THE
SÁNKHYA KÁRIKÁ,
OR
MEMORIAL VERSES ON THE SÁNKHYA PHILOSOPHY,
BY
ÍSWARA KRISHNA;
TRANSLATED FROM THE SANSKRIT
BY
HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE, ESQ.
 Also
THE BHÁSHYA OR COMMENTARY OF
GAURAPÁDA;
TRANSLATED, AND ILLUSTRATED BY AN ORIGINAL COMMENT,
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SÁNKHYA KÁRIKÁ.

I.

The inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain; for pain is embarrassment: nor is the inquiry superfluous because obvious means of alleviation exist, for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished.

BHÁSHYA.

Salutation to that Kapila by whom the Sáňkhya philosophy was compassionately imparted, to serve as a boat for the purpose of crossing the ocean of ignorance in which the world was immersed.

I will declare compendiously the doctrine, for the benefit of students; a short easy work, resting on authority, and establishing certain results.

Three sorts of pain.—The explanation of this Árya stanza is as follows:

The divine Kapila, the son of Brâhma indeed: as it is said, “Sanaka, Sanandana, and Sanátana the third; Ásuri, Kapila, Bobhu, and Panchasikha: these seven sons of Brâhma were termed great sages.” Together with Kapila were born Virtue, Knowledge, Dispasion, and Power: for he being born, and observing the world plunged in profound darkness by the succeeding series of worldly revolutions, was filled with compassion; and to his kinsman, the Brahman Ásuri, he communicated a knowledge of the twenty-five principles; from which knowledge the destruction of pain proceeds. As it is said; “He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever order of life he may have entered, and whether he wear braided hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven, he is liberated (from existence): of this there is no doubt.”

The inquiry is in consequence of the embarrassment of the three sorts
of pain. In this place the three sorts of pain are, 1. (ādhyātmika) natural and inseparable; 2. (ādhibhautika) natural and extrinsic; and 3. (ādhisthaiva) non-natural or superhuman. The first is of two kinds, corporeal and mental: corporeal is flux, fever, or the like, arising from disorder of the wind, bile, or phlegm: mental is privation of what is liked, approximation of what is disliked. Extrinsic but natural pain is fourfold, according to the aggregation of elementary matter whence it originates; that is, it is produced by any created beings, whether viviparous, oviparous, generated by heat and moisture, or springing from the soil; or in short, by men, beasts, tame or wild birds, reptiles, gnats, mosquitoes, lice, bugs, fish, alligators, sharks, trees, stones, &c. The third kind of pain may be called superhuman, daivika meaning either divine or atmospheric: in the latter case it means pain which proceeds from cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolts, and the like.

Where then, or into what, is inquiry, in consequence of the embarrassment of the three kinds of pain, to be made? Into the means of precluding them. This is the inquiry. Nor is the inquiry superfluous. That is; if this inquiry be (regarded as) superfluous, the means of precluding the three sorts of pain being obvious (seen); as for example; the internal means of alleviating the two inseparable kinds of pain are obvious, through the application of medical science, as by pungent, bitter, and astringent decoctions, or through the removal of those objects that are disliked, and accession of those that are liked; so the obvious obstruction of pain from natural causes is protection and the like; and these means being obvious, any (farther) inquiry is superfluous: if you think in this manner, it is not so; for absolute, certain, final, permanent, obstruction (of pain) is not (to be effected) by obvious means. Therefore inquiry is to be made by the wise elsewhere, or into means of prevention which are absolute and final.

COMMENT.

The first verse of the Kārikā proposes the subject of the work, and not only of that, but of the system to which it belongs, and of every philosophical system studied by the Hindus; the common end of which
is, ascertainment of the means by which perpetual exemption from the metempsychosis, or from the necessity of repeated births, may be attained: for life is uniformly regarded by the Hindus as a condition of pain and suffering, as a state of bondage and evil; escape from which finally and for ever is a consummation devoutly to be wished.

The liberation thus proposed as the object of rational existence cannot be attained as long as man is subject to the ordinary infirmities of his nature, and the accidents of his condition: and the primary object of philosophical inquiry therefore is, the means by which the imperfections flesh is heir to may be obviated or removed. As preparatory then to their right determination, it is first shewn in the text what means are not conducive to this end; such, namely, as obvious but temporary expedi-ents, whether physical or moral.

Of this introductory stanza Professor Lassen, in the first number of his Gymnosophista, containing the translation of the Káríká, has given a version differing in some respects from Mr. Colebrooke's. He thus renders it: "E tergeminorum dolorum impetu oritur desiderium cognoscendæ rationis, qua iī depellantur. Quod cognoscendi desiderium licet in visibilibus rebus instructuose versetur, non est (instructuosum) propter absentiam absoluti, et omni ævo superstitis remedii."

In the first member of this sentence, the translation of abhígháta by 'impetus' is irreconcilable with the context. The sense required by the doctrine laid down is 'impediment, embarrassment, the prevention of liberation by worldly cares and sufferings.' So the same word abhíghátaka is immediately used to mean 'preventing, removing,' 'depellens.' Professor Lassen's text, it is true, reads apagáháta, but this is not the reading followed by Mr. Colebrooke, nor that of the citation of the text given in the S. Bháṣhya or S. Kaumudi; it is that of the S. Tatva Kaumudi and S. Chandríká, and although in itself unobjectionable, yet is not a necessary nor preferable variation. At any rate there can be no question that the word abhígháta may be used in the sense of 'depellere,' and that sense therefore equally attaches to it in the prior member of the hemi-stich. So in the Bháṣhya of Gaurapáda we have ádhibhautikasya rakshá-dina abhíghátaḥ; 'The prevention of extrinsic pain is by protection and
the like.’ It would not be possible here to render abhīghāta by ‘impetus.’ By Vāchespāti the term abhīghāta is defined ‘the confinement of the sentient faculty (explained to mean here ‘life’), through the impediment opposed by threefold distress abiding in spirit.*’ Nārāyana interprets it more concisely asahya sambandha†, ‘intolerable restraint.’ ‘Embarrassment’ therefore sufficiently well expresses the purport of these definitions, or the obstructions offered by worldly sufferings to the spirit anxious to be free.

This variation, however, is of no great consequence: the more important difference is in the second portion of the stanza; and as Professor Lassen has deviated advisedly from Mr. Colebrooke, it is necessary to examine the passage more in detail. The following are his reasons for the version he has made:

“Hæc posterioris versus (drīshīē etc.) interpretatio, sicuti scholiastarum suffragiis probatur, a grammatica postulatur. Quod ideo moneo, ne leviter rationem, a Colebrookio, V. summo, in hoc versus enarrando initam deseruisses censear. Is enim: ‘nor is the inquiry superfluous, because obvious means of alleviation exist: for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished.’ Sed vereor, ne vir summus constructionem partículæ chēt sententiam claudentis et a negatione exceptæ male intellexerit. De qua re dixi ad Hitop. proœm. d. 28. Ex interpret. Colebrook. construendum esset: drīshīē sc. sati (i.e. yadyapi drīshīam vidya tē) sā (jijnāsā) aparthrownā ekántā—abhāvāt‡. Sed ut omittam, partículæ chēt nullum omnino relinquui locum in sententia, na inopportuno versus loco collocatum esse, non potes quin concedas. Male omnino se habet tota sententia et claudicat. Equidem construuo: drīshīē sā (jijnāsā) aparthrownā (bhavati) chēt (tathāpi) na (aparthrownā bhavati) ekánta—abhāvāt‖. Prorsus similiter dicitur nābhāvāt infr. v. 8. Ablativum igitur ekántyatyantoh

* हुःकण्येश्वांतःकरण्वर्विन्ना प्रतिकृत्तया चेतनाश्चर्करिपशंस्वयोश्च्छि
यात्।।
† ऋसस्वतन्थ।।
‡ हेतु सति (यद्यपि हेतु विद्ये) सा (जिज्ञासा)
ऋपायो न एका—भावात्।।
‖ हेतु सा (जिज्ञासा) ऋपायो (भवित) चेत्
(तथापि) न (ऋपायो भवित) एकान्त—भावात्।।
abhávát, non ad drishité refero cum Colebrookio, sed ad negationem, quæ cum supplementis suis apodosin constituit. Nam quæ post chéna sequuntur verba, ad apodosin pertinere semper observavi. Quam grammatica postulare videtur, patitur præterea loci tenor enarrationem, imo melior evadit sententia. Ad drishité enim relatis istis verbis, id tantum dicitur, rerum visibilium cognitione non attingi posse philosophiæ finem, liberationem absolutam et perpetuam a doloribus; mea posita enarratione non id tantum docetur, sed additur etiam hoc: finem istum posse attingi, licet alio cognitionis genere. Tres omnino positiones altero hemisticii versus continentur: philosophiæ (id enim valet gignásá, i. e. cognitionis desiderium) finem esse emancipationem a doloribus certam et omne tempus transgredientem; deinde ad eum non perveniri ea via quæ primum initur, quia obvia quasi sit, i. e. remediorum a sensibilibus rebus petitorum ope; denique ea remedia cognoscendi desiderium posse expleri. Sed aliter atque Colebrookius hasce sententias inter se conjungit noster, et per conditionem effert, quod ille per negationem enuntiat."

In this view of the meaning of the verse, there is a refinement that does not belong to it, and which is not Indian: arguments are often elliptically and obscurely stated in Sanscrit dialectics, but one position at a time is usually sufficient for even Brahmanical sublety. The only position here advanced is, that the cure of worldly evil is not to be effected by such remedies as are of obvious and ordinary application, as they can only afford temporary relief. Death itself is no exemption from calamity, if it involves the obligation of being born again.

The version proposed by Professor Lassen rests upon his notion of the grammatical force of the expression chéna or ché, 'if,' na, 'not:' the former he would refer to the prior member of the sentence, the latter to the subsequent expressions. But this division of the compound is not that which is most usual in argumentative writings. The phrase is an elliptical negation of a preceding assertion, chét referring to what has been said, implying, 'if you assert or believe this;' and na meeting it with a negatur, 'it is not so:' then follows the reason or argument of the denial. Thus in the Muktávali: 'But why should not Darkness be
called a tenth thing, for it is apprehended by perception? If this be said, it is not so (iti chén-na); for it is the consequence of the non-existence of absolute light, and it would be illogical to enumerate it amongst things*. So in the Nyāya Sūtra Vritti: ‘If by a disturbance in the assembly there be no subsequent speech, and through the want of a reply there be defeat; if this be urged, it is not so (iti chén-na), because there has been no opportunity for an answer †.’ Again in the Sānkhya Pravachana Bhāshya. Sūtra:—‘If it be said that Prakriti is the cause of bondage, it is not so, from its dependent state‡.’ Comment:—‘But bondage may be occasioned by Prakriti. If this be asserted, it is not so. Why? Because in the relation of bondage, Prakriti is dependent upon conjunction, as will be explained in the following precept ‖.’ Also in the Vedānta Sūtra Vivriti: ‘If in consequence of such texts of the Vēdas as “let sacrifice be performed as long as life endures” their performance is indispensable, and constant and occasional rites must be celebrated by those engaged in the attainment of true knowledge; and if, on the other hand, the attainment of true knowledge is distinct from the observance of ceremonies; then a double duty is incumbent on those wishing to eschew the world. If this be asserted, it is not so (iti chén-na), from the compatibility of severalty with union, as in the case of articles of khayar or other wood.§’ that is, where there are several obligations, that which is most essential

* ननु दशमं द्वयं तमः कुतो नोक्तं तदं प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्वत इति चेच च्वाच शयक्षेऽछावेशवर्ययोपपत्ती द्वालारक्रमनाय अर्यावयवत्व। † समाभिर भादिनां चेदनुभाष्यमेव उत्तराप्रतिपत्तिः चेचप्रतिभैति चेच उत्तरावसरं भावति। ‡ प्रृढःतिनिवस्थाचेच तस्या ऋपि पारतंत्रं। ‖ ननु प्रकृ तिनिवस्थाचेच भावति चेच यतस्तस्त्वा ऋपि वनाबले संयोगपारांत्रं मुन्नरसौले वक्ष्यमांमसि। § ननु यज्ञाविनां ग्रावबीवं वाय्यनाव श्यक्षेऽवययत्वं प्राप्तानां विविदिपार्ष्येन निवानन्त्यवंशयं: प्रस्वये यदि च विविदिपार्ष्येन यज्ञवादनसामपरिमित्वं तत्: संसारवावृत्तृमां हिरुंशानं स्यादितिचेच खादिरादिवत् संयोगपृष्ठकोपस्यः।
may be selected from the rest. In the same work we have an analogous form used affirmatively; as, ‘But how by the efficacy of knowledge, after the dissipation of ignorance, in regard to the object (of philosophy), can the true nature of the essentially happy (being) be attained? for as he is eternally existent, knowledge is not necessary to establish his existence. If this be asserted, it is true (iti ché; satyam).’ Brahme, one essentially with felicity, is admitted to be eternal, but in a state of ignorance he is not obtained; like a piece of gold which is forgotten (and sought for), whilst it is hanging round the neck.’ Here it would be impossible to refer satyam to the succeeding member of the sentence, as the apodosis being separated from it, not only by the sense, but by the particle api. Passages of this description might be indefinitely multiplied, but these are sufficient to shew that the construction in the sense adopted by Mr. Colebrooke is common and correct.

Accordingly his version is uniformly supported scholiastarum suffragiis. Thus in the S. Bháshya, as we have seen, the passage is explained, drishté sá apártá ché chét évam manyasé na ékánta, &c.; ‘If by reason of there being obvious remedies, you think indeed the inquiry superfluous, no (it is not so), from their not being absolute and permanent.’ So in the S. Tatwa Kaumudi, after stating the objection at length, the commentator adds, nirákaro iti, na iti; ‘(the author) refutes it (by saying), no, not so:’ kutah, ‘why?’ ékántatyantatoh abhávát. The S. Chandriká is to the same effect, or still more explicit: ‘There being obvious means, the inquiry is superfluous, the conclusion being otherwise attained: if (this be urged) such is the meaning (of the text), (the author) contradicts it; no, it is not so.’ This commentator giving the very reading, drishté sati, which Professor Lassen argues Mr. Colebrooke’s version would errone-

* नन्विद्यानिवृत्तेविद्यासाध्येऽयून प्रयोजनविशेषिक्ष खस्त्यानन्दस्य त
   पालं तस्य नित्यात्मकात् विद्यासाध्यावभावावृद्ध्य चेत् सत् नित्यं प्रामान
   पान्दाधकाश्च समव्रतवत्वाभावाब्धवदनवायं विस्मृतक्कृतवत्वामीर्द्वदनवार्तं
   भवति।

† निरक्रोत्ति निति। कुतः। एव।—अभावात्।

‡ हेतु सति सा जिन्त्वात् अणायां अनयसिद्धाः सतै। चेतिवथेऽ। निषेधयति नेति।
ously require. The remaining scholiast, Ráma Kríshna, adopts the comment of the Chandriká word for word, and consequently the commentators are unanimous in support of the translation of Mr. Colebrooke.

With respect to the passages referred to by Professor Lassen as establishing the connexion of the negative with the latter member of the sentence, instead of its being absolute, it will be seen at once that they are not at all analogous to the passage in our text. They are declaratory, not argumentative; and the terms following the negative particle are the parts or circumstances of the negative, not the reasons on which it is grounded. Thus in the Hitopadesa: ‘What will not be, will not be; if it will be, it will not be otherwise.’ So in v. 8. of the Káriká: ‘The non-apprehension of nature is from its subtlety, not from its nonentity.’ In neither of these is there any reference to a foregone position which must be admitted or denied, nor is the negative followed by the reasons for denial, as is the case in our text.

These considerations are more than sufficient to vindicate, what it was scarcely perhaps necessary to have asserted, Mr. Colebrooke’s accuracy; and they are now also somewhat superfluous, as I have been given to understand that Professor Lassen acknowledges the correctness of his interpretation. The commentary of Gaurapáda distinctly shews that nothing more is intended by the text, than the unprofitableness of recourse to visible or worldly expediency for the relief or removal of worldly pain. In subjoining therefore the gloss of Váchespati Misra, with a translation, it is intended rather to illustrate the doctrines of the text, and the mode of their development by native scholiasts, than further to vindicate the correctness of the translation.

† But verily the object of the science may not need inquiry, 1. if there be no pain in the world; 2. if there be no desire to avoid it; 3. if there be no means of extirpating it. The impossibility of extirpating it is

* यद् भावि न तत्त्वावि भविष्यतदत्त्वाति । ।
† सीतक्ष्यालदनुपलब्धि
नं तदभावात् । ।
† एवं हि न शास्त्रिचिवाय तिद्वर्जित यदि दुःख नाम
जगति न स्थान । सदा न जिहासितं । जिहासितं स्थावश्चक्षं समुख्येत ।
twofold; either from the eternity of pain, or from ignorance of the means of alleviation: or, though it be possible to extirpate pain, yet that knowledge which philosophy treats of may not be the means of its removal; or again, there may be some other and more ready means. In the text, however, it is not said that pain does not exist, nor that there is no wish to avoid it. From the embarrassment of the three kinds of pain.—A triad of pain, three kinds: they are the ādhyātmika, ‘natural;’ ādhibautika, ‘extrinsic;’ and ādhidāvika, ‘superhuman.’ The first is of two kinds, bodily and mental: bodily is caused by disorder of the humours, wind, bile, and phlegm; mental is occasioned by desire, wrath, covetousness, fear, envy, grief, and want of discrimination. These various kinds of pain are called inseparable, from their admitting of internal remedies. The pain that requires external remedies is also twofold, ādhibautika and ādhidāvika. The first has for its cause, man, beasts, deer, birds, reptiles, and inanimate things; the second arises from the evil influence of the planets, or possession by impure spirits (Yakshas, Rākshasas, Vināyakas, &c.). These kinds of pain, depending upon the vicissitudes arising from the quality of foulness, are to be experienced by every individual, and cannot be prevented. Through the obstruction occasioned by the three kinds of pain abiding in spirit, arises embarrassment, or
confinement of the sentient faculty. The capability of knowing the impediment occasioned by such pain, is considered the cause of the desire to avoid it; for though pain may not be prevented, yet it is possible to overcome it, as will be subsequently explained. Pain then being generated, inquiry is to be made into the means of its removal. *Tad apaghātakē: tad* refers here to the three kinds of pain, *tad* having the relation dependent upon its being used as a subordinate (relative) term. *The means (hetu) of removing*—These are to be derived from philosophy, not from any other source: this is the position (of the text). To this a doubt is objected; *As there are obvious means, the inquiry is superfluous; if so*—. The sense is this: Be it admitted that there are three kinds of pain; that the rational being wishes to escape from them; that escape is practicable; and that means attainable through philosophy are adequate to their extirpation; still any investigation by those who look into the subject is needless; for there do exist obvious (visible) means of extirpation, which are easily attainable, whilst the knowledge of philosophical principles is difficult of attainment, and to be acquired only by long study, and traditional tuition through many generations. Therefore,
according to the popular saying, “Why should a man who may find honey in the arkka flower, go for it to the mountain?” so what wise man will give himself unnecessary trouble, when he has attained the object of his wishes. Hundreds of remedies for bodily affections are indicated by eminent physicians. The pleasures of sense, women, wine, luxuries, unguents, dress, ornaments, are the easy means of obviating mental distress. So in regard to extrinsic pain, easy means of obviating it exist in the skill acquired by acquaintance with moral and political science, and by residing in safe and healthy places, and the like; whilst the employment of gems and charms readily counteracts the evils induced by superhuman agency. This is the objection. (The author) refutes it; it is not so. Why? From these means not being absolute or final. Ekhánta means the certainty of the cessation of pain; atyanta, the non-recurrence of pain that has ceased. (In obvious means of relief there is) the non-existence of both these properties; the affix tasi, which may be substituted for all inflexions, being here put for the sixth case dual;—as it is said; “From not observing the (invariable) cessation of pain of various kinds, in consequence of the employment of ceremonies, drugs, women, moral and political studies, charms, and the like, their want of certain operation (is predicated); so is their temporary influence, from
observing the recurrence of pain that had been suppressed. Although available, therefore, the obvious means of putting a stop to pain are neither absolute nor final, and consequently this inquiry (into other means) is not superfluous." This is the purport (of the text).

The Sánkhya Chandriká and S. Kaumüdi are both to the same effect, and it is unnecessary to cite them. The original Sútras of Kapila, as collected in the S. Praṇavacaná, and commented on by Vijñyána Bhiṣkhu, confirm the view taken by the scholiasts.

Sútra:—'The final cessation of the three kinds of pain is the final object of soul*.'

Comment:—'The final cessation of these three kinds of pain, the total cessation of universal pain, whether gross or subtle (present or to come), is the final, supreme object of soul †.'

Sútra:—'The accomplishment of that cessation is not from obvious means, from the evident recurrence (of pain) after suppression ‡.'

Comment:—'The accomplishment of the final cessation of pain is not (to be effected) by worldly means, as wealth, and the like. Whence is this? Because that pain of which the cessation is procured by wealth and the like is seen to occur again, when that wealth and the rest are exhausted ‖.'

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ह्यालिकाठुः स्ख्य निर्वेषर्ध्यादानीलििकलं। निमृत्त्यापि पुनःप्रश्चरि
द्यादानीलििकलमिति । सुक्रोंशिक्षायाग्निलिणिक्षुः खनिर्वृत्ते यह
उपाय इति नापार्थि जिज्ञासित ॥

* अङ्गिनिविष्टः स्वायत्निवृत
तिरत्त्वमुत्पार्थि । † एवं चित्विपढः खानां स्वायत्निवृत्तिः स्थूलसू
र्माधारभेद्यो निषेप्तो निमृत्तिः सोऽपि धर्मः पराप्तुः पुर्वार्थि । ‡ नह
ह्यालिकाठुः स्थूलस्वरूपानुवृत्तिदश्यनात्।

† लोकालिकाठुः ध्यानादलििकल्
खनिर्वृत्तिलििकलििस्ति । कुः । धनादिना दुः खनिर्वृत्ते: पश्चादन्वये पुनः
पिठुः स्थूलस्वरूपानुवृत्तिदश्यनात्।
II.

The revealed mode is like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure; and it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others. A method different from both is preferable, consisting in a discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul.

BHÁSHYA.

Although the inquiry is to be directed to other than to obvious remedies, yet it is not to be directed to such as are derivable from revelation, as means of removing the three kinds of pain. Anusravati, 'what man successively hears;' ánusravika, 'that which is thence produced, revealed mode;' that is, established by the Védas: as it is said: "We drank the juice of the acid asclepias; we became immortal; we attained effulgence; we know divine things. What harm can a foe inflict on us? How can decay affect an immortal?" (This text of the Védas refers to) a discussion amongst Indra and other gods, as to how they became immortal. In explanation it was said, "We were drinkers of soma juice, and thence became immortal," that is, gods: further, "We ascended to, or attained, effulgence, or heaven; we knew divine, celestial, things. Hence then, assuredly, what can an enemy do to us? What decay can affect an immortal?" dhurti meaning 'decay' or 'injury:' 'What can it do to an immortal being?'

It is also said in the Védas, that final recompense is obtained by animal sacrifice: "He who offers the aswamédha conquers all worlds, overcomes death, and expiates all sin, even the murder of a Brahman." As, therefore, final and absolute consequence is prescribed in the Védas, inquiry (elsewhere) should be superfluous; but this is not the case. The text says, the revealed mode is like the temporal one—drishítavat; 'like, same as the temporal,' drishíténa tulya. What is that revealed mode, and whence is it (ineffectual)? It is impure, defective in some
respects, and excessive in others. It is impure from (enjoining) animal sacrifices; as, “according to the ritual of the aswanédha, six hundred horses, minus three, are offered at midday.” For though that is virtue which is enjoined by the Védas and laws, yet, from its miscellaneous character, it may be affected by impurity. It is also said; “Many thousands of Indras and other gods have passed away in successive ages, overcome by time; for time is hard to overcome.” Hence therefore, as even Indra and the gods perish, the revealed mode involves defective cessation of pain. Excess is also one of its properties, and pain is produced by observing the superior advantages of others. Here, therefore, by excess, atisaya, is understood the unequal distribution of temporal rewards, as the consequence of sacrifice; the object of the ritual of the Védas being in fact in all cases temporal good. Therefore the revealed mode is like the temporal one. What then is the preferable mode? If this be asked, it is replied, One different from both. A mode different from both the temporal and revealed is preferable, being free from impurity, excess, or deficiency. How is this? It is explained (in the text: It consists in a discriminative knowledge, &c. Here, by perceptible principles, are intended Mahat and the rest, or Intellect, Egotism, the five subtile rudiments, the eleven organs (of perception and action), and the five gross elements. The imperceptible one is Pradhná (the chief or great one). The thinking soul, Purusha (the incorporeal). These twenty-five principles are intended by the (three) terms vyakta, avyakta, and jna. In discriminative knowledge of these consists the preferable mode; and he who knows them knows the twenty-five principles (he has perfect knowledge).

The difference between the perceptible, and imperceptible, and thinking principles, is next explained.

COMMENT.

Having taught that worldly means of overcoming worldly evil are ineffectual, it is next asserted that devotional remedies, such as the rites enjoined by the Védas, are equally unavailing; and knowledge of the
three parts or divisions of existence material and spiritual, is the only mode by which exemption from the infirmities of corporeal being can be attained.

The Védas are inefficient, from their inhumanity in prescribing the shedding of blood: the rewards which they propose are also but temporary, as the gods themselves are finite beings, perishing in each periodical revolution. The immortality spoken of in the Védas is merely a long duration, or until a dissolution of the existent forms of things*. The Védas also cause, instead of curing, pain, as the blessings they promise to one man over another are sources of envy and misery to those who do not possess them. Such is the sense given by Gaurapáda to atiṣaya, and the S. Tatwa Kavumúdi understands it also to imply the unequal apportionment of rewards by the Védas themselves: ‘The jyotishtoma and other rites secure simply heaven; the vágapéya and others confer the sovereignty of heaven: this is being possessed of the property of excess (inequality) †.’

In like manner, the original aphorism of Kapila affirms of these two modes, the temporal and revealed, that there ‘is no difference between them‡,’ and that ‘escape from pain is not the consequence of the latter ‖,’ because ‘recurrence is nevertheless the result of that immunity which is attainable by acts (of devotion)§,’ as ‘the consequences of acts are not eternal**.’ Here however a dilemma occurs, for the Véda says, ‘There is no return (regeneration) of one who has attained the sphere of Brahma by acts (of devotion) ††.’ This is explained away by a Sútra of Kapila, which declares that the Véda limits the non-regeneration of one who has

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* अत्रामृत्वाभिधीयां चिरस्वे मानसुपलख्यति यदाह अभृतसम्पूर्ण स्म 
नम्मृत्वं भाषये \ विश्लु पुराणं \ \+ ज्योतिष्टोमादयः स्वर्गमाच 
साधनं वाजपेयादयः सेवरायस्त्वेवतिशयिन्युक्तव योः। \ \+ अयोऽविशेष्यशोभ 
योः। \ नानुषचविकादपि तत् सिद्धः। \ § कम्मीसाधयचेन 
पुनर्वृत्ति। \ ** कम्मीसाधययस्त चानियतेल। \ †† कम्मीश्य ब्रह्मलो 
कातस्यानावृत्ति।।
attained the region of Brahmá to him who, when there, acquires discriminative wisdom*.

This discriminative wisdom is the accurate discrimination of those principles into which all that exists is distributed by the Sánkhya philosophy. *Vyakta,* 'that which is perceived, sensible, discrete;' *Avyakta,* 'that which is unperceived, indiscrete;' and *Jña,* 'that which knows, or discriminates:' the first is matter in its perceptible modifications; the second is crude, unmodified matter; and the third is soul. The object of the *S. Kārikā* is to define and explain these three things, the correct knowledge of which is of itself release from worldly bondage, and exemption from exposure to human ills, by the final separation of soul from body.

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### III.

*Nature,* the root (of all), is no production. Seven principles, the *Great* or intellectual one, &c., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive.

**BHÁSHYA.**

*Múla* (the root) *prakriti* (nature) is *pradhána* (chief), from its being the root of the seven principles which are productions and productive; such nature is the root. *No production.*—It is not produced from another: on that account nature (*prakriti*) is no product of any other thing. *Seven principles.*—*Mahat* and the rest; from its being the great (*mahat*) element; this is Intellect (*Buddhi*). *Intellect and the rest.*—The seven principles are, 1. Intellect; 2. Egotism; 3—7. The five subtle rudiments. These seven are productions and productive: in this manner: Intellect is produced from the chief one (nature). That again produces Egotism, whence it is productive (*prakriti*). Egotism, as derived from Intellect, is a produc-

* तच्च प्रान्तविवेकस्थानावृत्तिः: १
tion; but as it gives origin to the five subtile rudiments, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of sound is derived from Egotism, and is therefore a production; but as causing the production of ether, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of touch, as generated from Egotism, is a production; as giving origin to air, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of smell is derived from Egotism, and is therefore a production; it gives origin to earth, and is therefore productive. The subtile rudiment of form is a production from Egotism; as generating light, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of flavour, as derived from Egotism, is a production; it is productive, as giving origin to water. In this manner the Great principle and the rest are productions and productive. *Sixteen are productions; *that is, the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, with mind, making the eleventh, and the five elements: these form a class of sixteen which are productions, the term *vikāra* being the same as *vikriti*. Soul is neither a production nor productive. These (principles) being thus classed, it is next to be considered by what and how many kinds of proof, and by what proof severally applied, the demonstration of these three (classes of) principles, the perceptible, the imperceptible, and the thinking soul, can be effected. For in this world a probable thing is established by proof, in the same mode as (a quantity of) grain by a *prastha* (a certain measure), and the like, or sandal and other things by weight. On this account what proof is, is next to be defined.

**COMMENT.**

In this stanza the three principal categories of the Sānkhya system are briefly defined, chiefly with regard to their relative characters.

Existent things, according to one classification, are said to be fourfold: 1. *prakriti*; 2. *vikriti*; 3. *prakriti-vikriti*; and anubhaya rápa, neither *prakriti* nor *vikriti*. *Prakriti*, according to its ordinary use, and its etymological sense, means that which is primary, that which precedes what is made; from *pra*, *pra*, and *kri*, ‘to make.’ This, however, is further distinguished in the text into the *mūla prakriti*; the *prakriti* which is the root and substance of all things except soul, matter or nature; and secondary, special, or relative *prakriti*, or every production that in its
turn becomes primary to some other derived from it. By prakriti may therefore be understood the matter of which every substance primarily or secondarily is composed, and from which it proceeds, the primary, or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it, 'productive' principle of some secondary substance or production. This subsequent product is termed vikriti, from the same root, kri, 'to make,' with vi, implying 'variation,' prefixed. Vikriti does not mean a product, or thing brought primarily into existence, but merely a modification of a state of being, a new development or form of something previously extant. We might therefore consider it as best rendered by the term 'development,' but there is no objection to the equivalent in the text, or 'product.' In this way, then, the different substances of the universe are respectively nature, or matter, and form. Crude or radical matter is without form. Intellect is its first form, and Intellect is the matter of Egotism. Egotism is a form of Intellect, and the matter of which the senses and the rudimental elements are formed: the senses are forms of Egotism. The gross elements are forms of the rudimental elements. We are not to extend the materiality of the grosser elements to the forms of visible things, for visible things are compounds, not simple developments of a simple base. Soul comes under the fourth class; it is neither matter nor form, production nor productive. More particular definitions of each category subsequently occur.

IV.

Perception, inference, and right affirmation, are admitted to be threefold proof; for they (are by all acknowledged, and) comprise every mode of demonstration. It is from proof that belief of that which is to be proven results.

BHÁSHYA.

Perception;—as, the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue, the nose, are the five organs of sense; and their five objects are respectively, sound, feel,
form, flavour, and odour: the ear apprehends sound; the skin, feel; the eye, form; the tongue, taste; the nose, smell. This proof is called, (that which is) seen (or perception). That object which is not ascertainable either by its being present, or by inference, is to be apprehended from right affirmation; such as, Indra, the king of the gods; the northern Kurus; the nymphs of heaven; and the like. That which is not ascertainable by perception or inference, is derived from apt (or sufficient) authority. It is also said; “They call scripture, right affirmation; right, as free from error. Let not one exempt from fault affirm a falsehood without adequate reason. He who in his appointed office is free from partiality or enmity, and is ever respected by persons of the same character, such a man is to be regarded as apt (fit or worthy).” In these three are comprised all kinds of proof. Jaimini describes six sorts of proof. Which of those then are not proofs? They are, presumption (arthāpatti), proportion (sambhava), privation (abhava), comprehension (pratībhā), oral communication (aṅgīkāya), and comparison (upamāna). Thus: “Presumption” is twofold, ‘seen’ and ‘heard.’ ‘Seen’ is where in one case the existence of spirit is admitted, and it is presumed that it exists in another. ‘Heard;’ Devadatta does not eat by day, and yet grows fat: it is presumed then that he eats by night. “Proportion;” By the term one prastha, four kuravas are equally designated. “Privation” is fourfold; prior, mutual, constant, and total. ‘Prior;’ as, Devadatta in childhood, youth, &c. ‘Mutual;’ as, Water jar in cloth. ‘Constant;’ as, The horns of an ass; the son of a barren woman; the flowers of the sky. ‘Total’ privation, or destruction; as when cloth is burnt, or as from contemplating withered grain, want of rain is ascertained. In this manner privation is manifold. “Comprehension;” as, The part of the country that lies between the Vindhyā mountains on the north and Sahya mountains on the south, extending to the sea, is pleasant. By this sentence it is intended to express that there are many agreeable circumstances comprehended in that country, the name of the site indicating its several products. “Oral communication;” as, When people report there is a fiend in the fig-tree. “Comparison;” The Gavaya is like a cow; a lake is like a sea. These are the six kinds of proof; but they are comprised
in the three; for presumption is included in inference, and proportion, privation, comprehension, oral communication, and comparison, are com-
hended in right affirmation. Therefore from the expressions (in the text),
*they comprise every mode of demonstration, and are admitted to be threefold
proof*, it is said, that by these three kinds of proof, proof is established.
**Belief of that which is to be proven results from proof.**—The things to be
proven are, Nature, Intellect, Egotism, the five subtile rudiments, the
eleven organs, the five gross elements, and Soul. These five and twenty
principles are classed as the perceptible, the imperceptible, and the per-
cipient; and some are verifiable by perception, some by inference, and
some by authority; which is the threefold proof.

The definition of each kind (of proof) is next given.

**COMMENT.**

The work pauses in its enumeration of the physical and metaphysical
principles of the system, to define its dialectical portion, or the proofs
which may be urged in support of its principles.

The doctrine that there are but three kinds of proof, is said to be sup-
ported by a text of the Védas: *‘Soul is either to be perceived, to be
learned from authority, or to be inferred from reasoning.’* It is opposed
to the tenets of the *Naiyáyikas and Mímánsákás*, the former of whom
describe four kinds, and the latter six kinds of proof. The proofs of the
logicians are, *pratyaksha*, †‘perception;’ *anumána*, ‡‘inference;’ *upamána*,
‘comparison;’ and *śabda*, §‘verbal authority.’ Of these, comparison and
verbal authority are included by the *Sánkhya* under right affirmation;
the term *ápta* meaning ‘fit, right,’ and being applied either to the
Védas ††, or to inspired teachers ‡‡, as subsequently explained. The
*Mímánsákás* do recognise six kinds of proof; but *Gaurápáda* has either
stated them incorrectly, or refers to a system different from that now
found in the best authorities of this school. *Kumárika Bhatta* alludes

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* आन्वा वा दृष्ट्व: श्रोत्तथो मन्यत्स:। † प्रत्यक्षः। ‡ अनुमानः।
†† उपमानः। § शब्दः। ** आपः। ‡‡ आचार्यः।
to the sixfold proof of an older scholiast or Vṛttikāra, but those six proofs are, as Mr. Colebrooke states, perception, inference, comparison, presumption, authority, and privation; and the author of the Sāstra dipikā excludes expressly sambhava, pratibhā, and aitihya from the character of proofs. With regard to the terms specified, it may be doubted if exact equivalents can be devised. Arthāpatti is literally, 'attainment of meaning;' conjecture or presumption, 'inference;' from which it differs only in the absence of the predicate or sign from which the subject is inferred. The illustrations of the commentator do not very clearly explain the purport of the two kinds of this proof, 'seen' and 'heard.' In the Sāstra dipikā the first is exemplified by the sentence, "Devadatta is alive, but not in his house; it is presumed therefore that he is abroad." 'Heard,' sruta, is referred to the Vēdas, and applies to the interpretation of precepts by the spirit as well as the letter, as in a direction to offer any particular article, it may be presumed, that should that not be procurable, something similar may be substituted. Vāchespati also considers arthāpatti to be comprised in inference, as well as sambhava, 'identity' or 'proportion.' Privation, he argues, is only a modification of perception; and aitihya, or 'report,' is no proof at all, the person with whom it originates being undetermined. Pratibhā he does not mention. The concluding expressions of Gaurapāda, Pratijānāvāsa sanjñānam, are of questionable import, and there is possibly some error in the copy. The 'objects of proof,' prameya, are, according to the Sankhyā, all the principles of existence. Siddhi, 'accomplishment, determination,' in the last hemistich, is explained by pratiti, 'trust, belief.'

V.

Perception is ascertainment of particular objects. Inference, which is of three sorts, premises an argument, and (deduces) that which is argued by it. Right affirmation is true revelation.
BHÁSHYA.

Drishá 'seen,' or pratyaksha, 'perception,' is application or exertion of the senses in regard to their several objects, as of the ear, and the rest, to sound, &c. *Inference is of three kinds,* subsequent, antecedent, analogous. Inference antecedent is that which has been previously deduced; as, rain is inferred from the rising of a cloud, because formerly rain had been the consequence. Subsequent; as, having found a drop of water taken from the sea to be salt, the saltness of the rest also is inferred. Analogous; as, having observed their change of place, it is concluded that the moon and stars are locomotive, like Chaitra: that is, having seen a person named Chaitra transfer his position from one place to another, and thence known that he was locomotive, it is inferred that the moon and stars also have motion (because it is seen that they change their places). So observing one mango tree in blossom, it is inferred that other mango trees also are in flower. This is inference from analogy.

Again; *premises an argument, and (deduces) that which is argued by it.* That inference. Premises a prior argument; that is, the thing which has a predicate is inferred from the predicate, as, a mendicant (is known) by his staff; or it premises the subject of the argument, when the predicate is deduced from that of which it is predicated, as, having seen a mendicant, you say, this is his triple staff. *Right affirmation is true revelation.*—Apta means ácháryás, 'holy teachers,' as Brahmá and the rest. Sruti means 'the Védas.' 'Teachers and Védas' is the import of the compound, and that which is declared by them is true revelation.

In this manner threefold proof has been described. It is next explained by what sort of proof ascertainment is to be effected, and of what objects.

COMMENT.

The three kinds of proof, perception, inference, and right affirmation, are here more particularly explained.

The first is defined, 'what severally relates to, or is engaged in, an
object of sense*. *Adhyāvāsa*ya is explained by Vāchepati, ‘Knowledge, which is the exercise of the intellectual faculty†.’ Nārāyana explains it, ‘That by which certainty is obtained‡.’ The organs do not of themselves apprehend objects, but are merely the instruments by which they are approximated to the intellect: ‘neither does intellect apprehend them (rationally), being, as derived from (prakṛiti) matter, incapable of sense; but the unconscious impressions or modifications of intellect, derived through the senses, are communicated to soul, which, reflecting them whilst they are present in the intellect, appears by that reflection actually affected by wisdom, pleasure, and the like.§’

The explanation given by Gaurāpāḍa of the three kinds of inference is not exactly conformable to the definitions of the logicians, although the same technical terms are employed. Thus in the Nyāya Sūtra Vṛttī, in the comment on the Sūtra of Gautama¶, we have the following: ‘Three-fold inference. Prior, that is, cause; characterized by, or having, that (cause); as inference of rain from the gathering of clouds. Posterior, effect; characterized by it, as inference of rain from the swelling of a river. Analogous (or generic); characterized as distinct from both effect and cause, as the inference of any thing being a substance from its being earthy **.’ Here then we have inference *a priori*, or of effect from cause;

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*प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायः—विषयं प्रति वृत्ति।
† अध्यवसायो
बुधग्रामो ज्ञान।
‡ अध्यवसीयो निष्ठीयतेष्वेन।
§ बुधि
तत्तं हि प्राकृततदेशतनिन्दिति तद्योश्ववसायःश्वेतनी घटादि वत्।
एवं बुधितन्त्र सुखाद्योशीपि परिश्रामेदा ऋचेतना।
पुरुषसु मुखाय
ननुषः चेतन।
सोऽयं बुधितन्त्रज्ञानसुखादिना तत्प्रतिविषयित
झायपश्वायाज्ञानसुखादिमानिन्व भवतीत।
¶ चित्रिष्णानां पूर्वेऽव
ञ्ज्ञवत् सामान्यतोर्धं च।
** चित्रिष्णाति पूर्वेऽव चारणं तदत्त तल्लिं
गर्वं ज्ञया मेघीतिविष्णेः वृक्षानानां।
शेषः काम्यं तल्लिंगं शेषवत्
ज्ञया नदीवृक्षा वृक्षानां।
सामान्यतो शेषः कार्यकार्ये भिन्नतिंगं
ज्ञया पृथिवीवनेन द्वृक्षानानां।
inference *a posteriori*, or of cause from effect; and inference from analogy, or community of sensible properties; for *samánvya drishtam* is 'that which is recognised from generic properties, its own specific properties being unnoticed*.

