity, self-control, study and retention (of what is studied), there is continuity (even) when study and observance are shattered; and since there is universal acceptance, there is no sudden breakdown of everything.

164. "Since a man follows them who go in advance, observance (of representative men) is no authority at all (for Dharma). But there is not (assumed) a break of Vedic schools, because there will be occasion for the absence of rest even in any rite whatsoever, since each rite can be accomplished only by the methods of rites found in many schools."
165. If this be said, (the reply is), “Indeed in this way if there is the possibility of disturbance to acceptance by representative men, Vedas too will be accepted by men only as following them who go in advance, and thus Vedas will not be authoritative. And as such, he who runs away out of fear for a scorpion falls into the mouth of a (venomous) serpent.”

166. It is only in this way that remedies have been provided for by the great sages who were afraid of absence of rest which will arise in course of time. Therefore there is not the aforesaid defect also.

167. And this break is not through the process of (right) knowledge (at the time of final release), whereby it would be (only) laudable. On the contrary it is through the process of the culmination of forgetfulness, intoxication, conceit, indolence, nihilism, etc.

168. And therefore, after the break, there is (the revival of) the current; and after that there is the break again—thus it will be like the current of (the river) Saraswati. Otherwise there is occasion for the destruction of (the fruit of) what is (already) performed. In this way there is inferred that (just) like future breaks, this (break) which is now taking place has as its antecedent another (earlier) break.

169. And the venerable Vyasa mentions the words of the Adorable Lord in the Gitas:

O descendent of Bharata, whenever there is a decay of Dharma (Law) and there is the ascendency of Adharma (chaos), then I send myself forth (as an incarnation).

For the protection of the virtuous, and for the destruction of the evil doers, and for the establishment of Dharma, I am born in cycle after cycle.

170. And what is this which is called acceptance by representative men? It is understanding, retention (in memory), observance of what is conveyed etc., by those who have not seen a ground (for doing so).

171. Here indolence etc., cannot be the ground, because rites of a fatiguing nature form the chief part there. Nor can it be that, because of ineligibility for those methods (of attaining man's final ends) whose authority is established elsewhere (as in Buddhism etc.,) there is admission here (in Vedic religion) for want of another course; for here there is no admission even to those who are honoured by the others (i.e., Buddhists etc.). Nor is it eagerness for non-distinction in the matter of what can be eaten and drunk; for, this (Vedic religion) has for purport a regulation in such matters. Nor can it be illusion brought about by practicing wrong disputation; for, there is observance even from early age. Nor is it association with heretics in whom duplicity is possible; for, the observance is through the order of father (grandfather) etc. Nor is it the assumption of inactivity (as fruit) for the conceit of Yoga-practices; for, in the case of one in the first stage there is an immensity of activity (prescribed) in the Karma section (of the Veda). Nor is it a means of livelihood; for there is no visible fruit, according to the arguments already
stated. Nor is it the fraud of deceitful persons; for it is impossible in the present case (as there is no human source).

172. And such causes are possible in the case of the acceptance of the scriptures of Buddha etc. It is thus: Indolent people accept them because there is always a lightness of work there (in the form of religious rites). Those who have no other course do so because there is admission to even those who are dropped out from this side (i.e. Vedic religion). Those who are addicted (to worldly pleasures) do so because there is no regulation regarding what can be eaten etc. Those who practise wrong disputations do so because there is acceptance (of good and bad) according to one’s (free) choice. Those who are associated with heretics do so because there is no order of father (grandfather) etc. Those who have the conceit of non-activity do so because of scriptural passages like:

Knowing the difference between the two (the ever impure body and the ever pure self), for whom is purification prescribed?

Those who are incapable (to earn a living) do so as a means of livelihood, because eating every seven ghatikas (each ghatika is 24 minutes) etc. is permitted there. Stopping the sun (in his movement), splitting a rock, breaking a branch (of a tree), infusing of spirits (like goblins) into one’s body, talking by images, discussion on elements—because of the association of these things, those who are duped by deceitful persons do so. Therefore it is possible that they accept them (i.e. Buddhistic scriptures etc). Therefore they are not what are accepted by representative men. This is this distinction.

173. “Let this be so. If it be so, since in the arrest of the operation of all actions (and their fruits simultaneously) nothing can be produced and nothing can be destroyed in this Universe, which will be like the empty space, from what particularity is there creation again? ”

174. To the followers of the Sankhya it shines (i.e. it is acceptable) as from the transformation of Prakriti (the primal matter). In the system of Bhaskara, it is reasonable as from the transformation of Brahman. The Buddhistic religion follows (the course) that it is from the fruition of the prior residues.