Thus *S. Chandrikā* gives a similar, or logical, explanation of the three kinds of inference.

The definition of inference in general is the subject of the first member of the second hemistich. The expressions *linga*† and *lingī*‡ are analogous to 'predicate and subject,' or the mark, sign, or accident by which any thing is characterized, and the thing having such characteristic mark and sign. Thus *linga* is explained by logicians by the term *váyāya*, and *lingī* by *váyapaka*§; as in the proposition, There is fire, because there is smoke, the latter is the *linga*, *váyāya*, 'major or predicate;' and fire the *lingī* or *váyapaka*, the 'minor or subject,' or thing of which the presence is denoted by its characteristic. Inference, then, is a conclusion derived from previous determination of predicate and subject; or it is knowledge of the points of an argument depending on the relation between subject and predicate; that is, 'Unless it were previously known that smoke indicated fire, the presence of the latter could not be inferred from the appearance of the former*.

This is what the logicians term *paramēshā*, 'observation or experience.' *Āpta***, according to Gaurapāda, means *ācharya*; and *āpta sruti†† implies 'holy teachers and holy writ.' Nārāyana expounds it in a similar manner‡‡, and adds, that *āpta* means *Īswara*, or 'god,' according to the theistical *Sāṅkhyā*||. Vāchēśvarī explains the terms similarly, though more obscurely. *Āpta* is equivalent with him to *prāpta*, 'obtained,' and *yukta*, 'proper, right;' and *āpta sruti* is 'both that which is right and traditional, holy knowledge.§§; for *sruti* is defined to be 'knowledge of the pur-

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* अद्वैत स्वतंत्रशास्त्र सामान्यदर्शनमनुमाननिमित्तं । † लिंगं
† लिंगगत । ‡ वापणं। § वापणं। †† तद्यथायतीयकाणाः
धर्मेतत स्वाधूपूर्वकद्वितीयप्रकृतिविभासानन्दसामान्यम् लक्ष्यति। ** आपम।
†† आपमप्रथम। ††† चाक्ष्यार्थीयः चाक्ष्यार्थीयः ज्ञातानां। || सचेष्ठ
रसमे इशरा एव अरः। §§ आपमापासी चुंति चेतास्याचुंति:।
port of texts derived from holy writ; which knowledge is of itself proof, as obtained from the Védas, which are not of human origin, and fit to exempt from all fear of error*.’ The first term, vákyā, is explained to signify, ‘the Véda is the teacher of religion†;’ and the expression vákyáráthā is equivalent to dharma, ‘religion or virtue.’ ‘Religion is heard by it; as, “Let one desirous of heaven perform the jyotishtoma sacrifice:” such is a text (of scripture) ‡.’ The texts of the Védas and of other inspired works are authority, as having been handed down through successive births by the same teachers as Jaigishavya says, ‘By me living repeatedly in ten different great creations.’ So ‘the Véda was remembered by Kapila from a former state of being.§’ The Mimánsakas distinguish between ápta vákyā and véda vákyā: the former is human, the latter inspired, authority.

VI.

Sensible objects become known by perception; but it is by inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is obtained: and a truth which is neither to be directly perceived, nor to be inferred from reasoning, is deduced from revelation.

BHÁSHYA.

By inference from analogy; of things beyond the senses—the ascertain¬ment of existing things which transcend the senses. Nature and soul are

* श्रुतिवाक्याजनितं वाक्यार्थाम् तत्तः स्वतः प्रमाणमवपूयथवेदजनित
वेन सकलदोषश्रेयाबिनिचुक्युक्तं। † धम्मवायथः शूरः। ‡ शूरये धम्मोऽधः ज्ञोतिषोऽधः स्वर्गाध्याये यज्ञतात् वाक्यं। § दशम हासेनध्वनिपिलस्य कल्यादीक्ष्यात्राधीतशुरुस्मर्कासम्भवः।
not objects of sense, and are to be known only by reasoning from analogy. For as the predicates Mahat and the rest have the three qualities, so must that of which they are effects, the chief one (nature), have the three qualities; and as that which is irrational appears as if it was rational, it must have a guide and superintendent, which is soul. That which is perceptible is known by perception; but that which is imperceptible, and which is not to be inferred from analogy, must be learnt from revelation, as, Indra, the king of the gods; the northern Kurus; the nymphs of heaven: these depend upon sacred authority. Here some one objects, Nature or soul is not apprehended, and what is not apprehended in this world does not exist; therefore these two are not, any more than a second head, or a third arm. In reply it is stated, that there are eight causes which prevent the apprehension of existing things.

COMMENT.

In this verse, according to the translation followed, the application of the three different kinds of proof to three different objects is described: according to a different version, only one class of objects is referred to, those which transcend the senses, and of which a knowledge is attainable only by inference from analogy, or by revelation.

The S. Tatwa Kaumudi concurs with the S. Bhāṣya in understanding the terms of the text, sāmānyato drshīt̄a, to refer to anumānāt, intending ‘inference from analogy’. A similar explanation occurs in the S. Pravachana Bhāṣya: ‘Thence, from reasoning by analogy, the determination of both, of nature and soul, is effected.’ It appears therefore that in this place the text does not refer either to perception or to inference in general, as evidence of perceptible things, but solely to inference
from analogy, as proof of imperceptible objects. For inference *a priori* or *a posteriori* regards things not necessarily beyond the cognizance of the senses, like nature and soul, but those only which are not at the moment perceptible, as fire from smoke, rain from floods or clouds, and the like. It might be preferable, therefore, to render the verse somewhat differently from the text, or, 'It is by reasoning from analogy that belief in things beyond the senses is attained; and imperceptible things, not thereby determined, are to be known only from revelation.' The version of Mr. Colebrooke, in which he is followed by Professor Lassen ("Æqualitatis intellectus est per perceptionem: rerum quæ supra sensus sunt per demonstrationem vel hac non evictum, quod præter sensus est, probatur revelatione"), rests apparently upon the authority of the *S. Chandriká* and *S. Kaumudi*. 'Sámanyatas has the affix tasi in the sense of the sixth (possessive) case. The ascertainment of all objects appreciable by the senses, whether actually perceived or not, is by perception: therefore knowledge of earth and the other elements is by sense; but knowledge of things beyond the senses, as nature and the rest, is from inference *.

When inference from analogy fails, then, according to all the authorities, the remaining proof, or revelation, must be had recourse to, agreeably to the Sútras; 'Oral proof is fit instruction,' and 'fit instruction is communication of the proofs by which the nature of both prakriti and purusha may be discriminated †.'

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**VII.**

From various causes things may be imperceptible (or unperceived); excessive distance, (extreme) nearness, defect of the organs, inattent-
tion, minuteness, interposition of objects, predominance of other matters, and intermixture with the like.

BHĀSHYA.

Non-perception of things here existing may proceed from, their remoteness, as of Vishnumitra, Maitra, and Chaitra, dwelling in different countries; or their propinquity, as the eye does not see the collyrium applied to the eyelids; from defect of the organs, as sound and form are undiscernible by the deaf and the blind; from inattention, as a person whose thoughts are distracted does not apprehend what is said to him, however intelligibly; from minuteness, as the small particles of frost, vapour, and smoke in the atmosphere are not perceived; from interposition, as a thing hidden by a wall; from predominance of others, as the planets, asterisms, and stars are invisible when their rays are overpowered by those of the sun; from intermixture with the like, as a bean in a heap of beans, a lotus amongst lotuses, a myrobalan amongst myrobalans, a pigeon in a flock of pigeons, cannot be perceived, being confounded in the midst of similar objects. In this way non-perception of actually existing things is eightfold.

Be it granted, that whatever is to be ascertained (by any means) is; by what cause is apprehension of nature and soul prevented, and how is it to be effected?

COMMENT.

Reasons are here assigned why things may not be perceived, although they actually exist.

The terms of the text, as illustrated by the comment, are easily understood: the particle cha, in connexion with the last, is considered to imply the existence of other impediments besides those enumerated, such as non-production, as of curds from milk*. But these circumstances, for

* चकारोऽनुक्सन्नमुचयायः तेनानुज्वोऽपि संगृहित यथा क्षीराधवस्या यां दध्यानुज्ववाच हस्यते ।
the most part, account for the non-perception of perceptible things, and it is still to be considered why nature and soul, which are not amongst things ordinarily perceptible, are not perceived *.

VIII.

It is owing to the subtilty (of nature), not to the non-existence of this original principle, that it is not apprehended by the senses, but inferred from its effects. Intellect and the rest of the derivative principles are effects; (whence it is concluded as their cause) in some respects analogous, but in others dissimilar.

BHÁSHYA.

From subtilty the non-perception of that nature. Nature is not apprehended (by the senses) on account of its subtilty, like the particles of smoke, vapour, and frost, which are in the atmosphere, although not perceived there. How then is it to be apprehended? Its perception is from its effects. Having observed the effects, the cause is inferred. Nature is the cause, of which such is the effect. Intellect, egotism, the five subtile rudiments, the eleven organs, the five gross elements, are its effects. That effect may be dissimilar from nature: 'nature, prakriti; 'the chief one,' pradhána; dissimilar from it: or it may be analogous, of similar character; as in the world a son may be like or unlike his father. From what cause this similarity or dissimilarity proceeds, we shall hereafter explain.

Here a doubt arises, from the conflicting opinions of teachers, whether intellect and other effects be or be not already in nature. According to the Sáňkhyya doctrine, the effects are in nature; according to the

* नवुतिरवाचिष्टि मध्ये प्रकृत्याच्युतमभे किं प्रतिवन्धैरः
Buddhas and others, they are not; for that which is, cannot cease to be; and that which is not, can by no means be: this is a contradiction. Therefore, it is said—

COMMENT.

Nature is said to be imperceptible, from its subtilty: it must be therefore inferred from its effects.

The effects are the products of nature, or intellect, egotism, and the rest; some of which are of a similar, and some of a dissimilar character, as subsequently explained.

Effect, according to the Sānkhya system, necessarily implies cause, as it could not exist without it*: but on this topic there are different opinions, thus particularized by Vāchespati: ‘1. Some say, that that which is may proceed from that which is not. 2. Some say, that effect is not a separately existent thing, but the revolution of an existent thing. 3. Some say, that that which is not may proceed from that which is. 4. The ancients assert, that that which is comes from that which is (or ens from ens). By the three first propositions the existence of nature would not be proved; for,

‘1. The materiality of the cause of the world, of which the qualities goodness, foulness, and darkness are the natural properties, comprises sound and other changes of its natural condition, and is diversified by pleasure, pain, and insensibility; but if that which is, is born from that which is not, how can that insubstantial cause which is not, comprehend pleasure, pain, form, sound, and the like? for there cannot be identity of nature between what is and what is not.

‘2. If sound, and other diversified existences, were but revolutions of one existent thing, yet that which is could not proceed from such a source, for the property of manifold existence cannot belong to that which is not twofold: the notion of that which is not manifold through its comprising manifold existence is an obvious error.

* कायोकारणमाचं गम्यते।
'3. The notion of the Kanabhakshas, Akshcharananas, and others, that that which is not may proceed from that which is, excludes the comprehension of effect in cause, as that which is and that which is not cannot have community: consequently the existence of nature is not proved; and in order to establish its existence, the existence of effect in it must first be determined *.

Of the doctrines here alluded to, the first is said to be that of some of the Buddhists, who deny the existence of prakriti, or any universal cause, or of any thing which they cannot verify by perception. The second is that of the Védántis, who maintain that all that exists is but the vivarttas, literally the 'revolutions'—the emanations from, or manifestations of, one only universal spirit. It might be said that the Sánkhya seems to teach a similar doctrine, in as far as it refers all that exists, exclusive of spirit, to one common source, and makes all else identical with prakriti. It differs however in this, that it regards the substances evolved from the radical prakriti as substantial existences, as effects or products of a cause which exists no longer except in its effects. The Védántis, on the other hand, maintain that it is cause which is eternal, and that effects are

* केचिदाहरसतः सजन्यत इति एकस्य सतो विवर्तः कार्य्यज्ञातं न वस्तिवर्तपरे। अथे तु सतीसजन्यत इति। सतः सजन्यत इति वृद्धा। ततः पूर्ब्ध्वस्मिन् कल्पचे प्रधानं न सिद्धति मुख्यः खमोभेदः ब्रह्मपरि शास्त्रश्चाभायमः हि जगत् कार्यक्रस्य प्रधानतः सतर्जस्यम्: स्वभाववें। यदि पुनःसतः सजन्यत असाध्वस्सवः सतां कथमुखादिशशस्वाधामव्यमेन। स्वात् न्यायविद्या अनुपप्पत्तेऽव्यवशेषा। अर्थात् सतो विवर्तः शब्दा दिन्यमणं शास्त्रश्चाभायमः। सजन्यत इति न स्वात् न्यायविद्या प्रमाणमेत सतां आश्चर्यमां अतिरिक्त वात्। वैष्णवसि उपाधिश्च छचरादीनां सतं एव कार्याद्वः सतेन तेषां अतिरिक्त न प्रधानसिद्धिः॥ अत्रः प्रधानसिद्धयं प्रथमं तावत् सत्कार्यमेत प्रतिज्ञानीती॥
only its present operations. The popular form of Védántism asserts, indeed, that nothing exists but cause, and that its effects, or all that appears to exist, are unrealities, illusions, the phantoms of a dream: but the commentator on the Sáňkhya Pravachana declares, that the doctrine of máyá, or 'illusion,' is modern, and is contrary to the Védas, and that those who advocate it are nothing but disguised Baudhhas: 'The cause of the bondage of soul asserted by those concealed Baudhhas, the modern advocates of máyá, is here refuted *.' In the third case we have the authors specified as Kanabhakshas, 'Feeders upon little,' or upon atoms, perhaps; and Akshacharanas, 'Followers of controversy;' contemptuous terms for the Vaiśéshikas, who maintain the origin of all things from primæval atoms, or monads; and who may therefore be said to deduce what is not—the insubstantial forms of things—from actual corpuscular substance.

The fourth or ancient doctrine, that which is comes from that which is, ens from ens, τὸ ὄν from τὸ ὄν, is the converse of the celebrated dogma of antiquity, ex nihilo, nihil fit; and although in this place it is especially restricted to the relation of certain effects to a certain cause, yet it comes to the same thing as regards the world in general, the things of which cannot be derived from no primary existent thing; agreeably to the Sútra of Kapila; 'The production of a thing cannot be from nothing†; Οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος: not only according to Democritus and Epicurus, but according to all the ancient philosophers, who, Aristotle states, agreed universally in the physical doctrine, that it was impossible for any thing to be produced from nothing: Τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον ἐπὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὀμογνωμόνουσι τῆς δόξης ἀπαντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως. Phys. I. 4.

* नवीनामपि प्रच्छच्छविदानां मायावादिनां वत्थेतुतबं निराकृतम्।
† नावस्तुनो वस्तुसिद्ध:।
IX.

Effect subsists (antecedently to the operation of cause); for what exists not, can by no operation of cause be brought into existence. Materials, too, are selected which are fit for the purpose: every thing is not by every means possible: what is capable, does that to which it is competent; and like is produced from like.

BHÁSHYA.

From there being no instrumental cause of what exists not—non-existent, what is not—there is no making what is not: therefore effect is. In this world there is no making of what is not; as, the production of oil from sand: therefore the instrumental cause produces what is, from its having been formerly implanted. Hence perceptible principles, which are effects, exist in nature.

Further, from selection of materials.—Upádána is ‘(material) cause,’ from the selection of it: thus, in life, a man who desires a thing, selects that by which it may be produced; as he who wishes for curds, takes milk, not water (for their material cause). Thence effect is.

Again, every thing is not by every means possible. The universal possibility of every thing is not; as of gold in silver, &c. or in grass, dust, or sand. Therefore, from the non-universality of every thing in every thing, effect is.

Again, what is capable does that to which it is competent; as, a potter is the capable agent; the implements, the lump of clay, the wheel, rag, rope, water, &c. (are capable), by which he makes the jar, which is capable of being so made from earth. Thence effect is.

Lastly, like is produced from like. Such as is the character of cause, in which effect exists, such also is the character of effect; as, barley is produced from barley, rice from rice. If effect was not (did not pre-exist), then rice might grow from pease; but it does not, and therefore effect is.

By these five arguments, then, it is proved that intellect and the other
characteristics do (pre)exist in nature; and therefore production is of
that which is, and not of that which is not.

COMMENT.

Arguments are here adduced to shew that the effects or products of
nature are comprised in, and coexistent with, their cause or source; con-
sequently they are proofs of the existence of that primary cause or
source.

It is laid down as a general principle, that cause and effect are in all
cases coexistent, or that effect exists anteriorly to its manifestation; sat-
kāryam* in the text meaning ‘existent effect prior to the exercise of
(efficient) cause†;’ or, as the phrase also of the text asadakaranāt ‡ is
explained, ‘If effect prior to the exercise of (efficient) cause does not
exist, its existence cannot by any means be effected ‖.’ The expression
sat-kāryam, therefore, is to be understood throughout as meaning ‘ex-
istent effect,’ not the effect of that which exists: and the object of the
stanza is to establish the existence of cause from its effects, and not of
effects from the existence of cause, as Professor Lassen has explained it:
“Quænam sint rationes docetur quibus evincatur mentem ceteraque prin-
cipia effecta esse a νο Ι. τινι.” Mons. Pauthier (Traduction de la Sāṅkhya
Kārikā, 105) is more correct in his view of the general purport of the
verse; “Ce qui n’existe pas ne peut arriver à l’état d’effet;” but he has
mistaken the particulars—the reasons why that which is not can never
be, for the means which would be fruitlessly exercised for its production:
it is not that such existence cannot be effected “par la co-opération
daucune cause matérielle,” &c., but because an effect requires an adequate
material cause, and the like.

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* सतकार्यम्.
† सतकार्यम् प्राचुः कारणभावारादितिष्ठेऽः.
‡ अस
ढकर्षात्.
‖ असचेत् कारणভाबारात्, पूर्वः कार्यम् नास्य सत्तमेनापि
केंद्रूः शक्ताः.
Not only has the meaning of this verse been misapprehended by its translators, but the doctrine which it conveys seems to have been somewhat misconceived by high authority. M. Cousin, referring to this passage, observes, "L'argumentation de Kapila est, dans l'histoire de philosophie, l'antécédent de celle d'Enésidème et Hume. Selon Kapila il n'y a pas de notion propre de cause, et ce que nous appelons une cause n'est qu'une cause apparente relativement à l'effet qui la suit, mais c'est aussi un effet relativement à la cause qui la précède, laquelle est encore un effet par la même raison, et toujours de même, de manière que tout est un enchaînement nécessaire d'effets sans cause véritable et indépendante." M. Cousin then supports his view of the doctrine by selecting some of the arguments contained in the text; as, "That which does not exist cannot be made to exist;" and, "Cause and effect are of the same nature:" and he adds, as a third, that "il ne faut pas s'occuper des causes, mais des effets, car l'existence de l'effet mesure l'énergie de la cause; donc l'effet équivaut la cause." In this instance, however, he is scarcely justified by his authority, whose object is not to dispense with the consideration of cause altogether, but to prove its existence from that of its effects. Kapila, therefore, is far from asserting that "il n'y a pas de cause," although he may so far agree with the philosophers referred to, in recognising no difference between material cause and material effects: for it must be remembered, that it is of material effects, of substances, that he is speaking. His doctrine is, in fact, that on which Brown enlarges in his lectures on power, cause, and effect—that "the forms of a body are the body itself; and that all the substances which exist in the universe are every thing which truly exists in the universe, to which nothing can be added which is not itself a new substance: that there can be nothing in the events of nature, therefore, but the antecedents and consequents which are present in them; and that these accordingly, or nothing, are the very causes and effects which we are desirous of investigating." Lect. on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, p. 175. Kapila, however, has not asserted a series of antecedents and consequents without beginning; and whatever we may conceive of his mūla-prakriti, his original and unoriginated substance whence all substances proceed, it is a fixed point
from which he starts, and the existence of which he deduces from its effects: the mutual and correlative existence of which, with their cause, he endeavours to establish by arguments, which, as regarding a curious and not uninteresting part of the Sānkhyā philosophy, it may be allowable to recapitulate a little more in detail.

1. **Asadakaranāt**: 'Because efficient or instrumental cause cannot make or produce that which is not.' Professor Lassen renders this, 'Ex nulla nonentis efficacitate, nonens nil efficit. *Asat* in this passage, however, is the object, not the agent; and *karana* is employed technically to denote the efficient or operative cause, the energy of which would be exerted in vain, unless applied to materials that existed: that which does not exist cannot be brought into existence by any agent. It would be useless to grind the sesamum for oil, unless the oil existed in it: the same force applied to sand or sugar-cane would not express oil. The appearance or manifestation of the oil is a proof that it was contained in the sesamum, and consequently is a proof of the existence of the source whence it is derived. This dogma, in its most comprehensive application, is of course the same with that of the Greeks, that nothing can come from nothing, and makes the creation of the universe dependent upon pre-existing materials. Here, however, the application is limited and specific, and as Sir Graves Haughton, in his vindication of Mr. Colebrooke's exposition of the Vēdanta philosophy, has justly observed, it means no more than that things proceed from their respective sources, and from those sources alone; or that certain sequents follow certain antecedents, and indicate consequently their existence.

2. **Upādāna grahanāt**: 'From taking an adequate material cause: a fit material cause must be selected for any given effect or product.' There is no difference of opinion as to the purport of *upādāna*: 'Such as the substance evolved, such is that from which it is evolved;' or as illustrated by *Gaurapāda*, 'He who wishes to make curds will employ milk, not water:' but this being the case, the effects which we behold, or infer, must proceed from something similar to themselves, and consequently prove the existence of that substance. 'The relation between cause and effect is the generation of effect; but there can be no relation
(between cause and) a non-existent effect, and therefore effect is*,” and consequently so is cause.

3. ‘From the unfitness of all causes for every effect;’ sarva sambhāvārāhārāt. There must be an identity of character between the sequent and its antecedent, and the existence of one indicates that of the other: a jar is made with clay, cloth with yarn; the latter material could not be used to fabricate a water-pot, nor clay to weave a garment. If this was not the case, all things would be equally fit for all purposes,

... ex omnibus rebus
Omne genus nasci possit.

It is not, however, here intended to assert, that “idonea causa non est ulla quam sad, ṛo ḍṛ,” but that the effect must have a determinate existence in that cause, and can be the only effect which it can produce; as in the commentary on this expression in the S. Pravachana Bhashya: ‘If effect prior to production do not exist in cause, there would be no reason why cause should not produce one non-existent effect, and not another †.’

4. Saktaśya sakyākaranāt; ‘From the execution of that which the agent is able to do.’ Active or efficient causes can do only that to which they are competent: the potter and his implements fabricate a water-jar, not a piece of cloth; they are not competent to the latter, they are capable of the former. If effect did not pre-exist, if it were not inseparable from cause, power, or the exertions of an agent, and the employment of means, might derive from any antecedent one consequence as well as another.

5. Karanābhāvat; ‘From the nature of cause;’ that is, from its being of the same nature or character with effect, and consequently producing its like; or, according to Vācheśpapati, ‘from the identity of cause with effect †.’ ‘Cloth is not different from the threads of which it is woven,

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* कार्य्येष संवर्भं कारणं कार्य्येष्य जनकं संवर्भं कार्य्यायास्तो न सम्भवति तस्माति दिति ।
† उप्योगे प्राढव कारणं कार्याचायां हि न कों पि विदेशेष्याति येन कंदस्तः जनेतो तत्रतमिति ।
‡ कार्य्येश्य कार शाल्माति ।
for it is made up of them*. Here, then, we have precisely the discovery of modern philosophy, ‘that the form of a body is only another name for the relative position of the parts that constitute it; and that the forms of a body are nothing but the body itself’ (Brown’s Lectures:) a discovery which, simple as it may appear to be, dissipated but recently the illusion of ‘substantial forms,’ which had prevailed for ages in Europe. It seems, however, to have been familiar to Hindu speculation from the remotest periods, as the commentator on the S. Pravachana, and the author of the S. Chandrikā, cite the Védas in its confirmation: ‘Before production there is no difference between cause and effect †. There is good reason, however, to think that the conclusion drawn from the doctrine by the Védas was very different from that of the Sánkhyas, being the basis of Pantheism, and implying that before creation the great First Cause comprehended both cause and effect: the texts illustrating the dogma being such as, ‘The existent τὸ ὅν verily was unevolved¶—This, the Existent, was, oh pupil, before all things∥—The Unborn was verily before all δ.’ The Sánkhyas, like some of the old Grecian philosophers, choose to understand by tad, idam, τὸ ὅν, τὸ ἐν, ‘the comprehensive, eternal, material cause.’

From the arguments thus adduced, then, it is concluded that effect is, sat kāryam¶: that is, that it exists in, and is the same with, cause; or, as Gaurapāda has it, mahaṅ and the other characteristics of pradhāna are in pradhāna. Sat kāryam is therefore neither ‘ponendum est existens (sad) emphatice ita dictum τὸ ὅντως ὅν, per se ens,’ nor ‘effectus existentis, ab existente effectum, effectum a τὸ ὅντι:’ the question is, whether effect exists or not before production; and not whether it is produced ‘a τὸ ὅντι an a τὸ μὴ ὅντι.’ It is the production, or appearance, of that which is or is not; not the production of any thing by that which is or is not; agreeably to the Sūtra of Kapila: ‘There is no production of that which

* न परस्लन्यम् भविष्यते तत्त्वमात् । ।
† उपयोगः प्रागापि कार्यस्य कारणानेदं शूरते । ।
‡ तदृशः केत्रस्याक्षरत्माति । ।
Ⅰ सेतृव सौम्ये द्वास्तासीति । ।
Ⅱ अखयंवेदस्थास । ।
Ⅲ सत्कायः । ।
is not, as of a man’s horn*.—The production of that which is not is impossible, as would be that of a human horn†. Agreeably to the same doctrine also is the reply made in the Sūtras to the objection, that if effect exists already, existence is superfluously given to it; ‘It is absurd to produce what is already extant‡.’ The answer is, ‘It is not so; for the actual occurrence or non-occurrence of production depends upon manifestation∥:’ that is, the present existence of an effect is not the production of any thing new, but the actual manifestation of a change of form of that which previously existed: something like the notions which Aristotle ascribes to ancient philosophers, that all things were together, and that their generation was merely a change of condition: Ἡν ὡμοὶ τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοῖνδε καθέστηκεν ἄλλοιςοθαί: and it is curious enough to find the doctrine illustrated almost in the words of Hobbes: “Faciendum est quod faciunt statuarii, qui materiam exculpentes, supervacaneam imaginem non faciunt sed inveniunt;” or as VIJNYĀNA BHIKSU has it, ‘The active exertion of the sculptor produces merely the manifestation of the image which was in the stone§.’

Although however, as identical with cause, and regarded as proofs of its existence; effects or products, in their separated or manifested condition regarded as forms only, possess properties different from those of their source or cause: these differences are detailed in the next stanza.

X.

A discrete principle is causable, it is inconstant, unpervading, mutable, multitudinous, supporting, mergent, conjunct, governed. The undiscrēte one is the reverse.

* नासतुमादो नर्मृगवत्। † नर्मृगुकुत्थ्यस्यासत उत्पादो न सम्भवत्। ‡ नभवलि भाष्यायेंगवत्। ∥ नामिक्षतिनित्वमेनु श्वरार व्यवहारो। § मिलामथ्यस्यतिमया लेंक्ष्यायपारे भाभ्यक्षिमां।
BHĀSHYA.

*Discrete*; intellect and the other effects. *Causable*; that of which there is cause; the term *hetu* meaning ‘cause,’ as synonymous with *upādāna, kārana,* and *nimitta.* Nature is the cause of a discrete principle; therefore discrete principles, as far as the gross elements inclusive, have cause: thus, the principle intellect has cause by nature; egotism by intellect; the five rudiments and eleven organs by egotism; ether by the rudiment of sound; air by that of touch; light by that of form; water by that of taste; and earth by that of smell. In this way, to the gross elements inclusive, a discrete principle has cause. Again, *it is inconstant,* because it is produced from another; as a water-jar, which is produced from a lump of clay, is not constant. Again, *it is unpervading,* not going every where: a discrete principle is not like nature and soul, omnipresent. Again, *it is mutable*; it is subject to the changes which the world undergoes: combined with the thirteen instruments, and incorporated in the subtle frame, it undergoes worldly vicissitudes, and hence is mutable. *It is multitudinous;* it is intellect, egotism, the five rudiments, and eleven organs; and the five gross elements are *supported* by the five rudiments. *It is mergent,* subject to resolution; for at the period of (general) dissolution, the five gross elements merge into the five rudiments; they, with the eleven organs, into egotism; egotism into intellect; and intellect merges into nature. *Conjunct,* conjoined, made up of parts, as sound, touch, taste, form, and smell. *Governed,* not self-dependent; for intellect is dependent on nature, egotism on intellect, the rudiments and organs on egotism, and the gross elements on the rudiments. In this way the governed or subject discrete principle is explained: we now explain the undiscrete.

*The undiscrete one is the reverse.* An undiscrete principle is the contrary in respect to the properties attributed to the discrete: that, is causable; but there is nothing prior to nature, whence follows its non-production, and therefore it is without cause. A discrete principle is inconstant; an undiscrete is eternal, as it is not produced. The primary elements are not produced from any where; that is, nature. A discrete
principle is unpervading; nature is pervading, going everywhere. A
discrete principle is mutable; nature immutable, from the same omni-
presence. Discrete principles are multitudinous; nature is single, from
its causality: “Nature is the one cause of the three worlds;” thence
nature is single. Discrete principles are dependent; the undiscrete one
is independent, from its not being an effect: there is nothing beyond
nature of which it can be the effect. A discrete principle is mergent;
the undiscrete immergent (indissoluble), being eternal: intellect and the
rest, at the period of general dissolution, merge respectively into one
another; not so nature; and that therefore is immergent (indissoluble).
A discrete principle is conjunct (or compound, made up of parts); nature
is uncompounded, for sound, touch, flavour, form, and odour, are not in
(crude) nature. Discrete principles are governed; the undiscrete is in-depen-dent, it presides over itself. These are the properties in which discrete
and undiscrete principles are dissimilar: those in which they are similar
are next described.

COMMENT:

It was stated in the eighth stanza, that intellect and the other effects
of nature were in some respects similar, and in others dissimilar, to their
cause: the properties in which the dissimilarity consists are here enu-
merated.

The generic term used for the effects or products of primæval nature
(vyakta*) means, in its etymological and commonly received senses, that
which is evident or manifest, or that which is individual or specific;
from vi, distributive particle, and anja, ‘to make clear or distinct.’ The
purport is therefore sufficiently well expressed by the equivalent Mr. Cole-
brooke has selected, ‘discrete,’ detached from its cause, and having a
separate and distinct existence. Nature (or primary matter) is the reverse
of this, or avyakta†, ‘undiscrete, unseparated, indistinct.’ If natura were
substituted for tellus, these lines of Lucretius would illustrate the appli-
cation of the terms in question:

* यक्तः । ।
† अयक्तः ।
Discrete or separated effect or principle (meaning by principle a *tatva*, or category, according to the Sāńkhya classification of the elements of existent things) is described by its properties, and they are the same which are specified in the original Sūtra. 1. **Hētumāt***, 'having cause, or origin,' *hetu* implying 'material, efficient, and occasional cause;' 2. **Anūtya††,' temporary;' for whatever has cause has beginning, and whatever has a beginning must have an end. At the same time this is to be understood of them in their actual or present form or condition: 'Of their own nature (or as one with their cause) they are eternal, but they are perishable by their separate conditions‡‡.' So in the Sūtras 'destruction' is explained 'resolution into cause.' 3. 'Unpervading §§.' 'Every one of the effects of nature is not observable in every thing, they are dispersed as different modifications*. 'Vyāpti is the essential and inherent presence of one thing in another, as of heat in fire, oil in sesamum, &c. 4. **Sakrīya**, 'mutable,' or 'having action;' perhaps 'movable' or 'migratory' would perfectly express the sense; for the phrase is explained to signify that the effects of nature migrate from one substance to another: 'Intellect and the rest leave one body in which they were combined, and enter into the composition of another: this is their transition: the transition of the gross elements earth and the rest, composing body, is well known ††.' 5. 'Multitudinous:' many, anēka †† being repeated in various objects and persons, as 'the faculties in different individuals, and the elements in different forms ||||.' 6. Supported

* हेतुमातः । † अनित्य । †† सबैकाप्रायः सबभावती नित्यलम
वस्माभिर्भिनाशिनिं च । || नान: कारणस्ते । § अनापि ।
† वस्माभिर्भिनाशिनि न वामोति । ** अनित्यः । †† बुद्धादय उपात्रः
देहं व्यक्ति देहानानांक्षोपादत इति तेषा परिस्पर्यं शरीरपूर्ववादीनां
च परिस्पर्यं मृत्युः । †† अनेकः । |||| प्रतिपुरूषं बुद्धादिनां भेदात्
पुर्ववादीपि शरीरघटादिनवेटः ।
by, referable to, āsrita*; as an effect may be considered to be upheld by
its cause, or an individual referable to a species; as trees form a wood.
7. 'Mergent,' linga†; that which merges into, or is lost or resolved into,
its primary elements, as subsequently explained. Intellect and the rest
are the lingas, signs, marks, or characteristic circumstances of nature:
and when they lose their individuality, or discrete existence, they may
be said to have been absorbed by, or to have fused or merged into, their
original source. Although, therefore, the application of linga as an attri-
butive in this sense is technical, the import is not so widely different from
that of the substantive as might at first be imagined. Vāchespati, ex-
plaining the term, has, 'Linga, the characteristic of pradhāna, for these
principles, buddhi and the rest, are its characteristics, as will be here-
after explained‡:' and the author of the S. Chandrikā has, 'Linga is
that which characterizes, or causes to be known∥; it is the anumāpaka‡,
'the basis of the inference': 'For this effect (of nature) is the parent
of the inference that an undiscrète cause exists¶.' (See also Com. on
v. 5, p. 24.) According to these interpretations, 'predicative' or 'charac-
teristic' would perhaps be a preferable equivalent; but 'mergent' or 'dis-
solvable***' is conformable to the S. Bhūṣhya. The commentator on the
S. Pravachana explains it by both terms 'inferential' or 'resolvable:'
'Effect is termed linga, either from its being the ground of inference of
discourse, or from its progress to resolution††.' 8. 'Combined, conjunct,'
sāvayava†‡; explained by Vāchespati, 'mixing,' misrana∥∥, or 'junction,'
samyoga∥∥∥, as the elements combine with one another. It might be said,
then, that nature is a compound, as its products combine with it; but this
is not so, for their union with nature is not mere 'mixture or conjunction,
but identification from the sameness of the cause and effect*: a notion which distinguishes the pradhána of the Sánkhyas from the first principles of those Grecian philosophers, who, if their doctrines have been rightly represented, taught that substances existed either as distinct particles of an aggregate, or component parts of a mixture, in their original form. In the Sánkhya they separate or reunite as one and the same.

10. ‘Governed†’: the effects of nature depend upon its existence, and each in its turn produces its peculiar effect or product, in furtherance of the influence of nature, or in consequence of its existence, without which they would cease to be, and their effects would be null; as, ‘In the effect of egotism, which intellect has to produce, the fulfilment of nature is regarded; otherwise intellect, being ineffective, would not be able to produce egotism †.’

The properties of nature, or the undiscrète principle, are the reverse of these; it has no cause; it has no end; it is omnipresent; it is immutable; it is single; it is self-sustained; it is the subject, not the predicate; it is entire, or one whole; it is supreme.

Although the especial object of the text here is the dissimilarity between the effects of nature and their material cause, yet the term avyakta applies equally to purusha, or ‘soul,’ also an invisible or undiscrète principle; and accordingly soul differs from discrete principles in the same circumstances as nature. In the properties, therefore, of non-causability, constancy, omnipresence, immutability, singleness, self-support, substantiveness, entirety, and supremacy, soul and nature correspond. They differ, however, in other respects, and particularly in those in which nature and its effects assimilate, as enumerated in the succeeding stanza.

* न तु प्रधानस्य बुद्धादिविः संयोगस्तादात्म्यात्।
† परतत्र।
‡ बुद्धा हि स्कारायेहंहंकारे जन्यतितथे प्रकृत्यापूर्वोपेक्ष्यत अन्यथा द्वीषा सति नालमहंकारं जन्यितुमिति।
XI.

A discrete principle, as well as the chief (or undiscrète) one, has the three qualities: it is indiscriminative, objective, common, irrational, prolific. Soul is in these respects, as in those, the reverse.

BHĀSHYA.

Has the three qualities: it is that of which goodness, foulness, and darkness are the three properties. A discrete principle is indiscriminative; discrimination does not belong to it: that is, it cannot distinguish which is a discrete principle and which are properties, or that this is an ox, that is a horse: such as the properties are, such is the principle; such as is the principle such are the properties; and the like. Objective; a discrete principle is to be enjoyed (made use of), from its being an object to all men. Common; from being the common possession of all, like a harlot. Irrational; it does not comprehend pain, pleasure, or dulness. Prolific; thus, egotism is the progeny of intellect; the five rudiments and eleven organs of egotism; and the five gross elements of the five rudiments. These properties, to prolific inclusive, are specified as those of a discrete principle; and it is in them that the chief (or undiscrete) one is similar: "Such as is a discrete principle, such is the chief (or undiscrete) one." Therefore as a discrete principle has three qualities, so has the undiscrete, or that of which intellect and the rest, having the three qualities, are the effects: so in this world effect is of the like quality with cause, as black cloth is fabricated with black threads. A discrete principle is indiscriminative; so is the chief one, it cannot discern that qualities are distinct from nature, that qualities are one thing, and that nature is another; therefore the chief one is indiscriminative. A discrete principle is objective; so is the chief one, from its being the object of all men. A discrete principle is common; so is the chief one, being common to all things. A discrete principle is irrational; so is the chief one, as it is not conscious of pain, or pleasure, or dulness. Whence is this inferred? From the irrationality of its effects; from an irrational
lump of clay proceeds an irrational water-pot. Thus has (nature) the chief one been explained. *Soul is in these respects, as in those, the reverse:* this is now explained.

*Reverse of both the discrete and undiscrete principles.* Soul is the reverse of both, thus: Discrete and undiscrete have (the three) qualities; soul is devoid of qualities: they are indiscriminative; soul has discrimination: they are objects (of sense or fruition); soul is not an object (of sense or fruition): they are common; soul is specific: they are irrational; soul is rational; for inasmuch as it comprehends, or perfectly knows, pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is rational: they are prolific; soul is unproulic; nothing is produced from soul. On these grounds soul is said to be the reverse of both the discrete and undiscrete principles.

It is also said, *as in those,* referring to the preceding verse; for as the chief (or undiscrete) principle is there said to be without cause, &c. such is the soul. It is there stated that a discrete principle is causable, inconstant, and the like; and that the undiscrete one is the reverse; that is, it has no cause, &c.; so soul is without cause, being no production. A discrete principle is inconstant; the discrete one is constant; so is soul; and it is immutable also, from its omnipresence. A discrete principle is multitudinous; the undiscrete is single; so is soul. A discrete principle is supported; the undiscrete is unsupported; so is soul. A discrete principle is mergent; the undiscrete immergent (indissoluble); so is soul; it is not in any way decomposed. A discrete principle is conjunct; the undiscrete one uncombined; so is soul; for there are no (component) parts, such as sound, &c., in soul. Finally, discrete principles are governed; the undiscrete one is independent; so is soul, governing (or presiding over) itself. In this way the common properties of soul and nature were described in the preceding stanza; whilst those in which they differ, as possession of the three qualities, and the like, are specified in this verse. Next follows more particular mention of these three qualities, with which both discrete principles and the undiscrete one are endowed.

**COMMENT.**

In this verse the properties common to crude nature and to its products
are specified, continuing the reference to the eighth verse, in which it was
asserted, that in some respects the effects of nature and nature itself were
analogous. This being effected, the text proceeds to state that soul has
not the properties which are common to nature and its products, but
possesses those which are peculiar to the former; agreeing therefore in
some respects with crude nature, but dissimilar in every respect to its
effects or products.

The three qualities*, or satwa†, ‘goodness,’ rajas‡, ‘foulness,’ and
tamas§, ‘darkness,’ which are familiar to all the systems of Hindu specu-
lation, are more particularly described in the next verse; soul has them
not. Pradhāna, ‘the chief one,’ crude nature, and its products, have not
discrimination, viveka§, the faculty of discerning the real and essential
differences of things, of ‘distinguishing between matter and spirit, of
knowing self; the exercise of which is the source of final liberation (from
existence) ¶.’ By the term ‘objective**’ is intended that which may be
used or enjoyed, such as the faculties of the mind, and the organs of
sense; or such as may be perceived by observation, vijnāna††: such
nature, or pradāna, may also be considered as the origin of all things
inferable by reason. Soul, on the contrary, is the observer or enjoyer, as
afterwards explained. Achetana‡‡, ‘irrational,’ that which does not think
or feel, unconscious, non-sentient; as in the Meghadūta; ‘Those afflicted
by desire seek relief both from rational and irrational objects††;’ explained
either ‘living and lifeless’§§, or ‘knowing and ignorant’¶¶; chetanā***
being defined ‘knowledge of right and wrong,’ or ‘of what ought, and
what ought not, to be done †††.’

The general position, that the properties of soul are the reverse of
those of the products of nature, requires, however, some modification in
one instance. A discrete principle is said to be multitudinous, many,
aneka*; consequently soul should be single, eka†; and it is so, accord-
ing to the S. Bhāṣṭya‡. On the other hand, the S. Tatwa Kaumudi
makes soul agree with discrete principles, in being multitudinous: ‘The
properties of non-causability, constancy, and the rest, are common to
soul and nature; multitudinosness is a property common to (soul and)
an undiscrete principle∥.’ The S. Chandrikā confirms the interpretation,
‘The phrase tathā cha implies that (soul) is analogous to the undiscrete
principle in non-causality and the rest, and analogous to discrete prin-
ciples in manifold enumeration.§’ This is, in fact, the Sāṇkhya doctrine,
as subsequently laid down by the text, ver. 18, and is conformable to the
Sūtra of Kāpiṇa; ‘Multitude of souls is proved by variety of condition¶;’
that is, ‘the virtuous are born again in heaven, the wicked are regener-
ated in hell; the fool wanders in error, the wise man is set free**.’
Either, therefore, Gaurapāda has made a mistake, or by his eka is to be
understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or
several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it
(R. A. S. Trans. vol. I. p. 31), ‘individual.’ So in the Sūtras it is said,
‘that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of
receptacle, as the ethereal element may be confined in a variety of ves-
sels ††.’ This singleness of soul applies therefore to that particular soul
which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage, and
liberation; for, as the commentator observes, ‘one soul is born, not

* अनेक। † एक। ‡ अनेकं व्यक्तमेकमयज्ञं तथा पुष्मा
nाथेकः। || अहेन्तमचन्त्रियवादिक प्रधानसाधम्मेदिति पुष्मस्य एवम
नेकवं व्यक्तसाधम्मे। § तथा चायक्तसङ्गःपटेतुमनवादिना एवं
व्यक्तसङ्गःपटेत्वनेकसङ्गेदिति। ¶ जन्मादिक अवस्थात्: पुष्मवहल्ल।**
पुष्मवान् स्वर्गं जायते पापी नरेष चोडो भस्ये ज्ञानी मुच्ये।
†† उपाधिमेदेशमक्ष्य नानायोग ज्ञाकाश्य घटादिभ।।
another (in a regenerated body)*. The singleness of soul therefore, as asserted by Gaurapāda, is no doubt to be understood in this sense.

XII.

The qualities respectively consist in pleasure, pain, and dulness; are adapted to manifestation, activity, and restraint; mutually dominate; rest on each other; produce each other; consort together; and are reciprocally present.

BHĀSHYA.

The qualities goodness, foulness, and darkness, are severally the same as what is agreeable, what is disagreeable, and what is indifferent: thus goodness is all that is pleasure, priti meaning ‘pleasure;’ being one with (or consisting of) that (pleasure): foulness is one with, or consists of, disagreeableness (aprīti): darkness consists of, or is the same with, dulness; vishāda meaning mōha, ‘dulness, stupidity.’ Next, are adapted to manifestation, &c.; artha signifying ‘competency’ or ‘fitness.’ Goodness, then, is for the sake of manifestation; it is fit for, or adapted to it; foulness is for activity; darkness for restraint: that is, the qualities are connected with, or possessed of, manifestation, action, and inertia. They mutually dominate: they are mutually paramount, sustaining, productive, cooperative, and coexistent. Thus, they are said to dominate mutually; that is, they severally prevail or predominate over each other, or they are displayed by the properties of pleasure, pain, or dulness. When goodness is dominant, it overpowers foulness and darkness by its own properties, and is exhibited or identified with light and joy. When foulness predominates, it overpowers goodness and darkness, and exists in pain and action. When darkness triumphs, it suppresses goodness and foul-

* एक पुरुषो जाते नापरः ।

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ness, and is supreme as one with insensibility and inaction. So they rest on each other: the qualities combine with one another, like binary atoms. They produce each other, as the lump of clay generates the earthen jar. They consort together, as males and females cohabit: as it is said, "Goodness is the consort of foulness, foulness of goodness; darkness is called the consort of both:" that is, they are respectively associates. They are reciprocally present: they abide or exist reciprocally, according to the text, "qualities abide in qualities" (that is, the same qualities may be regarded as different, according to their different effects): thus, a beautiful and amiable woman, who is a source of delight to every one else, is the cause of misery to the other wives of her husband, and of bewilderment (insensibility) to the dissolute: and in this manner she is the cause of the influence of all three qualities. Thus also, a king, assiduous in protecting his people, and curbing the profligate, is the cause of happiness to the good, of misery and mortification to the bad: here foulness (activity) produces the effects of goodness and darkness. So darkness, by its investing nature, produces the effects of goodness and foulness, as clouds, overshadowing the heavens, cause delight upon earth, animate by their rain the active labours of the husbandman, and overwhelm absent lovers with despair. In this manner the three qualities are reciprocally present (or perform the functions of one another).

COMMENT.

The three qualities are here described, by their effects and relations; by the production of pleasure, pain, and indifference; and by the manner in which they are detached or combined in their operations and influence.

The terms priti and apriti are here used as synonyms of sukha, 'pleasure,' and dukha, 'pain;' vishāda as a synonyme of moha, 'bewilderment, stupefaction, dullness, or insensibility.' The composition of átma with these terms, prityátmaka, implies 'essential or inseparable presence,' like that of life or soul in the living body. An exact equivalent for such a compound can scarcely perhaps be supplied, but the sense may be conveyed by such expressions as 'consists of, comprehends, is one or iden-
tical with, and the like. *Ātmą* is here used also to shew that the properties have positive existence; that is, pleasure is not the mere absence of pain; pain is not the mere absence of pleasure; as, ‘Negatives could not be essential ingredients in any thing: pleasure, pain, and insensibility are therefore entities; the word *ātmą* implying being, existence, existent nature, or property.’

The absolute and relative influence of the several qualities is sufficiently illustrated by Gaurapáda; but Váchespáti understands the text as in some respects differently constructed. Instead of considering the last term, *vrittaya*†, as a distinct condition, *anyonyavrittaya*‡, expounded in the *S. Bháshya*, *parasparam varittanté*§, they are reciprocally present,’ he interprets *vritti* by *kriyá*, ‘act, operation, function,’ and compounds it with each of the foregoing terms §. In all other respects his explanation of the terms coincides with that of the elder commentator. The passage quoted by Gaurapáda is cited by Váchespáti, with some difference, from the Védas: ‘As it is said in the ágama, all universally present are the associates of each other: goodness is the partner of foulness, foulness of goodness; both are the companions of darkness, and darkness is said to be the associate of both. Their original connexion, or disjunction, is never observed.’ The Chandriká concurs with the *S. Tatwa Kavamudi* in the explanation of *vritti***. This commentary likewise offers some additional interpretation of the terms *priti*, &c. Thus *priti* is said to

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* नेत्रेतराभावः सुखाद्योऽपि तु भावः। अश्वमण्डुस्य भाववच नात। † मिथुनवृत्तयथ। ‡ अन्योन्यवृत्तयः। || परस्परं वर्तनेत। § सा च (वृत्तिं) प्रवेकमित्वतः यथायोन्याविभववृत्तयोः। स्योन्याविभववृत्तयोः। स्योन्याजानन्तवृत्तयोः। स्योन्यामिथुनवृत्तयः। || भवति चा चागमे। अन्योन्यमिथुनः। सर्वं सर्वंगामिन्तवं रजस्ति मिथुनं सर्वं सवस्य मिथुनं रज। तमसवक्षपि मिथुने ते सत्रजस्ति उभे उभयोः। सत्रजसोऽस्मि चुनं तम उच्यते नैषामादिः। संरेयोऽग्रो विप्रयोगो चोपलभ्यते। ** अन्यो न्यपरं वृत्तिपरं च चतुर्ब्ध्वेचित।
comprise 'rectitude, gentleness, modesty, faith, patience, clemency, wisdom.' apriti, besides 'misery,' implies 'hatred, violence, envy, abuse, wickedness:' and vishāda is not only 'insensitivity;' but 'tardiness, fear, infidelity, dishonesty, avarice, and ignorance. Whenever either of these is observed, it is referable to the corresponding quality *.'

In speaking of qualities, however, the term guna is not to be regarded as an insubstantial or accidental attribute, but as a substance discernible by soul through the medium of the faculties. It is, in fact, nature, or prakriti, in one of its three constituent parts or conditions, unduly prominent; nature entire, or unmodified, being nothing more than the three qualities in equipoise, according to the Sūtra, 'Prakriti is the equal state of goodness, foulness, and darkness †:' on which the commentator remarks, 'Satva and the rest are "things," not specific properties, from their being subject to combination or disjunction, and from their having the properties of lightness, heaviness, and strength ‡:' and again, 'From the construction of intellect and the rest endowed with the three properties, like cords wherewith to bind the victim the soul.' So in the S.Śāra, 'Goodness and the rest are not the faculties of that (prakriti), being of the same nature §'—'Such expressions as "qualities of nature" are to be understood (in the same sense) as (the term) "the trees of a forest" ‖:' that is, the forest is nothing different from the trees of which it is the aggregate, although particular trees or clumps may sometimes be indivi-
dualized. In like manner nature is not different from the qualities, but is the aggregate of them. 'Ingredients or constituents of nature,' therefore, would be a preferable term perhaps to 'quality;' but 'quality' is the more ordinary acceptance of the word guna, and it may therefore be used, remembering only the distinction made by the Sânkhyas of its materiality, as a constituent part of nature itself; the qualities being, in fact, only the conditions of things, and therefore not separable from the things themselves. It may be thought possible that there is some connection between the gunas which are the constituents of prakriti, and the qualities, passions, or affections of primary matter of the older philosophers, alluded to by Aristotle; from the changes produced by which on one unaltered substance all things originated: Τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ἱπτομενοῦσας, τοῖς δὲ πάθεσι μεταβαλλοῦσας, τούτο στοιχεῖα καὶ ταύτην τῶν ὄντων τῆν ἀρχήν φασιν εἶναι. Metaph. I. 3. Another analogy may be conjectured in the identification of the two gunas, satwa and rajas, with priti, 'affection,' and apriti, 'aversion,' as they thus correspond with the φλια and νείκος, the 'love' and 'strife' of Empedocles, as the principles of creation; respectively the source of what is good or evil.

The sense in which the several terms for the three gunas is employed is sufficiently clear from the explanation given of them in the text; and the meaning of the equivalents which Mr. Colebrooke has assigned them must be understood according to the same interpretation. Prof. Lassen renders them essentia, impetus, and caligo; which, similarly understood, are equally unobjectionable: but as the name of a 'quality,' satwa, is not perhaps well rendered by 'essence,' or even by 'existence,' which is its literal purport, 'goodness,' denoting exemption from all imperfection, seems to be preferable. Impetus is rather the effect of rajas, than the quality; and the term 'foulness,' derived from its etymology from ranj, 'to colour or stain,' will better comprehend its characteristic results. The quality bears a striking analogy to the perturbatio of the Stoics, and might be rendered by that word, or by 'passion,' in its generic acceptation. 'Darkness,' or caligo, expresses both the literal and technical signification of tmanas.

P
XIII.

Goodness is considered to be alleviating and enlightening: foulness, urgent and versatile: darkness, heavy and enveloping. Like a lamp, they cooperate for a purpose (by union of contraries).

BHÁSHYA.

Goodness is alleviating, &c.—When goodness predominates, the frame is light, the intellect is luminous, and the senses are acute. Foulness is urgent and versatile.—What urges, urgent, exciting: as a bull, upon seeing another bull, exhibits vehement excitement; that is the effect of foulness. Foulness is also seen to be versatile; that is, a person under its influence is capricious. Darkness is heavy and enveloping.—Where darkness prevails, the members of the body are heavy, the senses obtuse, or inadequate to the performance of their functions. But here it may be said, If these qualities are contraries to one another, what effect can they produce by their several purposes, and how therefore can it be said, they cooperate, like a lamp, for a (common purpose). Like a lamp, their operation is for a (common) purpose: as a lamp, which is composed of the opposites, a wick, oil, and flame, illuminates objects, so the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, although contrary to one another, effect a (common) purpose.

This question involves another. It was said (in ver.11) that a discrete principle, as well as the chief one, has the three qualities, and is indiscriminative, objective, and the like. Admitting this to be true of the chief one (or nature), how is it ascertained that intellect and the rest have also the three qualities, and are indiscriminative, and the like? This is next explained.

COMMENT.

The description of the three qualities is continued in this verse.

Goodness is alleviating; laghu, ‘light;’ it is matter, elastic and elevating, generating upward and lateral motion, as in the ascent of flame, and the currents of the air. It is the cause of active and perfect functionality
also in the instruments of vitality*; enlightening, prakásakam, ‘making manifest,’ the objects of the senses. The term ishtam, meaning ordinarily ‘wished, desired,’ imports in the text merely drishlam, ‘seen, regarded, considered’—by the Sánkhya teachers†. Foulness is urgent and versatile.—The qualities of goodness and darkness are both inert and inoperative, even with regard to their own peculiar consequences; and it is only by the restless activity and stimulating agency of the quality of foulness that they are roused to action; upashtambhakam‡ being here explained to signify ‘stimulating, impelling,’ udyotakam, prédakam∥, contrary to its usual sense of ‘opposing, hindering.’ It might be supposed to imply some relation to the primitive shtabhī, ‘stop, hinder, oppose, be stupid;’ inasmuch as the idea appears to be that of action consequent upon obstruction, or inertia, ‘reaction.’ Thus, as illustrated in the S. Bhásyha, a bull displays excitement on beholding, or being opposed by, another. The S. Tatwa Kaumudi has, ‘The qualities goodness and darkness, on account of their own inertia, are inoperative, in regard to the exercise of their own effects, until excited by foulness. Having been roused from inactivity, they are made to put forth vigour and energy; and therefore foulness is said to be urgent‡.’ The Chandrikā is to the same effect: ‘The meaning is this: From the production of combination and activity by foulness, the definition of that quality is excitement and versatility **.’ It is not necessary, however, to take into consideration the sense of the primitive shtabhī, for upashtambhaka is not derived from that root, but from stambhu††, a Sautra root; which therefore, although the meanings of

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* कर्णानां चृतिष्टुल्लेल्लोऽर्थवः।। सांख्याचार्यः।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।..† सांख्याचार्यः।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।..‡ उपः स्थानः।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।..§ प्रेयः।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।।..‘सवैतम्भी स्वयम्
क्रियत्या स्वकार्यम्बृत्तिः प्रत्यवसीदतो रजसीपश्चेत। अवसादात् प्रच्छाया
उत्साह प्रयत्नं कार्यः। तदिद्मुक्तमपश्चेतर्ज इति।।** रजसेव
संशोष क्रियोरूपतम्भाः प्रेयः सन्तियनं च रजसी लक्षणमितिभावः।।†† सम्भूः।
shītabhi are usually also assigned to it, may take the import required by the text, of 'urging' or 'exciting.'

The quality of darkness is 'heavy,' gurum, causing sluggishness of body and dulness of mind. It is also varanaka, 'surrounding, enveloping,' so as to obstruct light, retard motion, &c.

But these qualities, although contraries, cooperate for a common purpose; as the cotton, the oil, and the flame, although mutually destructive, combine in a lamp to give light. The common object of the qualities is the fulfilment of the purpose of soul, as is subsequently explained.

XIV.

Indiscriminativeness and the rest (of the properties of a discrete principle) are proved by the influence of the three qualities, and the absence thereof in the reverse. The undiscerning principle, moreover, (as well as the influence of the three qualities,) is demonstrated by effect possessing the properties of its cause (and by the absence of contrariety).

Bhāṣya.

That which is the property of indiscriminativeness and the rest is proved from the influence of the three qualities in mahat and the other discrete principles: but this is not proved in the undiscerning; therefore it is said, by the absence the reverse of it: the reverse of it; the absence; the non-existence of the reverse of that: thence the undiscerning principle is established; as, where there are threads, there is cloth; the threads are not one thing, and the cloth another. Why so? From the absence of the reverse (they are not contraries to each other). In this manner the discrete and undiscerning principles are established. The latter is remote, the former is near: but he who perceives discrete principles, perceives the undiscerning one also, as there is no contrariety between them. Hence also the undiscerning one is proved by effect possessing the properties of cause in this world: such as is the nature of the cause, such is that of the effect;
thus, from black threads black cloth is made. In the same manner, as
the characteristics of intellect and the rest are their being indiscrimina-
tive, objective, common, irrational, prolific, such as they are, such the
undiscrete is proved essentially to be. From the influence of the three
qualities, indiscriminativeness and the rest are proved to be in discrete
principles; and from there being no difference between them (and the
undiscrete), and from essential identity of the properties of cause and
effect, the undiscrete principle also is demonstrated.

But it is replied, this cannot be true; for in this world that which is not
apprehended is not; but the undiscrete one is, although not applicable.

COMMENT.

It was stated in ver. 8, that mahat and the other effects of prakriti
were in some respects like, and in others unlike, to their original. The
circumstances in which they were dissimilar were specified in ver. 10,
and those in which they agreed in ver. 11. In the latter stanza, the first
of the concurrent properties that was named was that of their possessing
the three qualities; and in verses 12 and 13 it was explained what was
meant by the three qualities. In the present stanza it is asserted, that as
the effects of prakriti have the three qualities, they must have, as a neces-
sary consequence, the other properties, want of discrimination and the
rest, enumerated in ver. 11; and that as they have them, their origin, or
prakriti, must have them also, as there is no essential difference between
the properties of cause and effect.

The influence of goodness, foulness, and darkness, or the varied affec-
tions and conditions of all substances, is the obvious cause of perplexity,
or want of discrimination, &c.; being, in fact, the same state or condition.
Traigunya is the influence or any consequence of the three gunas. The
next expression is variously interpreted.

Mr. Colebrooke renders tad viparyaya abhavat*, 'and from the absence
thereof in the reverse;' that is, the absence of want of discrimination, &c.

* तत्तत्वपर्यायाभावात्

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in that subject which is the reverse of the material products of nature, as, for instance, soul, is a negative proof of their existence in the former. The properties of contraries are contrary. Soul and matter are contraries, and consequently their properties are mutually the reverse of each other: but one property of soul is freedom from the three qualities, whilst that of matter, or any material product of prakriti, is their possession: consequently the former must be capable, and the latter incapable, of discrimination. The same may be said of the other properties of mahat and the rest. Thus Vāchārjyā observes: ‘It (the assertion) is first plainly or affirmatively expressed in the natural order: it is then put negatively, or in the inverted order: from the absence thereof in the reverse; from the absence of the three qualities in soul, as the reverse of the products of prakriti, in regard to want of discrimination and the like.* The S. Chandrikā has a similar explanation: ‘The reverse of that want of discrimination; where that is that is the reverse (of mahat, &c.), or soul: for in soul there are not the three qualities; or, where there is not want of discrimination there are not the three qualities, as in soul†: intimating, therefore, that tad, ‘thereof,’ may refer either to the three qualities traiṣṇava, or to want of discrimination, &c.

There is, however, another sense attached to the expression; and the reverse is understood not to signify soul, or any thing contrary to mahat and the rest, but to imply contrariety or incompatibility in the properties of their origin, or prakriti: that is, indiscriminativeness and the rest are the properties of mahat, &c. not only from their possessing the three qualities, but because there is nothing contrary to indiscriminativeness, &c. in prakriti. This proposition is indicated by Vāchārjya, who, after explaining the passage as above, adds, ‘Or it may be understood as

* स्फुटनान्योपनिशद्ग्रं ध्रुवरूपिक्षवा तत्रत्व्योग्यान्यात्रवेक्षणात्मिक्षिक्षेप्यपर्यं पूर्वे चेयुष्याभावातः।
† तत्स्याविषेकिलित्य विपर्ययो यथा संस्करण्त्यो आक्लम तच चेयुष्याभावात्मकं तत्स्याविषेकिलिं बहुस्त्र चेयुष्याभावात्मकं अल्मवंदित्तः।
taking for its two subjects vyakta and avyakta (discrete and undiscrrete matter), and by the inverted proposition (or negatively) asserting that there is no reason (to the contrary) arising from one being exempt from the three qualities*.' The same is more explicitly stated by Gaurapáda. The absence of indiscriminativeness, he observes, as deduced from the influence of the three qualities, relates in the first instance to vyakta, 'discrete matter,' not to avyakta, or 'indiscrete:' but the same must apply to the latter also, because there is no property belonging to it which is incompatible with, or the reverse of, the properties of the vyakta, or 'discrete matter,' mahat, &c.; as in the case of the cloth and the threads of which it is woven, there is no incompatibility between them.

The first portion of the stanza having shewn, then, either simply that discrete matter is possessed of indiscriminativeness, &c. or that both it and indiscrete matter are equally devoid of discrimination, proceeds to draw the conclusion that such an indiscrete cause must exist, endowed with properties similar to those of its indiscrete effects, because there is no difference of property between cause and effect; agreeably to the Sútra, 'The three qualities, insensibility and the rest, belong to both (prakriti and its products)†:' and Váchèspati observes, 'Effect is seen to be the same in its properties with cause. As the properties of the threads, &c. are identical with those of cloth and the like, so the attributes of pleasure, pain, and insensibility, evidenced in the effects, which are distinguished as mahat and the rest, are proofs that similar conditions must belong to their cause: the existence of pradhána or avyakta, as a cause, of which pleasure, pain, and insensibility are the conditions, is consequently established‡.'

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* अष्ट वा व्यक्तार्थेऽपि पक्षीकृत ऋणव्याहवति एव हेतु
वृक्षयथः।  
† चिन्तुिस्चतन्त्रवादीखयोः।  
‡ कार्ये हि कारणामुखः
अद्य यथा तंत्रादिगुणामकं पदार्थ तथा महादित्तशेषानापि कार्येष
सुखद्वमहोब्धेण स्वकृतं गतिमुखः स्वमोहामभो भवित्वधे तथा च तत्
कार्येष सुखद्वमहोब्धेन प्रधाननमये ज्ञिनं भविति ।
XV.

Since specific objects are finite; since there is homogeneity; since effects exist through energy; since there is a parting (or issue) of effects from cause, and a reunion of the universe,—

BHÁSHYA.

The undiscrète principle is cause: this is the completion of the construction of the sentence. Since specific objects are finite: as in the world, wherever the agent is, his limits are observed: thus, a potter makes certain jars with certain portions of clay; so with intellect: intellect and the other characteristics (of nature) are finite, as specific effects of it. Intellect is one, egotism is one, the subtle rudiments are five, the organs eleven, the gross elements five: from the limitation of these species nature is their cause, which produces finite discrete principles. If nature were not the cause, then discrete principles would have no limit: from the measure (or limit) of specific objects, therefore, nature exists, whence discrete principles are produced. Since there is homogeneity: as in the world, that which is notorious is observed; for having seen a religious student engaged in sacred study, it follows that his parents were assuredly of the Brahmanical tribe: so having observed that mahat and the other characteristics have the three qualities, we conclude what their cause must be; and in this way from homogeneity the chief one exists. Since effects exist through energy: in life, that which is effective in any thing is active in the same: a potter is able to make a jar, therefore he makes a jar, not a piece of cloth. Since there is a parting of effect from cause: the chief one is cause; that which makes is cause, that which is made is effect: the separation of cause and effect: thus; a jar is competent to hold curds, honey, water, milk; not so is its cause, or the lump of clay; but the lump of clay produces the jar, the jar does not produce the lump of clay. So having observed intellect and the other effects, it is inferred that cause must have been separated, of which these discrete principles are detached portions. Again, since there is a reunion of the
universe (vaiśvarūpa). Viśva here means 'the world;’ rūpa, 'individualization' (or specific form): the abstract condition of the form of the world is the universe: from its reunion, nature exists (as cause); whence there is no mutual separation of the five gross elements, earth &c., composing the three worlds; or, the three worlds are comprised in the gross elements. The five gross elements are earth, water, fire, air, ether; which at the season of general dissolution return in the order of creation to a state of non-separation, or into the modified five subtle rudiments: they and the eleven organs reunite in egotism; egotism resolves into intellect; and intellect into nature. Thus the three worlds, at the period of general dissolution, reunite in nature; and from such reunion of the discrete and undiscrète principles, like that of curds and milk, it follows that the undiscrète principle is cause.

COMMENT.

The sentence is incomplete, the government being in the first member of the following verse; kāram asti-avyaktam, 'There is (a general) cause (which is undiscrète).’ Hitherto the subjects discussed have been the existence of effects, and their correspondence or disagreement with their cause. It is now shewn that cause exists imperceptible, or undiscrète.

From specific effects being finite: from the certain or definite measure of the varieties of discrete principles, as one intellect, one egotism, five rudiments, and the like. If there were no certain and defined cause, the effects would be indefinite and unlimited: the water-jar, however, must be limited by the earth of which it consists, and which, as a distinct body, is no longer extant. 'Homogeneity,' samanwaya, is defined 'the common nature of different things*,' as the property of generating pain, pleasure, and dulness, which is possessed by intellect and the rest. Effects exist through energy: 'through the energy, ability, or power of cause they

* bhāvānāṃ saman śūpata.
become active*:' A parting, or issue, of effect from cause, and final reunion of the separated effect. \textit{Vaisvarūpa} is merely a synonyme of \textit{kārya}, 'effect;' that which is of various, or every, sort of form, or nature. The evolution of effect from unseparated cause is illustrated by comparing nature to a tortoise, the limbs of which are at one time protruded, and at another retracted within the shell: 'As when the limbs which are in the body of the tortoise protrude, then they are distinguished, or (it is said) this is the body, those are the limbs: so when they are withdrawn into it they are undistinguished (from the body)†.' \textit{S. Tatwa Kaumudi}. In like manner the water-jar or the diadem exist in the lump of clay or of gold, but are distinguished from it only when individually manifested; they become mere clay or gold again on losing their detached condition: thus earth and the rest exist in the subtile rudiments; those and the organs of sense and action in egotism; egotism in intellect; and intellect in nature: when manifested or put forth they are separated or distinguished from their several sources, but at the period of universal dissolution lose their distinct form, and become progressively one with their common original: the existence of which therefore, as their undiscrete cause, is proved both by their appearance or separation, and disappearance or reunion.

XVI.

There is a general cause, which is undiscrete. It operates by means of the three qualities, and by mixture, by modification, as water; for different objects are diversified by influence of the several qualities respectively.

\begin{itemize}
\item [∗] \text{कारणशिक्षितः काय्यं प्रवर्तते।}
\item [†] \text{यथा कृम्मश्रीरे शन्येवाञ्जानि निषरतिः विभज्यन इरु कृम्मश्रीरेवेतनायस्याञ्जानीति। एवं निविष्मानानि तत्समस्यं यज्जीभवति।}
\end{itemize}
BHÁSHYA.

That which is known as the undiscrète principle is the cause; whence intellect and the other effects proceed. *It operates by means of the three qualities.*—That in which are the three qualities, goodness, foulness, and darkness, is the (aggregate of the) three qualities. What then is that? The equipoised condition of goodness, foulness, and darkness, is the chief one (nature). Also, *from mixture.*—In like manner as the Ganges unites into one river the three streams that descend upon the head of Rúdra, so the (aggregate of the) three qualities, the undiscrète, produces a single discrete principle; or, as many threads combined form one piece of cloth, so the undiscrète generates intellect and the rest from the interweaving of the three qualities: and thus from the influence of the three qualities and their aggregation the discrete world proceeds. But if discrete principles proceed from one undiscrète, then one form should be common to all. This objection is invalid; for it is *by modification, like water, from a variety in the receptacles of the several qualities,* that the three worlds, derived from one undiscrète principle, assume different conditions of being. The gods are united with pleasure, mankind with pain, animals with dulness; so that a discrete principle, emanating from one nature, becomes modified, like water, according to the diversified receptacles of the qualities. *Prati prati* implies ‘several order:’ *guná sraya,* ‘a receptacle of the qualities,’ by the difference of that receptacle (according to that several receptacle) in which it is lodged. Discrete principles are varied from modification; as the simple element water, when fallen from the atmosphere, is diversely modified as various fluids, according to its various combinations, so from one *pradhána* proceed the three worlds, which are no longer of one (uniform) character. In the divinities the quality of goodness predominates, foulness and darkness are inert; therefore they are supremely happy. In men the quality of foulness abounds, and goodness and darkness are inert; therefore they are supremely miserable. In animals goodness and foulness are inactive, and darkness prevails; and therefore they are supremely insensible.

In these two stanzas the existence of nature (*pradhána*) has been determined: in the next place, that of soul is to be established.
COMMENT.

In this verse, besides the conclusion drawn from the arguments in the preceding stanza, it is here explained how nature, which is one, produces diversified effects. This is said to be through the influence of the three qualities, the combination or several predominance of which in various objects is attended with a modification and diversity of that which is essentially one and the same.

‘Modified condition,’ according to Vāchespāti, ‘is the character of the three qualities, which are never for a moment stationary,’ except when creation is not: and from this constant vicissitude ensues combination in different proportions, or the predominance of one or other in different objects; for they are always combined, or mixed, in different proportions. This is the mixture, the blending, or contention of the qualities which the text intends. Hence proceeds the modification of the original matter; as rain water, falling upon different trees, is modified as the juice of their different fruits. ‘As simple water shed by the clouds, coming into contact with various situations, is modified as sweet, sour, bitter, pungent, or astringent, in the character of the juice of the cocoa-nut, palm, bèl karanja, and wood-apple.’ S. Tatwa Kaumudi. So, according to Cudworth, the Italic philosophers maintained that the forms and qualities of bodies were only different modifications of primary matter. “The same numerical matter,” he observes, “differently modified, causing different phantasms in us, which are therefore vulgarly supposed to be forms and qualities in the things, as when the same water is successively changed and transformed into vapour, snow, hail, and ice.” Intellect. System, III. 426.

It may be doubted if the latter portion of the verse should not be

* परिषालम्बावत्व बिष्णुयाना पारिषुभ्य क्षणमविनिः।
† यथा
वारिद्वृक्षमुदगमेक्ककसमय तत्तत्तविचक्रणानासाधतारिकेनात्लीवित्व
चिरविल्वामलक कुपित्यफलसत्या परिषेतमयि मधुरामुलिक्रमुक्तुरुपाय
तया विकल्यते।
preferably rendered, 'By modification, like water, according to the receptacle, or subject, of the qualities *.' Such is evidently the sense in which the S. Bhāshya understands it, and such appears to be that of the above illustration; the simple water being modified, as sweet, sour, &c., according to the tree by which it is absorbed, and the fruit of which it constitutes the juice. So certain objects are fitted for certain qualities; as the gods for goodness, men for foulness, animals for darkness; and nature is modified in them accordingly; that quality predominating which is conformable to the receptacle: the question here being, not the origin of things, but of their different properties. Vāchespāti, however, seems to make the diversity of objects depend upon the qualities, not the difference of qualities upon the subject; explaining the phrase prati gūnasraya vishēhāt, 'The difference which is produced by the recipience of each several quality; thence, &c.†' The Chandrika has the same explanation, adding, 'Diversity is from diversity (different ratio) of qualities ‡.' There is no incompatibility, indeed, in the two views of the meaning of the text, as the variety of things depends upon the difference or disproportion of the three primary qualities, whether those qualities modify, or be modified by, the subject to which they belong: in either case the variety is not a different thing, it is only a modification of the same thing, pradhāna.

XVII.

Since the assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use; since the converse of that which has the three qualities, with other properties (before mentioned), must exist; since there must be superintendence; since there must be one to enjoy; since there is a tendency to abstraction; therefore, soul is.

* प्रतिप्रतिगुणाध्रविशेषात् | † एकेकगुणाध्रवेश यो विशेषत्व
स्मात् | ‡ गुणविशेषाःप्रथमस्मां
BHÁSHYA.

As it is said, "Liberation is obtained by discriminative knowledge of discrete and undiscrete principles;" and whereas the undiscrete has been shewn to be distinct from the discrete by five arguments (ver. 9), so soul being, like the undiscrete principle, subtile (not cognizable by the senses), its existence is now established by inference. Soul is.—Why? Because the assemblage of objects is for another's use.—The assemblage of intellect and the rest is for the use of soul: this is inferred from the irrationality (of nature and its effects), like a bed. In like manner as a bed, which is an assemblage of bedding, props, cords, cotton, coverlid, and pillows, is for another's use, not for its own; and its several component parts render no mutual service; thence it is concluded that there is a man who sleeps upon the bed, and for whose use it was made: so this body, which is an assemblage of the five elements, is for another's use; or, there is soul, for whose enjoyment this enjoyable body, consisting of an aggregate of intellect and the rest, has been produced.

Again, soul is, because the reverse of that which has the three qualities has been declared: as it was stated in a former verse (11), 'A discrete principle has the three qualities, is indiscriminate, objective, &c.;' and it is added, "Soul is in these respects the reverse."

Again, soul is, because there must be superintendence.—As a charioteer guides a chariot drawn by horses able to curvet, to prance, to gallop, so the soul guides the body: as it is said in the Shashthi Tantra, "Nature, directed by soul, proceeds."

Soul is, because there must be an enjoyer.—In like manner as there must be some one to partake of food flavoured with sweet, sour, salt, pungent, bitter, and astringent flavours, so, as there is no capability of fruition in intellect and the other products of nature, there must be soul, by which this body is to be enjoyed.

Again, soul is, because there is a tendency to abstraction.—Kaivalya is the abstract noun, derived from kevala, 'sole, only'—for, on account of, that (abstraction); the practice of it: from the exercise of (or tendency to) abstraction (for the sake of its own separation or detachment) it is
inferred that soul is. That is, Every one, whether wise or unwise, equally desires imperishable release from succession of worldly existence.

It is next to be determined whether this soul be but one superintendant over all bodies, like the string that supports all the gems of a necklace; or whether there be many souls presiding severally over individual bodies.

COMMENT.

Arguments for the existence of soul as a distinct principle are here adduced.

The existence of soul is established by inference: a bed implies a sleeper; nature, made up of its effects, is for the production of pain, pleasure, and insensibility, of which soul alone is conscious*. But admitting that the assemblage is for the benefit of another, why should that other be soul? because soul is not a similar aggregate; it is not made up of qualities and the like, but is the reverse of nature in these respects, as was explained in verse 11: or, as the commentator on the Sūtra, Sanhata parārthatwāt†, observes, because the property of pain or pleasure, which is identical with body, must be different from that which enjoys the one, or suffers the other. Because there must be an enjoyer.—The existence of an enjoyer implies the existence of both pleasure and pain; election between which cannot be made by intellect and the rest, which are inseparable from them, and it must be the act of something else, which is soul. ‘Intelect and the rest are the things to be used (bhogya) or perceived (drisya), and consequently imply one who perceives‡.’ S. Tatwa Kaumudi.

The term kaivalya, rendered ‘abstraction,’ signifies ‘detachment from the world.’ or, as it is explained, ‘absolute suppression of the three kinds of pain, as a property of sacred writ, holy sages, and inspired teachers or prophets. It must therefore be something different from intellect and the

*[सुभुःसमेहात्मकत्या व्यक्ताद्यः सर्वं संधाता:।] [सहतपरार्थ लात्।]  
†[भोग्या हस्या बुझाद्यो न च द्रष्टारमन्तरिण] हर्षता युक्ता  
†[तेषां तस्माददृष्टा हर्षबुझात्तिरिणः स चामिति।]

[The * and † indicate footnotes which are not included in this transcription.]
rest, which are the same thing as pain, and cannot effect a separation from their own essence." * S. Tatwa Kauśmūdi. So Vijnāna Bhikṣu explains kaivalya, 'absolute extirpation of pain.'

The arguments in the text for the existence of soul are so many original aphorisms of Kapila; aś, 1. 'Soul is distinct from body, &c.†' 2. 'From an aggregate being for another's use॥' 3. 'From (the properties of) soul being the converse of the three qualities, &c.॥' 4. 'From superintendence॥' 5. 'From the tendency to abstraction॥' The commentator notices a different reading of the last Sūtra 'From nature not being competent to abstraction; but this he considers erroneous ††. The fifth book of the S. Pravachana contains other Sūtras affirmative of the separate existence of soul.

XVIII.

Since birth, death, and the instruments of life are allotted severally; since occupations are not at once universal; and since qualities affect variously; multitude of souls is demonstrated.

BHĀSHYA.

Life and death, and the instruments (of life) — From the several allotment of these: this is the meaning of the text. Thus, if there was but one soul,

* शत्राण्यां महिपाण्यां दिशतोचनाणां च। कैवल्यं वायुविनिक्तः कन्य यमशाक्तिः न वृद्धायीमां सम्भवति ते हि दुःखास्मात् रथं स्वाभाविक मोक्षयितुं शक्यने। † दुःखान्तोख्तः। †† शरीरादिशतिरिक्तः पुनान्॥ संहतपरार्थिव। ॥ चिरगुणादिविपिनयात्। ॥ अधि शानाशीति। ॥ ॥ कैवल्यं प्रवृत्तिः। ॥ ॥ अधि कैवल्यं प्रकृति। ॥ इति मूचपातः प्रामादिरक्तादुप्रेरणार्यस्मिन्।
then when one was born, all would be born; when one died, all would die; if there was any defect in the vital instruments of one, such as deafness, blindness, dumbness, mutilation, or lameness, then all would be blind, deaf, dumb, maimed, and halt: but this is not the case; and therefore, from the several apportionment of death, birth, and instruments of life, multiplicity of soul is demonstrated. *Since occupations are not at once universal.*—Yugapat means, ‘at one time.’ Not at once; or, at one time. Occupation: as engaging in acts of virtue and the like are not observed to occur at one moment; but some are busy with virtuous, others with vicious, actions; some cultivate indifference to the world, and some acquire true wisdom: therefore, from the non-contemporaneousness of occupation, multitude of souls is concluded. Also, *since qualities affect variously.*—From the contrary nature of the qualities multitude of souls is proved; as, in birth in general, one endowed with the quality of goodness is happy; another with that of foulness is wretched; and a third having that of darkness is apathetic: hence, therefore, multitude of souls is proved.

Soul is not agent: this is next declared.

**COMMENT.**

The multitudinous existence of soul, or the individual incorporation of soul in different bodies, is here maintained.