175. “And (the Nyaya view) that it is from a particularity in time is not reasonable since there is no particularity in the form of a limiting adjunct. And casual attributes cannot particularise when they do not (actually) exist; since they have the same form always. Nor is it through the medium of cognition; because that (cognition), being non-eternal, does not exist then. And as for eternal (cognition), there is no particularisation either through its sphere or through its form.”

176. If it be so said, it is not so; for there is continuity for the breathing of God in the form of a succession of activity of ultimate atoms, of the nature of lesser and still lesser intensity, which end with the
contact designated pracaya (i.e. mere coming together without creating volume) and whose sole purpose is to demarcate time, (of ultimate atoms) which have obtained a residue from the agitation of the break up of the great elements (i.e., the five elements), (just) like the continuity of the succession of breaths, whose sole purpose is to secure the process of the fruition of life for the living beings who have obtained sleep derived from the fatigue of some agitation of the body.

177. As for the question “How long?” it is acknowledged as “only for that length of time”, without transgressing what is established in the scripture, since there is no conflict (with anything else). Or, experience in another Universe can be the limiting adjunct for time. At the end of a time demarcated by that (limiting adjunct), there is creation again.

178. It is mentioned in scripture that just like fruits distributed among the creepers of the gourd, there are hundreds of Eggs (i.e., Universes) strung together in the might of God. If there is occasion for the break down (of the Vedic tradition), then, of what is the acceptance in this way, and by whom, whereby there would be authoritativeness (for the Vedas)? This object (i.e., authoritativeness) is what produces knowledge and not what produces (an effect). Thus the effect which disappears for want of what produces (it), how can this be established by what is accepted as what produces (only) knowledge?

179. “Let it be so. Let Kapila and others themselves be those who have realised Dharma and who have accomplished (their life’s end) through Karma and Yoga; they themselves can bless humanity through the teaching of what is pleasing and what is conducive to happiness, taking supreme mercy on them when they find them burnt down in the embers of the circumlocutory world. There is no need for a Supreme Lord who is endowed with the knowledge of the (exact) number of worms (in the world) which (knowledge) is of no purpose.” If this be said, it is not so, “since there can be no rest anywhere other than in Him.”

180. It is thus: Even on the acceptance of the position that intuition is the means for seeing what is super-sensible, this (intuition) does not in truth produce realisation, whereby we can have rest.

181. If it be said that it is through agreement with other means of valid knowledge, it is not so, because it is not found in the case of non-killing etc., being the means of what is conducive to happiness. If it be said that there is scripture (to that effect), it is not so; for since intuition alone is the basis, even that (scripture) has as sphere what does not afford rest. If it be said that there can be activity even on partial agreement, it is not so; for (just) like statements in dream it is possible to be otherwise.

182. And there can be no intuition on what has not been (previously) known. Indeed, thieves, serpents etc., are imagined by cowards only if they are (previously) known. And (the fact) that Karma and Yoga are means to what is conducive to happiness is not
known from anything. And the knowledge of these two (Karma and Yoga) in their mere form is of no purpose anywhere nor is it what can be established by intuition.

183. And in this, concomitance and non-concomitance are not possible, because, they are to be experienced in another body, and because, since the fruit is not cognised (at the time of the observance) it (i.e., its being a means of what is conducive to happiness) does not exist at the time of its observance.

184. Nor does this become reasonable merely by the re-cognition of the two bodies of the natures of the doer and the experiencer (of the fruit), because that (re-cognition) is not there. Indeed, no one recognises, "I experience this fruit of that (particular) prior deed." Even in the mere possibility that some people can be so, there is no rest, because there is no authority to make such a distinction.

185. If it be said that there can be rest in Kapila and others, on account of mutual agreement as in the case of all the teachers who go to sleep on the night of the first day of the half month (which is a holiday) and waking up on the morning (of the second day of the half month, which is a working day), it is not so, because there is no authority for the re-cognition in a separate birth like the re-cognition in the same birth. And even if there be, there is no rest in the form of observance, when there is no re-cognition of one being a Brahmin through particularity of eligibility. Indeed there is no rule that because of one's parents in a previous birth having been Brahmans, in a later birth also he would be a Brahmin, whereby there can be the regulation of caste etc. at the beginning of creation.