Birth is defined to be the association of soul with body; death, its detachment: soul being always existent, and not in itself subject to birth or death; as in the *Śr̥vaṇabhaṭṭa Pravacana Bhāṣya*:* also the *Ś. Tatwa Kaumudi:* ‘Life is the combination of soul with the pains incident to body, &c.; not any modification of soul. Death is the abandonment of those bodies, &c.; not the destruction of soul †.’ The instruments of life are

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* जन्मसमयं चार नोत्पत्तिचिन्तनां धन्मनस्तन्त्राभावात्
† देहदिनौ
यादववेदनामि: पुरुषस्यस्बस्यो जन्म न तु पुरुषस्यपरिरङ्गम:।
तेवादेव
देहादीनां परित्यागो मरणं न बल्मीवो बिनाशः।

†
the organs of perception and action, with egotism and intellect. ‘Allot-
ment,’ *niyama*, properly ‘rule, regulation,’ is explained by *vyavasthā*,
which may import ‘distribution;’ as, ‘The distribution is in regard to dif-
f erent souls in several bodies*:* so also the Sūtra of *Kapila*; ‘From the
distribution of life, &c. follows the multitudinousness of soul †.’ The term
is especially understood, however, of the distribution which is laid down
by religious and legal authorities, ‘a prescribed distribution or allotment,’
as the commentator on the Sūtra observes, after stating, ‘The virtuous
man is happy in heaven,’ &c. (see p. 48); ‘Souls are many, as otherwise
there would not be the occurrence of such division, or appointment of
conditions, as is laid down in the Vēda and the law ‡.’ If soul were one,
all the accidents, vicissitudes, and interests of existence would simulta-
neously affect all individuals.

But though manifold, as individualized, this individual soul is one and
unchanged, through all its migrations into various forms, until its final
liberation. It is the disguise which is changed, not that which wears it,
as has been before explained (p. 48).

The multiplied existence of soul is in especial contradiction to the
document of the Vēdāntis, of the universality of one supreme soul of the
world, from which all human souls are derived, as in such texts as this;
‘One only existent soul is distributed in all beings; it is beheld collect-
ively or dispersedly, like the reflection of the moon in still or troubled
water. Soul, eternal, omnipresent, undisturbed, pure, one, is multiplied
by the power of delusion, not of its own nature ||.’ This is undoubtedly
the doctrine of the Vēdas, and the Sānkhyā teachers, who profess to
receive those works as authority, are obliged to interpret the texts

* प्रतिक्षेपं पुरुषमेदेभवति यवस्था। † जन्मादियवस्थातः पुरुष
बहुः। ‡ इवादेः भूतिस्मृतियवस्थाया विभागस्यान्यानुपपत्त्वा पुरुषा
बहुः। \| एकं एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते यवस्थितः। एकः वहुः
चैव हस्यं जन्मसन्निष्ठः। नियः सहस्राभिः कृष्टिः दीपवः।
एकः स भिन्नते शक्त्या माया न स्वभावात्।
unfavourable to their dogmas in a peculiar manner. Thus the Sūtra of Kapila asserts, ‘There is no contradiction (to the doctrine of many souls) in the unity of the Vēdas, from its reference to the comprehensiveness of genus*;’ that is, Soul, considered as genus, is but one; its nature and properties are common to all souls, individualized and manifold in connection with individual aggregates of the products of nature. ‘Genus here means community, unity of nature; such is the purport of the unity of the Vēdas; not indivisibility, from the absence of any motive (for its continuing undivided). This is the meaning of the Sūtra †.’ The subject is discussed at considerable length by Viñāna Bhikshu; but, notwithstanding his arguments, it is clear that the Sānkhya doctrine is contradictory to that of the Vēdas.

The doctrines of those Grecian philosophers, who maintained the immateriality and eternity of soul, conformed to that of the Vēdas. As far as we are able to learn of the doctrines of Pythagoras, he taught that human souls were portions of one supreme soul. Plato held the souls of men to be emanations from God, through the soul of the world. Souls and bodies were both portions of the τὸ ζένων, the ‘one existent,’ of the Stoics; and even Aristotle appears to have conceived the human soul to be an intellectual energy, derived from an eternal intelligence. Cudworth asserts that none of the ancient philosophers maintained the Sānkhya notion of the eternity of individual souls. ‘It doth not follow,” he remarks, “because they held souls to be ingenerable, that therefore they supposed souls to have existed from all eternity of themselves unmade. This was never asserted by theist or atheist. The philosophic theists, who maintained aeternitatem animorum, did, notwithstanding, assert their essential dependence upon the Deity, like that of the lights upon the sun, as if they were a kind of eternal effulgency, emanation, or eradication, from an eternal Sun.” Intell. Syst. III. 429.
XIX.

And from that contrast (before set forth) it follows, that soul is witness, solitary, bystander, spectator, and passive.

BHÁSHYA.

And from that contrast: the contrast of the possession of the three qualities. Contrast: reverse. Soul is void of qualities, is discriminative, enjoyer, &c. The contrast is that presented by these attributes of soul; and thence, the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness being agents (active), it follows that soul is (passive) witness. This sentence is syntactically connected with the preceding, regarding the multitudinousness of soul. The qualities, as agents, act; a witness neither acts nor desists from action. Again, abstraction (detachment) is an attribute (of soul); the property of being sole is detachment or abstraction, difference or distinctness (from all others); that is, it is distinct, or separate, from the three qualities. Next, being a bystander (is an attribute of soul): the condition of a middle man (or looker-on, or neutral). Soul is a bystander, like a wandering mendicant: as a vagrant ascetic is lonely and unconcerned, whilst the villagers are busily engaged in agriculture, so soul does not act where the qualities are present. Hence also proceed the properties of being a spectator and passive. From being a bystander, soul is a spectator, and is not a performer of those acts (which it contemplates). The three qualities, goodness, foulness, and darkness, engage in acts in the relation of agent and act; not soul: and in this manner the existence of soul is demonstrated.

But if soul is a non-agent, how does it exercise volition? as, I will practise virtue, I will not commit crime: here soul must be the agent; for if soul is not the agent (then these purposes cannot be entertained). This is a dilemma: to explain which it is said—

COMMENT.

In the preceding verse it was stated that soul was many; in this, its other attributes are enumerated.
The conjunction cha, in the term tasmāt-cha, connects the sentence with the preceding, or with bahutvam, ‘multitudinousness.’ The contrast alluded to is that intimated in ver. 14, and is this: Soul has not the three qualities, it is discriminative, it is perceptive, it is specific, it is rational, it is unprolific; being the reverse, in these respects, of nature and its effects. Not being an object of sense, but perciipient of such objects, it observes and testifies to the existence of nature and its products, like an evidence in a lawsuit being plaintiff and defendant. ‘That which is irrational cannot observe, and that to which an object is apparent is a witness.’ Solitariness is ‘exemption from the three kinds of pain; or, in fact, total abstraction from the world: this is the necessary consequence of being devoid of the three qualities, which are essentially the same with pleasure, pain, and dulness; and from them, therefore, soul is equally free. From the same cause, absence of qualities and insusceptibility of agreeable or disagreeable emotions, proceeds the next property of soul, that of being a bystander; madhyastha, ‘neutral, indifferent, unconcerned;’ udāśīna, ‘neither rejoicing in pleasure, nor sorrowing in pain.’ Qualities, and particularly foulness, are indispensable to activity; and being without them, soul is consequently inert: the same is considered to be also the necessary result of its being ‘discriminative and unprolific, or unproductive.’ VIJÑĀNA BHĪKṢU restricts the term sīkṣī, ‘witness,’ to the sense of ‘ beholder,’ distinguishing it from the other term, to which such a translation is more applicable, draśtri, as importing one who has the object near to, or before, his eyes; the latter implies seeing in general: hence he says, ‘Soul witnesses or contemplates buddhi (intellect), and sees the other principles.’

* वैतनोहि द्रष्टा भवति नागता: साश्री च दर्शितविषयो भवति ।
† ज्ञाविनिरकः लंचयाभावः कैवल्यं ।
‡ विवेकिवादप्रमसवपरमेयः कर्तंति सिद्ध ।
 वुड्डिर्व साश्री पुरूषोन्नेषां तु द्रष्टृमात्रमिति ।
XX.

Therefore, by reason of union with it, insensible body seems sensible; and though the qualities be active, the stranger (soul) appears as the agent.

BHÁSHYA.

Here soul is said to be possessed of sensation; and in connection with it, intellect and the other predicates of nature assuming the appearance of sense seem sentient: as in life, a jar with cold water appears to be cold, with warm water seems to be warm; so intellect and the rest, from union with it, with soul, seem sensible. But the qualities perform the active application (of sense), not the soul: for although in common it is said, soul is the doer, the goer, yet soul is not the agent. How so? Though the qualities be active, (soul) the stranger appears as the agent. There being activity of the qualities, soul, which is indifferent, or inactive, appears as if it was the agent; which it is not. Here is an illustration: as a man who is not a thief, being taken up along with thieves, is suspected to be a thief also; so soul, being connected with the three active qualities, is supposed, though inert, to be active also.

In this manner the distinction of the perceptible, imperceptible, and thinking principles (ver. 2. p. 13) has been explained; from the discrimination of which liberation is obtained. It is next expounded why the union of the two (chief) principles, nature and soul, takes place.

COMMENT.

It is here taught that the sentient faculty resides in soul, and not, as it appears to do, in the products of nature; and that activity resides in the qualities, not, as it appears to do, in soul.

The term chétaná, from chit, 'to reflect,' means in general 'reason, intelligence;' but it is here applied to the possession or exercise of every faculty proper to a sentient and thinking being. It is the attribute of soul only, as will be more distinctly made clear when the functions of the senses, of consciousness, and intellect are explained, and they are shewn
to be merely the vehicles or instruments through which ideas and notions are conveyed. They seem, however, to act independently, but this is merely from their union with, or, more correctly, proximity to, soul; *samyoga* being explained by the commentators to mean here merely *sannidhāna*, 'approximation.' In like manner, soul, which is contemplative, not active, mover, though itself unmoved, appears to be active through a similar contiguity. 'I am sentient; wishing to do, I do: here a common origin or subject of action and reflection is apprehended*.' *S. Tatwa Kaumudi.* But this is an error, as the site or subject of action and reflection is distinct †. The term *linga* in the first line is explained to denote *mahat* and the subtle products of *pradhāna*. *Udāśīna*, 'indifferent,' is said also to mean 'inert ‡.'

But it appears that there are passages in the Védas and in the law-books which attribute agency to soul, and knowledge to *buddhi* ||: and to meet this is supposed to be the purpose of the aphorism, 'Agency from affection, intelligence from propinquity §;' that is, 'The apparent agency of soul is from the affection (or operation) of *buddhi*; the apparent intelligence of *buddhi* (understanding) is from the proximity of soul; neither is actual. Their mutual transfer of properties is like that of fire and iron in a heated bar, or of the sun and water, in the reflected rays of the former from the latter §.' *S. Prav. S.* In like manner the *S. Chandrikā* exemplifies the doctrine by reference to *buddhi*, the organ of the understanding; and furnishes also an example of the sense in which चेतुनाः.

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* चेत्तोऽह चिकिष्ण दिन्त्वित्त तृत्तिचैतत्त्वयोः समस्मायधिकरणमनु
  भवसिद्य। † यत्शैतन्यक्षेत्रे भिन्नाधिकरणे युक्तिः सिंधे तस्मानानि
  रित। ‡ अदातात्त्वमक्षेत्रे। || पुरुषस्य कङ्खूना बुद्धरुपे चैतन्यं च युक्ति
  स्मृतयह्यध्यमानं। § उपरागात् कङ्खून सिद्धान्तियात्। " पुरुषस्य
  यत् कङ्खूं तदद्यपरागात् बुद्धेश्या चित्ता सा पुरुषस्वाभिधाद्यादि एतदभयं
  न वास्तवमित्वायः। यथागण्यथार्थं वा जत्त्वाविभयं: परस्परं संयोगवि
  जेस्ताः परस्परेरर्धमिष्यवहः।
intelligence,' is to be understood: 'Thence the effect (of pradhána), the category buddhi, which is unintelligent, is as it were intelligent, (seems to be that which says) I know, becomes as it were endowed with knowledge *:' that is, it is not the understanding, but soul, that knows. This, however, applies equally to all the other products of nature, as far as to the subtle rudiments, whether individually considered, or as composing subtle body †. They are all non-sentient, or irrational and inert. Their activity depends on combination with the qualities; their sentient power on proximity to soul: and the conjoint presence of these two properties leads to the erroneous belief that soul is agent, as well as sentient.

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XXI.

For the soul's contemplation of nature, and for its abstraction, the union of both takes place, as of the halt and blind. By that union a creation is framed.

BHÁSHYA.

The union of soul with nature is for its contemplation (of nature); that is, soul contemplates nature (in the state of) intellect and the other effects to the gross elements inclusive. For that object is the union of nature with soul; and the same union, which is also for the abstraction (of the latter), is like the association of the halt and blind. As, a lame man and a blind man, deserted by their fellow-travellers, who in making their way with difficulty through a forest had been dispersed by robbers, happening to encounter each other, and entering into conversation so as to inspire mutual confidence, agreed to divide between them the duties of walking and of seeing; accordingly the lame man was mounted on the

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* तस्मादचेतनमध्ये लिङ्गमुखितार्थ चेतनाविद्वत्ज्ञानामेति ज्ञानवस्त्रवति। † लिङ्गमहदाति मूलसमर्पणलं।
blind man’s shoulders, and was thus carried on his journey, whilst the blind man was enabled to pursue his route by the directions of his companion. In the same manner the faculty of seeing is in soul, not that of moving; it is like the lame man: the faculty of moving, but not of seeing, is in nature; which resembles, therefore, the blind man. Further, as a separation takes place between the lame man and the blind man, when their mutual object is accomplished, and they have reached their journey’s end, so nature, having effected the liberation of soul, ceases to act; and soul, having contemplated nature, obtains abstractedness; and consequently, their respective purposes being effected, the connexion between them is dissolved.

Again, By that, by that union, a creation is framed.—As the birth of a child proceeds from the union of male and female, so the production of creation results from the connection of nature and soul.

The text next describes the particulars of all the products of nature.

COMMENT.

The object of the union of soul and nature, or the final liberation of the former by its knowledge of the latter, is here explained.

‘Contemplation,’ darśana, is considered to comprise ‘fruition,’ bhoga. As nature is devoid of sensibility and reflection, it can neither enjoy nor observe; and its existence would be therefore without an object, unless there were some other one capable both of observation and fruition*. This other one is soul. But, again, as pain is inseparable from nature, so enjoyed soul desires, after a season, to be loosed from the combination; and this detachment, or the liberation of purified soul, necessarily requires some one from which to be liberated: that some one is nature: consequently, for the fulfilment of their respective ends—the fruition of nature, and liberation of soul—their mutual cooperation and combination are essential. ‘Abstraction,’ kaivalya, is explained by Vāchespati, ‘The cause of the attribution of separation to purified soul, which cannot be

* भोग्यं प्रधानं भोजनं क्रमारम्यन्तरेण न सम्भवति।

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without previous union with nature*.

But these results cannot be attained without the evolution of the products of nature, and consequently they assume their several developments, or, in other words, *a creation is framed*; as it is only in the state of discrete principles that nature is to be contemplated by soul, and it is only by the exact appreciation of the same, and of their source, that soul can detach itself from nature. For both purposes, therefore, the world must exist, as developed from its material cause.

There are passages in the Védas, however, attributing creation to soul; as, ‘That was from it—From this soul was ether produced †.’ To this it is replied, that all that is herein intended is the attribution of the act of the inferior, or nature, to the superior, soul: ‘As in the world it is said that a king triumphs or is defeated, when it is not he, but his army, that suffers a defeat or achieves a victory ‡.’ _S. Prav. Sára._

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**XXII.**

From nature issues the great one; thence egotism; and from this the sixteenfold set: from five among the sixteen proceed five elements.

**BHÁSHYA.**

Nature (_prakriti_) is also termed ‘the chief one’ (_pradhána_), ‘the supreme’ (_brahme_), ‘the undistinguished’ (_avyaktam_), ‘the multi-comprehending’ (_bahudhániká_) and _máyá_. Such are its synonyms. From that which is devoid of characteristic attributes, or from (crude) nature, the great one (_mahat_) is produced: this is also termed ‘intellect’ (_buddhi_); it is also called _ásuri_, or ‘demoniac’; _mati_, or ‘understanding’; ‘notoriety’

* सत्पुस्वायत्तायाः सत्पुस्वायत्तायाः प्रथम समस्याः समस्याः न च सत्पुस्वायत्तायायाः प्रथम समस्याः समस्याः।
† तत् तत्तसाक्षा एतस्मात्साधन्यो ज्ञात्मकं सम्बूतं।
‡ मथा लोको दश्यं निरुपितं वर्त्तमानं जयपराज्यं राज्यं उपचयं।
(khyáti), 'knowledge' (jnána), 'wisdom' (prajná). From thence proceeds egotism, also called 'the origin of the elements,' &c. (bhútádi), 'the luminous' (taijasa), 'the modified' (vaikrita), 'conscience' (abhimána). From this the sixteenfold set.—From this, from egotism, the class of sixteen is derived. This consists of the five subtle elements, or the archetypes of sound, touch, form, flavour, and odour: the synonyms of tan-mátra are all words denoting 'subtle' (sukshma): also the eleven organs, the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue, the nose, which are the five organs of perception; the voice, the hand, the foot, and the organs of excretion and generation, which are the five organs of action; and, besides these, mind, making the eleventh, and being an organ of both action and sensation. These constitute the class of sixteen produced from egotism. From five among the sixteen.—From the five subtle elements proceed the five gross elements: as it is said, "From the archetype sound, ether is produced; from touch, air; from form, light (or fire); from flavour, water; from odour, earth: and thus from these five rudiments the five gross elements proceed." As also it is said, "From discriminative knowledge of perceptible and imperceptible principles and the thinking soul (see ver. 2) liberation is obtained." Now, therefore, intellect and the rest, to the gross elements inclusive, forming twenty-three categories, have been specified (in the text); the undiscrete principle has been described (see ver. 15, 16); and soul has been explained (ver. 18, 19); and these constitute the twenty-five tatwas (physical and metaphysical categories of the Sánkhya system of philosophy). He who knows the universe to be composed of these principles—called tatwas, from the abstract of tad, 'that,' implying the abstract existence of those principles—as it is said, "He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever order of life he may have entered, and whether he wear braided hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven, he is liberated: of this there is no doubt." (See p. 1.) The twenty-five categories are, nature, soul, intellect, egotism, the five subtle (or rudimental) elements, the eleven organs of sensation and of action, and the five gross elements.

It is stated in this stanza, from nature issues the great one. What is meant by that great one is next defined.
COMMENT.

The categories of the Sāṇkhya system have been before alluded to (ver. 3. p. 16), in explanation of their mutual relations, and of the properties which they have in common, or by which they are discriminated from one another; but we have them here enumerated in the order of their production, as prefatory to a detailed description of them and of their functions contained in the following stanzas.

The generic term for the twenty-five principles, tattva, or as usually and with equal correctness written tatwa, is explained by Gaurapāda to mean 'the abstract existence,' astitwa*, ोजिया, essentia, of tat†, that; that thing, which is the object of philosophical investigation, or which has a real existence, and must be known. The more common etymology, tat, 'that,' and twam, 'thou,' belongs to the Vēdānta system; as in the Mahāvākyā, tat-twam asi, 'that (supreme soul) thou art,' implies the identity of universal and individualized spirit.

We have in the scholia of Gaurapāda on this stanza some synonomyes of nature and the two first principles, the analysis of which elucidates the ideas entertained of them by the Sāṇkhyas. The succeeding stanzas will afford an opportunity of adverting to the terms used for intellect and egotism, and we may here confine the inquiry to the synonomyes of nature, or matter.

Prakriti, as has been previously mentioned (p. 17), intimates, that which precedes, or is prior to, making; that which is not made from any thing else. It is also used relatively, to signify that which is the source from which a product is derived; so that mahat is the prakriti of akankāra, &c. (see p. 18). Here, however, our business is with the primary source of all material products, and the term indicates merely that which preceded (pra) production (kriti); what that may have been is left wholly undefined or implied by the particular term. The same may be said of it agreeably to another etymology given in the Sāṇkhya Sūra, where

* असिविन्व | † तत् |
pra is interpreted by prakrīśa, ‘principal, chief, best,’ analogously to its other denomination, pradhāna, ‘the chief.’ Pradhāna is derived from pra, ‘principal,’ and dhā, ‘to hold;’ ‘that in which all generated effect is comprehended.’ The next synonyme, avyakta, ‘the unseparated, the undistinguished, the unperceived,’ has been also previously noticed (p. 41) as derived from anja, ‘to make clear,’ with vi, separative preposition, and the negative a prefixed: the term is of as frequent occurrence as either of the preceding, and is constantly used as a synonyme of prakriti in the Puranas and in Manu. Brahme, which is to be carefully distinguished from Brahmad, the personified creative power, is ordinarily applied either to the Vedas or supreme spirit, and is an uncommon synonyme of prakriti; but as derived from vriha, ‘to increase,’ it implies the first principle of which the expansion becomes all perceptible objects. Bahudhānaka is derived, like pradhat, from dhā, ‘to hold;’ dhānaka, ‘the holder’ or ‘comprehender’ of bahu, ‘much,’ of all things. Māyā, in its ordinary sense of ‘illusion,’ is applied to prakriti, not by the Sānkhyas, for they maintain the reality of existing things, but by the Vedāntis and Pauranikas, who regard creation as a delusion or as a sport of the Creator: it is derived from the root mā, ‘to measure,’ and may here perhaps imply either ‘comprehension,’ like pradhat, or ‘extension.’ There is no explanation of the term by any of the Scholiasts. Vijnāna Bhikshu quotes the Vedas to shew that it is synonymous with prakriti. In the Sāṅkhya Sāra we have other synonymes, as, sakti, ‘power,’ bāras; ajā, ‘the unborn, the unproduced;’ tamas, ‘darkness;’ and avidyā, ‘ignorance.’

Now what is to be considered as the sense of these words? By what equivalent is prakriti to be best rendered? Professor Lassen translates it procreatrix, but this seems to convey too much the idea of personality, and therefore, although very well agreeing with the original term as used by the Pauraniks, where prakriti is commonly personified, yet it can
scarcely be considered as indicative of that which not only produces, but is the thing produced, being at once the origin and substance of all things. Mr. Colebrooke has rendered the term sometimes by 'nature,' and sometimes by 'matter:' the former expresses both the parent and the progeny, and agrees in being also the constant subject of prosopopeia. It is therefore preferable to perhaps any synonyme that the English language can offer. At the same time the correct equivalent is 'matter,' materia, quasi mater, 'the substance and source of material things;' not, however, crude, visible, or divisible matter, but that first principle of the Pythagoreans and Platonists, and of Aristotle, which having neither parts, nor form, nor sense, nor quantity, nor any of the properties of body, was yet the one universal, incorporeal, invisible substance from which all bodies were derived. Διὸ δι τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος ὅρατοι καὶ πάντως αἰσθητοῦ μνημάτα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν μὴν μὴν ἄρα μὴν μὴν πῦρ μὴν ὕδωρ λέγομεν, μὴν ὅσα ἐκ τούτων μὴν ἕξ ὅν ταῦτα γέγονεν. ἄλλα ἀνόρατον εἴδος τι καὶ ἀμορφὸν πανδεχιέτο. Timaeus. See also the Physics, b. III. c. 6. That we are to understand this of the prakriti of the Sāṅkhya is evident from the meaning of its several appellations. It is also said by Vijnāna Bhikhu, that 'the world is merely modification of form, of which prakriti is the materiality *.' 'It is not individual or formal, but universal material †.' S. Pr. Bhāskya. Its invisibility is, as we have seen (ver.8. p.29), attributed, not to its non-existence, but to its subtilty (saukshmya). Prakriti is also defined 'the equilibrium of the three qualities ‡;' and here it differs from the subject matter of Aristotle in having qualities. These qualities, however, whilst prakriti is yet unevolved, neutralize each other, and are scarcely qualities as regards primary nature, because their loss of equilibrium, or their activity, is concurrent with the discontinuance of prakriti as separate from its products. So far, however, prakriti may be considered as different from the brute matter of the ancient physiologists, that it produces

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* परिशास्क्यं जगद्यादानकथं तु प्रकृति:। † पारिष्ठ्रं न सबीपादान—सबीपादान प्रथां न परिष्ठ्रं आपकिमित्यथः। ‡ चि गुणसाम्यं।
products of its own energy or power for a special cause, and is therefore more akin to the “plastic nature that acts, ἔνεκα τοῦ, for the sake of something.” In the Sāṅkhya system, however, such nature is not distinct from matter itself, whilst it appears to be a different principle in the writings of the Greek philosophers, although not always very intelligibly described; for, as Cudworth observes of Aristotle, “he nowhere declares of this nature of his, whether it be corporeal or incorporeal, substantial or accidental.” To conclude, we are to understand of the prakṛiti of the Śāṅkhya, primary, subtile, universal substance, undergoing modification through its own energy, and for a special motive, by which it is manifest as individual and formal substance, varied according to the predominance of qualities, which are equipoised and inert in the parent, and unequal and active in the progeny.

XXIII.

Ascertainment is intellect. Virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power are its faculties, partaking of goodness. Those partaking of darkness are the reverse.

Bhāshya.

The definition of intellect is ascertainment. Ascertaining (discerning, determining) is ascertainment: as in the seed the future germinating shoot is contained, so is determination (in intellect). This is a jar, this is cloth: that intellect which will so determine is so defined. This intellect has eight members, according to the twofold affection of goodness and darkness. The first kind, or intellect, partaking of goodness, is of four kinds, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power. Virtue comprises humanity, benevolence, and acts of restraint (yama) and of obligation (niyama). The former are said in the Pātanjala to be, restraint of cruelty, of falsehood, of dishonesty, of incontinence, and of avarice: the latter are the obligations of purification, contentment, religious austerity, sacred study, and worship of God. Knowledge has for its synonyms, manifestation, cer-
tainty, light. It is of two kinds, external and internal. The former is (knowledge of) the Védas and their six subordinate branches, recitation, ritual, grammar, glossary, prosody, and astronomy; also (of) the puránas, and of logic, theology, and law. Internal knowledge is that of nature and soul, or (the discrimination that) this is nature, the equipoised condition of goodness, foulness, and darkness: this is soul, perfect, devoid of qualities, pervading, and sentient. By external knowledge worldly distinction or admiration is acquired; by internal knowledge, liberation. Dispassion is also of two kinds, external and internal. The former is the indifference of one who contemns sensible objects from observing their defects, or the trouble of acquiring and preserving them; the inconvenience of attachment to them; their liability to decay; and the injustice they cause. The latter is the indifference of one who is desirous of liberation, and looks upon nature as if it was a piece of witchcraft or a dream. Power is the abstract property of a superior (or divine) being: it is eightfold, (the capacity of) minuteness, magnitude, heaviness, lightness, reach, gratification of will, dominion, subjugation, and irresistible purpose. Atomic existence is meant by 'minuteness;' so that a person becoming atomically subtile or minute may traverse the world: 'magnitude' is said of one who may make himself a giant: 'lightness' is having limbs like the fibres of the lotus stalk, or like cotton, so as to be able to stand upon the tops of the filaments of a flower: 'reach' is attainment of a desired object by going to the place where it is situated, wherever that may be: 'gratification of will' is obtaining or effecting whatever is desired: 'dominion' is governing the three worlds, as a king: 'subjugation' is having all things subject: 'irresistible purpose' is compelling the site, rest, and motion of all things, from Brahmá to a block, agreeably to the will of the person endowed with this faculty. These are the four properties of intellect which soul obtains when the qualities of foulness and darkness are overcome by that of goodness.

But those partaking of darkness are the reverse.—When intellect is influenced by the quality of darkness, then its four properties are the reverse of the above; they are, vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. In this manner intellect having eight members, as it is affected by goodness or
foulness, is produced from the undiscrete principle having the three qualities.

Intelect has thus been explained. Egotism is next described.

**COMMENT.**

The first product of nature, or intellect, is here described by its properties.

Intelect (buddhi) is adhyavasāya*. It is not easy to offer a satisfactory equivalent for this word, nor to understand precisely what is meant by it. In the Amera Kosha it occurs as a synonyme of utsāha†, 'effort, strenuous and continued effort, perseverance;' according to Rāmārama, 'possessing great power‡.' He derives it from sho antakarmmani||, 'finishing, making end of,' with adhi§, 'over,' and ava¶, 'off;' that is, entirely or absolutely ending or effecting; as in the Hitopadēsa: 'The precepts of knowledge confer not the least benefit on one who is afraid of exertion: of what use is a lamp to a blind man, though it be within his reach**.' In the Mitākshara, utsāha is explained, 'Effort (or perseverance) in the performance of acts accomplishing the objects of man††.' In the Bhatti Kāvyā we have the word used in the sense of 'wish, purpose, determination:' 'The bird said to the monkeys, You have not studied the law, if at such a season you wish (or resolve) to die‡‡.'

In a preceding passage (ver. 5) the phrase prati vishaya adhyavasāya ||, 'ascertaintment of several objects,' was given as the definition of drishta,
'perception;' and the explanation of the Scholiast, *buddhiyāpāra jñānam*,*
'knowledge, which is the exercise of the intellectual faculty,' was cited
(p. 23). The same commentator, *Vāchespāti*, here defines it, 'the specific
function of intellect, not differing from intellect itself;' or, to quote the pas-
sage at length, 'Ascertainment is intellect, from the identity of the act and
the agent, as will be explained. Every one who engages in any matter first
observes, or considers; he next reflects, it is I who am concerned in this;
and then determines, this is to be done by me; thence he proceeds to act:
this is familiar to every one. Thence this ascertainment that such act is
to be done is the determination of intellect, which is as it were endowed
with reason, from the proximity of the sentient principle. This is the
specific function of intellect, not differing from intellect itself; and the
definition of intellect is ascertainment, as that comprehends both its
generic and specific distinctions†.'

The explanation of the *S. Chandrika* is to the same effect: 'Adhya-
vasāya is a sort of modified condition of intellect, as flame is of a lamp;
it is certainty in this form, such an act is to be done by me‡.'

These explanations, however, would rather seem to intimate intention,
or volition, or, at least, the determination to act after reflection; but the
determination or conclusion that such an act should be done, does not
necessarily signify that it shall be done: it is only the conclusion or
ascertainment of its fitness. This function of the intellect, also, is not
indispensably connected with the notion of will; as in the example given

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* *buddhiyāpāra jñānam*.
† *Adhyavasāya* is a sort of modified condition of intellect, as flame is of a lamp; it is certainty in this form, such an act is to be done by me.
‡ These explanations, however, would rather seem to intimate intention, or volition, or, at least, the determination to act after reflection; but the determination or conclusion that such an act should be done, does not necessarily signify that it shall be done: it is only the conclusion or ascertainment of its fitness. This function of the intellect, also, is not indispensably connected with the notion of will; as in the example given...
by Gaurapáda; where, in the simple conclusion after consideration, “this object is a jar; that, is a piece of cloth,” no wish, or will, is indicated; no act follows. It is clear also that he considers adhyavasáya merely as the functions of intellect in exercise: they are in intellect, and part of it, as the germ is in the seed, until brought into activity. Intellect is only an instrument; that which, having received the ideas or images conveyed through the organs of sense, and the mind, constructs them into a conclusive idea, which it presents to soul. Its function in exercise, therefore, is ascertainment or certainty, as described in the S. Pravachana Bhásyá, which explains adhyavasáya, ‘the synonyme, as well as buddhi, of the great principle (mahat), and its specific function denominated ascertainment.*'

The other synonymes of this principle are, buddhi, derived from budh, ‘to know,’ ‘knowing, intellect.’ Mahat, ‘great, the great principle;’ ‘The first and most important of the products of nature, and presiding over and pervading the whole†.’ Ásuri‡: this is a very unusual and questionable denomination. It occurs only in the S. Bháshya, and may be an error, perhaps for semushi, one of the synonymes of buddhi in the Amera kosha. It cannot be connected with asura, ‘a demon,’ as if the faculty were incompetent to convey divine knowledge; for one of its properties, in connexion with the quality of goodness, is jñána, ‘true knowledge.’ There is no good reason why it should be derived from Asuri, the pupil of Kapila, unless allusion is made to some personification of intellect, as the bride of the sage. No explanation of the word is given in the Bháshya, and I must confess my inability to suggest one entitled to any confidence. Mati means ‘understanding:’ manyaté anayá, that by which any thing is understood. Khyáti properly signifies ‘fame,’ but here means ‘notoriety, notion, familiar knowledge;’ as in the Smriti,
‘The great one it is, whence the familiar notions of the universe are always produced.’ Jñyāna is usually the term for ‘true or divine knowledge;’ knowledge of matter and spirit leading to liberation; but it is here employed in its generic purport, ‘that by which things are known.’ The same may be said of prajnā, which is also commonly used in the sense of ‘true wisdom,’ but here implies merely, ‘that by which knowledge is obtained,’ prajnāyaté anayá, as Rámáśrama expounds it. Several of these terms, in their technical, as well as literal application, bear an analogy to the νοεις of Aristotle, and the ἐφώνησις of Plato. M. Cousin considers the category to be ‘une sorte d’ame du monde.’ It is, however, the instrument most proximate to soul, by which the latter perceives, wills, and acts.

Intellect is of two kinds, or has two sets of properties, as it is influenced or affected by the opposite qualities, goodness and darkness. The former are, ‘virtue,’ dherma; ‘knowledge,’ jñyāna; ‘dispassion,’ vairágya; and ‘power,’ aiswaryya. The latter are their negatives, ‘vice,’ adherma; ‘ignorance,’ ajñyāna; ‘passion,’ avairágya; and ‘weakness,’ anaiswaryya. These again comprehend specific varieties.

Dherma, ‘virtue,’ according to the S. Bháshya, comprehends morality and religion. The S. Tātaṇa Kaumudi explains it, ‘The cause of happiness and liberation.’ As the source of prosperity and happiness in life, it is the discharge of religious and moral obligations; as the means of liberation, it is the observance of the eightfold yoga, or eight modes of contemplative devotion. Jñyāna, or ‘knowledge,’ is defined by the same Scholiast to be, ‘distinct notion of the difference between the three qualities and soul.’ ‘Dispassion,’ vairágya, is the extinction of rāga, ‘colour,’ or passion, which like dyes of various hues tinctures the soul.’

* महानिति यत्र: क्षमातिलोकान्ते जायते सदा । ।
† धम्मोभुद्र
यन्न:धेयसहि: । ।
‡ यागदानादि: ।
¶ श्राक्ष्योगानुपुष्टान ।
§ गुप्तपुरुषायताः क्षमातिली ।
॥ रागाद्य: क्षमायनित्वविस्तिनस्या
सभायो चौराग्यं ।
'Power,' aiswaryya, is the possession of superhuman faculties. It is always termed eightfold, even in the S. Bhāṣyā, although nine varieties are there named: one of them, however, 'heaviness,' garīmā, finds no place among the definitions given there, any more than in other authorities. It may be supposed to be included under the faculty of magnitude.

The four first faculties, 'minuteness,' animā; 'lightness,' laghīmā; 'reach,' prāpti; and 'magnitude,' mahīmā; are explained and illustrated every where much in the same way. According to Vāchespati, the person endowed with the first can make his way into a solid rock: with the second, he may ascend to the solar sphere upon a sunbeam; or, as Moore has it, "may dance on a beam of the sun:" with the third, he can touch the moon with the tip of his finger: and with the fourth, he may expand himself so as to occupy all space. The latter four faculties are less distinctly defined, and are sometimes confounded: the shades of difference are indeed so slight, that they may all be resolved into one, 'absolute power over matter.' 'Gratification of will,' prākāmya, is generally defined by ichchhānabhīghāta*, 'unobstruction of wish;' or, as explained by Hēmachandra, in his commentary on his own Lexicon, 'The wishes of a person possessing this faculty are unimpeded by the properties of material nature, such as form and the like; so that he can swim, dive, or float in earth as readily as in water†.' This is sometimes adduced in illustration of the meaning of the next faculty, but less accurately. That, is termed vasītā, which Vāchespati defines, 'absolute subjugation of the elements and elementary beings‡.' The Chandrikā makes it 'independence on matter||,' which is much the same as prākāmya; and a similar confusion occurs in Rāmāśrama’s commentary on Amera, for he illustrates it by 'swimming or diving on dry land.§.' 'Subjugation of nature' is the usually accepted import; as Hēmachandra, 'Thus as (with this faculty)

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* इच्छानिभिधातः। † नास्य भूतस्वरूपैव्यादिमिरिस्त्राभिह्यते
भूसाच्युतज्ञति निमित्ति यषोदेक। ‡ भूतभौतिकं वशी भवत्वचर्यं।
|| गुरुभूतायाम्बधिनीता। § भूमाच्युतानिमित्तः।

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any one determines the elements shall be, so they remain.*' The next faculty is 'dominion,' īśītā. According to Vāchespati, it is 'disposition at will of the production, arrangement, and expenditure of the elements and elementary beings †.' Nārāyaṇa explains it, 'directing or compelling them at will ‡.' Rāmāśrama interprets it prabhutva, 'dominion, sovereignty; under which inanimate things obey command §.' The last faculty is termed yatratkāmāvasāyatītā. In Rāmāśrama’s commentary he reads the word kāmāvasāyatītā ¶; and the only variety he notices is that of the sibilant, which is sometimes, he observes, the dental, instead of the palatal letter ﬀ. According to the latter reading it is derived from śi **, 'to sleep;' to the former, from shó ††, 'to destroy;' in either, with ava prefixed, meaning, as Rāmāśrama explains it, 'he who tranquillizes or destroys (that is, accomplishes) his desires ‡‡.' The reading of Gaŭra-pāda is, however, yatratkāmāvasāyatītā, as one compound; and the common definition of the term is 'true (infallible) purpose ‡‡,' wherever exercised: 'Whatever the person having this faculty intends or proposes must be complied with by that which is the subject of his purpose; the elements themselves must conform to his designs §§.' The Chandrikā has, 'Whatever the will proposes, that it obtains ‡‡.' Hēmacandra, in his text, gives the word as in the Bhāṣya, yatratkāmāvasāyita; and explains it, 'he who accomplishes his desires, to whatever they may be directed ***:' and he illustrates it by saying that 'an arhat, or Baudhā saint, can, by

* तेन यथा तान्ति (पृथिविदारिनि) यथावस्थायति तथावतितिन्ते।
† भूतभौतिकान्त्र प्रसावहृद्यायानामीपि। ‡ भूतभौतिकान्त्र संक्षिप्तमां चेतु प्रेष्यां। ¶ प्रभुव चेनस्याञारायाजाजारिष्य। ‡‡ इशित वश काम च तथा कामावशायिता। ** शी।
†† घो। ‡‡ कामावशेषे—अवश्यिता। §§ सत्यसंक्षिप्ताः।
‰ यथाय चंत्योभवति भृतेव तेब्तन भूतानि भवन्ति। *** यथाय चंत्योभवति तत्त्वारुपेन्ति।
virtue of this faculty, convert poison into ambrosia, and administer it as means of vitality."

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XXIV.

Consciousness is egotism. Thence proceeds a twofold creation. The elevenfold set is one: the five elemental rudiments are the other.

BHÁSHYA.

The elevenfold set: the eleven organs. The five elemental rudiments: elementary matter of five kinds, or the rudiments, sound, touch, form, flavour, and odour. What sort of creation proceeds from that which is thus defined is next explained.

COMMENT.

The third category is here specified, and described as the source of the senses and their respective objects.

The term here given as the synonyme and definition of 'egotism,' ahankāra †, is abhimāna ‡, translated 'consciousness.' The ordinary sense of both words is pride, and the technical import is 'the pride or conceit of individuality;' 'self-sufficiency;' the notion that 'I do, I feel, I think, I am,' as explained by Văchespati: 'I alone preside and have power over all that is perceived and known, and all these objects of sense are for my use. There is no other supreme except I; I am. This pride, from its exclusive (selfish) application, is egotism.' The principle, therefore, is something more in Hindu metaphysics than mere consciousness.

* विषमयमूलकार्यं संक्षिप्तको भोजयं जीवयति।।
† अहंकारः।।
‡ अभिमानः।।
यत् लत्वालोचितं मतं च तत्तत्तमतिकृतः गृहः
खर्ममद मद्यौ अवामी विषयः मद्यो नान्योत्तिकृतः कब्जत्तवहम
सि योद्भिमानः सोसाधारणववहारवधुंकारः।।

† अभिमानः।।
or conscience. It might be better expressed, perhaps, by 'le moi,' as it adds to the simple conception of individuality the notion of self-property, the concentration of all objects and interests and feelings in the individual.

The other synonyms of this category express rather modifications of it, as the next stanza intimates. Taijasa, 'the active' or 'the ardent,' from téjas *, 'light, splendour, ardour,' refers to its animating or exciting influence on human actions, in connection with the quality of foulness. Bhútádi †, 'primitive element,' and vaikrita ‡, 'the modified,' as explained in the Bháshya, on the next verse, regard its being, in connection with darkness and goodness, the principle from which the organs and objects of sense proceed: for it must not be forgotten, that this category of egotism or consciousness has a physical, not a metaphysical character, according to the Sánkhya philosophy, being the organ or instrument by which the impression of individuality is conveyed to soul. It is in this capacity that it may be considered the primary element, the parent of the rudiments of the elements, or the objects of sense, and of the organs by which they are perceived. It is, in fact, the same with both these, as it is only by the application of our own senses to the objects of sense that we can become conscious of individual existence.

XXV.

From consciousness, affected by goodness, proceeds the good elevenfold set: from it, as a dark origin of being, come elementary particles: both issue from that principle affected by foulness.

BHÁSHYA.

When goodness predominates in egotism over darkness and foulness, that egotism is of the pure kind; the name of which, according to ancient

* तेजस् । † भूतादि: । ‡ वैकृत: ।
teachers, was vaikrita, 'the modified.' From this modified egotism the class of eleven organs is produced. \textit{The good set:} perfect organs; adequate to their functions: the set is thence called \textit{good}. Again; \textit{from it, as a dark origin of beings, \\&c.}—When darkness predominates in egotism over goodness and foulness, that egotism is called \textit{dark}, or, as it was named by the old masters, 'primitive element,' bhūtādi. \textit{From it come elementary particles;} the fivefold set. The first element of the elements is darkness; therefore it is usually called \textit{the dark:} from that primitive element the fivefold rudimental set proceed. \textit{Both issue from that principle affected by foulness:} that is, the egotism in which foulness predominates over goodness and darkness takes the denomination taijasa, 'the active;' and from that both proceed; both the eleven organs and five rudiments. For the pure egotism, which is vaikrita, 'the modified,' becoming so modified, produces the eleven organs: but to do this it takes active egotism for its assistant; for pure (sātwika) egotism is inert, and is only able to produce the organs when combined with the active. In like manner the dark egotism, or that which is called 'primitive element,' is inert, and becomes active only in union with the active, when it produces the five rudiments. Therefore it is said, both the organs of sense and their objects issue from the modification of egotism affected by foulness. The good elevenfold set proceeds from modified egotism, or that which is affected by the quality of goodness. They are next particularized.

\textbf{COMMENT.}

The products of egotism are here described as proceeding from three modifications of that principle, varied by the influence of the three qualities.

The terms used to designate the 'pure,' or sātwika principle; the 'dark,' or tāmasa; and the 'foul,' or rājasa; 'variety of egotism,' or vaikrita, bhūtādi, and taijasa; have been explained. According to our text, as understood by the Scholiasts, the eleven organs of sense issue from pure or modified egotism, and the five rudiments from elemental egotism; both being influenced by ardent or active egotism.' The commentator on the \textit{S. Pravachana} has a rather different explanation,
interpreting *ekādaśaka*, ‘eleventh,’ not ‘elevenfold;’ according to him, this eleventh, which is mind, proceeds from the first kind of egotism; the other ten from the second kind; and the elements from the third. “*Sutra:* The pure eleventh (organ) proceeds from modified egotism. *Comment:* Eleventh, is mind, which in the class of sixteen organs and rudiments is of the quality of goodness; therefore it is born from egotism, affected by goodness, called *vaikrita.* This is the sense. Hence it follows, that from egotism, affected by foulness, proceed the other ten organs of sense; and from egotism, affected by darkness, proceed the rudiments*.” This interpretation he defends by the authority of the law-books and Puranas; and he gives a similar turn, although rather indistinctly expressed, to the text of the *Kārikā.* In the stanzas subsequent to this, to ver. 37, the organs of sense are fully described, and in ver. 38. the text returns to the elements. It is not necessary, therefore, to enter upon any explanation of them in this place. There is a remarkable expression in the *Bhāshya,* which presents a notion familiar to all ancient cosmogonies. *Gaurapāda* says, ‘the first of the elements was darkness†.’ It is the first of the ‘elements,’ not the first of ‘things;’ for it was preceded by unevolved nature, and intellect, and it is itself a modified form of individuality. It therefore harmonizes perfectly well with the prevailing ideas in the ancient world, of the state of things anterior to elementary or visible creation, when “chaos was, and night,” and when

Nullus adhuc mundo praebat lumina Titan,
Nec nova crescendo reparabat cornua Phoebē.

In the influence of the quality of foulness, or passion, for the word *rajas* has both senses, may be suspected an affinity to the doctrine of an active principle, the moving mind, the *eros,* that set inert matter into motion, and produced created things.

* *Sātvikākārāṇe pravartante vaikritadūkkhāraṇe. || Ekādāśanaṁpuruṣē māṇe: kṣaṇilāgamaṁ śātanāṁkraṇaṁ kṣaṇiḥ kṣaṇaḥ śātanāṁkraṇanāṁjāyant iṣṭvān. || Śrītrairajasaṁkraṇaṁ vinayakānāṁ śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇaṭă ṣaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaṁkraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇācmantā śaṁsaşanskraṇामः ||

† Bhūtānapātādhvānām: ||
XXVI.

Intellectual organs are, the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin: those of action are, the voice, hands, feet, the excretory organ, and that of generation.

BHÁSHYA.

Reckoning from the eye to the organ of touch, the organs are called ‘intellectual.’ Touched by it, the organ of touch, which is the skin: thence the term for the skin which is used (in the text), ‘that which touches,’ sparśanaka. Intellectual organs are five, as they ascertain or know (severally) five objects, or sound, touch, form, flavour, and smell. Those of action, &c.—They perform acts, whence they are called ‘organs of action:’ thus, the voice articulates; the hands variously manipulate; the feet effect motion; the excretory organ, excretion; and the sexual organ, generation. Thus are enumerated ten organs, five of intellect and five of action. The character and nature of the eleventh, or mind, is next described.

COMMENT.

The five instruments or means of perception and five of action, products of egotism, are enumerated in this stanza.

The term ‘organs’ is correctly applicable to the material instruments by which perception is exercised; but it is not to be understood of the gross corporeal bodies, the visible eye, ear, hand, &c., which are parts of gross body. The word ‘senses’ would therefore be a less equivocal term, only that it does not so distinctly convey the idea of an instrument which, though subtile, is substantial. The original word, indriya, is defined to mean whatever relates or belongs to indra, said to be a synonyme of soul, the senses being indicative, being marks or signs, of the presence of soul*:

* इन्द्रस्यात्मनात्मिकानिर्दिन्त्रियस्यमुच्चते।
accordingly each is denominated a linga (see p. 24), 'a characteristic feature or indication *.'

XXVII.

(In this set is) mind, which is both (an organ of sensation and of action). It ponders, and it is an organ as being cognate with the rest. They are numerous by specific modification of qualities, and so are external diversities.

BHÁSHYA.

Here, as one of the class of organs, mind is said to be both. Among the organs of sensation it is one of sensation, and among those of action it is an organ of action also. As it performs the function of the organs of sensation and of those of action it belongs to both. It ponders (or purposes); whence the term sankalpaka. It is also an organ as being cognate with the rest; for such is the meaning of the word sádhermya. The organs of sensation and action being (cognate or) produced, along with mind, from egotism affected by goodness, have this (property, of origin) in common with mind; and from this common property mind is an organ likewise.

Thus eleven organs are produced from egotism affected by goodness. What, then, is the function (vrittī) of mind? Reflection (sankalpa) is its function. Sound and the rest are the functions of the organs of sensation. Speech and the rest are the functions of the organs of action. Now are these various organs, apprehending various objects, so created by Iswara? or are they self-generated? since nature, intellect, and egotism, are devoid of sense; and soul is devoid of action. Thence, according to the Sánkhya doctrine, a certain spontaneity is the cause (of the variety of the senses). Therefore it is added, They are numerous by specific modification of qualities, and so are external diversities: that is, the several objects of these eleven

* दृष्टयहात्ति: च चक्षु: श्रद्धयहात्ति: अग्रममित्वादि:
organs, or sound, touch, form, flavour, and odour, which are the objects of five; speech, manipulation, motion, excretion, and generation, the objects of other five; and reflection, the object of mind; these all proceed from specific modification of qualities. From the variety (or special difference) of such modifications of the qualities the multifariousness of the organs proceeds, as well as the diversity of external objects: consequently this variety is not the work of Iswara, nor of egotism, nor of intellect, nor of nature, nor of soul; but from modification of the qualities, produced by spontaneity. It does not proceed designedly (it is not the result of a will to act), because the qualities are non-sentient (unconscious or irrational). How then does it take place? This, as will be afterwards explained, is in like manner as the secretion of milk is for the growth of the calf, so the proceedings of nature take place for the liberation of soul, without soul's being cognizant of them; so the unconscious qualities become modified by the existence of the eleven organs, and their varieties are thence derived. Hence the eye is placed in its elevated orbit for the purpose of looking up to heaven; and in like manner the nose, the ear, the tongue are commodiously situated for the apprehension of their respective objects: the organs of action are also distributed conveniently for the discharge of their several duties of their own nature, through the modification of the qualities, not as their objects; as it is elsewhere said, “Qualities abide in qualities; that which is the function of the qualities is their object.” External diversities, therefore, are to be regarded as made by the qualities: this is the meaning of the text. Of which nature is the cause.

The several functions of the organs are next specified.

COMMENT.

After defining mind as an instrument both of sensation and of action, this verse explains how it is that there are various organs and objects of sense; and it is said to depend in both cases upon specific modifications of the qualities of nature.

Mind is an instrument both of sensation and of action. Its function is sankalpa, a word that more commonly means ‘resolve, purpose, expecta-
tion; as in the Hitopadēsa, 'the crow,' Laghupatanaka, says, 'All has been heard by me; and this is my resolve, that we must be friends.' And Menu: 'Desire is the root of expectation; sacrifice is its product.'

Or, as Kullūka Bhātīa explains it, 'Sankalpa is understanding to this effect, that by a certain ceremony a desired consequence is effected.' In both passages the notion of 'conclusion from foregone premises' is conveyed, and that seems to be its meaning here. Thus Vāchespāti explains it: 'The mind carefully considers a substance perceived by an organ of sense, (and determines) this is simple, that is not so; or discriminates them by their condition of predicate and predicable.' Again, it is said, "First, knowledge or perception is simple (inconsiderate), like the knowledge of a child, a dumb man, or the like: it is produced by the mere thing; but when, after this, the thing, as distinguished by its properties, by its genus, and the like, is recognised by the understanding, and intellect is in accordance with perception, that period (or interval) of determination is the operation of the mind." Here, then, sankalpa is the process of reflection, the consideration of the object of simple perception, so as to form a definite idea, which mind transmits, through individuality and intellect, to soul. In this way mind is an organ both of perception and action; perceiving the objects presented by the senses, and forming them into a positive idea. It is further identified with both classes of organs by originating from the same source, egotism affected by goodness; and consequently it consists of the same material.

The second portion of the stanza conveys a doctrine that is not very intelligible. The variety of the senses and of the objects of the senses is
said to arise spontaneously in them, from specific modification of the three qualities. Vācaspāti understands the allusion to external objects to be merely illustrative; that is, the internal organs are diversified by modification of the qualities, in the same manner that external objects are varied by the same modification*. and the translation follows this explanation. In the Bhāshya a different reading in the original occurred, which would require the passage to be rendered, 'and from variety of external objects†:' thus ascribing the diversity of the organs, not only to modification of the qualities, but to the diversity of external objects, which require suitable, and therefore various organs for their apprehension. The reading is, however, clearly incompatible with his argument, although Gaurapāda is somewhat obscure; but the variety is noticed and admitted by the author of the Chandrikā‡.

The S. Pravachana Bhāshya considers the multifariousness spoken of in the Sūtra, which conveys apparently a similar doctrine to that of the Kārikā, as restricted to mind: 'Multifariousness is from modification of qualities, as the variety of human condition (is from various association): that is, as the very same individual assumes different characters, according to the influence of his associations; becoming a lover with a mistress, a sage with sages, a different person with others; so mind, from its connection with the eye or any other organ, becomes identified with it, and consequently is diversified according to the function of sight and the rest of the organs with which it is severally associated‖.' The association of mind with the organs is intimated by the Vēdas, as in the text, 'My mind was elsewhere, I did not hear§.' The very illustration used by Locke:

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* वाहमेदाशेति हर्षानां यथा वाहमेदास्मैतदपीत्यथः। † वा
बहमेदाच। ‡ वाहमेदाशेति पादे तु याहमेदाद्यन्त्रियंब्धेद ावश्यको
बोध्य इत्यथः। † † गुणपरिवर्तामन्दधामाज्ञानमवस्यात्। यथैव एव
नरः संगवशानां भजते कामनीसंगमन् कामुको विरक्षसङ्गाबिरक्षोऽथ
संगमान्य एव मनोशयि चक्षुरादिसंगमः चक्षुराढात्कावेन दर्शनादिवृत्ति
विशिष्टत्या नाना भवति। § अह्वाचनमा अभूवं नाश्यामिति।
"A man whose mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, takes no notice of impressions made by sounding bodies upon the organ of hearing: therefore it is evident that perception is only when the mind receives the impression," says the English philosopher; and the Hindu infers, that 'the mind must cooperate with the organs of sense, even for perception, as they would otherwise be incapable of performing their functions.'

The materiality of mind, considered as distinct from consciousness, intelligence, and soul, and as neither more nor less than an internal sense, a sensorium, is much less absurd than the same character of it when considered as part of, or identical with, soul, as was the doctrine of the Epicureans, whose description of mind, as an organ merely, agrees well enough with the Hindu notion:

\[
\text{Primum; animum dico mentem quam sepe dicamus}
\]
\[
\text{Esse hominis partem nihilominus ac manus ac pes}
\]
\[
\text{Atque oculi, partes animantes totius existant. Lucretius, III. 94.}
\]

XXVIII.

The function of five, in respect to colour and the rest, is observation only. Speech, handling, treading, excretion, and generation are the functions of five (other organs).

BHÁSHYA.

The term 'only' (mátra) is to be understood in the sense of specialty, or the exclusion of what is not specified; as in the sentence, "Alms only are received;" that is, nothing else is received. Thus the eyes are observant of colour (form), not of flavour and the rest; and so of the

* चक्षुरादीनां मनः संयोगं विना व्यापाराङ्गमलादनुमायते ।
other senses. And in this way the function of the eye is colour (vision); of the tongue, taste; of the nose, smell; of the ear, sound (hearing); of the skin, touch: these are the functions of the intellectual organs. *Speech and the rest* (are the functions) of the five organs of action; or, speech is the function of the voice (larynx, &c.); handling, of the hands; treading, of the feet; dejection of excrement separated from food, of the rectum; and generation of offspring, of the sexual organs: ‘function or object’ being required for each term by the grammatical construction of the sentence.

The functions of intellect, egotism, and mind are next described.

**COMMENT.**

The text particularizes the functions of the organs of sense severally.

The general term for the office of the senses is *ālochana* *, literally ‘seeing, beholding, perceiving, observing.’ According to ancient authorities it is said to comprise both the first undeliberative, and the second deliberative knowledge; or, in short, what is understood by ‘perception †.’

The commentator on the *S. Pravachana*, who gives this explanation, observes, however, that some consider deliberative perception to be the property of the mind only, whilst simple or undeliberative perception is that of the external senses; and this appears to be the doctrine of the Sānkhyas: the senses receive simple impressions from without of their own nature; whether those impressions are *perceived*, depends upon the cooperation of the internal sense, or mind. The term for ‘function’ is *vritti*, explained by *vyāpāra*, ‘active exercise or application;’ also by *sāmartyam*, ‘ability, adequacy;’ and *phala*, ‘fruit, result.’

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* अलोचनां। † अलोचनश्रवणां पूर्वारूढिःशब्दायातं। अवस्थालो\-चन ज्ञान प्रथम निर्विकल्पं। परंपरानुसार वसङ्गमेंज्ञातिदिभिमिलिते। तथाच निर्विकल्पत्वकस्विकल्पकप\-द्विधिमयमि ऐण्ड्रेर्वज्ञानमालोचनमंग। निमि।

Dd
has vishaya, ‘object;' and it may be said, that the function and object of a sense is the same thing, sight being both the function and the object of the eye. There is some difficulty in translating some of the terms satisfactorily, although there is none in understanding what is meant by them. Thus rūpa, ‘form,' or, as rendered in the text, ‘colour,' is the object and office of the eye; it is therefore equivalent both to visible substance and sight. So of śabda, ‘sound;' it is both hearing and that which is heard. Sperśa, ‘touch,' is the faculty and the substance to which contact may be applied. In rasa, ‘taste,' and gandha, ‘smell,' we have the double equivalents, as both words in English, as well as in Sanscrit, express both the sense and the sensible property. In English, ‘voice' is a function; but here, at least, vāch* is also the instrument of speech. In the other organs of action the function is more readily rendered; but the difficulty in any case is only that of language, and the sense is sufficiently explicit.

XXIX.

Of the three (internal instruments) the functions are their respective characteristics: these are peculiar to each. The common function of the three instruments is breath and the rest of the five vital airs.

BHÁSHYA.

The natural properties, which are the several characteristics, are the respective characteristics (as previously defined). Ascertainment is intellect (ver. 23): that also is the function of intellect. Consciousness is egotism (ver. 24): consciousness is both its characteristic and its function. Mind ponders (ver. 27): such is its definition; and reflection, therefore, is the function of mind. Of these three, intellect, egotism, and mind, their respective characteristics are their specific functions. The functions of the intellectual organs, as before explained, are also specific (the same is

* वाच् ।
the case with the organs of action). But now their common function is described. *The common function of the instruments.*—The function of the instruments in common is *breath and the rest of the five vital airs*; the airs called prána, apána, samána, udána, and vyána. These are the five airs which are the common function of all the organs of sense. The air, for instance, called prána is that which is perceptible in the mouth and nostrils, and its circulation is the common function of the thirteen kinds (of instruments): that is, where there is breath, the organs acquire (are connected with) soul (they become living). Breath, like a bird in a cage, gives motion (vitality) to the whole. It is called prána, ‘breath’ or ‘life,’ from ‘breathing.’ From carrying downwards (apanayana), the air apána is so named; the circulation of which, also, is the common function of the organs. Samána is so named from conducting equally (samanayana) the food, &c. (through the frame). It is situated in the central part of the body, and its circulation is the common function of the instruments. The air udána is denominated from ascending, or from drawing or guiding best (un-nayana). It is perceptible in the space between the navel and the head, and the circulation that it has is the common function of the organs. Lastly, the air by which internal division and diffusion through the whole body is effected is called vyána, from its pervading (vyápti) the body like the etherial element. The circulation of that, also, is the common function of the assemblage of the organs. In this manner these vital airs, as the common function of the instruments, are explained; that is, the common function of the thirteen kinds (of organs).

**COMMENT.**

Besides the peculiar functions of the three internal instruments, mind, egotism, and intellect, which as the same with their definitions have already been specified, they have a common office in the evolution or circulation of the internal aerial humours which constitute vitality.

The translation limits this community of function to the three internal instruments only, or to intellect, egotism, and mind; and such is the interpretation of Vâchespati Misra: ‘The five airs, or life, is the function of the three (internal) instruments, from being present where they are,
and absent where they are not*.” So the S. Pravachana Bh. explains the Sútra Sámanya harana vritti; which is also the phrase of the Káriká, ‘the function of the three internal instruments†.’ Gaurapáda, however, understands vitality to be the common function of all the organs, external and internal; or thirteen instruments, ten of the former, and three of the latter kind. The expression of the text also is general, and applicable either to all the organs, or to any of them, as variously understood. The two meanings are not irreconcilable, although, strictly speaking, the sense followed in the translation is most correct; for although vitality is the common function of all the senses, yet it is essentially so of the internal senses only: it might continue with the privation of any or all of the external senses, but could not, as Váchespáti states, subsist without the internal organs, as it depends upon their existence for its own. So also the S. Pravachana Bháshya calls the vital airs not only the ‘functions,’ but ‘modifications, of the internal instruments||.’ These vital airs are not to be confounded with váyu, or ‘elemental air,’ for the Védas are authority for their different origin: ‘From him is born vital air, mind, and all the senses, heaven, wind, light, water, and the all-sustaining earth§.’ ‘The attribution of aerial operation to modification of the internal instruments arises from their being susceptible of a sort of motion similar to that of air, and from their being governed by the same deity¶.’ The vital airs are, in fact, the vital functions of breathing, circulation, and digestion. That these functions, resulting from organization, should be supposed to partake of the nature of aerial humours, originates very possibly from some misapprehension of the phenomena of breathing, flatulence, and arterial pulsation. The term used by Gaurapáda to designate their

* चायानिदिकरणी पञ्चवायव्य जीवनं वृत्तिकालेवे भावानदभावे।
† सामान्यकारणवृत्ति:।
‡ अन्तः: करणवस्त्रूलितः।
|| परिष्कारेदा:।
§ एतस्माजायेत प्राणो मनं संबंद्रियाणिच।
¶ अन्तः: करणपरिशकमेव।
|| वायुनिद्यंतंविशेषावायुङ्गुदवाधिकारच।
¶¶ अन्तः: करणपरिशकमेव।
action occurs syandana, 'moving, circulation,' in the copy; but spandana, 'throbbing, pulsation,' were perhaps a preferable reading. The offices assigned to them are evidently connected with notions either of circulation or a pulse. Thus Prána is breath, expiration and inspiration. Apána is flatulence, crepitus. Samána is eructation, supposed to be essential to digestion. Udána is the pulsation of the arteries in the head, the neck, and temples; and Vyána is the pulsation of the rest of the superficial arteries, and occasional puffiness of external parts, indicating air in the skin. The situations assigned to the five airs by the S. Tatwa Kaumudi are much less consistent and intelligible. Thus Prána is there said to be the function of the tip of the nostrils, head, navel, and great toes; Apána, of the back of the neck, the back, the feet, and the organs of excretion and generation; Samána, of the heart, the navel, and the joints; Udána, of the head, throat, palate, forehead, and root of the nose; and Vyána, of the skin. With exception of the last, it is not easy to understand how such absurd situations should have been selected. The S. Bháshya may be taken as the expression of the earlier notions.

XXX.

Of all four the functions are instantaneous, as well as gradual, in regard to sensible objects. The function of the three (interior) is, in respect of an unseen one, preceded by that of the fourth.

BHÁSHYA.

Of all four the functions are instantaneous.—The four are, intellect, egotism, and mind, in connection with any one of the organs of sense. Of these four the function is instantaneous in regard to perception, or in the ascertainment of perceptible objects. Intellect, egotism, mind, and the eye see form at once, in one instant, (coming instantly to the conclusion) that is a post. The same three, with the tongue, at once appreciate flavour; with the nose, odour: and so with the ear and skin.
Again; their functions are also gradual in regard to sensible objects.—Of that aggregate of four the function is also (occasionally) gradual (progressive). Thus, a person going along a road sees an object at a distance, and is in doubt whether it be a post or a man: he then observes some characteristic marks upon it, or a bird perched there; and doubt being thus dissipated by the reflection of the mind, the understanding discriminates that it is a post; and thence egotism interposes, for the sake of certainty, as, verily (or, I am certain) it is a post. In this way the functions of intellect, egotism, mind, and eye are (successively) discharged. And as in the case of a visible object, so it is as to sound and the rest of the objects of perception.

But in respect of an unseen one, the functions of the three are preceded by that of the fourth.—Unseen implies time past, or future: for instance, in respect to ‘form,’ the function of the eye has preceded that of intellect, egotism, and mind, as has that of the skin in respect to touch; of the nose in regard to smell; of the ear in relation to sound; and of the tongue in respect to taste. The functions of intellect, egotism, and mind are preceded in order by those of the senses in regard to time future or past, whilst in regard to time present they may be either instantaneous or gradual. Further—

COMMENT.

The consentaneous or successive operation of the three internal and any one of the external organs in the formation of ideas is here described.

The cooperation of the three internal organs and any organ of sense may be instantaneous (yugapat), like a flash of lightning, or as at the sight of a tiger, when the recognition of him, knowledge of his ferocity, conclusion of personal peril, and determination to try to escape are the business of one and the same moment: or their operation may be gradual or successive (kramaśas), allowing leisure, for instance, for the eye to see, for the mind to consider, for egotism to apply, and for intellect to conclude. Gaurapāda rather disarranges the order of succession, and places the function of egotism last, assigning to it the office of belief or conviction. Vāchespati’s illustration is more regular: ‘Thus, the ear
hears the twang of a bowstring; mind reflects that this must be for the flight of an arrow; egotism says, It is aimed at me; and intellect determines, I must run away.* Whenever the object is unseen, adrīśīta, not present, whether it be past or be to come, there must have been a prior perception of it; that is, as the text is explained by the commentators, there must have been a prior perception of it by an organ of sense. The expression of the text, tat pūrvikā vṛtti, 'their prior function,' might be thought to refer to a prior notion gained by the conjoint operation of the internal and external organs at some former period. This, however, would be recollection, the seat of which, as well as of judgment or inference, is in buddhi, or 'intellect,' alone; as in the Pātanjala Sātra, 'Proof, refutation deliberation, sleep, memory; these are said to be the functions of intellect †.' The prior operation, therefore, is merely perception or observation by the external sense, alochanam (see ver. 28), conveying simple ideas to the mind. Taking, then, this prior simple idea acquired through an external organ, any further consideration of it is the gradual operation of the three internal instruments. Where the object is present, conviction may be either momentary or successive: the Sānkhyas maintaining the possibility of consentaneous operation of the organs of sense and mind, egotism and intellect, in opposition to the doctrine of the Vaisēshikas, that the formation of ideas is in all cases a graduated process: Where the object is absent, the idea must be formed by the internal organs so far in successive order that they must be consequent upon a former impression received by an external sense; but as concerns themselves, their action may be either simultaneous or successive‡. The

* ऋष्ट्रप्राणिहितमनः कर्षणाकृष्णस्तिरोपिज्ञितमिरस्तिकृतकोदशः प्रेक्षातः पादव्रीयमिति निद्रितानिति ऋष्ण च मान प्रवेष्टीयमित्वम् ऋषाध्यक्षपञ्चसरार्थीम् स्थानादिति। † प्रमाशवीपयंयविवक्त्य नित्रास्वरूपयः इति। एतत् सर्वे पादव्रीये सुर्वितां या एता चुभिरूपम् उक्ता इति। ‡ अन्तः कर्षणचतुष्य युगपत् ऋषेण च धृष्टह्यपृष्टिः—यथा ह्ये तथा धृष्ट्यपृष्टिः योजना।
illustration which occurs in the *Bhāṣya* and other commentaries, of the
course of reasoning by which the nature of a distant object is determined,
is something like that with which, in the Philebus, the formation of
opinion is elucidated.

XXXI.

The instruments perform their respective functions, incited by
mutual invitation. The soul's purpose is the motive: an instrument
is wrought by none.

BHĀSHYA.

Swam is repeated, implying 'several order:' that is, intellect, egotism,
mind, perform their respective functions, the incitement to which is mu-
tual invitation. Ākāta implies 'respect and alertness.' They do this for
the accomplishment of the purpose of soul. Egotism and the rest effecting
it through intellect: that is, intellect, knowing the wishes of egotism and
the rest, proceeds to its own peculiar function. If it be asked, why it
does so? the answer is, the purpose of the soul is the motive. Soul's pur-
pose is to be fulfilled: for this object the activity of the qualities occurs,
and thence these instruments make manifest the object of the soul. How
is it that (being devoid of intelligence) they act? They act of their own
accord. An instrument can be wrought by none.—The purpose of soul
alone causes them to act: this is the meaning of the sentence: an instru-
ment is not made—not roused—to act by any human superior.

It is next specified how many (instruments) intellect and the rest are.

COMMENT.

The circumstances that induce the internal and external organs to
perform their respective functions are said to be mutual incitement, and
spontaneous disposition to effect the objects of soul.

The organs of sense are said to act by mutual invitation or incitement.
Their cooperation in the discharge of their respective functions is com-
pared to that of different soldiers in an army, all engaged in a common
assault, but of whom one agrees to take a spear, another a mace, another a bow. It is objected, that the organs being declared non-sentient, incapable of intelligence, cannot be supposed to feel, much less to know, any mutual design or wish, ākūta* or abhipraya†; and the terms are explained to signify the insensible influence which the activity of one exerts upon that of another, if there be no impediment in the way; a sort of sympathetic or consentaneous action. ‘Ākūta here means incitement to activity; that is, at the time when one organ is in action, the activity of another, if no obstruction hinder it ‡. ‘With this view the several instruments are directed by a presiding power, which may be termed the adaptation of the mutual fitness of their natures||. The motive for this sympathetic action is the purpose of soul, fruition or liberation; which purpose they of their own accord, but unconsciously, operate to fulfil, in the same way as the unconscious breast spontaneously secretes milk for the nourishment of the infant; according to the Śūtra, ‘As the cow for the calf:’ that is, as the milk of the cow of its own accord exudes for the use of the calf, and awaits not the effort of another, so the organs of their own accord perform their office for the sake of their master, soul §. S. Pravachana Bh. They must act of their own nature; it is not in the power of any one to compel them to act. Gaurāpāda’s expression is, ‘Not by any sovereign man¶:’ perhaps some particle, such as vā, may have been omitted in the copy, making the sense, ‘Neither by a deity nor a mortal;’ or the phrase may imply, that they are not compelled to action even by soul, as a divinity; but fulfil soul’s purposes through an innate property, undirected by any external agent.

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* आकूत | † अभिप्रय | ‡ आकूतमात्र प्रवृत्तमुनुखलं तञ्चक्ष्य आपाराजनसमय एव तथा चात्संति वाधेकाव्यापि | § औपन्यास धिशाचा करणां स्वस्प्रामण्योपयोगाभिन्न भवितं | ¶ धनुष बक्षाय। यथा वज्राय धनोः स्वयमेव क्षीरं स्वच्छं नान्यायार्थमेव कर्णतः स्वामिनः पुष्पस्य कृते स्वयमेव कर्णानि प्रवल्लतः उच्ययः | ॐ न वेन चिदिश्यं पुरुषेण |
XXXII.

Instrument is of thirteen sorts. It compasses, maintains, and manifests: what is to be done by it is tenfold, to be compassed, to be maintained, to be manifested.

BHÁSHYA.

Instrument.—Intellect and the rest are three; the intellectual organs are five; the organs of action are five: all together thirteen. What this performs is next declared: it compasses, maintains, and manifests; that is, the organs of action compass and maintain; those of perception manifest. How many kinds of action there are is next specified. Its action, that which is to be done by it, is tenfold; of ten kinds, as hearing, touch, &c. by the instruments of perception; speech and the rest by those of action: and thus by the former, manifestation, and by the latter, comprehension and support, are effected.

COMMENT.

The sense of the term karana, ‘instrument’ or ‘organ,’ is here explained, as a generic denomination for the external and internal organs.

The instruments or organs are thirteen; that is, three internal, intellect, egotism, and mind; and ten external, or the organs of sensation and action. Their respective functions as organs have been explained: their effects as instruments are classed under three heads, ‘compassing,’ áharaṇa*; ‘maintaining,’ dhárana†; and ‘manifesting,’ prakáśana‡. The first, which means, literally, ‘taking, seizing,’ and rendered in the text ‘compassing,’ signifies ‘the application of an organ to the object to which it is adapted,‘ and is the especial function of the organs or instruments of action. ‘Maintaining,’ dhárana, ‘supporting, upholding,’ is, according
to the *S. Bhāshya*, also the office of the instruments of action; but the authors of the *S. Tatwa Kaumudi* and *S. Chandrikā* assign it to the three internal instruments, intellect, egotism, and mind, as being especially the supporters of vitality. *Buddhi, ahankāra*, and mind uphold, through their function being designated as the production of the vital airs, &c.*

The elder commentator could not, of course, admit this doctrine; for we have seen (ver. 29) that, according to him, all the senses or instruments contribute to support the vital principle. All the Scholiasts agree in attributing *manifestation, enlightening*, *prakāśana*, to the intellectual organs. The objects to be effected by the instruments are tenfold, reducible to the same three classes: speech, manipulation, walking, excretion, and generation are to be compassed, to be effected, *āhārya†*, by the actual application of the several organs: sound, taste, touch, smell, form to be manifested, to be made sensible, *prakāśya*: and all of them, together with the vital airs, constituting in fact animal life, are to be *dhāryya‡*, upheld or maintained.

XXXIII.

Internal instruments are three; external ten, to make known objects to those three. The external organs minister at time present: the internal do so at any time.

**BHĀSHYA.**

*Internal instruments.*—Intelect, egotism, and mind are three, from the difference between intellect and the others. *External ten.*—The five organs of perception and five of action are the ten external instruments, and they are to make known objects for the fruition of intellect, egotism,
and mind. *Time present:* that is, the ear hears a present sound, not one that is past, nor one that is to come: the eye sees present form, not that which is past, nor that which is future: the skin touches present substance: the tongue tastes present flavour: the nose smells present odours, nor past nor future. It is the same with the organs of action: the voice articulates actual, not past nor future words: the hand takes hold of a present water-pot, not one that has been or is to be: the feet traverse a present, not a past nor a future walk: and the organs of excretion and generation perform present, not past nor future offices. External organs, therefore, minister at time present. *The internal ones do so for any time.*—Intelllect, egotism, and mind regard objects of any period: thus intellect forms an idea, not only of a present water-jar, but of one that has been or will be made: so egotism exercises consciousness of an object past, present, or future: and mind considers the past and future, as well as the present. Internal instrument is, therefore, for all times.

It is next explained which of these instruments apprehends specific, and which unspecific objects.

**COMMENT.**

The difference between the functions of the external and internal organs, as concerns time, is here explained: the action of the former being confined to time present; that of the latter comprehending also the past and the future.

Internal instrument is so denominated from operating within the body*: the external from being applied to exterior objects, making them known to the internal organization. The term *vishaya,* 'object,' is also explained by *bhoga,* 'that which is to be enjoyed;' and *vyāpāra,* 'exercise;' and *vishayākhyā,* 'that which declares or makes objects known.' It is also defined as 'that which occasions the exercise of the functions of the three internal instruments†.' External sensation is

* शरीराभ्यासर्वत्रिविद्यान: करणं ।
† विषयं व्यापाराभास्याति जनयति ।
necessarily confined to present objects, but mind, consciousness, and intellect apprehend from present objects those which have past, or are to come; as past rain from the swelling of a river; and future rain, in the absence of any other prognostic, from the destruction of the eggs of the ants*. This last phrase alludes probably to the well-known destruction of various species of the ant tribe, which in the East takes place immediately before the setting in of the rainy season: they then take wing, and fly abroad in vast multitudes, of which few survive; according to the Hindustani proverb, 'چہونی کی جو موت آتی ہے تو پر نکلتی', When the ants are about to die, their wings come forth.' The expression "ants' eggs," pipilikānda, is, however, rather questionable. It occurs in both copies of the S. Tatwa Kaumudi.

XXXIV.

AMONG these organs the five intellectual concern objects specific and unspecific. Speech concerns sound. The rest regard all five objects.

BHĀSHYA.

* The intellectual organs concern specific objects: they apprehend objects which have specific properties. The intellectual organs of men distinguish sound, touch, form, taste, smell, along with objects of indifference, pleasure and pain. The organs of the gods apprehend objects which have no specific distinctions. So, amongst the five organs of action, speech concerns sound. Speech, whether of gods or of men, articulates words, recites verses, and the like; and this instrument is the same in both orders of beings. The rest—all except speech; the hand, the foot, and the organs of excretion and generation—regard all five objects: that

* यथानन्दीयूराणादभूषितिरसरनुयातके विप्रीतिरासाधसंवेश्चर्याब्रवि यतिवृद्धिरिति।

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is, sound and the other four objects of perception belong to all the other organs; for there may be sound, touch, form, taste, and smell in the hands; the foot treads upon the earth, of which sound and the rest may be characteristics; the excretory organ separates that in which the five objects abide; and the generating organs produce the secretion which is equally characterised by the five organs of sense.

COMMENT.

Another distinction is made in the functions of the external instruments, as they regard objects with or without specific characteristics.

Objects are distinguished as having specific characters or effects, savivēsha *, and as devoid of them, nirvivēsha †; and the instruments are discriminated according to their capability of conveying notions of either. The organs of sense in mortals can apprehend only those objects which have specific characters; either sensible, as colour, form, taste, &c.; or moral, as pleasant, painful, or indifferent. The faculties of the gods and of sages can apprehend objects without such characteristic properties, and which exercise no moral effect, producing neither pleasure, pain, nor indifference. The S. Tatwa Kaumudi identifies ‘specific’ with ‘gross corporeal’ objects ‡, and ‘unspecific’ with ‘subtile and rudimental’ objects §; the latter of which are cognizable alone by the organs of holy men and deities ¶. This distinction applies to all the external organs, except the voice, which in men, saints, and gods can articulate sensible, specific, or corporeal words alone; for it is the organ of the voice that is the origin of speech. Speech cannot, like sound, taste, &c., originate with any thing gross or subtile exterior to the speaker; it must proceed from him, through the agency of a gross material instrument, and must therefore be gross or sensible itself. Gross corporeal mechanism cannot be the source of a subtile product, and therefore with every order of beings

* सविशेषः। † निविशेषः। ‡ स्फूर्तिविषयः। § सूक्ष्मविषयः। ¶ तत्तोम्बोधीसां योगिनां च श्रोत्सर्वाय पर्वायथ श्रूः विषयं च।
  अस्मदादिनां तु स्फूर्तिश्लेष्वयमेव।
speech must be specific. ‘The rest,’ śeshāni referring to the organ of speech, implies the other organs of action, all of which may regard the five objects of perception; that is, they may comprehend them all; as from the combination (or capability) of sound, touch, colour, smell, taste, in objects like a water-jar and others, which may be compassed or taken hold of by the hand, &c.’* S. Tatwa Kaumudi.

XXXV.

Since intellect, with the (other two) internal instruments, adverts to every object, therefore those three instruments are warders, and the rest are gates.

BHĀSHYA.

With the internal; that is, intellect, with egotism and mind. Adverts to; takes, apprehends; that is, apprehends sound and the rest at all three seasons. Therefore these three are warders, and the rest are gates.—The rest; the other instruments; instruments being understood. Further—

COMMENT.

A metaphor is employed to illustrate the functions of the external and internal instruments.

The internal instruments are compared to warders, doorkeepers, or to persons having charge of a door or gate; not opening and closing it merely, but as taking note of all that enter: the external senses being the doors or gateways by which the objects of perception gain admission.

* पाष्यायायायायां घटादीनां पंचशष्टियायालकऽग्राहिः
XXXVI.

These characteristically differing from each other, and variously affected by qualities, present to the intellect the soul's whole purpose, enlightening it as a lamp.

BHÁSHYA.

These, which are called instruments: they variously affected by qualities. How affected? Like a lamp; exhibiting objects like a lamp. Characteristically differing; dissimilar, having different objects; that is the sense. Objects of the qualities is intended. Variously affected by qualities; produced or proceeding from qualities. Soul's whole purpose.—The instruments of perception and action, egotism and mind, having illustrated the object of soul (as attainable) through each respectively, present it to the intellect, place it in the intellect; and consequently soul obtains pleasure and the rest; that is, every object seated in intellect. Further—

COMMENT.

The process by which ideas are conveyed to soul is here described. Intellect (buddhi or mahat) is the instrument or organ which is the medium between the other instruments or organs and soul; that is, all ideas derived from sensation, reflection, or consciousness must be deposited in the chief or great instrument, intellect or understanding, before they can be made known to soul, for whose use and advantage alone they have been assembled. They are variously affected by the qualities.—They convey impressions or ideas, with the properties or effects of pleasure, pain, and indifference, accordingly as they are influenced by the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness. In fact these organs are identified with the qualities by all the commentators. Gaúrapáda says, 'they proceed or are born from them*:' and in the S. Tatwa Kaumudi and

* गुणमयोज्ञानः इ
S. Chandrikā they are called also ‘products or modifications and varieties of the qualities;’ thus the former has, ‘The external organs, mind, and egotism are affections of qualities; they are changes of condition of the qualities goodness, foulness, and darkness*;’ the latter, ‘These affections of the qualities are kinds (or varieties) of them †.’ It might have been preferable, therefore, to have rendered the expression gunaviśēsha, ‘modifications or affections of the qualities.’

The progressive communication of impression to soul is thus illustrated by Vāchespati: ‘As the head men of a village collect the taxes from the villagers, and pay them to the governor of the district; as the local governor pays the amount to the minister; and the minister receives it for the use of the king; so mind, having received ideas from the external organs, transfers them to egotism; and egotism delivers them to intellect, which is the general superintendent, and takes charge of them for the use of the sovereign, soul. The same idea is more concisely expressed in the S. Pravachana Bh. ‘Śūtra: In the common employment of the organs the chiefship belongs to buddhi, as in the world. Comment: As the function of the organs is in common, through subservience to the purposes of soul, so the most important is that of intelligence; like the office of the prime minister amongst the chiefs of villages and the rest, who are all alike engaged in the service of the king ‡.’ The cooperation of opposites for a common purpose has been once before (p. 54) compared to the light of a lamp, derived from the combination of oil, cotton, and flame.