As in the case of God, there is no cognition (by Kapila etc.) of the particular elements brought together by particular unseen potencies. And it has (already) been said that there is no rest in their being able to see things that are super-sensible.

186. By this has been refuted the (possibility of) setting the (Vedic) tradition into motion through the regulation of cast among those who travel in other Brahmandas (Universes), for there is no power for such migration. Indeed even migration to another Varsha (a sub-continent) is difficult to perform. How can there be migration to another world? Whence, further, could there be migration to another Brahmanda? 

187. If it be said that on account of the possession of power to become atomic etc., even this is possible, it is not so; for there is no authority even for this, and there is no rest by a mere possibility.

188. If it be said that the authority here is the unreasonableness otherwise of the first acceptance by representative men, it is not so; for when there is reasonableness by assuming one (God) of this nature, there is prolixity in assuming more than one (such being). The power to create for one who has no body and the possession of the power to become atomic etc., have necessarily to be assumed (in any case). If it be said, "Let there be only one such", then there is no rest in anyone other than God.
189. May I remain even in my last days in a state of worship to that God Siva, the Bhava, the one ground for confidence, possessing the greatness of continued cognition which shines without an obstacle, who sports in making and making this world of supernatural and wonderful nature through his Maya and then destroying it, and destroying and destroying it and then creating it.

END OF THE SECOND BOOK

NOTES

FIRST BOOK

[The figures refer to the sections. The lines refer to the lines within that particular section.]

1. This is a Mangala (benediction) in which the author introduces the name of the book also. Some epithets are difficult even in the original to be construed with the name of the book dealing with Logic. The commentator tries to read some such meaning with extreme difficulty. This double meaning is ignored in the translation.

3. A subject can be discussed only if there is a doubt about the subject. In the case of the Lord, there is no such doubt. Yet this is a discussion or ratiocination prescribed as a preliminary to meditation. Hearing, ratiocination and meditation are the three stages prior to realization. In the third line, it is better to take the words “by nature” before the word “eternal.”

4. The whole work is divided into five Books corresponding to the five questions raised here. In the first two, the doctrine is established and in the next three the objections to the doctrine are met.

5. The first problem is dealt with under five main headings, stated in this verse. They are:
   (1) Dependence: sections 1 to 13.
   (2) Beginninglessness: sections 14 to 30.
(3) Differentiation: sections 31 to 38.
(4) Universal observance: sections 39 to 47.
(5) Experience confined to individuals: sections 48 to 189.

After dealing with these points it is proved that there is a supernatural element in man's experiences. By an oversight the third point was omitted in the translation. It may be restored, "on account of differentiation" after "beginninglessness", in the third line. In line 9, read "it" for "if" at the end.

6. The Sanskrit equivalent for "is not produced from something" is akasmāt bhavati. This Sanskrit expression is analysed and all possible alternative interpretations are taken up here. The negative particle may express a denial of any of the various elements in the expression, namely, (1) from something, i.e., a cause, (2) produced i.e., production, (3) something, i.e., something other than the effect itself, as cause, or (4) something, i.e., something that can be specified; or (5) the whole expression means only that it is so, not that there is a specific denial of any particular factor. These are the five alternative interpretations.

8. The first four alternatives are easily disposed of. It is the last alternative, "that it is so," which is taken up for detailed refutation. This continues up to the 13th section.

9. "Existence only sometimes": that things are produced, and destroyed later, and as such they exist only for some time, not eternally.

10. That prior non-existence was always there, and as such, the effect could have come into existence even before.

12. Ether (ākāra), according to Indian philosophy, is eternal, and so its essential attribute, namely, etherness, is also eternal; i.e., it is not produced from anything. Similarly, smoke also need not necessarily be produced from a definite cause, namely, fire, in order that it may be smoke. Smoke does not cease to be smoke, if it is not produced from fire, just as "etherness" does not cease to be "etherness" and does not pertain to all even though it is not produced from a particular cause. This is the objector's position taken up for refutation.

16. This is the translation of a verse and as such it ought to be in thick type.

18. The translation of the last passage is not quite accurate. It has to be read as, "but not that, without production by something devoid of an antecedent, something comes into existence without an antecedent." The idea is that we cannot accept a position that something without an antecedent came into existence without being produced by something which itself too has an antecedent; a thing comes into existence only as produced by an antecedent factor which factor in its turn too had an antecedent factor as producer. This is the usual position.