* वाचेश्वरीयम्नोहसंकारायथैरुष्यविशेषां गुणविशेषां सत्यराजसमतां विकारः। † एते गुणविशेषां गुणानां भेदः। ‡ समानकर्मयोगे बुद्धे प्राधान्यं लोकवत्। यद्यपि पुरुषार्थेऽवस्त्र समान एव सर्वां गर्भानं व्यापारलतां च पुरुषी प्राधान्यं लोकवत् लोके हि राजार्थक्वाविशेषे।

h h
XXXVII.

Since it is intellect which accomplishes soul's fruition of all which is to be enjoyed, it is that, again, which discriminates the subtle difference between the chief principle (pradhána) and soul.

BHÁSHYA.

All: whatever comes within the reach of the organs, and in all three (past, present, and future) periods. Fruition: several or respective enjoyment, through the instrumentality of the organs of perception and action, whether in gods, men, or animals. The internal instrument intellect accomplishes, completes or effects; consequently it is that, again, which discriminates, makes a distinction between the objects of nature and soul, (or establishes) their difference or severalty. Subtle: not to be apprehended by those who have not practised religious austerities, (or such distinctions) as, this is nature, the equipoised condition of the three qualities, goodness, foulness, and darkness; this is intellect; this is egotism; these are the five subtle rudiments; these the eleven organs; these the five gross elements; and this, which is different from them all, is soul. He whose intellect explains all this obtains liberation.

It was said above (ver. 34) that "objects are specific and unspecific:" which these are respectively is next described.

COMMENT.

The function of discriminating between soul and nature is here also assigned to intellect.

The immediate contiguity and communication of intellect with soul, as that of a prime minister and a sovereign, enables it to appreciate the latter; whilst its being the medium of conveyance to external objects familiarizes it with them also; and thus it is enabled to distinguish between both: or, as explained in the Chandriká, this discrimination is the necessary consequence of its relative function; for as it conveys ideas of pleasure or pain to soul, and is in this way the cause of its fruition, it is
subservient to another, to something of a different nature from its own; and the knowledge of this is discrimination between nature and soul. All, sound and the rest, with which the preposition prati (implying severally) is to be connected. The fruition is that of soul. As intellect accomplishes this, consequently although it be as it were a chief principle, yet it is for another’s use, not its own; and as hence arises the purpose of liberation, this sense is accordingly intended to be expressed in the phrase, *It is that again which discriminates, &c.*

XXXVIII.

The elementary particles are unspecific: from these five proceed the five elements, which are termed *specific*; for they are soothing, terrifying, or stupifying.

BHĀSHYA.

The five subtle elements, which are produced from egotism, or the rudiments sound, touch (substance), form, flavour, and odour, are said to be unspecific; they are the objects (of perception) to the gods, characterised by pleasure, producing neither pain nor stupefaction. *From these five proceed the five elements*, called earth, water, fire, air, and ether. These are said to be specific. From the rudiment smell, earth proceeds; from the rudiment flavour, water; from form (colour), fire; from touch (substance), air; and from the rudiment sound, proceeds ether. These gross elements are termed *specific*. They are the objects of the senses of men, and are soothing, causing pleasure; *terrifying*, causing pain; and *stupifying*, causing insensibility; as the ethereal element may give delight to one

* सब शब्दातीतयोऽवतित स उपयोगः पुक्षस्य तस्मानात्मायति तस्मानात्मायति पराधानाम् पराधानाम् स तस्मानात्मायति भावः मौख्यतुजननक्लादिपि स सत्तवा भिभिन्नालीतिपुण्यति ।
person coming forth at once from within a house, so the same may be
the source of pain to one affected by cold, or heat, or wind, or rain; and
if he be going along a road leading through a forest, in which he loses
his way, it may then, from the perplexity of space, occasion stupefaction:
so the air (or wind) is agreeable to a person oppressed by heat, disagree-
able to one feeling cold; and when tempestuous and loaded with clouds
of sand and dust it is stupifying. The same may be said of fire and the
rest. There are other specific varieties.

COMMENT.

It was intimated in ver. 34, that objects were both specific and unspecific; and it is here explained, that by the former is meant the various
property which the same element possesses at different times, and under
different circumstances, in regard to mortals; and by the latter, the uni-
form and unvaried operation of the subtile rudiments in respect to the
gods.

The precise nature of the rudimental elements is not very intelligible,
according to their usual identification with what we are accustomed to
consider as qualities, not substances, or sound, tangibility, form or colour,
flavour, and odour; śabda, sparsa, rūpa, rasa, and gandha. It seems,
however, that we should regard the rudimental elements as the imper-
ceptible subjects of these qualities, from which the grosser and visible
elements, ether, air, light, water, and earth, originate. So Vijnāna
Bhikshu calls them ‘subtile substances, the elements which are the
holders (sustainers or subjects) of the species of sound, touch, colour,
taste, and smell; but in which, as a genus, the three species of pleasur-
able, painful, and indifferent do not occur: they are not varieties of the
gross elements, but in each respectively the elementary property exclu-
sively resides; whence they are said to be rudiments. In those elements
that elementary property resides alone (without being diversified, as
agreeable, &c.); and as there is no distinction between a property and
its subject, that which is a rudimental substance is called a rudiment,
tan mátra; the existence of which as a cause is inferred from that of the
gross element as an effect*.'  *Tan mátra* is a compound of *tad*, 'that,' and *mátra*, 'alone;' implying, that in which its own peculiar property resides, without any change or variety: so Váchespati explains the text, 'Sound and the rest; the subtile rudiments; for the properties of agreeable, &c. do not belong to them, they have no quality which is fit for (mortal) fruition. This is the meaning of the word *mátra* †.'—These rudiments, though not appreciable by human sense, are said to be sensible to sages and to gods, producing to them pleasure only, from the predominance with them of the quality of goodness, and consequently of happiness‡.'

The notion of something more subtile than the elements was not unknown to early Grecian philosophy, and Empedocles taught that they were compounded of some more minute matter, or of elements of the elements, *stóicheia stóicheion*. Plutarch and Stobæus, according to Cudworth, understand by these rudiments of the elements primary atoms; but it may be doubted if they are to be so understood, for, according to Aristotle, Empedocles held that there were four elements, out of which all bodies were composed, and which were not mutually transmutable. In fact the doctrine of Empedocles, which was that of the school of Pythagoras, offers another analogy to the Indian, in the assertion, not of four, but of five elements, according to Plutarch, or the author *De placitis philosophorum*, l. II. c. 6, or ether, fire, earth, water, and air. Intellect. Syst. I. 97. That Empedocles was not of the atomic school is evident from

* तन्माचारि च यज्ञातीय तू शान्तादिविशेषचयं न तिष्ठति तज्ञाति याना शक्षस्वभा एवरसग्न्यानामाधारभूतानि सूक्ष्मद्रव्याशि शूलानामवि जेषा। । तस्मिन्द्रसिस्मलु तन्माचे तेन तन्माचाता स्मृता । शूलभूतात अयोत्त तत् कारणतया तन्माचात्यानुमानेन शूलान्यंचतन्माच्यं वोध इत्यथः।।
† शन्तादितन्माचारि सूक्ष्माशि न चेषा शान्तादिरस्तुप भोग्याव्यो विशेष इति माचंद्राष्टाय:।।†तन्माचारि च देवादिमा चभोग्यवेन केवलं सुखात्मकाष्टेव मुखाधिक्यादिति।
Lucretius, who specifies him as one of those who greatly misunderstood the principles of things:

Principiis tamen in rerum fecere ruinas
Et gravior magni magn'o cecidere ibi casu. I. 741–2.

It may be suspected that something like the Hindu notion, that the senses, or their faculties, and the gross elements, partake of a common nature, is expressed in the celebrated, though otherwise not very intelligible verses of the same philosopher:

Γαῖη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαιν ὅπωταμαι, ἑατί  ὅδρος
Αἰρέτι δ' ἀιρέτα διαν, ἅπαρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἄδηλην:

‘By the earthy element we perceive earth; by the watery, water; the air of heaven by the aerial element; and devouring fire by the element of fire.’

As opposed to the simple unvaried rudiments, the derivative gross elements, which are sensible to men and animals, are susceptible of three qualities; they may have specific or varied effects, may be diversified as species; they are said, accordingly, to be soothing or agreeable *, terrific or disagreeable †, and stupifying, bewildering ‡; that is, they may be either of these, according to the different circumstances in which the influence of one or other of the three qualities predominates. When goodness prevails, whether it be in themselves or in the object affected, they are śānta, ‘tranquil or pleasant;’ when foulness, they are ghora, ‘frightful, disagreeable;’ and when darkness prevails, they are ‘perplexing;’ mūrha: as Vāchespati†: ‘In the gross elements, ether and the rest, some, through the predominance of goodness, are soothing, pleasant, agreeable, light; some, through the prevalence of foulness, are terrific, painful, restless; whilst others, through the influence of darkness, are stupifying, depressing, heavy ‡.’
XXXIX.

Subtile (bodies), and such as spring from father and mother, together with the great elements, are three sorts of specific objects. Among these, the subtile bodies are lasting; such as issue from father and mother are perishable.

BHĀSHYA.

Subtile: the rudimental elements, that, when aggregated, form the rudimental or subtile body, characterised by intellect (mahat) and the rest, and which always exists, and undergoes successive states of being (transmigration): those are subtile (bodies). Such as spring from father and mother are the cementers or means of the aggregation of gross bodies, or by the effect of the mixture of blood and seminal secretion in sexual cohabitation, at fit seasons they form the envelopment of the subtile body in the womb; that subtile body then is nourished, through the umbilical cord, by the nutriment derived from the food and drink received by the mother; and the (entire) body, thus commenced with the triple ingredient of the subtile rudiments, the cognate investure, and the gross elements, becomes furnished with back, belly, legs, neck, head, and the rest; is enveloped in its sixfold membranes; is provided with blood, flesh, tendons, semen, marrow, and bones; and is composed of the five gross elements; ether being supplied for its cavities (or extension), air for its growth, fire for its nutriment, water for its aggregation, and earth for its stability: and thus being equipped with all its (component) parts, it comes forth from the maternal womb. In this way there are three kinds (of bodies): which of these is constant, and which temporary, is next described. The subtile bodies are lasting.—Subtile; rudimental elements: these are lasting, constant; by them body is commenced, and migrates, according to the imperative influence of acts, through the forms of beasts, deer, birds, reptiles, or immovable substances; or, in consequence of virtue, proceeds through the heaven of Indra, and other celestial abodes. So the subtile body migrates until knowledge is attained; when that is
attained, the sage, abandoning all body, acquires liberation: these sorts of bodies, or subtile, therefore, are called lasting. Such as issue from father and mother are perishable.—Having left that subtile body, the frame that proceeds from mother and father ceases, even here, at the time that the breath departs; the body born of parents ceases at the time of death, and merges into earth and the other gross elements.

What subtile body is, and how it migrates, is next described.

COMMENT.

Objects were distinguished in the preceding verse according as they were with or without specific or diversified effects: they are here classified according to their forms, their origin, and duration.

A question of some difficulty, however, arises here, as to the objects of the classification. Are they bodies in general? or are they gross bodies only? In the preceding stanza it was stated, that the subtile elements, the tan mātras, were unspecific; whilst their effects, the gross elements, were 'specific,' viśēśha. It is now stated, that there are three kinds of viśēshas, 'sorts, species, specific differences;' but it is not explicitly defined of what these are the varieties. Mr. Colebrooke, following the principal commentators, renders it 'sorts of objects;' that is, of bodies in general. Professor Lassen, carrying on the sense of viśēśha, 'specific,' from the preceding stanza, considers the variety here spoken of to concern only gross or perceptible elementary bodies: “Distincta, elementa que distincta dicuntur (ver. 38). Distinctorium triplex est divisio in subtilia, a parentibus progenita, crassa" (ver. 39). He admits that the commentators are against this interpretation, but concludes rather that they are in error, than that Īswara Krishna should have employed the word viśēśha in a double sense.

The interpretation of Prof. Lassen is highly creditable to his critical acumen and judgment, and is possibly correct, although it is scarcely compatible with the notions of subtilty and durability which the text ascribes to this branch of the triad. His view is not, as he supposes, wholly unsupported by the commentators; for Vijñāna Bhikshu similarly explains the stanza, as will presently be noticed. The passage
is one of some importance, as it regards apparently the history of the Sánkhya doctrines respecting the nature of that subtile body which is the immediate vehicle of soul, as we shall have occasion to notice more particularly, when we come to verse 40. If the meaning of the text be as Prof. Lassen renders it, it furnishes reason to suppose that the author of the Káriká had introduced an innovation upon the original doctrine, as will be subsequently indicated.

According to Gaurapáda and Nárayana, the sorts or species intimated in this verse are different from those described in the preceding; the former calls them, as above, 'other varieties*'; and the latter has, referring to ver. 38, 'So many are the specific varieties; but these are not all, there are others†.' Váchespati's expression, 'A further species of species‡, might be thought to refer to the gross elements; but, from the explanation that follows, it is evident he does not intend to limit the specific differences to gross elementary bodies. Agreeably to the explanation, then, in which these writers concur, bodies in general are threefold, subtile, generated, and elementary; and consistently with this view they consider 'subtile,' súkshma, as equivalent to tan-mátra, 'rudimental:' thus Gaurapáda has, 'Subtile is the aggregated rudimental elements, forming a rudimento-elemental subtile body∥.' so also Váchespati; 'Subtile means subtile bodies; subtile body is one specific object.§' and the Chandriká; 'Subtile are what are called rudimental bodies¶.' Consequently they also conceive the subtile objects spoken of in this verse to be something entirely different from the gross elementary viéśhas, or 'species,' of the preceding verse; not merely sub-species or varieties of the same: and it must be admitted that there is some inconsistency in the Káriká's speaking of subtile bodies being a species of gross bodies; of
the *imperceptible* being a variety of the *perceptible*. According to Viññāna Bhiṣkhu, however, the text merely intends by 'subtle,' sūkṣma, a modification of gross elementary body; a corporeal frame, which is subtle only relatively, or which is more refined than the second kind of body specified in the text, that which is begotten: 'The nature of that body which is the support of rudimental body is explained in the *Kārikā*, "subtle, generated," &c.: here is meant, body aggregated of the five elements, the (product or) effect of the rudimental elements, which is subtle relatively to generated body*'. The same notion is again intimated by expressions which will be subsequently cited; and there remains no doubt that this commentator understands by the sūkṣma of the text, 'a subtle variety of gross elementary body,' distinctorum distinctio. The other commentators understand by it, 'rudimental bodies,' elementa indistincta. Either interpretation is therefore allowable: the latter agrees best with the philosophy, the former with the construction, of the original.

In the second variety of bodies of course specific or sensible bodies only are intended; bodies generated or begotten are made of the gross elements, agreeably to the Sūtra, 'Body consists of the five elements†:' they are, however, in some degree distinguished here from the elements; holding, according to Gaurapāda, a middle place between them, and rudimental bodies serving to combine them; upachāyaka causing upachāya, 'proximate aggregation;' the parts of the embryo being derived in the first instance from the parents, and their development being the result of the accession of the elements, for purposes which he describes. There is some incongruity, however, in this explanation, as it makes a distinction where there is no essential difference; organized matter being, in fact, the same with elementary matter. The other commentators, therefore, give a different explanation of the term 'great elements,' restricting
it to inorganic matter. Thus Váchespáti observes, ‘Subtile body is one variety of objects; generated bodies are a second; and the great elements a third: water-jars and the like (inorganic bodies) are comprised in the class of the great elements.’ So also the Chandriká: ‘Subtile bodies are those called rudimental; generated, are gross bodies; and the great elements are mountains, trees, and the like.’

In this threefold division of bodies, as explained by the Scholiasts on the Káriká, we have, in fact, but two distinctions, subtile and gross; the latter being subdivided into organic and inorganic. The twofold distinction is that which is especially recognised in the Sútras: thus in the S. Pravachana Bháshya, the Sútra, ‘Thence (the origin) of body,’ is explained, ‘from the twenty-three tatwas (or categories) two kinds of bodies, subtile and gross, proceeded’; and again, ‘Gross body is for the most part generated (some bodies being inorganic), the other (subtile body) is not.’

The chief object of the stanza is, however, to assert the different duration of these three kinds of bodies; subtile are permanent: and here we have an argument in favour of the translation adopted; for no form of gross body could be considered as lasting: as composed of the elements, in however delicate a form, it must resolve into them at the time of death; whilst the subtile bodies, consisting of the subtile elements, endure either till liberation, or until the great Pralaya

Dissolvi quo quaeque supremo tempore possint.
XL.

(Subtile body), primæval, unconfined, material, composed of intellect, with other subtile principles, migrates, else unenjoying; invested with dispositions, mergent.

BHÁSHYA.

Primæval; whilst yet the universe is uncreated: in the first creation of nature, at that season subtile body is produced. Unconfined; uncombined either in the state of animals, men, or gods; and from its subtilty wholly unrestrained, or passing into rocks and the like without obstruction; it migrates; it goes. Permanent: until knowledge is attained it migrates. Composed of intellect, with other subtile principles; having mahat and the rest: that is, intellect in the first place, with egotism and mind, to the five subtile rudiments, to the subtile principles, to the rudimental elements. It migrates; it traverses the three worlds, as an ant the body of Siva. Unenjoying; without enjoyment: that subtile body becoming capable of enjoyment only in consequence of acquiring the property of action, through its aggregation by external generated body. Invested with dispositions.—Dispositions, as virtue and the rest; which we shall hereafter explain (see ver. 43). Invested with; coloured or affected by. Subtile body is that which, at the period of universal dissolution, possessed of mahat, intelligence, and the other subtile principles, merges into the chief one (or nature), and, exempted from further revolution, remains extant there until creation is renewed, being bound in the bondage of the stolidity of nature, and thereby incompetent to the acts of migrating and the like. At the season of re-creation it again revolves, and is hence called linga, `characteristic' or `mergent,' or súkshma, `subtile.'

From what cause the thirteen instruments (intellect, egotism, and the eleven organs) revolve, as has been said, is next explained.

COMMENT.

The condition of subtile body, in regard to commencement, duration, and term, is here described.
The commentators are agreed that the subtle body here spoken of is the linga, or the linga sarīra, ‘rudiment,’ or ‘rudimentary body;’ ordinarily, though perhaps not quite accurately, confounded: the linga consisting, as intimated in the last phrase of the Bhāṣya, of thirteen component parts, intellect, egotism, and the organs of sense and action; whilst the linga sarīra adds to these a bodily frame, made up of the five rudimental elements. In this form, however, they always coexist, and it is not necessary to consider them as distinct: thus the Sūtra of Kapila states, ‘one linga of seventeen*;’ that is, according to the Scholiast, in the beginning, at creation: there is but one rudimental body at the period of creation, consisting of an aggregate of the eleven organs, five rudimental elements, and intellect†. This was at first embodied in the person of Hiranyakarbhā, or Brahmā, and afterwards ‘multiplied individually, according to variety of actions‡.’ In this enumeration egotism is omitted, being included, according to the commentator, in intellect. ‘Unconfined,’ asakta, means unobstructed, capable of passing into any bodies. The next epithet, niyata, translated ‘material,’ is explained by Gaurapāda as above, by nitya, ‘permanent, lasting;’ and Vāchespati attaches to it the same signification, ‘It endures till the period of universal dissolution;’ and the S. Pr. Bhāṣya observes, also, that it ceases, or is destroyed, only at the same season; a property, of which it may be observed by the way, that it furnishes another reason for identifying the sūkshma, or ‘subtle body,’ of the foregoing stanza with the linga, or ‘rudimental body,’ of this verse. The Chandrikā explains niyata differently, ‘distinct in different persons.’ The composition of subtle body is explicitly described by Vāchespati: ‘Subtle body is an assemblage of intellect, egotism, the eleven senses, and the five

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* समदेशां लिङ्गं।
† लिङ्गश्रीरवं समगर्दा समस्मितरः प्रभवति।
‡ अन्नार्धेन्द्रियाणि पञ्चतन्त्राचार्यि वृद्धिकृतसमस्तं।
§ श्रावश्यं।
|| चामहाः पञ्चतन्त्राचार्यि।
\* प्रायः।

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elements.* He ascribes, however, to this a specific or ‘diversified existence, from its endowment with senses, which are the sources of pleasure, pain, or indifference †. The commentators agree that subtle body is subject to enjoyment or suffering only through its connection with generated body; understanding apparently thereby, not its abstract capability of either, but the actual condition in which it partakes of them; for it is repeatedly declared that the seat of enjoyment and suffering is _buddhi_, or ‘intellect;’ through the presence of which as an ingredient in subtle body, it is immediately added, the latter is invested with ‘dispositions,’ _bhávas_; that is, with the properties of intellect enumerated in ver. 23, virtue, vice, knowledge, ignorance, &c. The term _bháva_ was rendered by Mr. Colebrooke in that place by ‘sentiments,’ but in another (ver. 43) he expressed the same ‘dispositions,’ which, as far as relates to the mental _bhávas_, appears to be a preferable equivalent. Of the consequences of these dispositions, reward in heaven, or punishment in hell, dead, decomposed animal body is no longer susceptible: ‘In a dead body there can be no sense of pleasure or pain; this all admit ‡.’ In order, however, to be placed in circumstances leading to such enjoyment or suffering, generated body is necessary; and therefore subtle body migrates, _sansarati_, goes from one body to another continually: hence the world is called _sansára_, ‘migration’ or ‘revolution.’ ‘Through the influence of intellect the whole of subtle body is affected by dispositions or conditions, in the same manner as a garment is perfumed from contact with a fragrant _champa_ flower ||’ S. _Tatwa_ _Kaumudi_. Subtle body is called _linga_ from its consisting of those principles which are so termed, either from their indicating or characterising that nature from which they proceed, or from their being ultimately resolvable into it. Thus the
Chandrikā has, 'Linga, from designating, apprising *:' Gaurapāda, as above, 'It merges into nature at the season of dissolution :' and Vāches-pati, 'Linga is so termed because it suffers resolution (laya), or from its characteristic indication of the source from which it proceeds †.' See also remarks on ver. 10. p. 43.

XLI.

As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a stake, &c. so neither does subtle person subsist supportless, without specific (or unspecific) particles.

BHĀSHYA.

As a picture without the support of a wall or the like does not stand; as the shadow does not stand without the stake (the gnomon of a dial); that is, without them does not exist. The term et cetera comprises (other illustrations); as, water cannot be without coldness, nor coldness without water; fire without heat; air without touch; ether without extension; earth without smell; so by this illustration it is intimated that it, the rudiment (linga), does not subsist without unspecific or rudimental particles. Here also specific elements are implied, or body composed of the five gross elements; for without a body, having specific particles, where can the place of the linga be; which, when it abandons one corporeal frame, takes refuge in another. Supportless; devoid of support. Subtile (person); instrument of thirteen kinds: this is the meaning of the text.

For what purpose (these subtle elements are embodied) is next described.

* लिङ्गादिक जापनालिंग।  || लिङ्ग तथ गच्छतीमि लिङ्ग हेतुम।
चेनचास्य लिङ्गलयिति भावः।
COMMENT.

In the preceding verse it was stated that subtle person migrated, or as soon as deprived of one body it took refuge in another. It is now explained why this must be; and that it proceeds from the necessity of something to give to subtle principles asylum and support.

The text accordingly states, that the 'rudiment,' the linga, cannot exist without such support; but with regard to the support itself there is some difference of opinion, the passage being variously read and interpreted.

Gaurapāda reads the expression, avīśēśhair vinā, 'without unspecific particles;' by which he states that he means the 'rudimental particles,' the tav mátras. He adds, that specific particles, gross elementary bodies, are also necessary; using the terms avīśēśha and viśēśha as they were before employed (ver. 38), to represent severally the rudimental and gross elements. Vāchespati and Nārāyana read the phrase viśēśhair vinā, 'without specific particles;' but they use the term 'specific' apparently in its general acceptation of 'species,' without reference to its technical employment in ver. 38; for they confine its purpose to that of 'subtile bodies.' 'Without specific particles; without subtle bodies: that is the meaning*.' S. Tatwa Kaumudi. 'Without specific particles; without very subtile bodies: the rudiment (linga), being unsupported, does not remain; but being supported by subtile bodies it exists †.' S. Chandrikā. So far therefore, although the reading be different, the interpretation appears to be the same. The linga, or 'rudiment'—for it is to be observed, that it is this which is spoken of by both text and comment, and not the linga śarira, 'rudimental body'—cannot subsist without a bodily frame. Whence that frame is derived, Gaurapāda makes sufficiently clear. The linga, or 'rudiment,' consists of but thirteen principles—the unclothed faculties and senses: the rudimental body, by which they are aggregated and

* विशेषकारिता सूक्ष्मश्रीरस्त्रयः ||
† विशेषकारितसूक्ष्मशारिः
रूपिना लिङ्ग सूक्ष्मश्रीरस्त्रयः न तिर्धिति किंतु सूक्ष्मश्रीरांथितां तिर्धिति।
defended, is a *tan mátrika* body, composed of the rudimental elements (p. 123). This again, for worldly existence, is enveloped in a bodily frame of gross elementary composition.

It may, however, be suspected that the authors of the *S. Tatwa Kau-
mudi* and the *Chandriká* have not attended to the distinction, and that they intend by their 'specific or subtle bodies' only one of the 'species,' or *višéshas*, which may be intimated in ver. 38; a modification of the gross elements enclosing, not the naked 'rudiment,' the *linga*, but the 'rudimental body,' the *linga śaríra*. Such, at any rate, is the interpretation of *Vijnána Bhisiku*, who, commenting on this stanza of the *Káríká*, explains 'specific particles, those which are called subtle amongst gross; a species or variety of gross elements:' and he says, that 'the definition of subtle body which is given in the preceding stanza, "composed of intellect with other subtle elements" (p. 128), as compared with the expression of the present verse, proves that there is a distinction made between subtle body and the specific variety of the gross elements, which is also called subtle *'.

The question then is not one merely of a difference of interpretation, but it is a difference of doctrine. According to Gaúrapáda's explanation, which appears to be the original theory, living bodies consist of two parts, one of a subtle, and one of a gross nature; the latter perishes or decomposes at death; the former may live on through the existence of the world: the latter gives cover to the former, which is the immediate vehicle of soul, and accompanies it constantly, through successive perishable bodies, until soul's liberation, or until a period of universal dissolution restore its component parts to their primitive and common parent. To this body the term of *linga śaríra*, 'rudimental body,' is properly applied; it is also called *átiveśika*, that which is swifter than the wind in passing from body to body; and, as Mr. Colebrooke observes, "it seems..."
to be a compromise between an immaterial soul and the difficulty which a gross understanding finds in grasping the comprehension of individual existence, unattached to matter.” Tr. R. As. Soc. I. 32.

But some of the expounders of the Sánkhya doctrines have not thought even the rudimental body sufficiently material for the purpose of independent existence, when separated from gross body; and a third corporeal frame has been devised for its support, to which the present verse of the Káriká and the other passages which seem to allude to a subtle form of specific or gross elementary matter relate, according to VIJÑÁNA BHIKSU: ‘Having abandoned gross body, a support is necessary for the passage of rudimental body to other regions, and another species of body is established.’ This is more particularly explained in the same writer’s commentary on a somewhat obscure Sútra immediately preceding: “In the body, which is the receptacle of the receptacle of that (rudimental body); for the denomination of body is applied to one as it is to the other.” That is, the receptacle or support of that rudiment, which will be described as composed of the five elements, is supported or contained in body constituted of the six organic ingredients (bones, blood, &c.); to which the name body is applied, from the same being applicable to the sense of the word adhisháhána (déha, “body,” being understood apparently in either case “containing” or “comprehending”). The corporeity of the vehicle or receptacle (adhishståhána) arises from its relation to the (aggregate) linga; the corporeity of gross body, from its being the receptacle of vehicular body. This is the meaning of the text. We have therefore three (kinds of) body established.” Quoting a passage which appears opposed to
this, and to intimate, as Gaurapāda has done, a twofold distinction only of bodies, the same writer observes, ‘What is said in writings, upon the authority of the Védas, that there are but two (kinds of) bodies, arises from their identifying the rudimental and vehicular bodies as one, as they are mutually permanent and subtile.’ This is no doubt correct; but it is very unlikely that the elder writers admitted any form of the gross elements to be equally permanent and subtile as the rudiments from which they proceeded. In the institutes of Manu, for instance, although the doctrine there laid down is of a different tenor from that of the Sāṅkhya system, we have but two kinds of bodies, a subtile and a substantial one, described: ‘After death another body, composed of the five rudimental elements, is immediately produced, for wicked men, that may suffer the tortures of the infernal regions.’ Manu, XII. 16. We have here, then, a body composed of the five rudimental elements. In the Bhagavad Gītā it is intimated that soul retains the senses and mind in the intervals of migration: ‘At the time that spirit obtains a body, and when it abandons one, it migrates, taking with it those senses, as the wind wafts along with it the perfume of the flowers.’

If Vāchespati be correct in his interpretation of the word purusha, the Vēda makes one kind of subtile body of the size of the thumb: ‘“Yama drew forth violently the subtile body, as big as the thumb.”—The specification of the size merely denotes minuteness; extraction of soul would be absurd; and therefore by purusha must be meant “a subtile body,” that which reposes in gross body.” This, agreeably to the older doctrine, would
be rudimental body; according to later refinement, vehicular. It is
the latter which, as Mr. Colebrooke mentions (Tr. R. As. Soc. I. 33) in
Patañjali's Yoga sástra, is conceived to extend, like the flame of a lamp
over its wick, to a small distance above the skull; and which, according to
M. Cousin, is "la fameuse pensée intracranienne, dont on a cru faire
récemment une découverte merveilleuse." Hist. de la Philosophie, I. 195.

The notion of some corporeal, however subtle, envelopment of soul—
the εἰκών, umbra, manes, simulacrum, spirit, or ghost—giving to invisible
and intangible soul some visible and tangible materiality, "such," as Good
(Translation of Lucretius) observes, "as will at least enable the soul to
assume some degree of material configuration, and to be capable of cor-
poral feelings, however spiritualized and refined, even after its separation
from the body"—has prevailed in all times and in all ages. Nor was the
doctrine confined to the people or the poets: such of the philosophers as
maintained the immateriality of soul, attaching to it, until its final purifi-
cation, some portion of corporeal substance, or some substantial, though
subtle investiture, or ὕπνος, or vehicle. Thus Cudworth (vol. III. 517)
states, that 'the ancient assertors of the soul's immortality did not suppose
human souls, after death, to be quite stripped stark naked from all body,
but that the generality of souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or
airy body accompanying them; as also they conceived this spirituous
body to hang about the soul also here in this life, before death, as its
interior indument or vestment, which also then sticks to it when that
other gross earthly part of the body is by death put off as an outer gar-
ment." It also appears, that "besides the terrestrial body, and this spi-
rituous body, the ancients held that there is a third kind, of a higher rank,
peculiarly belonging to such souls, after death, as are purged and cleansed
from corporeal affections, called by them σώμα αὐρατοειδές, or a luciform
body." The authorities quoted by Cudworth for these opinions are new
Platonists, or Christian writers of the fourth and fifth centuries; and it
seems not unlikely that they borrowed some of their notions from the
doctrines of Christianity. They profess, however, to repeat the tenets of
Pythagoras and Plato; and Cudworth asserts, that the distinction of two
interior vehicles or tunicles of the soul, besides that outer vestment of the
terrestrial body, is not a mere figment of the latter Platonists, but a tradition derived down from antiquity. Mosheim, in his translation of Cudworth, has entered, in a note, very fully into an inquiry as to the origin of the opinion of a subtile body investing soul, and concludes, "Vetus hæc opinio aut si mavis superstition, ab ipsis fere Graecorum heroicis temporibus ducta:" and Brucker, in reference to his observations on this subject, remarks, "Hoc vero magna doctrina et ingenio demonstravit Mosheimius hanc de vehiculo opinionem non demum in juniorum Platonicorum cerebro enatam esse sed fuisse dogma canæ antiquitatis." Hist. Philos. I. 714. Although, therefore, less clearly expressed than by the Hindu writers, the early Greek philosophers entertained similar notions of the nature of the subtile body, which was inseparable from soul until the period of its final exemption from transmigration.

XLII.

For the sake of soul's wish, that subtile person exhibits (before it), like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequence, with the aid of nature's influence.

BHÂSHYA.

The purpose of soul is to be fulfilled, therefore nature proceeds to action. This (purpose) is twofold, apprehension of sound and the other objects of sense, and apprehension of the difference between qualities and soul. Apprehension of sound and the other objects of sense is enjoyment of sensual gratification, as fragrance and the like in the spheres of Brahmâ and the rest: apprehension of the difference between the qualities and soul is liberation. Therefore it is said, For the sake of soul's wish subtile person is active. Through relation of means and consequences.—Means (or antecedents) are virtue and the like: consequences are their results, such as their ascending to heaven and so forth, as we shall hereafter explain. By their relation; their connection. With the aid of
nature's influence; of the influence of the chief one, nature. As a king in his own kingdom does what he wishes of his own authority, so by the application of the supreme authority of nature, through the relation of means (or causes) and consequences, subtile body exhibits: that is, nature commands subtile body to assume different conditions, by taking different (gross) bodies. Subtile body is that which is aggregated of subtile atomic rudimental elements, and is possessed of thirteen instruments (or faculties and senses). It assumes various conditions, by its birth, amongst gods, animals and men. How does (it exhibit)? Like an actor, who when he enters upon the scene is a god, and when he makes his exit is again a mortal: or again, a buffoon. So the subtile body, through the relation of causes and consequences, having entered the womb, may become an elephant, a woman, or a man.

It was said (ver. 40), "Subtile body migrates, invested with dispositions." What those dispositions are is now described.

COMMENT.

The circumstances on which transmigration depends are here said to be the purpose of soul, enforced by the authority of nature.

Soul's purpose is either fruition or liberation; and to accomplish one or other of these, subtile body passes through various conditions, assuming different exterior forms, as an actor puts on different dresses to personate one while Ráma, another while Yudhishthira, or again, Vaisa*. The purpose of soul is enforced by the power, authority, or influence of nature†. Vibhutwa, as illustrated by Gaurápáda, means 'kingly or supreme authority.' Váchespati understands it as 'universality' rather, as in the text of the Purána: 'This wonderful vicissitude is from the universality of nature‡; that is, from its invariable presence and consequent influence. But besides these motives, the purpose of soul and

* यशा हि नटस्युद्धीकामाणाय रामो वाङ्जातवे चतुरास्त्रो च
**विभवेश्वरे गारुपादाय प्रवर्तित ।
† विभुवकोणात ।
‡ वाचेश्वरे प्रधानस्य परिवर्तित.

महत्।
influence of nature, which may be regarded as the remote and proximate causes of transmigration in general, it is still necessary to have what may be regarded as a special, or exciting, or efficient cause; the reason of the particular migration; the cause wherefore, in particular instances, subtle body should ascend from the exterior frame of a man to that of a god, or wherefore it should descend from the exterior frame of a man to that of a brute. This depends, then, upon the relation of certain occasional or instrumental means or causes, *nimittas*, with their incidental consequences or effects, the *naimittikas*; as virtue and vice, which lead severally to reward and punishment after death; that is, to regeneration in an exalted or degraded condition. Thus the *Chandrikā* explains the terms: ‘*Nimitta* is virtue and the rest; *naimitta* is the effect, having the *nimitta* for its cause, as gross bodies, &c. By the relation or connection of these two, subtle body, assuming the form of gods or other beings, performs its part.’ Professor Lassen has been needlessly perplexed by this verse, and has strangely rendered it as follows: “Corpusculum hocce propter genii causam effectum, ludionis instar se habet ad has modo ad illas originarias et derivatas conditiones pronum, post conjunctionem procreatricis cum potestate sua.”

XLIII.

Essential dispositions are innate. Incidental, as virtue and the rest, are considered appurtenant to the instrument. The uterine germ (flesh and blood) and the rest belong to the effect (that is, to the body).
BHÁSHYA.

Dispositions (bhávas, ‘conditions’) of being are considered to be threefold, innate, essential, and incidental. The first, or innate, are those four which in the first creation were cognate with the divine sage Kapila, or virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power. The essential are declared; these were four sons of Brahmá, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanátana, and Sanatkumára; and these four dispositions were produced with them, who were invested with bodies of sixteen years of age (or perpetually juvenile bodies), in consequence of the relation of causes and effects (or in consequence of merit in a former existence); therefore these dispositions are called essential. Incidental are those derived through the corporeal form of a holy teacher; from which (in the first instance) knowledge is incidentally obtained by such as we are; from knowledge comes dispassion; from dispassion, virtue; and from virtue, power. The form of a teacher is an incidental product (of nature), and therefore these dispositions are termed incidental: “Invested by which, subtle body migrates” (ver. 40). These four dispositions are of the quality of goodness; those of darkness are their contraries: as above, “Virtue, &c. are its faculties partaking of goodness; those partaking of darkness are the reverse” (ver. 23). Consequently there are eight dispositions, or virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, vice, ignorance, passion, weakness. Where do they abide? They are considered appurtenant to the instrument. Intellect is an instrument, and to that they are appurtenant; as in ver. 23, “Ascertainment is intellect; virtue, knowledge,” &c. Effect; body. The uterine germ and the rest belong to it; those which are born of the mother, the germ and the rest, or the bubble, the flesh, the muscle, and the rest, which are (generated), for the development of the infant, in the union of the blood and the seminal fluid. Thus the conditions of infancy, youth, and old age are produced; the instrumental causes of which are food and beverage; and therefore they are said to be attributes of the effect (or of the body), having, as the instrumental cause, the fruition of the sensual pleasures of eating and the like.

It was said (ver. 42), “Through the relation of means and consequences:” this is next explained.
COMMENT.

We have here an explanation of what is to be understood by the term \textit{dispositions}, used in a former passage (ver. 40).

The translation of \textit{bhāva} adopted by Mr. Colebrooke in this place is ‘disposition’; in the passage referred to he had employed, as above remarked, ‘sentiment;’ but it was there changed, in order to preserve consistency. Neither word perhaps exactly expresses the purport of the original, nor is it easy to find one that will precisely correspond. In some respects ‘condition,’ mode, or state of being, \textit{conditio}, as rendered by Professor Lassen, is preferable, as better comprehending the different circumstances to which \textit{bhāva} is applied; although, as he has occasion subsequently to remark, it does not very well express all the senses in which \textit{bhāva} occurs. These circumstances or conditions, according to the obvious meaning of the text, are of two kinds, or intellectual and corporeal. The first comprise virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, and their contraries; the second, the different periods of life, or embryo, infancy, youth, and senility. They are also to be regarded as respectively cause and effect; virtue, &c. being the efficient cause, or \textit{nimitta}; bodily condition the \textit{uaimittika}, or consequence; as Vāchespati explains the object of the stanza, ‘which,’ according to him, ‘distinguishes incidental cause and consequence, the latter being the incidental conditions of body †.’

But besides the division of conditions or dispositions into the two classes of intellectual and corporeal, they are also characterised according to their origin, as \textit{sānsiddhika, prākrita}, and \textit{vaikrita}, rendered in the text ‘innate, essential, and incidental.’ Prof. Lassen translates them \textit{conditiones absoluæ, pendentes ab origine, pertinentes ad evoluta principia}. Both the two first are innate, and some further distinction is necessary. ‘Superhuman’ or ‘transcendental’ would perhaps best explain the first, as they are, according to the commentator, peculiar to saints and sages. According to \textit{Gaurapāda}, they occur only in one instance as the cognate

\begin{footnotesize} \begin{itemize}
\item \textit{भाव:} ।
\item \textit{निमित्तं नैसिद्धिकं च विन्धन्ते। वैकृतिकं नैनिसिद्धिकं।}
\end{itemize} \end{footnotesize}
conditions of the divine Kapila, the author of the Sankhya system. The second class, which may be rendered ‘natural,’ agreeably to his view, which is a little mystical, originated with the four holy and chaste sons of Brahma. The third class, those which are incidental or constructive, vaikrita, belong to mortals, as they are produced in them by instruction. Vachespata recognises but two distinctions, identifying, as in the translation, the innate (sambhaddha) with the essential (prakrita) dispositions, they being both swabhavika, ‘inseparable, inherent,’ not the production of tuition, and opposing to it the constructive or incidental (vaikritika)∗.

A similar account of their origin as in the Bhāshya is given, but under these two heads only: ‘Thus in the beginning of creation the first sage, the venerable and great Muni Kapila, appeared, spontaneously endowed with virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power. The incidental and unspontaneous dispositions were produced by the cultivation of the means (of producing them), as (the lessons of) Prāchetasā and other great Rishis†.’ These dispositions or conditions are dependent upon the instrument, that is upon buddhi, or ‘intellect,’ of which they are faculties, as was explained in verse 23. The states or conditions of life depend upon the body, and are the immediate effects of generation and nutriment, the more remote effects of virtue, vice, &c.

XLIV.

By virtue is ascent to a region above; by vice, descent to a region below: by knowledge is deliverance; by the reverse, bondage.
BHÁSHYA.

By virtue ascent.—Having made virtue the efficient cause, it leads upwards. By upwards eight degrees are intended, or the regions of Brahmá, Prajápati, Soma, Indra, the Gándharbas, the Yákshas, the Rákshasas, and Piśáchas: the subtile body goes thither. Or if vice be the efficient cause, it migrates into an animal, a deer, a bird, a reptile, a vegetable, or a mineral. Again; by knowledge, deliverance: knowledge of the twenty-five principles; by that efficient cause, deliverance: the subtile body ceases, and (soul is) called ‘supreme spirit’ (paramátmá). By the reverse, bondage: ignorance is the efficient cause, and that (effect) bondage is natural (prákrita), incidental (vaikáríka), or personal (dákshína), as will be explained: “He who is bound by natural, incidental, or personal bondage is not loosed by any other (means than knowledge).”

Next, other efficient causes are declared.

XLV.

By dispassion is absorption into nature; by foul passion, migration: by power, unimpediment; by the reverse, the contrary.

BHÁSHYA.

If any one has dispassion without knowledge of principles, then from such dispassion unprecedented by knowledge occurs absorption into nature, or when the individual dies he is resolved into the eight primary elements, or nature, intellect, egotism, and the five rudiments; but there is no liberation, and therefore he migrates anew. So also by foul passion; as, I sacrifice, I give gifts, in order to obtain in this world divine or human enjoyment; from such foul passion proceeds worldly migration. By power, unimpediment.—Where eightfold power, as minuteness, &c. is the efficient cause, then non-obstruction is the effect. Such power is unim-
oped in the sphere of Brahmá, or in any other. *By the reverse, the contrary.*—The contrary of unimpediment is obstruction, which proceeds from want of power, everywhere obstructed.

Thus sixteen efficient causes and effects have been enumerated: what they comprehend (or amount to) is next described.

**COMMENT.**

In these two verses the efficient causes of the various conditions of subtle body and their effects, or its conditions, are detailed.

These causes and effects are collectively sixteen, eight of each: the former are positive and negative, as diversified by the qualities of goodness and foulness (ver. 23); and the effects respectively correspond. They are accordingly,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Effect</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Virtue</td>
<td>2. Elevation in the scale of being.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Ignorance</td>
<td>8. Bondage or transmigration.</td>
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By 'virtue,' *dharma*, both religious and moral merit are intended. *Ascent*, going upward, is elevation to a more exalted station in another birth; the term *sthána* implying both place and degree. According to *Gaurapáda*, this ascent is eightfold, and the subtle frame may after death assume a new body amongst the various classes of spirits, Piśáchas, Rákshasas, Yákshas, and Gandherbas; or may attain a place in the heaven of Indra; of Soma, or the moon; of the Prajápatí, or progenitors of mankind; or even in the region of Brahmá. It is a curious, though perhaps an accidental coincidence, that the Syrians and Egyptians enumerated also, according to Plato (Epinomis), eight orders of heavenly beings: their places, however, seem to be the planets exclusively. The
author of the *S. T. Kauṇḍinya* understands by *ascent*, or elevation, ascent to the six superterrestrial regions, *Dyu*, or *Bhūvar loka*, the atmosphere; *Śvēr loka*, the heaven of Indra; *Mahar loka*, *Janaloaka*, and *Tapoloka*, worlds of sages and saints; and *Satya loka*, of Brahmā. By *degradation* he understands descent to the subterrene regions, *Pātāla*, *Rasātalā*, &c. These notions are, however, not incompatible, as rewards and punishments in heaven and hell are but temporary, and subtle body must even afterwards assume terrestrial form, and undergo a series of migrations before escape from the bondage of existence can be finally accomplished.

*Bondage* is said by the commentators to be of three kinds, intending thereby three different errors or misconceptions of the character of soul and nature; the prevalence of which precludes all hope of final emancipation. ‘These errors or bonds are, 1. *Prākritika*; the error or bondage of the materialists, who assert soul in nature (or matter): 2. *Vaikritika*; the error of another class of materialists, who confound soul with any of the products of nature, as the elements, the senses, egotism or intellect: and, 3. *Dākshina*; the error or bondage of those who, ignorant of the real character of soul, and blinded by the hope of advantage, engage in moral and religious observances:’ as Vāchespatī*. These errors confine the soul to its subtle material frame for various protracted periods; as, for instance, in the case of those who identify soul with sense, for ten *manvantaras*, or above three thousand millions of years (3,084,480,000).

By *dispassion* occurs ‘absorption into nature,’ *prakṛiti laya†*; or, as the *Kauṇḍinya* and *Chandrikā* express it, ‘resolution into the chief one and the rest ‡.’ Gaurapāda makes the meaning of the phrase sufficiently clear: according to him it signifies the resolution of even the subtle body into

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*pāparashitaratmanasamastaksah bhūtaḥ brahmapūjā rājā kalaśadaroṣaś cādāmś cādāmś tiverō tiverō mṛgāhīkām samāsavat pāparashitaratmanasamastaksah brahmapūjā rājā kalaśadaroṣaś cādāmś cādāmś tiverō tiverō mṛgāhīkām samāsavat*
its constituent elements: but this is not in this case equivalent to liberation; it is only the term of one series of migrations, soul being immediately reinvested with another person, and commencing a new career of migratory existence until knowledge is attained.

The remainder of the text requires no explanation.

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XLVI.

This is an intellectual creation, termed obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfectness. By disparity of influence of qualities the sorts of it are fifty.

BHÁSHYA.

This aggregate of sixteen causes and effects is called an intellectual creation. Pratyaya means buddhi, 'intellect.' "Intellect is ascertainment," &c. (ver. 23). This intellectual creation is of four kinds, obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfectness. In this classification, doubt (obstruction) is ignorance; as when any one beholding a post (at a distance) is in doubt whether it is a post or a man. Disability is when, even though the object be distinctly seen, the doubt cannot be dissipated. The third kind is called acquiescence; as when a person declines to doubt or determine whether the object be a post or not; saying, What have I to do with this. The fourth kind is perfectness; as when the delighted observer notices a creeper twining round the object, or a bird perched upon it, and is certain that it is a post. By disparity of influence of qualities.—By the unequal (or varied) influence of the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, acting on this fourfold intellectual creation, there are fifty modifications of it: and these kinds in which severally goodness, foulness, or darkness prevails, and the other two are subordinate, are next particularized.

COMMENT.

In this and the five following stanzas the modifications of the causes and consequences, or the conditions of existence produced by the intel-
lectual faculties, as influenced by the three qualities, are detailed and classified.

By ‘intellectual creation,’ *pratyaya serga*, is to be understood the various accidents of human life occasioned by the operations of the intellect, or the exercise of its faculties, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power, and their contraries. *Pratyaya* properly means ‘trust,’ but is here considered to be synonymous with *buddhi*. It may be understood as implying ‘notion;’ and *pratyaya serga* is the creation or existence of which we have a notion or belief, in contradistinction to bodily or organic existence, of which we have an idea or sensible perception; the *bhūta serga*, or ‘elemental creation.’

Existence then, dependent on the faculties of the intellect and their consequences, is further distinguished as of four kinds: 1. ‘Obstruction,’ *viparyaya*, is explained by Vāchespati ‘ignorance’ (*ajñāna*), by Gaura-pada ‘doubt’ (*samsaya*): 2. ‘Disability,’ *aśakti*, is imperfection of the instruments or senses: 3. *Tushiti* is ‘acquiescence’ or ‘indifference’: and, 4. *Siddhi* is ‘complete or perfect knowledge.’ ‘In the three first are comprised the seven intellectual faculties, virtue and the rest (see p. 88), all except knowledge, which is comprehended in perfectness.’ *S. Tatwa Kaumudi*. This is the collective or generic division. Each genus is again divided so as to form fifty species, according as they are affected by the three qualities, or the predominance of one, and the depression of another. The species are enumerated in the succeeding verse.

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* प्रत्ययस्ति:।

† भूतस्ति:।

† तत्तयपर्यंयाशक्तिजित्वेष्यु

यथायोग: समानां धम्मादीर्द्वां ज्ञानवर्जिनमनव्रत: सिद्धिः च ज्ञानस्येति।

|| एकक्षाधिकबलता इयोवे एकक्षयूपूनबलता इयोवे।
XLVII.

There are five distinctions of obstruction; and, from defect of instruments, twenty-eight of disability: acquiescence is ninefold; perfectness eightfold.

BHÁSHYA.

Five distinctions of obstruction; namely, obscurity, illusion, extreme illusion, gloom, and utter darkness: these will presently be explained. There are twenty-eight kinds of disability from defect of instruments; which also we shall describe. Acquiescence is ninefold, being the kinds of knowledge partaking of the quality of foulness in an ascetic. Perfectness is eightfold, which in holy men consists also of the kinds of knowledge partaking of the quality of goodness. These will all be explained in order; and first of obstruction.

COMMENT.

We have here the fifty varieties of intellectual creation, or conditions dependent upon the faculties of intellect, simply enumerated under each head respectively.

The text in each case is limited to the enumeration of the number of the varieties, leaving their designations and descriptions to be supplied by the scholia: accordingly we have in the Bháshya the five distinctions of obstruction specified. They are referred to in the text, in the succeeding stanza, for the purpose of enumerating their subdivisions, and it is unnecessary therefore to enter upon the detail here.

XLVIII.

The distinctions of obscurity are eightfold, as also those of illusion; extreme illusion is tenfold; gloom is eighteenfold, and so is utter darkness.
BHÁSHYA.

Obscurity is eightfold; final dissolution being so distinguished through ignorance; as when a person thinks that soul merges into the eight forms of prakriti, or the five rudiments, egotism, intellect, and nature, and thence concludes, I am liberated: this is eightfold obscurity. The same is the number of kinds of illusion; in consequence of which, Indra and the gods, being attached to the possession of the eight kinds of superhuman power, such as minuteness and the rest, do not obtain liberation, but upon the loss of their power migrate again: this is called eightfold illusion. Extreme illusion is of ten kinds, accordingly as the five objects of sense, sound, touch, form, taste, and smell, are sources of happiness to the gods or to men. In these ten objects (or the five objects of sense twice told) consists extreme illusion. Gloom is eighteenfold.—The faculties of superhuman power are eight sources, and the objects of sense, human or divine, are ten, making eighteen; and the feeling that makes men rejoice in the enjoyment of these eighteen, and grieve for the want of them, is gloom. Utter darkness has in like manner eighteen varieties, originating with the eightfold superhuman power and the ten objects of perception; but it applies to the profound grief felt by one who dies amidst the abundance of sensual delights in the season of enjoyment, or who falls from the command of superhuman faculties: that is utter darkness. In this manner the five varieties of obstruction, obscurity and the rest, are severally subdivided, making sixty-two varieties.

COMMENT.

The five kinds of obstruction, ignorance, or uncertainty, alluded to in the preceding stanza, are here specified, and their subdivisions enumerated.

'Obstruction,' viparyaya*, means, properly, whatever obstructs the soul's object of final liberation: it is consequently any cause of bondage,
of confinement to worldly existence, or of perpetual migration, and is therefore one of the four elements of the creation of the world; as, if spirit was not so confined, created forms would never have existed. So the Śūtra of Kapila has, ‘Bondage is from obstruction;’ but liberation depends on knowledge: bondage therefore arises from ignorance, and ignorance or error is obstruction. Gaurapāda accordingly uses sansayi†, ‘doubt’ or ‘error,’ as the synonyme of viparyaya; and the specification of its sub-species confirms this sense of the term, as they are all hinderances to final emancipation, occasioned by ignorance of the difference between soul and nature, or by an erroneous estimate of the sources of happiness, placing it in sensual pleasure or superhuman might.

The five varieties of obstruction or error are, ‘obscurity,’ tama; ‘illusion,’ moha; ‘extreme illusion,’ mahāmoha; ‘gloom,’ tāmisra; ‘utter darkness,’ andhatāmisra. The distinctions are more subtle than precise, but their general purport is sufficiently obvious; they all imply ignorance of self, and thirst of pleasure and power. Another enumeration, that of the Yoga, or Pātanjala school, as repeated by Viñāna Bhikshu, calls the five species, ‘ignorance’ (avidyā), ‘egoism’ (asmitā), ‘love’ (rāga), ‘hate’ (dveśa), and ‘idle terror’ (abhinnvēsa), as fear of death and the like.† They are called also in the same system, ‘the five afflictions.’ These are identified with the species named in the text. Obscurity is that ignorance which believes soul to be sealed in primary nature, or one of its first seven products; and is therefore eightfold. Illusion is that egoism that exults in the appropriation of the eight superhuman faculties; and is consequently eightfold also. Extreme illusion, or love, is addiction to sensual objects, as they are grateful respectively to gods and men: therefore this class of impediments to liberation is tenfold. Gloom, or hate, is of eighteen kinds; ten as affecting the ten objects of sense, or the five divine and five human, as before distinguished, and termed by Gaurapāda.

† Sansayi. ‡ Vidyāmsatāraṇagadhiṣṭaṁ

निवेश: पञ्च योगोऽस्मि बन्धेऽविपययस्त्रावातारभेदं इति। रयव

द्वारस्मतारागविज्ञानिवेशः पञ्चक्रिया इति पातालं।
Pāda, drishīdā, 'seen,' perceived by men; and anusravikā, 'heard traditionally,' by men, of the gods: and eight connected with the possession of the eight superhuman-faculties. The mental conditions here intended are those of fierceness and impatience, with which sensual enjoyments are pursued, or superhuman powers are exercised. Utter darkness, or terror, is the fear of death in men; and in gods, the dread of expulsion from heaven by the Asuras: in either case the loss of pleasure and power is the thing lamented; and as their sources are eighteen, so many are the subdivisions of this condition. These distinctions are said to be the work of former teachers; as in the S. Pravachana Bhāsha: 'The subdivisions are as formerly described: that is, the subdivisions of obstruction, which is said to be of five species, are such as were fully detailed by former teachers, but are in the Sūtra but briefly alluded to, for fear of propinquity.'

XLIX.

Depravity of the eleven organs, together with injuries of the intellect, are pronounced to be disability. The injuries of intellect are seventeen, by inversion of acquiescence and perfectness.

BHĀSHYA.

From defect of instruments there are twenty-eight kinds of disability; this has been declared (ver. 47): these are, depravity of the eleven organs, or deafness, blindness, paralysis, loss of taste, loss of smell, dumbness, mutilation, lameness, constipation, impotence, and insanity. Together with injuries of the intellect: as, together with these, there are twenty-eight kinds of disability, there are seventeen kinds of injuries of the
intellect. *By inversion of acquiescence and perfectness*: that is, there are nine kinds of acquiescence, and eight of perfectness; and with the circumstances that are the reverse of these (seventeen), the eleven above specified, compose the twenty-eight varieties of disability. The kinds of injury of the intellect which are the reverse of (the sorts of) acquiescence and perfectness will be understood from the detail of their varieties.

The nine kinds of acquiescence are next explained.

**COMMENT.**

The various kinds of the second class of conditions or disability are here enumerated.

'Disability,' *āśakti*, or incapability of the intellect to discharge its peculiar functions *, is the necessary result of imperfection of the senses, or of any of the organs of perception and of action. But besides these, which are sufficiently obvious, such as blindness, deafness, and any other organic defect, there are seventeen affections of the intellect itself equally injurious to its efficiency. These are described as the contraries of the conditions which constitute the classes acquiescence and perfectness. Under the former head are enumerated, dissatisfaction as to notions of nature, means, time, and luck, and addiction to enjoyment of the five objects of sense, or the pleasures of sight, hearing, touching, &c. The contraries of perfectness are, want of knowledge, whether derivable from reflection, from tuition, or from study, endurance of the three kinds of pain, privation of friendly intercourse, and absence of purity or of liberality.

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**L.**

Nine sorts of acquiescence are propounded; four internal, relating to nature, to means, to time, and to luck; five external, relative to abstinence from (enjoyment of) objects.

* चुंबरक्षितः स्वायापरः।*
BHĀSHYA.

Five internal sorts of acquiescence.—Those which are in the individual are internal. They are said to relate to nature, to means, to time, and to luck. The first is, when a person understands what nature is, its being with or without qualities, and thence knows a principle (of existence) to be a product of nature; but knows this only, and is satisfied: he does not obtain liberation: this is acquiescence in regard to nature. The second is, when a person, ignorant of the principles (of existence), depends upon external means, such as the triple staff, the water-pot, and other implements (used by ascetics): liberation is not for him: this is acquiescence in regard to means. Acquiescence in regard to time is when a person satisfies himself that liberation must occur in time, and that it is unnecessary to study first principles: such a one does not obtain liberation. And in the same way acquiescence as relates to luck is when a person is content to think that by good luck liberation will be attained. These are four kinds of acquiescence. Five external, relative to abstinence from (enjoyment of objects).—The external sorts of acquiescence are five; from abstinence from enjoyment of (five) objects of sense; that is, when a person abstains from gratification through sound, touch, form, flavour, and smell; such abstinence proceeding from observation of (the evils of) acquiring, preserving, waste, attachment (to sensual pleasures), and injuriousness. Acquiring is pain (or trouble), for the sake of increase, by the pasturage of cattle, trade, acceptance of gifts, and servitude. There is pain in the preservation of what has been acquired; and if they be enjoyed, they are wasted; and waste, again, is vexation. When attachment to sensual pleasures prevails, the organs have no repose: this is the fault of such attachment. Without detriment to created things there is no enjoyment (of sensible objects); and this is the defect of injuriousness. From observing then the evil consequences of acquiring and the rest, abstinence from enjoyment of the five objects of sense is practised; and these are the five sorts of external acquiescence. From the variety of these internal and external kinds proceed the nine sorts of acquiescence. Their names are differently enumerated in other works, or ambhas, salilam, ogha, vrishṭi, sutamas, páram, sunetram, nárikam, and anuttamāmbhasikam: and from
the reverse of these kinds of acquiescence, constituting the varieties of
disability, injuries of the intellect arise, named (according to the last
mentioned nomenclature) anambhas, asalilam, and so on. From the con-
trariety of these, therefore, are inferred the injuries of the intellect.

Perfectness is next described.

COMMENT.

The different kinds of acquiescence, apathy, or indifference, are spec-
cified in this verse.

The kinds of acquiescence, content, or complacency, tushī, are of two
descriptions; internal or spiritual, ādhyātmika, and external or sensible,
bhāya. Gaurāpāda explains the former, ‘being in self or spirit.’ Vāches-
pati defines them, ‘Those kinds of acquiescence are called internal which
proceed from discrimination of self, as different from nature.’ According
to Vijnāna Bhikṣu, they are those principles or sentiments which preside
over collected or composed soul. Of the different species, the first, or
that which relates to nature, acknowledges it as the radical principle of all
things, but expects that as every thing is but a modification of nature, so
nature will effect all that is necessary, even liberation, for example, and
the individual I remains passive and complete. Another person, as the
means of liberation, adopts a religious or mendicant order, or at least bears
the emblems, as the staff, the water-pot, and the like: the term vividikā
used in the Bhāṣya is of doubtful import, and is perhaps an error. Others
suppose that liberation must come in time, or at least by a long con-
tinued course of meditation. Others imagine it may come by good luck;
and contenting themselves with these notions or practices, omit the only
means of being freed from existence, discriminative meditation. The five
external kinds of acquiescence are self-denial, or abstinence from the five objects of sensual gratification; not from any philosophic appreciation of them, but from dread of the trouble and anxiety which attends the means of procuring and enjoying worldly pleasures; such as acquiring wealth, preserving it, spending it, incessant excitement and injury or cruelty to others. Besides the terms ordinarily significant of these divisions of acquiescence, the Scholiasts specify other words, the usual sense of which is quite different, and which may therefore be regarded as the slang or mystical nomenclature of the followers of the Yoga. There is some difference in the precise expressions, but they are of a similar purport in general. The first four, the synonymes of the internal modes of acquiescence, are alike in all the authorities; or, *ambhas*, *water*; *salila*, also *water*; *oghha*, *quantity*; and *vrishli*, *rain*. *Gaurapada* then has for the five exterior modes, *sutamas*, *great darkness*; *para*, *shore*; *sunetra*, *a beautiful eye*; *nariika*, *feminine*; and *anuttamambhisika*, *unsurpassed water*. *Vachespata* makes them, *param*, *suparam*, *good shore*; *aparam*, *shoreless*; *anuttamambhas*, *unsurpassed water*; and *uttamambhas*, *excellent water*. The *Chandrikā* has the same, except in the third place, where the term is *parpāra*, *both shores*; with which the *S. Prav. Bh.* agrees. No explanation of the words is anywhere given, nor is any reason assigned for their adoption.

LI.

Reasoning, hearing, study, prevention of pain of three sorts, intercourse of friends, and purity (or gift) are perfections (or means thereof). The fore-mentioned three are curbs of perfectness.
BHÁSHYA.

Reasoning; as when a person always reasons, What here is truth? What is the future? What is final felicity? How may I attain the object (of my existence)? and from reflecting in this manner, the knowledge is acquired that soul is different from nature; that intellect, egotism, the rudiments, the senses, the elements, are several and distinct. In this manner knowledge of the (twenty-five) principles is attained, by which liberation is accomplished. This is the first kind of perfectness, called reasoning. Next, from knowledge acquired by hearing proceeds knowledge of nature, intellect, egotism, the rudiments, the senses, and the elements; whence liberation ensues: this is perfectness by hearing. When from study, or the perusal of the Védas and other (sacred) writings, knowledge of the twenty-five principles is acquired; that is the third kind of perfectness. Prevention of the three kinds of pain.—When, for the purpose of preventing the three kinds of pain, internal, external, and superhuman, a holy teacher has been attended, and liberation is derived from his counsel; then this constitutes the fourth kind of perfectness. This is threefold, with reference to the three different sorts of pain, and makes, with the three preceding, six varieties of perfectness. Next, intercourse of friends; as when a friend, having acquired knowledge, obtains liberation: this is the seventh kind of perfectness. Gift; as when a person assists holy men, by donations of a dwelling, of herbs, of a staff, a wallet, food, or clothing; and (in requital) receives from them knowledge, and thus obtains liberation: this is the eighth sort of perfectness. In other books these eight kinds of perfectness are termed táram, sutáram, táratáram, pramodam, pramoditam, pramodamánam, ramyakam, and sadá-pramuditam.—From contrariety to these, the injuries of intellect which occur, or causes of disability, are termed atáram, asutarām, &c.; thus completing the twenty-eight kinds of disability, as in the text (ver. 49), "Depravity of the eleven organs, together with injuries of the intellect," &c. Thus the contraries of the sorts of acquiescence being nine, and the contraries of the kinds of perfectness being eight, they form seventeen injuries of intellect; and these, with the eleven defects of the organs, constitute twenty-eight kinds of disability, as previously stated.
In this way the various kinds of obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfectness, have been affirmatively and negatively described. Again, the forementioned three are curbs of perfectness.—Forementioned; that is, obstruction, disability, and acquiescence; they are curbs of perfectness: threefold curbs from their severality. As an elephant is kept in check when restrained by a goad (or curb), so, impeded by obstruction, disability, and acquiescence, the world suffers ignorance: therefore abandoning them, perfectness alone is to be pursued; for by a person having perfectness knowledge is attained, and thence liberation.

It was stated (ver. 40) that “subtile body migrates, invested with dispositions:” those dispositions were previously said to be virtue and the rest, eight in number, modifications (or faculties) of intellect; which again have been described as modified by obstruction, disability, acquiescence, and perfectness. These (together) constitute intellectual creation, also called dispositional (or conditional): but subtile body is called a rudimental (or personal) creation, extending throughout the fourteen sorts of created things. (See v. 53.) It then becomes a question, whether soul’s purpose is accomplished by one kind of creation, or by both? This is next explained.

COMMENT.

The different kinds of perfectness are here specified.

By ‘perfectness,’ *siddhi*, is here to be understood the means of perfecting or fulfilling the purpose of soul, or the conditions essential to its attainment; the circumstances productive of knowledge; the necessary consequence of which is exemption from future transmigration. †Reasoning, hearing, study, intercourse of friends, and gift, are secondary kinds of perfectness, as subsidiary to the prevention of the three kinds of pain,

* *siddhi*: । । विहन्यमानसः दुःखसः विलासविनयातासः । इसा
मुख्यालिङ्गः: सिद्धस्वदयातीताविनागैः:। पंच सिद्धः। । तास्मः श्रीप
हेतुहे तुमच्छमायाण्वस्यतः। ॥
which constitutes a triple principal class: they are respectively distinguished as objects, and the means of effecting those objects.' *S. Tatwa Kauṇḍinya. Reasoning,* according to Vāchospati, is 'investigation of scriptural authority by dialectics which are not contrary to the scriptures;' and *investigation* is defined, 'refutation of dubious doctrine, and establishment of positive conclusions.' † *Hearing* is oral instruction, or rather the knowledge thence derived, or knowledge derived either from hearing another person read, or from expounding a work ‡. *S. Pr. Bh. Intercourse of friends* † is explained in the *S. Tatwa Kauṇḍinya* to signify 'dissatisfaction with solitary inquiry, and discussion with a teacher, a pupil, or a fellow-student.' Vijnāna Bhikṣu defines it, 'acquirement of knowledge from a benevolent visitor, who comes to give instruction.' Vāchospati and Nārāyana agree in rendering dāna — which Gaunapada explains by 'gift, liberality,' particularly to religious characters — by ṣuddhi, 'purity;' meaning the purity of discriminative knowledge; deriving it from the root daip, 'to purify;' and not from da, 'to give.' The former cites the authority of Patanjali for this sense of one kind of perfectness: 'Undisturbedness of discriminative knowledge, that is, purity; which is not attained except through long repeated and uninterrupted practice of veneration. That is also comprehended in discrimination by the term dāna.' He also observes that others interpret it 'gift, by which a sage, being propitiated, imparts

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* अग्रग्रधिकोपयोग्यमान्यामार्थपरीक्षा। परीक्षाः व संशयपूर्वप्रक्षाणि। राक्षसोत्सरपक्षक्ष्यस्थिपर्न। † अग्रदीयपादमार्कप्रक्ष्यवश्यापर्न। स्थवर्यत्व शालव। माक्कन युक्तान्तत्तदिति। ॥ सुहर्दमास्मि। ॥ धेरदा गुरुः। रिद्धसुवभवचारिणा महाद्वारकानां प्राप्ति। ॥ स्थविरस्वदेशार्थं गृहगतेत। परम्परस्वशिष्याक्षान्तामः। ॥ दानं। ॥ शुद्धि। ॥ देपं। शोधने। ॥ दानं। ॥ विवेक्यथात्तरतिविवशः। अविनवः शुद्धि। — सा च नविनाधिकृतं नयंदीयादिलक्ष्यविद्यासपरिपानाभवति। दा नेन विवेक्यथाणां विद्यां सोपि संग्रहीतः।
knowledge*. The S. Prav. Bh. gives this interpretation only†. The term for ‘curb,’ ankuśa‡, is the goad or iron hook used to guide an elephant: it is here explained by nivārana, ‘hindering;’ and ‘as obstruction, disability, and acquiescence hinder perfectness, they are to be shunned ‖.’

LII.

Without dispositions there would be no subtile person: without person there would be no pause of dispositions: wherefore a twofold creation is presented, one termed personal, the other intellectual.

BHĀSHYA.

Without dispositions, without intellectual creations, there would be no subtile person, no rudimental creation; from the non-assumption of repeated successive bodily forms, without the necessary influence of anterior conditions (or dispositions). Without person, without rudimental creation, there would be no pause of dispositions; from the indispensability of virtue or vice for the attainment of either subtile or gross body, and from the non-priority of either creation, they being mutually initiative, like the seed and the germ. There is no fault in this, for (the relation) is that of species, it does not imply the mutual relation of individuals. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, one termed conditional (or intellectual), the other rudimental (or personal). Further—

COMMENT.

It is here explained that a double condition of existence, a twofold creation, necessarily prevails; one proceeding from the intellectual facul-

* धनादिदाननाराधितो ज्ञानी ज्ञान प्रयज्ञति।† दानं च यथा धनादिदानन परितोषिताज्ञानलाभमेव इति।‡ अन्कुषः। ‖ सिद्ध परिपरिन्याक्यमेवं शक्तिनुष्टयो हेय इत्यथय:।
ties, the other from the rudimental elements; each being indispensable to the other.

It was stated (ver. 40) that subtile body migrates, invested with dispositions: and it was then explained (ver. 43, et seq.) what those dispositions or conditions were, viz. the conditions of the intellect (described in ver. 23), or virtue, vice, knowledge, ignorance, passion, dispassion, power, and debility. These were said (v. 46) to constitute an intellectual creation, or a series of conditions originating in affections of buddhi, or the intellectual principle. But the effects of these dispositions, the consequences of virtue or vice and the rest, can only be manifested in a bodily state, and therefore require necessarily a creation of a different character, personal or rudimental creation, such as subtile body, investing the imperceptible products of nature; intellect and its faculties included. Nor is such a creation indispensable for the existence or exercise of the intellectual conditions or sentiments alone, but it is equally necessary for their occasional cessation: thus virtue, vice, and the rest necessarily imply and occasion bodily condition; bodily condition is productive of acts of vice and virtue; vice and virtue, again, occasion bodily condition; and so on: like the seed and the tree, each mutually generative of the other; the tree bears the seed; from the seed springs the tree, again to put forth seed; and so on for ever; neither being initiative, neither being final. But one result of bodily condition is knowledge; knowledge is liberation, when soul is disengaged: subtile body then resolves into its rudiments, and the dispositions or conditions of the intellect terminate. In this way there are two creations, the bhāvākhyā*, that termed 'conditional' or 'intellectual;' and the lingākhyā†, that called 'rudimental' or 'personal.' Both these seem to be considered by the text, as well as by Gaurapāda and Vāchepati, as varieties of one species of the Pratyaya sarga, or 'intellectual creation.' The commentator on the S. Pravachana so far agrees with them, but he seems to restrict the two kinds more closely to a creation of intellect, regarding the linga as buddhi itself, and the bhāva

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* भावाक्ष्यः ।
† लिङ्गाक्ष्यः ।
as its conditions or dispositions. Thus, commenting on this verse of the Kārikā, he observes, ‘Bhāva signifies the modes of the apprehension (or the faculties) of intelligence, as the properties knowledge, virtue, and the rest. Linga is the great principle, or intelligence.’ He calls them both samashī sarga, ‘a collective or generic creation.’ By the other commentators, however, the linga is also called the tanmātra, or ‘rudimental creation’; and it further seems to imply ‘gross body;’ for ‘fruition, which is one of soul’s objects, cannot be accomplished without both bodies; without the receptacle that enjoys, and the objects to be enjoyed.’ The author of the Chandrikā has accordingly adopted a totally different version of this passage, understanding by bhāvakhyā, not any reference to intellectual creation, but the creation of sensible objects, the objects to be enjoyed; lingākhyā, or ‘personal creation,’ being the enjoyer: ‘Without the bhāvas, or present objects of sense, the linga, or aggregate of imperceptible principles, intelligence and the rest, could not be means of fruition; whilst without intelligence and the rest there could be no pause, no cessation, of the means of enjoying sensible objects. This is the purport of the text.’ And he defines linga to be ‘that which is only indicated, which is actually not visible, as intellect and the rest;’ and bhāva, ‘that object which is perceived or apprehended by the senses, the class of sensible objects.’

The succession of the two kinds of creation, as mutually cause and effect, is said by Vāchespati to be eternal, and without a beginning, as
even in the commencement of a kalpa bodily existence results from the conditions of similar existence in a former kalpa.

LIII.

The divine kind is of eight sorts; the grovelling is fivefold; mankind is single in its class. This, briefly, is the world of living beings.

BHÁSHYA.

Divine, of eight sorts; Bráhma, Prájapatiya, Saumya, Aindra, Gándherba, Yáksha, Rákshasha, and Paiśácha. Animals, deer, birds, reptiles, and immovable substances are the five grovelling kinds. Mankind is single. In this way there are fourteen sorts of creatures, there being three classes in the three worlds. Which is supreme in each is next explained.

COMMENT.

The intellectual or rudimentary creation hitherto described has been that of creation generally; we now have an account of specific or individual creation, composed of fourteen classes of beings.

The fourteen classes of beings are, first, eight superhuman, or Bráhma, that of Brahmá and other supreme gods; 2. Prájapatiya, that of progenitors, the Menus, the Rishis, or divine sages; 3. Saumya, lunar or planetary; 4. Aindra, that of Indra and divinities of the second order; 5. Gándherba, that of the demigods attendant on Indra, and of similar beings; 6. Rákshasa, that of demons, foes of the gods; 7. Yáksha, that of the attendants of Kúvéra; 8. Paiśácha, that of mischievous and cruel fiends. These are divine or superhuman beings. The ninth class is that of man, which contains but one species. We have then five classes of
inferior beings; or, counting from the preceding, 10. Animals, or domestic animals, *pāśu*; 11. Wild animals, as deer and the like, *mrīga*; 12. Birds; 13. Reptiles, or creeping things, including fish *sarisripa*; and 14. *Sthāvara*, fixed things, such as vegetables and minerals. These constitute the *vyashṭi serga**,* specific or individual creation; or, as denominated in the text, the *bhautika sarga*, the creation of *bhūtas*, "beings;" or elemental creation; the forms of things requiring the combination of the gross elements.

LIV.

Above, there is prevalence of goodness: below, the creation is full of darkness: in the midst, is the predominance of foulness, from *Brahmā* to a stock.

BHĀSHYA.

*Above*: in the eight divine regions. *Prevalence of goodness*: the extensiveness or predominance of the quality of goodness. Above is goodness predominant, but there are foulness and darkness also. *Below, the creation is full of darkness.*—In animals and insensible things the whole creation is pervaded by darkness in excess, but there are goodness and foulness. *In the midst*, in man, *foulness predominates*, although goodness and darkness exist; and hence men for the most part suffer pain. Such is the world, *from Brahman to a stock*; *from Brahman* to immovable things. Thus non-elemental creation, rudimental creation, conditional and elemental creation, in beings of divine, mortal, brutal, and (immovable) origin, are the sixteen sorts of creation effected by nature.

COMMENT.

The various qualities dominating in the different orders of beings are specified in this stanza.

* ब्रह्मिसर्गः।*
The coexistence of the several qualities, with the predominance of one or other of them, in different beings, has been previously explained (p. 54), as well as the different orders or states of existent beings; constituting, according to G.aurapāda, sixteen forms or kinds of creation: that is, apparently, each of the four classes of beings proceeds from four modifications of nature; or, from the invisible principles, from the subtile rudiments, from the conditions or dispositions of intellect, and from the gross elements.

LV.

There does sentient soul experience pain, arising from decay and death, until it be released from its person: wherefore pain is of the essence (of bodily existence).

BHĀSHYA.

There: in the bodies of gods, men, and animals. Pain produced by decay, and produced by death. Sentient soul: soul having sensibility. Experiences: soul experiences; not nature, nor intellect, nor egotism, nor the rudiments, senses, nor gross elements. How long does it suffer pain? this (the text) discusses. Until it be released from its person. As long as it is in subtile body, composed of intellect and the rest, it is discrete (or individualized); and as long as migratory body does not rest, so long, in brief, soul suffers pain, arising from decay and death, in the three worlds. Until it be released from its person: until the discontinuance of subtile person. In the cessation of subtile body consists liberation; and when liberation is obtained, there is no more pain. By what means, then, can liberation be effected? Whenever knowledge of the twenty-five principles, the characteristic of which is knowledge of the distinctness of soul and body, is attained; or whenever a person knows that this is nature, this intellect, this egotism, these are the five rudiments, these the eleven senses, these the five elements, and this is soul, separate and dissimilar
from them all; then from such knowledge proceeds cessation of subtile person, and thence liberation.

The object of the activity (or development of nature) is next explained.

**COMMENT.**

The presence of soul in these creations, and for what period, is here specified.

Having defined the different objects which form the twenty-five categories or *tattwas* of the Sánkhya philosophy, the text now comes to the main object of that and of all Hindu systems, the final dissolution of the connection between soul and body. The rest of the *Káriká* is devoted to the illustration of this topic. In this verse it is said that soul experiences pain in the different stages of existence, until its corporeal frame is discontinued; for soul itself is not susceptible of pain, or of decay, or death: the site of these things is nature, but nature is unconscious, insensible; and the consciousness that pain exists is restricted to soul, though soul is not the actual seat of pain; its experience of pain depends upon its connexion with rudimental person, of the material constituents of which, decay, death, and pain are concomitants. ‘Pain and the rest are from nature, they are properties of intelligence. How do they become connected with sense? Soul (*purusha*) is that which reposes (*sété*) in body (*puri*): subtile body is immediately connected with it, and becomes thereby connected with sense’.* S. *Tatwa Kaumudi.* When soul is released from body, its susceptibility of pain ceases: pain is therefore of the essence † of its own nature; that is, it is the inseparable concomitant of bodily creation, according to Panjali, as quoted in the *S. Chandriká*: ‘All is pain to the wise, through the conflict of opposite qualities, and by the sufferings arising from afflicting vicissitudes †;’ that is, from the
dread of death and the reiteration of birth; to which even the conditions of spirits, sages, and gods are subject. Thus the Sūtra of Kapila: 'The pain of death, decay, and the rest is universal*; as explained in the S. Prav. Bhāṣya: 'The pain of death, decay, and the rest is the common portion of all beings, whether above or below, from Brahmā to immovable things†.' So also another Sūtra: 'It is to be shunned, from the connection of successive birth by the thread of regeneration ||; that is, according to the commentator, * since regeneration is unavoidable, even after ascent to the regions above; and in consequence of the succession of births, that regeneration must be in an inferior condition; even the world above is to be shunned ||.' Gaurapāda and Vāchespati take no notice of the expression, 'Pain is of the essence.' The S. Chandrika explains it, 'Creation is essentially of the nature of pain §.' Rāma Krishna calls it, 'Former acts;' the acts of a former life ¶.

LVI.

This evolution of nature, from intellect to the special elements, is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively; done for another's sake as for self.

BHĀSHYA.

This (or 'thus, this; ityēsha) implies conclusiveness and limitation (that is, in this way all that has been hitherto described). Evolution of nature: in the instrumentality or act of nature. Whatever evolution of
nature, from intellect to the special elements: that is, (the evolution) of intellect from nature; of egotism from intellect; of the rudiments and senses from egotism; and of the gross elements from the subtile. Is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively.—This evolution is effected for the liberation of each individual soul which has assumed body, whether brute, human, or divine. How (is it effected)? It is done for another’s sake as for self: as, for instance, a person neglecting his own objects transacts those of a friend, so does nature; soul makes no return to nature. As for self; not for self: for the sake, in fact, of another is the apprehension of sound and the other objects of sense, or knowledge of the difference between soul and qualities; for souls are to be provided (by nature), in the three worlds, with objects of sense, and at last with liberation: such is the agency of nature; as it is said, “Nature is like a utensil, having fulfilled soul’s object it ceases.”

It is here objected, Nature is irrational, Soul is rational; then how can nature, like a rational thing, understand that by me, soul is to be provided in the three worlds with the objects of sense, and at last with liberation? This is true; but action and cessation of action are both observed in irrational things; whence it is said—

COMMENT.

The object of nature’s activity is here said to be the final liberation of individual soul.