22. That the effect is produced from a subtle cause is the opinion of a school of Buddhists.

23. The quotation mark in the beginning of the line is a mistake and may be removed. Causes are classified as material causes (samavāyikāraṇa) like thread for cloth, efficient cause (asamavāyikāraṇa) like the colour of the thread for the colour of the cloth, and incidental cause (nimittakāraṇa) like the weaver etc.

24. Both quality and action have substance as material cause, since both inhere in a substance.

25. This is the doctrine called the apohavāda of the Buddhists: a cow is what is different from non-cows. This is the nature of all things according to Buddhism. "From the relation of cause and effect." This is the first part of a
verse. The rest is: "or from one's own nature which
determines, there is (deduced) the regulation of existence
not without the other (avina[bhava]); it is not from concomi-
tance or non-concomitance." Existence not without the
other means universal relation with the other.

26. At the end of the section, the three modes of
producing fire known in ancient times are mentioned.

30. Solidified fire is gold. Atmospheric fire is lightning.

43. Lore of the three-fold scripture; Veda divided into
the three branches namely, Rk, Yajus and Sāman. There is
a four-fold division, including Atharvaveda. Storks (baka)
sit on the banks of lakes and rivers like innocent things and
pounce upon their prey. It means clever cheats here.

44. Prabhākara is the originator of one of the two main
schools of Mīmāṃsā, the other being Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.
Prabhākara is called Guru or Teacher. According to his
discipline, morning and evening ablutions have no fruit, and
are observed simply because they are enjoined in scripture.

47. This is the real difference between the vedic school
and the Buddhistic school. In the former there is a con-
tinuous tradition that cannot be traced to an individual, so that
there is no single individual who can be termed the first
originator of a tradition of duplicity, if religion is duplicity.
In religions started by a teacher there is such a possibility of
ascribing the duplicity to some one.

48. From this section, the main point in the First Book
is taken up, namely that there is a supernatural element in
the experiences of the life. The four previous points have
been dealt with till now.

60. The cause of burning is the fire, along with the
absence of a gem etc., qualified by the absence of a neutraliz-
ing agent. Thus the cause may be stated as.

(1) Fire and absence of gem etc.

(2) Fire and gem etc., along with the presence of
the neutralising agent;

(3) Fire and absence of gem etc., and presence of
neutralising agent.

Along with fire there must be the absence of what is
qualified, i.e., absence of gem etc., qualified by the absence of
neutralising agent. The substrate is "gem;" the qualifi-
cation is "absence of neutralising agent." There can be
the absence of the qualified by the absence of the substrate, by
the absence of the qualification and by the absence of both.
In the first of the above three cases, the substrate, namely,
gem etc., is absent. In the second case the absence of
neutralising agent, which is the qualification, is absent, since
there is the presence (i.e., the absence of the absence) of
the neutralising agent; but the substrate, namely, gem etc., is
there. In the third case, neither the substrate, "gem etc."
nor the qualification, "the absence of the neutralising agent,"
is there. A simple example is the absence of a man with
a stick. This can be secured by the absence of the man,
absence of the stick and absence of both the man and the stick.
In the above case, substitute gem etc., by man and absence
of neutralising agent by stick. Then the matter will be clear.

62. Non-existence is either relational (samsargabhāva)
like prior, posterior and absolute non-existence, or it is
reciprocal (anyonyabhāva) like the difference of jar from pot.
It is only relational non-existence that is a cause.

63. Non-existence-ness is not a genus (jāti) like cow-
ness. But a common notion is possible even without a
definite genus, through an adjunct (upādhi). A genus exists
only in substance, quality and action. The common notion of
other things and also of substance etc. where there is no genus,
is through an adjunct. In cases like, "These are all genuses" there is the common notion of genus; yet genus-ness is not a genus. Similarly, element-ness (bhū-tatva) and tangibility (mūrtatva) cannot both be genuses, since there is inter-lapping (sāṅkarya). In a case like "these are elements and these are tangible" there is a common notion through what is not a genus.

74. Grain is purified with water springled over it; this springling produces some excellence in the grain, and that same grain should be used at a later rite. This is infused potentiality.

77. A casual specification (upalakṣaṇa) is what does not exist in the substrate at the time of predication and of association with an activity, but which existed there some time earlier; this is like specifying a house as what had a crow sitting on the roof. A qualificatory specification (viveṣṭa) is what existed in the substrate earlier and what continues to exist there at the time of predication and of association with an activity as when a man is asked to bring the black jar. There is a third kind of specification which is the adjunct (upādhi) as when a man is asked to bring the glass made red by a colouring matter nearby, which reflects its colour on the glass. Here at the time of bringing, the colour ceases to be there; but at the time of predication, the specification was there. We speak of "an annotation by the Teacher (Prabhākara)" even though at the time of the specification, the Teacher is long dead. Similarly we specify a place as "a field named after Kuru" though at the time of this specification also, Kuru is dead.