Nature is properly inert, and its activity, its “motion” or evolution, takes place only for the purpose of soul, not for any object of its own. The term is ārambha, ‘commencement,’ ‘successive origin or beginning,’ as detailed in former passages: that is, of intellect from crude nature; of egotism from intellect; and so on. This is the spontaneous act of nature; it is not influenced by any external intelligent principle, such as the Supreme Being or a subordinate agent; as Brahmā, it is without (external) cause. But it is objected, Nature being eternal, her works
should be so too; and forms once evolved should therefore endure for ever. To this it is replied, The work is done for a special purpose, the liberation of individual soul; and that when this is accomplished, nature ceases with regard to that individual, as a man boiling rice for a meal desists when it is dressed †. _S. Tutwa Kaumudi_. According to _Gaurāpāda_, and to the text of the following stanza, nature so acts spontaneously; but the incompetency of nature, an irrational principle, to institute a course of action for a definite purpose, and the unfitness of rational soul to regulate the acts of an agent whose character it imperfectly apprehends, constitute a principal argument with the theistical Sāṅkhya for the necessity of a Providence, to whom the ends of existence are known, and by whom nature is guided, as stated by _Vāchespati_: 'But whether this (evolution) be for its own purpose or that of another, it is a rational principle that acts. Nature cannot act without rationality, and therefore there must be a reason which directs nature. Embodied souls, though rational, cannot direct nature, as they are ignorant of its character; therefore there is an omniscient Being, the director of nature, which is _Iswara_, or God †.' This is not inconsistent with the previous doctrine, that creation is the evolution of nature: it is so, but under the guidance of a ruling Power. The atheistical Sāṅkhya, on the other hand, contend that there is no occasion for a guiding Providence, but that the activity of nature, for the purpose of accomplishing soul's object, is an intuitive necessity, as illustrated in the ensuing passage.

*यथादनकाम जोदन्मय पाके प्रवृत्तिरोदनसिद्धी निवर्तते एवं प्रयोक्तः पुरुषान् मोचयितुप्रवृत्ता प्रकृतियं पुरुष मोचयित तं प्रति न पुनर्वस्तेत।
† स्यदेतः स्वार्थ परार्थ वा चेतनः प्रवस्तेः। न च प्रकृतिरचेतनेऽज्ञे भवि तुमहैति तस्मादस्त्कि प्रकृतिरधिष्टाः चेतनः। न च हेतुव्याह चेतना ऋषि प्रकृतिमधिष्टातुमहैति तेषां प्रकृतिस्वपनाभिज्ञाते। तस्मादस्ति सदार्थं दशीं प्रकृतिरधिष्टाः चेष्वर इति।
LVII.

As it is a function of milk, an unintelligent (substance), to nourish the calf, so it is the office of the chief (principle) to liberate the soul.

BHÁSHYA.

As grass and water taken by the cow become eliminated into milk, and nourish the calf; and as (the secretion ceases) when the calf is grown; so nature (acts spontaneously) for the liberation of soul. This is the agency of an unintelligent thing.

COMMENT.

The intuitive or spontaneous evolution of nature, for soul's purpose, is here illustrated.

As the breast secretes milk for a purpose of which it is unconscious, and unconsciously stops when that purpose, the nutriment of the young animal, is effected; so nature, though irrational, constructs bodily forms for the fruition and liberation of soul; and when the latter is accomplished, ceases to evolve. The illustration is from Kapila, as in the Sutra, 'From irrationality the activity of nature is like (the secretion of) milk *.'

LVIII.

As people engage in acts to relieve desires, so does the undiscrète (principle) to liberate the soul.

BHÁSHYA.

As mankind, being influenced by desire, engage in acts of various kinds for its gratification or fulfilment, and desist when the object is

* अचेतनले क्षीरवहेष्टिं प्रधानस्य ।

x x
accomplished, so the Chief one, active for the purpose of liberating soul, desists, after having effected the twofold purpose of soul; one, cognizance of enjoyment of the objects of sense; the other, cognizance of the difference between soul and qualities.

COMMENT.

Another illustration is here given of the activity of nature.

According to Vâchespati, this verse is an explanation of the phrase (in ver. 56), 'For another's sake as for self'; assigning, in fact, an object to nature, the accomplishment of its own wish; autsukya being rendered by ichchhā, 'wish;' and this wish, which is, 'the liberation of soul, being gratified, nature desists.'

LIX.

As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul.

BHÁSHYA.

As a dancer (or actress), having exhibited her performances on the stage in dramatic representations, rendered interesting by the display of love and other passions, in situations drawn from history or tradition, and accompanied by music and singing, desists from acting when her part is finished, so nature, having exhibited itself to soul, in the various characters of intellect, egotism, the rudiments, senses, and elements, desists.

What the cause of such cessation is, is next described.

COMMENT.

An illustration is here given of the discontinuance of nature's activity. Ranga, properly a stage or theatre, is said in the S. Tatwa Kaumudi

* स्वार्थे इत्य परार्थे।† सा खलिष्यमाणामात्री निबहते।
to imply also the audience*. A dancer is equally an actress, *narttaki*, at least was so in ancient times. The dancing girls of Hindustan are rather singers, than either actresses or dancers.

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**LX.**

Generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself) the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities.

**BHÁSHYA.**

*By manifold means.—* Nature is the benefactress of soul, of unrequiting soul. How? By the characters of men, gods, and animals; by circumstances involving pain, pleasure, and insensibility; by the properties of the objects of sense: in this way having by various means exhibited herself to soul, and shewn that 'I am one; thou art another;' having done this, nature desists. Thus she *accomplishes the wish* of that (soul) which is eternal, *without benefit* (to herself): as a benevolent man gives assistance to all, and seeks no return for himself, so nature pursues or effects the purpose of soul, without deriving from it any advantage.

It was said above (ver. 59), "Having manifested herself, nature desists." It is next shewn what she does, having desisted.

**COMMENT.**

This verse may be considered as a further explanation of the expression in ver. 56, "Nature labours for the benefit of soul as if for self, but not for any advantage."

'Generous, benevolent †: 'Not expecting a return; for it is not true generosity to do good to another with the expectation of requital ‡.'

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* राजस्येऽति स्वानेन स्वायति; परिषदातनुपलमश्यति। † उपका रिश्य। परार्थ्य प्रत्यक्षारसवेनेच्य प्रवृत्तिरिति न नियमः।
S. Chandriká. ‘Soul being devoid of qualities (ver. 19), is consequently devoid of action, and can therefore do nothing by way of return.’ Nature ‘accomplishes, goes to,’ charati or ácharati, or ‘effects,’ kuruté. The last word of the verse is differently read.

LXI.

Nothing, in my opinion, is more gentle than nature; once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul.

Bháshya.

There is nothing in the world more soft (gentle, timid) than nature, in my opinion: for which reason (nature’s) opinion consents another’s advantage. Wherefore nature says to herself, “I have been beheld by that soul,” and does not again present herself to the view of that soul; that is, she disappears from the presence of soul. That indicates what the text means by gentle.

It (the text?) declares Iswara (God) to be the cause of the world: thus; “Let this ignorant, brute, godless (soul), for its own pleasure or pain, go to heaven or hell, sent (thither) by Iswara.” Others say, spontaneity is cause: “By what (or whom) the swan is created white, the peacock of many colours;” that is, they are so naturally (or spontaneously). Here, therefore, the Sáńkhya teachers have said, How can beings endowed with qualities proceed from Iswara, who is devoid of qualities? or how from soul, equally devoid of qualities? Therefore (the causality) of nature is rendered probable. Thus; from white threads white cloth is fabricated; from black threads black cloth: and in the same manner, from nature, endowed with the three qualities, the three worlds, endowed with the three qualities also, are produced. This is determined. Iswara is without qualities: the origin of the three worlds endowed with qualities, from

* पुरुषस्य गृहातितस्यात एवानुपज्ञारिः उपकरातसमस्यः ।
him, would therefore be an inconsistency. By this (same reason) soul also cannot be cause. According to some, time is cause: "Time is the five elements; time destroys the world; time watches, when all things sleep; time is not to be surpassed." There are but three categories, the discrete principle, the undiscrete principle, and soul; and by one of them time must be comprehended. Time, then, is a discrete principle; for nature, from its universal creative power, is the cause of time; spontaneity merges into it (nature); and time, therefore, is not cause; neither is spontaneity. Nature alone, therefore, is cause; and there is no cause of nature. She does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul. Therefore it is my opinion that there is no cause more gentle, more enjoyable, than nature, such as Iswara and the rest.

It is said familiarly in the stanzas of the text, "Soul is liberated; soul migrates:" on this it is observed—

**COMMENT.**

Nature being once properly understood by soul ceases to act.

Nature being once fully seen—that is, known or understood—by soul: disappears, goes no more into its sight; it ceases to be, with respect to that individual soul. Why is this? Because it is the most soft, the most gentle or timid, sukumáratara, of all things. The term Kumára, properly implying 'soft' or 'young,' is explained by the Scholiasts to signify 'bashful, modest, unable to bear the gaze of soul.' Váchespati. Sukumáratara salajja†, Náráyana and Ráma Krishna. In the S. Bháshya it is rendered by subhogyatara‡, 'more fit to be enjoyed;' but this refers less to the metaphorical illustration, than to the doctrine, of the text, and might be rendered, 'more plastic;' there being nothing so suitable as nature (matter) for the cause or origin of sensible objects. The S. Tatwa Kaumudi amplifies and explains the illustration: 'Nature is like a woman of virtue and family: such a one, of retired habits and modest looks, may be, by

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* सुकुमारतरमतिपेशलता पुरुषदशनासहिष्युता। † सुकुमारतरं सलज्ज। ‡ सुभोग्यतरं। y y
some inadvertence, surprised in disable by a strange man, but she takes
good care that another shall not behold her off her guard. Nature being
once fully seen by discrimination, has too much matronly decorum to
allow herself to be looked at a second time*. The S. Chandrikā has a
similar exposition†. The S. Pravachana Bh. cites this verse in explana-
tion of the Sūtra, “Upon the detection of her faults, there is no further
approach of nature (to soul); like a woman of family‡;” that is, ‘When
nature finds that soul has discovered it is to her that the distress, &c. of
migration are owing, she is put to shame by the detection, and ventures
no more near soul; as a woman of family keeps aloof from a husband by
whom she knows her faults to have been found out. And this is consid-
ered as an additional reason for the discontinuance of the activity of
nature∥. This is my opinion§ refers to what has preceded, there is nothing
more gentle, as is shewn by the term iti; also by the Bhāṣya of Gaurapāda.
It is clear, therefore, that the expression refers to the author;
such is his opinion; that is, he does not here dogmatise, and say that
nature is actually more timid or soft than any thing else—for the phrase
is merely a figure of speech, a metaphorical illustration—but that it seems
so to him; the words having the force of ‘methinks, it seems.’ ‘Nature,
it seems to me, or methinks, is the most soft, timid, retiring, of all things, and cannot bear to be stared at rudely: once seen, therefore, as she is, she takes care, like a truly modest matron, to be seen no more.' Such is the obvious purport of the text, which is merely a further illustration of the idea conveyed in ver. 59. Gaurapāda has gone out of his way rather to discuss the character of a first cause; giving to sukumāratara a peculiar import, that of 'enjoyable, perceptible;' which nature eminently is, and is therefore, according to him, the most appropriate source of all perceptible objects, or, in other words, of creation.

LXII.

Verily not any soul is bound, nor is released, nor migrates; but nature alone, in relation to various beings, is bound, is released, and migrates.

Bhāshya.

Therefore, from that cause, soul is not bound, nor indeed is loosed, nor migrates; for, because, nature, in relation to various beings—in relation (or connection) with celestial, human, or brute forms, in the character of intellect, egotism, the rudiments, senses, and gross elements—is bound, is liberated, or migrates. For soul is of its own nature loosed, and goes every where, and how therefore should it migrate? migration being for the purpose of obtaining something not previously obtained. The phrases, therefore, Soul is bound, Soul is loosed or migrates, originate in ignorance of the nature of migration. From knowledge, the end of soul and existence, the real nature of soul is attained. That being manifest, soul is single, pure, free, fixed in its own nature. Consequently if there is no bondage there can be no liberation of soul. It is therefore said (see next verse), “Nature binds and liberates herself;” for where subtile body, composed of the rudiments, and having a triple cause, exists, such body is bound with triple bonds; as it is said, “He who is bound by the bonds of nature,” of nature’s products or of works, “cannot by any other be
loosed” (see Comment, ver. 45). Such a subtle body is affected by virtue, vice, &c.

Nature is bound, is loosed, and migrates. How is next described.

COMMENT.

The subjection of nature, not of soul, to the accidents of bondage, liberation, and migration is asserted in this verse.

The doctrine here laid down seems at variance with what has preceded, and with the usual purport of the notions that attach the accidents of bondage and liberation to soul. Apparently, however, the difference is one of words only.

Soul is incapable of action, consequently is not liable to change. It cannot be bound, as the consequence of acts which it does not perform; and as it is never in bondage, it cannot be set free. The application of these terms to soul, therefore, is to be understood in a relative, not in a positive sense; and their positive signification is properly restricted to nature. It is nature that is bound, nature that is liberated, nature that undergoes change or migration. When nature attaches herself to soul, when she separates from it, the converse is equally true, soul is attached to, or is separated from, nature; and is consequently said to be bound, to be set free, to undergo change. But soul is passive in all these things; it is nature that is active, that binds, loosens, or changes form. Gaurapāda’s explanation of these subtleties is not very clear, but such appears to be his understanding of the text. So also Vāchspatī: ‘Soul is without qualities, and exempt from vicissitude. How then can it be liberated? To soul, not liable to change, there could apply none of the circumstances termed bondage, arising from acts, sufferings, or consciousness: nor could worldly change or migration, another name for which is death, affect soul, incapable of action.’ The same commentator adds, ‘These circum-

* Puṣṭ śrīdurgāṇḍaparāśāmī kṣayamś mātyaḥ | svāsakṛṣṇaṃ kṛṣṇaśāmakṣayat |

vṛtiḥ parāśāmyamāṇam abhāvan veda eva kṣāyam nahi

santāra: mṛtyuṃ aparaṃ jayaḥ nityaḥ puruṣaḥ |
stances, which are in truth the acts and conditions of nature, are ascribed to and affect soul as the superior, in the same manner that victory and defeat are attributed and relate to a king, although actually occurring to his generals; for they are his servants, and the gain or loss is his, not theirs*. So Nārāyana explains the text: ‘Binding is the confinement of nature, in the various forms of intellect, &c.; and bondage and liberation are attributed to soul only through the contiguity of intellect, to which they belong, and not to soul†.’ It is from ignorance only that bondage and liberation are ascribed to soul; as by the Sūtra‡, as explained by the Scholiast, ‘Binding and liberation, or endurance of, and exemption from pain, are not (conditions) of soul in reality or absolutely, but (are considered as such) from ignorance; for the binding and liberation mentioned are (conditions) of nature.§’ So also the Sūtra¶, ‘From actual pain suffered by nature proceed binding and liberation, and from its attachments; that is, from its being affected by virtue and the rest, which are the causes of pain; like an animal; that is, as an animal may be bound or loosed, when entangled in a rope.’ The distinction, after all, is little more than nominal, except as it is the necessary consequence of the inactivity attributed to the soul.

* प्रकृतिरूपः तु नानाध्यया सति वधते च संसरति च मुक्ति य च वन्ध्योऽश्च ।
   संसारः पुरुष उपचरणः यथा जयपराजये भूतं कात्याश्च स्वार्थपरायतः
   तदाध्यया भूतानां तद्भावितस्य शोकोऽथं भवेत्।

† प्रकृतिरूपः नानाध्यया बुध्योऽद्विरा तद्र्येण तथा च वन्ध्योऽश्च बुध्योऽद्विनिद्रां
   मेव पुरुषं तस्मात्तस्वात तत्तत्मारोग्यं एव के वलं नं तद्यस्तीति भावः।

‡ नैकालतो बन्धमोक्षी पुरुषस्यविवेकाः।
   दु:ख्योगवियोगात्याः
   बन्धमोक्षी पुरुषस्य नैकालतःस्तत: किंविवेकाः परमार्थस्य यथोऽकृ
   बन्धमोक्षी प्रकृतिरूपः।

¶ प्रकृतिरूपः मणिगणात्म पणुवत।
   प्रकृति तेवरज्ञेन तत्रतो दुःखेन बन्धमोक्षी ससंगवत्कः।समाधिभिनिर्भलः
   मात्र पणुवद्यया पशुर्जालिनिमतः बन्धमोक्षभागी तद्विनिर्भलः।
LXIII.

By seven modes nature binds herself by herself: by one, she releases (herself), for the soul’s wish.

BHÁSHYA.

By seven modes.—These seven have been specified, as virtue, dispassion, power, vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness. These are the seven modes (or conditions) of nature by which she binds herself, of herself. And that same nature, having ascertained that soul’s object is to be accomplished, liberates herself by one mode, or by knowledge.

How is that knowledge produced?

COMMENT.

Nature is bound by seven modes, and liberated by one.

Nature binds herself by acts of whatever kind, especially by the faculties of intellect, enumerated above (ver. 23). She binds herself of her own accord. She frees herself by one mode, by the acquisition of philosophical knowledge. ‘Nature binds herself (in her own work), like a silkworm in its cocoon*.’ Sútra. Átman is here uniformly explained by swa, ‘own self.’

LXIV.

So, through study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist.

BHÁSHYA.

So, by the order explained, the study of the twenty-five principles, knowledge of soul, or the discriminative knowledge, ‘this is nature, this

* ज्ञातां व्यक्ति प्रथां कारणं, कोष्ठार्थं.
is soul, these are the rudiments, senses, and elements,' is acquired. *Neither I am: I am not. Not mine: not my body; that is, I am one (thing), body is another. Nor do I exist: that is, exempt from egotism. This is conclusive, incontrovertible: free from doubt. Viparyaya means 'doubt,' with the negative prefixed, 'absence of doubt;' and viśuddha, 'pure;' pure through absence of doubt. Single.—There is no other (true knowledge). In this way the cause of liberation is produced, is manifested (individually). Knowledge means knowledge of the twenty-five principles, or of soul.

Knowledge being attained, what does soul?

COMMENT.

The knowledge that is essential to liberation is here described.

It is acquired through study of the twenty-five principles, tatvābhīṣṣaṇa; familiarity with them; frequent recurrence to them: it is finite or conclusive, aparipatka; it leaves nothing to be learned: it is perfect, as being without doubt, aviparyayavīśuddha: and single, the one thing needful, kēvala. What sort of knowledge is this? or what is the result it teaches? The absence of individuality; the notion of the abstract existence of soul. *Neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist: that is, there is no activity, nor property, nor individual agency. I am not precludes action only*. Indeed ḁs, the root, together with bhū and kri, are said to signify action in general †. Nāsmī therefore signifies, not 'I am not,' but 'I do not.' The S. Tatva Kaumudi then proceeds: 'Thus all acts whatever, whether external or internal, ascertainment, consciousness, reflection, perception, and all others, are denied as acts of soul: consequently, there being no active functions in soul, it follows that neither do I (as an individual agent) exist. Aham here denotes "agent;" as, I know, I sacrifice, I give, I enjoy—or so on, implying uniformly the notion of an agent—nor is aught mine: an agent implies mastership; if there be no agent

* नास्तीपत्तन स्वाभिष्ट त्वमस्य निवेदयति।  † ज्ञातस्य ज्ञायां मात्यंवचना इति।
there can be no abstract mastership (or possession)*: The same authority gives also a different reading of the first expression, ná asmi, ‘I am male;’ or purusha, ‘unproductive of progeny,’ of acts†. The S. Prac. Bh., commenting on this verse of the Káriká, has, ‘Neither I am, denies the agency of soul; nor (is aught mine), denies its attachment (to any objects); nor do I exist, denies its appropriation (of faculties).’ The Sûtra is to the same effect: ‘From relinquishment (consequent on) study of principles; this is not, this is not ⊕: that is, of all the objects proceeding from prakriti, not one is soul. The phraseology is ascribed to the Védas, and a similar passage is thence cited: ‘Hence comes the conclusion, it is not, it is not (soul), it is not (soul is not), from it: such is not so; it is different, it is supreme, it is that very thing (that it is). It is not, it is not, (means) soul. Such is (the phrase), It is not ⊖, &c. And the Chandrikā explains the terms similarly: ‘I am not means I am not agent; therefore I am distinct from the principle of intelligence. Not mine is pain: exemption from being the seat of pain and the rest is thence determined. Nor do I exist: by this, difference from egotism is expressed ⊗.’ Ráma Krishna repeats the words of the
Chandrikā. By these expressions therefore, however quaint or questionable, we are not to understand negation of soul. This would be a direct contradiction to its specification as one of the categories of the system, one of the twenty-five essential and existent principles. It is merely intended as a negation of the soul’s having any active participation, any individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feelings. I am, I do, I suffer, mean that material nature, or some of her products, (substantially,) is, does, or suffers; and not soul, which is unalterable and indifferent, susceptible of neither pleasure nor pain, and only reflecting them, as it were, or seemingly sharing them, from the proximity of nature, by whom they are really experienced*: for soul, according to the Vedas, is absolutely existent, eternal, wise, true, free, unaffected by passion, universal†. This verse, therefore, does not amount, as M. Cousin has supposed, to “le nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme.”

LXV.

Possessed of this (self-knowledge), soul contemplates at leisure and at ease nature, (thereby) debarred from prolific change, and consequently precluded from those seven forms.

BHÁSHYA.

By that pure (absolute), single knowledge soul beholds nature, like a spectator, at leisure and composed; as a spectator seated at a play beholds an actress. Composed: who stays (or is involved) in self; or staying or abiding in one’s own place. How is Prakriti; debarred from prolific change? Not producing intellect, egotism, and the other effects. Consequently precluded from those seven forms: desisting from the seven forms
or modes by which she binds herself, or virtue, vice, and the rest, and which are no longer required for the use of soul, both whose objects (fruition and liberation) are effected.

COMMENT.

Soul, possessed of the knowledge described in the preceding stanza, or divested of all individuality, becomes indifferent to, and independent of, nature, which therefore ceases to act.

Soul contemplates nature, like a spectator, prêkshaka, one who beholds a dancer or actress; at leisure, avasthita, or without action, nishkriya; and at ease, sustha. This is also read swastha, 'calm, collected in self*; or nirâkula, 'unagitated.' Nature consequently has nothing more to do. The objects of soul, fruition and liberation, having been effected, by knowledge, the other faculties of intellect are needless.

LXVI.

He desists, because he has seen her; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation.

BHÁSHYA.

One present at a play, as a spectator, (ceases to behold;) so one, single, pure soul desists. One (nature), knowing I have been seen by him, stops, ceases. Nature is the one, chief cause of the three worlds; there is no second. Although form have terminated, yet from specific difference there is, even in the cessation of (the cooperation of) nature and soul, union, as a generic characteristic. For, if there be not union, whence is creation? There being union of these two; that is, of nature and soul; there being union from their universal diffusion: yet there is

* स्वस्म: स्वस्मिन् तिद्बनि ।
no further occasion for the world; from the object of creation being terminated. The necessity for nature is twofold: apprehension of the objects of sense, as sound, &c.; and apprehension of the difference between qualities and soul: when both these have been effected there is no further use for creation; that is, of further creation (of future regeneration); as in the case of a settlement of accounts between debtor and creditor, consequent on accepting what is given, when such a union is effected there is no further connection of object: so there is no further occasion for nature and soul.

If upon soul’s acquiring knowledge liberation takes place, why does not my liberation (immediately) occur? To this it is observed—

COMMENT.

The final separation of soul from nature is here indicated, as no further purpose is answered by their continued union.

The first part of this stanza repeats the illustrations given in preceding verses (61 and 65): “Nature, having been fully seen or understood, ceases to act.—Soul, having seen or understood, ceases to consider;” becomes regardless, upékshaka. Consequently there can be no future reunion, no future creation. For mere union of soul and nature is not the cause of the development of the latter, constituting worldly existence: the motive is, the fulfilment of the objects of soul. The activity of nature is the consequence of her subserviency to soul’s purposes; and when they are accomplished, all motive for action, all inducement to repeat worldly creation, ceases. ‘The two objects of soul, fruition and discrimination, are the excitements to the activity of nature; if they do not exist, they do not stimulate nature. In the text the term motive implies that by which nature is excited in creation (to evolve the world): which cannot be in the nonentity of the objects of soul.’ Vāchespati. So also Nā-
rāyana: 'In the (mere) union of these two there is no motive for the production of the world.' With the accomplishment, therefore, of the objects of soul, individual existence must cease for ever.

LXVII.

By attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest become causeless; yet soul remains a while invested with body, as the potter's wheel continues whirling from the effect of the impulse previously given to it.

BHĀSHYA.

Though perfect knowledge, that is, knowledge of the twenty-five principles, be attained, yet, from the effect of previous impulse, the sage continues in a bodily condition. How? Like the whirling of a wheel; as a potter, having set his wheel whirling, puts on it a lump of clay, fabricates a vessel, and takes it off, and leaves the wheel continuing to turn round. It does so from the effect of previous impulse.—From the attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest have no influence upon one who is possessed of such knowledge. These seven kinds of bonds are consumed by perfect knowledge: as seeds that have been scorched by fire are not able to germinate, so virtue and the rest are not able to fetter soul. These then, virtue and the rest, not being (in the case of the yogī) the causes (of continued bodily existence), body continues from the effects of previous impulse. Why is there not from knowledge destruction of present virtue and vice? Although they may be present, yet they perish the next moment, and knowledge destroys all future acts, as well as those which a man does in his present body by following instituted observances. With the cessation of the impulse the body perishes, and then liberation occurs.

What liberation, is next specified.

* तयोः संयोगादिपि सर्गेष्य जनने प्रयोजनं नास्ति।
COMMENT.

A reason is assigned why pure soul is not at once set free from body. This stanza may be considered partly as an illustration of the preceding, explaining the continued union of soul and body even after knowledge is attained. It is also a kind of apology for the human forms of Kapila and other teachers of the Sánkhya doctrines, who, although in possession of perfect knowledge, lived and died as men. The sage, or Yogi, is no longer susceptible of the accidents of virtue, vice, passion, dispassion, and the rest, which are the proximate causes of bodily existence; and his continuance in the bodily form arises from the effects of virtue, &c. lasting after the cause has ceased; like the whirl of a wheel after the impulse that set it going has been withdrawn. ‘As, when the potter’s work is done, the wheel, in consequence of the impulse or momentum given to it, continues revolving, but stops when the period under such influence has expired; so virtue and vice, incident to body initiative and mature, constitute impulse.’ The effects of former acts of virtue and vice, then, cease when the impulse derived from them is worn out; and the possession of knowledge prevents all future acts. Gaúrapáda apparently suggests a difficulty with respect to acts done in the present body; such as the observance of the Yoga, or performance of prescribed rites. These acts may be performed by a sage possessing perfect knowledge, and should therefore produce certain consequences. They lead, however, to no results; for as far as they are themselves concerned, they are but of brief duration, perishing as soon as performed; and with regard to any future effects, they are anticipated, prevented, or destroyed, by the possession of knowledge. Such seems to be the purport of the passage, but it is not very perspicuous.
LXVIII.

When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished.

BHÁSHYA.

When bodily separation is accomplished, by destruction of the effects of virtue, vice, and the rest. In respect of it, having accomplished its object, nature ceases: then absolute, certain—final, unimpeded—deliverance, liberation, consequent upon the condition of singleness. Soul obtains singleness (separation), which is both absolute and final.

COMMENT.

This verse refers to the first stanza, and announces the accomplishment of what was there stated to be the object of inquiry, absolute and final liberation.

When the consequences of acts cease, and body, both gross and subtile, dissolves, nature, in respect to individual soul, no longer exists; and soul is one, single, free, kévala, or obtains the condition called kaivalyam. This, according to Váchespati and Náráyana, means 'exemption from the three kinds of pain'. Gaurâpáda gives no definition of the term, except that it is the abstract of kévala. What the condition of pure separated soul may be in its liberated state, the Sánkhya philosophy does not seem to hold it necessary to inquire.
LXIX.

This abstruse knowledge, adapted to the liberation of soul, wherein the origin, duration, and termination of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the mighty saint.

BHÁSHYA.

Soul's object is liberation: for that (purpose) this abstruse, secret, knowledge (has been expounded) by the mighty saint, by the divine sage Kapila. Wherein, in which knowledge, the origin, duration, and termination, the manifestation, continuance, and disappearance, of beings, of the products (or developments) of nature, are considered, are discussed. From which investigation perfect knowledge, which is the same as knowledge of the twenty-five principles, is produced.

This is the Bháshya of Gaurapáda on the Sánkhya doctrines, profounded, for the sake of liberation from migration, by the Muni Kapila; in which there are these seventy stanzas.

COMMENT.

This verse specifies by whom the doctrines of the text were originally taught.

The commentary of Gaurapáda closes here in the only copy of the MSS. procurable; and consequently omits all notice of Iswara Krishna, to whom a subsequent stanza of the text attributes the Káriká. In the Bháshya it is said that the work commented on is the Sánkhya declared by Kapila; but that the Káriká is not the work of Kapila, the other Scholiasts agree. It is also different from the Sútras of that teacher, as given in the Sánkhya Pravachana, although it follows their purport, and sometimes uses the same or similar expressions. Gaurapáda may therefore probably only mean to intimate that its substance is conformable to the doctrines of the Sútras, not that it is the work of the Muni. These doctrines, he adds, are contained in seventy stanzas; of which, however, our copy has but sixty-nine. The verses of the Káriká, as usually met with, are seventy-two; but there also reference occurs to seventy verses,
as comprising apparently the doctrinal and traditional part of the text, derived from older authorities. Either Gaurapāda thought it unnecessary to explain the concluding three verses of the Kārikā, or there is some omission in the copy, or they do not belong to the work. The concluding verse is evidently inaccurate, the metre of the third line of the stanza being defective.

The Kapila to whom the Sāṅkhya philosophy is attributed is variously described by different authorities. In a verse quoted by Gaurapāda, in his comment upon the first stanza of the text, he is enumerated amongst the sons of Brahmā. Vijñāna Bhikṣu asserts him to have been an incarnation of Vishnu*. He refers also to the opinion of a Vēdanta writer, that Kapila was an incarnation of Agni, or ‘fire,’ upon the authority of the Smriti†; but denies their identity. There does not appear to be any good authority for the notion. Kapila is a synonyme of fire, as it is of a brown, dusky, or tawny colour; and this may have given rise to the idea of Agni and the sage being the same. The identification with Vishnu rests on better grounds. The popular belief of the Vaishnavas is, that there have been twenty-four Avatārās of Vishnu, and Kapila is one of them. The earliest authority for this specification is no doubt the Rāmāyana, in which Vāsudeva or Vishnu is said by Brahmā to assume the form of Kapila, to protect the earth against the violence of the sons of Sāgara, searching for the lost steed intended for their father’s asvamedha. †Brahmā having heard the words of the gods, who were bewildered with the dread of destruction, replied to them, and said, Vāsudeva

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* तदिरिष्ण। शाश्वं कपिलसूर्यो भगवान् विष्णुक्षितलोकहिताय प्रवाहि
tivan ।।

† अग्नि: स कपिलो नाम सांख्यशब्द प्रवर्तक इति स्मृते:।

‡ देवताम वचः श्रुता भगवान् वै पितामहः।

प्रयुवाच सुसंवाचसः कृतात्वलोकोहिताय

वस्यं वुढ्या कृता वासुदेवसः धीमतः।

महिषी मांधवस्थयस: स एष भगवान् भ्रुः।

कपिलं द्वापरमास्याय धारणविनिं धराः।
is the Lord, he is Mādhava, of whom the whole earth is the cherished bride; he, assuming the form of Kapila, sustains continually the world.' So also the Mahābhārata: 'Then spake incensed, Kapila, the best of sages; that Vāsudeva, indeed, whom the holy Muni call Kapila.*' According to the Bhāgavat, he was the fifth incarnation of Viṣṇu: 'The fifth Avatāra was named Kapila, the chief of saints, who revealed to Ásuri the Sāṅkhya explanation of first principles, which has been impaired by time †.' Book I. s. 12. The latter half of the third book describes him also as an Avatār of Vāsudeva, but as the son of Devahúti, the daughter of Sāyambhuva Menu, married to the Prajapati Kerdama.

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LXX.

This great purifying (doctrine) the sage compassionately imparted to Ásuri, Ásuri taught it to Panchasikha, by whom it was extensively propagated.

COMMENT.

Purifying; that which purifies from the defects which are the cause of pain; pávana or pavitra. Great, chief, principal, agryam, mukhyam. This verse anticipates an objection that may be made to the authority of the text; as it may be said, Although the words of Kapila must command attention, of what weight are the lessons of an uninspired teacher? The answer is, that they are the same which were originally taught by Kapila himself to his pupil Ásuri. According to the passage cited by

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* तत: कुडी महाराज कपिलो मुनिसत्वमः
वासुदेवति यें प्राहुः कपिलं मुनिपुर्ववा: ||

† पञ्चमः कपिलो नाम सिद्धेश: कालविश्वः
प्रोवाचासुरे सांख्यं तत्वामांविनिषेषयेः ||
Gaurapáda, in his notes on the first stanza (p. 1), Ásuri is also a son of Bráhma. He is mentioned elsewhere as the pupil of Kapila, and preceptor of Panchasikha, but there are no details of his history. Of Panchasikha there is some account in the Mahábhárat, on occasion of his visiting Janaka, king of Mithilá, and imparting to him the Sánkhyya philosophy. He is there also said to be named likewise Kapila*; which the commentator explains to mean that he was like Kapila, being the disciple of his disciple †, as the text proceeds to call him; ‘He, the long-lived, whom they term the first disciple of Ásuri‡.’ He is also called Kapileya, from his being, it is said, the son of a Bráhmaní named Kapila. ‘Ásuri went to the sphere in which that which is Brahma, the mystic-named, and multiform, and eternal, is beheld. His disciple was Panchasikha, nourished with human milk: for there was a certain Brahman matron, named Kapila, of whom he became the son, and at whose bosom he was fed: thence he obtained the denomination of Kapileya, and divine imperishable knowledge.’

LXXI.

Received by tradition of pupils, it has been compendiously written in Arya metre by the piously disposed Iswara Krishna, having thoroughly investigated demonstrated truth.

* यमाहु: कपिलं सांख्यः प्रमर्थिप्रजापति। † स: कपिलस्तम्भ शियात्तंत्रलिथम। ‡ आसुरः प्रथमं शिष्यं यमाहुःपिष्टविनं।
|| यत्रदेकवशं बहुः नानाध्यं प्रदेशंते। आसुरिमेस्वते तत्स्म मूर्ति प्रतिपदे तद्वयं।
|| तत्स्य पंचविश्वं शिष्यो मानुषयप्रभृत:। ब्राह्मणी कपिलानाम काविदासीकुटुबिनी।
|| तथा: पुत्रमान्य स्वितं स पिवति सत्वी।
|| तत: स कपिलेयलं लेभे बुद्धि च नैतिकी।
COMMENT.

'Succession or tradition of pupils,' śishyaparamparā: each pupil becoming teacher in his turn, as is the case with the Pandits to the present day. It rarely, if ever, happens that any branch of Sanscrit literature is acquired by independent study: every science is studied under some teacher of eminence, who can, not unfrequently, trace his traditionary instruction upwards for several generations. The interval between Panchasikha and Íswara Krishna is not particularized, but was probably considerable, as no allusion to the author of the Káriká occurs in the older writings. If his commentator Gaupáda be, as is not unlikely, the preceptor of Sankara Áchárya, Íswara Krishna must date anterior to the eighth century.

LXXII.

The subjects which are treated in seventy couplets are those of the whole science, comprising sixty topics, exclusive of illustrative tales, and omitting controversial questions.

COMMENT.

We have here in the text reference to seventy stanzas, as comprising the doctrinal part of the Sánkhya. In fact, however, there are but sixty-nine, unless the verse containing the notice of Kapila be included in the enumeration; and in that case it might be asked, why should not the next stanza at least, making mention of the reputed author, be also comprehended, when there would be seventy-one verses. The Scholiasts offer no explanation of this difficulty.

The sixty topics alluded to in the text are, according to the Rája Várttika, as cited by Váchespati, 1. the existence of soul; 2. the existence of nature; 3. the singleness, 4. the objectiveness, and 5. the subservience, of nature; and 6. the multifariousness, 7. the distinctness, and 8. the inertness, of soul; 9. the duration of subtile, and 10. that of gross,
body. These are the ten radical categories. To them are to be added, the five kinds of obstruction, nine of acquiescence, twenty-eight of disability, and eight of perfectness; making altogether sixty. Another enumeration specifies the sixty categories or objects: 1. soul; 2. nature; 3. intellect; 4. egotism; 5—7. the three qualities; 8. the class of the five rudiments; 9. that of the eleven senses or organs; 10. that of the five elements. These are the ten radical padartha, or categories. The remaining fifty are the same as those previously enumerated. In consequence of comprehending all these topics, the Káriká is a system, a ásstra; not a partial tract or treatise, or prakarana; although it omits the illustrative anecdotes and controversial arguments. The Káriká must consequently refer to the collection of Kapila’s aphorisms, called Sánkhya Pravachana. This work is divided into six chapters, or adhyáyas; in the three first of which are contained all the dogmas of the system furnishing the materials of the Káriká; the fourth chapter is made up of short tales or anecdotes, ákhyaýikas, illustrative of the Sánkhya tenets; and the fifth is appropriated to the refutation, paraváda, of the doctrines of different schools. Exclusive of these two subjects, Íswara Krishna professes, therefore, to give the substance of the S. Pravachana, or of the Sútras of Kapila assembled in that collection.

The Ákhyaýikas are in general very brief and uninteresting. The Sútras, in fact, supply only a subject for a story, which the Scholiasts may expand much after their own fancies. Thus the Sútra, ‘From instruction in truth, like the king’s son.’ On which Viñána Bhikshu narrates, that ‘there was a king’s son, who, being expelled in infancy from his native city, was brought up by a forester, and growing up to maturity in that state imagined himself to belong to the barbarous race with which he lived. One of his father’s ministers having discovered him, revealed to him what he was, and the misconception of his character was removed, and he knew himself to be a prince. So soul, from

* सकलशास्त्रशास्त्राद्दशामिष्टा प्रकाशणमपि शास्त्रमेवेति सिद्ध।
† राजपुच्छवत्तोपदेश्तात।
the circumstances in which it is placed, mistakes its own character, until
the truth is revealed to it by some holy teacher, and then it knows itself
to be Brahme.*'

The controversial portion of the original Sūtras is as brief as the nar-
native, and, from the nature of the subject, much more obscure. The
argument is suggested, rather than advanced, and it remains for the
Scholiast to amplify and explain it. A specimen of the mode in which
this is effected will best exemplify the darkness and difficulty of this
part of our subject. Some modern followers of the Védanta assert that
liberation is the attainment of (pure) felicity. To this it is replied: 'Ma-
manifestation of felicity is not liberation, from its not being a property†.'
Thus explained by the Scholiast: 'The condition of happiness, or that
of attainment (or manifestation), is not a property of soul. The nature
(of soul) is eternal, and is neither an object to be attained, nor the means
of attainment. Therefore the attainment of happiness cannot be libera-
tion. This is the meaning (of the Sūtra‡). 'Attainment of happiness in
the region of Brahmā and the rest is a secondary (or inferior) sort of
liberation; as to maintain the contrary would be in opposition to the text
of the Védà, which says that a wise man abandons both joy and sorrow∥.'

* आनंदाभिव्यक्तिकारणमेव जन्मपराक्रमसे ज्ञात ज्ञान हि विशिष्टः पत्तिः शरीर हि ज्ञात ज्ञान हि विशिष्टः पत्तिः शरीर हि

† आनंद हि ज्ञात ज्ञान हि विशिष्टः पत्तिः शरीर हि ज्ञात ज्ञान हि विशिष्टः पत्तिः शरीर हि

‡ आनंदाभिव्यक्तिकारणमेव जन्मपराक्रमसे ज्ञात ज्ञान हि विशिष्टः पत्तिः शरीर हि ज्ञात ज्ञान हि विशिष्टः पत्तिः शरीर हि

∥ आनंदाभिव्यक्तिकारणमेव जन्मपराक्रमसे ज्ञात ज्ञान हि विशिष्टः पत्तिः शरीर हि ज्ञात ज्ञान हि विशिष्टः पत्तिः शरीर हि
Further; if attainment be a faculty of soul, what sort of faculty is it? Is it constant or temporary. In the first case, there may be, even in the state of accomplishment, still the existence of the object of soul: in the last, inasmuch as there is perishableness of all that is engendered (or, that which has a beginning must have an end), then eternal liberation is subject to termination: therefore the attainment (or manifestation) of felicity is not chief or real liberation; and the assertion that it is so, is a false conclusion of the modern Védántis: this is undeniable*.

* किंचाभिष्क्कर्मण्यां शिशु सा किं नित्या ज्ञानिया वा ज्ञाने सिद्धे वा पुरूषार्थे। अन्ये जन्मभावस्य विनाशित्या मृणालस्य नाशपरिस्वर्तमादि नन्दाभिष्कृतमुन्त्यमाशु इति नवीन वेदानिनामप्रतिक्रिया एवं अपि धिनेऽ।
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