79. A body is fit for enjoyment as having its own merit as a contributory factor. Because the body is a means of enjoyment, its having a merit as contributory factor is established. The expression, "establishment of what is already established" shall not be taken in its literal sense; it simply means "it defeats its purpose." We can say that in the body, desire is the contributory factor, or volition is such factor or knowledge is such factor. There is no need to accept a merit as such factor.

80. We cannot say that body etc. are generated by that merit, not merely assembled together; because mind which is included in that "etc." is eternal and cannot be generated. If it be said that it is only in respect of such things that are produced, even then the same rites which can be taken as casual specifications can explain such production and no merit is to be assumed.

83. Water can be sprinkled with the palm of the hand upward or downward. These are respectively spoken of here as spraying (prakṣaṇa) and springling (abhyaṅkṣaṇa).

84. Charms, (mantra) that is, incantations that are recited along with the rites.

85. Kārīṁ sacrifice is performed for getting rain. Here the effect is in the clouds. But that effect is through association with the person who performs it. The immediate unseen fruit of the rite is in the person and not in the cloud. "Grain" that is sprinkled with water.

86. Sacrificial grasses are spread out with a purificatory rite and the offering must be placed on the same grass.

88. Read in the last line "relation with the fruit of springling etc."

94. There must be some contact with heat (pāka) of a particular nature by which there can be the first differentiation, and also the final differentiation in the form of seeds etc. The contact with heat that exists in the ultimate atoms must be of that same nature,
102. Line 8. What we call presence in it is the concept of "I" etc.

112. According to Indian Logic, the numbers two and above are produced in objects by what is called *āpekṣā-buddhi*, a particular kind of cognition. But the number is produced in the object, only in respect of those who have this cognition. When a man recognises a group of things as two or more in number, this attribute, the number two etc., is not cognised by another who does not have that particular cognition. "Only a minor term": only what is yet to be proved.

119. Eight dispositions: virtue, vice, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, knowledge and volition.

126. Read "If" instead of "It" in the beginning.

146. The Logicians' view is that two genuses must have the relation of either one being included in another as earth being included in substance or mutual exclusion as between cow and horse. There cannot be partial inclusion and partial exclusion, as between elements and tangible things. In this latter case both cannot be genus; only one of them can be accepted as genus.

189. Read "contributory" in the first line.

SECOND BOOK

1. In the second line read "has been generally established." The general establishment is by inference from universal observation of the Vedic rites. What is here to be established is the exact relation of such and such special rites as causes of special fruits. It is this relation that cannot be known by persons like us.

2. The first alternative is the Mīmāṃsā view and the second one is the Sāṅkhya view.

3. About validity and invalidity, there are the following different views:

   (1) Mīmāṃsakas: Validity is intrinsic; invalidity is extrinsic. This is the view of the Bhāṭṭa school. To the Prābhākaras, there is no invalidity at all. Knowledge is valid as such.

   (2) Sāṅkhya: validity and invalidity are both intrinsic.

   (3) Baudha: validity is extrinsic; invalidity is intrinsic.

   (4) Nyāya: validity and invalidity are both extrinsic. This is the view that will be substantiated in this book.

4. It is the view of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsakas that is refuted here.

6. In line three, read "can be so,"

15
11. In the fourth line, read "If" for "It".
12. That nature: nature of not being of human origin.
14. Read the first two lines as "Therefore, just as the volition of activity and withdrawal have attachment and aversion as causes". In the fourth line, read "even though there is the non-existence without the other" instead of "even when there is no non-existence without the other". Volition of activity has attachment as cause and volition of withdrawal has aversion as cause, because there is attachment as invariably accompanying activity and aversion as invariably accompanying withdrawal. But the absence of attachment may not be invariably accompanied by withdrawal and the absence of aversion may not be invariably accompanied by activity. In this position we do not say that the cause of withdrawal is aversion, but the cause of activity is the absence of aversion, even though attachment is there.
15. Counter-probans: satpratipakṣa. There can be a counter-syllogism in the form, "Veda is not valid because there is the absence of the merits of the speaker."
16. A defect of the speaker produces doubt about the validity of his words. So absence of defect only removes a doubt. To this the reply is that man's words could be subject to doubt not merely by the defects of the speaker, but by the absence of merits in him also.
18. Read "extrinsically" for "intrinsically" in the first line.
35. This is another chief point on which there is a strong difference between Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. The former holds that sound is a quality of ether (Ākāśa) and momentary; the latter holds that sound is a substance and is eternal.
36. For the same reason: for the reason that it is not tangible, i.e., that it cannot move. Break is break with the sense-organ of hearing, which is of the nature of ether; and ether is all-pervasive and there cannot be a break with it.
42. Last line: read "is (meant by) predicate."
47. Counter-correlate; pratiyogin. In all relations there are two things, a pratiyogin and an anuyogin. The jar in the case of the floor with the absence of a jar, is the counter-correlate.
69. Textual statement refers to the Nyāyasāstra of Gautama. The citation is Ny. Su. 4-1-27.
70. The venerable Teacher is Gautama, the author of the basic text, namely, the Nyāyasūtras.
83. Tōne, dhvani.
84. First line: read "so" for "no" at the end of the line.
85. In the 3rd line, read correctly "cognising".
90. Three categories beginning with generality; generality, (sāmānyā), speciality (viśeṣa) and inherence (saṃvāyā).
92. In the third line read "anything other than the sense of hearing" for "the sense of hearing."
94. It is only the specific qualities that are cognised by definite sense-organs, like colour by the eyes, smell by the sense-organ of smelling, taste by the sense-organ of taste etc.
98. In lines 6 and 7, "by a single sense-organ like the sense of smell" must be taken together. "Like smellness etc." is the example in the inference.
99. Read "quite" for "quiet" in the first line. In line 12, "this" refers to possession of increase and decrease, mentioned in line 7.
100. In the 8th line read "what is regulated" for "regulated".
106. Lines 3 and 4: generality called individualness.
113. Functioning after cessation: a sense-organ functions in respect of an object for a moment and then stops; then it functions again; this is so in the case of visual perception.

119. Last line: one cannot even entertain a doubt about the eternity of sound, to say nothing of accepting such a position.

121. Here begins the second of the two main points dealt with in this Book, as stated in the first verse (third section) above.

124. In line 6, read "rainy season etc." for "rainy season." There is no rule that a day of a winter season is so because it is preceded by a day of the winter season; the first day of the winter season is not so preceded and as such the rule breaks down.

128. In the 2nd line, read "but not" instead of "not".

130. The terms "bile" etc. are misleading. They refer to the three primary divisions of functions generally called "life". All diseases are traced to some disturbance in one or the other of these three. The combination in the third line is of increase, malignancy and abatement at the same time. There is death when there is the simultaneous appearance of the disturbance in all the three, but only disease when they are single.

134. The creation of the first individual in a genus is a mental act of the creator. The rest are through the various processes of natural procreation etc.

136. Convention is about the meanings of words. In the 4th line read "just" for "justs".

139. Binary atoms (dṛyaṇuśka); two ultimate atoms (pāramānu) produce a binary atom, and three binary atoms produce a tertiary atom (tryaṇuśka). The ultimate and the binary atoms are beyond the cognition of man and cannot be handled by him; their action is brought about by the unseen element in a self (adṛṣṭa).

140. The literal translation for the last sentence will be: "Therefore this will be devoid of much current."

151. The third point that there must be a God is taken up from this section onwards. There are two aspects here. Dharma cannot be established merely on tradition and custom; Dharma cannot be prescribed by a Teacher. The first aspect is taken up till section 178; the second aspect is taken up from section 179 onwards. This is the chief aspect of the third main point in this Book.

153. In the first two lines read "this (observance of representative men)" for "observance (of representative men)" and remove the brackets before and after "of representative men" in line 3.

154. In the first line read "ununderstood" for "understood"; in line 6, read "or as conveying a meaning or as not at all" for "or as not conveying a meaning or as.

155. In line 3, after "following it" and after the quotation marks, add: "the knowledge of text (lit. words) is in the same way. If it be said that a text being its basis is inferred in the form of its being the observance (of representative men), but that through that text, its being what is to be done is inferred."

156. For the word "Then" in line 11, read "If it be said that even then, there is pervasion of it by the scripture itself being its basis, then."

159. Put a quotation mark after "this may be your meaning." This quotation continues in the next section also, as the opposite view, refuted in the second half of the next section.

169. These two verses are in the Bhagavad Gita, IV-7 and 8.