THE

SĀṂKHYA--KĀRIKĀ

Is'vara Kṛṣṇa's Memorable Verses on Sāṁkhya Philosophy
with the Commentary of Gauḍapādācārya

श्रीमद्विधरक्षणमणीतः समीपपादश्रायः:

सांख्यकारिकाः:

Critically edited with Introduction, Translation and Notes

BY

Vidyāsudhākara Dr Har Dutt Sharma, M.A., Ph.D.,

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विस्तृतोपः पातालमान्तरिपुष्पादिभि: समवद्भक्ता:

BY
Vidyāsudhākara Dr Har Dutt Sharma, M.A., Ph.D.,
Professor of Sanskrit, Sanātana Dharma College,
(Nawabganj) Cawnpore.

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INTRODUCTION

I. The Origin of Philosophical Enquiry

In this world, the end of all activity is happiness. Nobody even in his imagination likes to suffer pain even for a moment. Even those who commit suicide do so only when they are sorely disgusted with the pains inherent in Sansāra. Truly has it been said by our elders, "Every one desists from pain; every one desires happiness." But what happiness is cannot be very well explained by those who lack philosophical insight. The enjoyment of sense-objects which people resort to as 'pleasure' day and night and for which they put forth their utmost effort is considered by philosophers as entirely undesirable, mixed as it is always with pain. So the wise leave all worldly enjoyments even as one does honey mixed with poison and seek the highest end of human existence which alone leads to final and absolute happiness; and after they have attained it for themselves, they are moved with pity for the creatures quivering in the well of miseries and for their good they apply themselves to the propagation of the truth attained. Thus do the wise explain the Origin of Philosophical Enquiry.

II. The Significance of Śāṁkhyā Philosophy

Of all the philosophical systems, Śāṁkhyā has been considered by all to be the most ancient. Nobody can gainsay the fact that this occupies a prominent place in all the Sāstras, since this is either supported or controverted by every philosophical system. Therefore, the importance of this Sāstra is recognised by all the systems. Śāṅkarācārya says—"The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedānta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-
difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sūtras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhāna doctrine." (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 289). So also in the Mahābhārata we read—
"There is no knowledge like that of Śāṅkhya, no power like that of Yoga. You should have no doubt as to Śāṅkhya being the highest knowledge." (Śānti, 316, 2).

Though the use of the word Śāṅkhya is found first of all in the Ṣvet. Up.—तत्कारणं साङ्ख्ययोगाधिपत्यं etc. (VI, 13), yet Śāṅkhya reflections are found even in the Rgveda and the other Upaniṣads. This proves the antiquity of this Śāstra. This will be made clear in detail further on.

Śāṅkhya is derived from the word saṁkhya. The word saṁkhya is used in the sense of thinking and counting. Cf. "चर्चा सांख्य विचारणि" (Amara I, V, 3). Thinking may be with reference to basic principles or knowledge of Self. Counting refers to the twenty-four principles and as'akti, atasti, etc. The double implication of the word has been set forth by Vijñānavibhūṣa in his preface to Śāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya, by a quotation from the Mbh.—
"सांख्यं प्रचुद्वते चेत प्रकृतिं च प्रचुद्वते।
तत्त्वानि च चतुर्विकल्पं सांख्यं प्रकृतितिष्ठ॥"

So, Śāṅkhya means knowledge of Self through right discrimination. Garbe is of opinion that the word Śāṅkhya was originally used in the sense of counting, and it was then applied to the system of Kapila which enumerates the 25 principles. (For details and the opinion of Jacobi, see S. P., p. 189, 2n. and pp. 190-191). Jayacandra S'armā says with regard to Sāṅkhya in Saṁskṛta-Candrika, a magazine which became defunct long ago, that the Śāṅkhya is tawny, with deep-brown face, and has a big belly. He has a rosary in his hand and a staff, and keeps long nails and hair. (Adipūrṇa quoted, VII of 1821 S'aka., Vol. 1 and 2, p. 8). Really speaking, since the word Kapila stands both for a particular colour and for the founder of Śāṅkhya Philosophy, therefore, owing to the similarity of word the writer of the Purāṇa has indulged in conjectures of his own. It appears that the writer of the Purāṇa at the time of writing happened to see some sage with tawny face and corpulent body and was led to describe his form and colour.

Some scholars, seeing the rejection of Īśvara in the Śāṅkhya-system, have maintained that it is vedaviruddha or opposed to S'ruti (S. S., p. 21 ff.; S. P., 13 ff.). Śāṅkarācārya also, seeing that Śāṅkhya is opposed to advaita, avers that Śāṅkhya is not rooted in the S'rutis.

"Although there are many Smritis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Śāṅkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Śāṅkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (Ṣvet. Up., VI, 13).

......, we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude is not to be attained by the knowledge of Śāṅkhya Smriti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice." (S. B. E., XXXIV, pp. 297-8). In deciding also the vaidika or the non-vaidika character of Śāṅkhya, the great S'āṅkara says—"The scriptural passage which the pūrvapakṣin has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i.e., of some Kapila) as are contrary to scriptures, for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz., the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname of Vāsudeva." (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 294).
Similarly others have also maintained the opposition of Sāmkhya to Sruti. Truly speaking, Sāmkhya could be divided into two—one ses'vāra, the other niris'vāra. Let the theists not take the niris'vāra-Sāmkhya, propounded in the Kārikā, etc., as rooted in Sruti, but who can take exception to the vaidika character of the ses'vāra-Sāmkhya as propounded in the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas? For instance, we come across ‘yathā-s'rutinidars'ana as a synonym of Sāmkhya in—

एनानं नव सर्गाणि तत्त्वाति च नराधिकः
तत्त्ववितात्त्वाति यथाभुतविनिदर्शनात्॥
(Mbh., Sānti., 310, 25)

In the 213th chapter of Sāntiparvan, in the section describing the intrinsic, extrinsic and super-natural aspects of the vibhūtis of Prakṛti many synonyms of the upholders of Sāmkhya are met with; e.g., ब्रह्मणातन्त्रादिलिन्निः (p. 1) तत्त्वग्रहिणिः; (2) योगप्रवेशिनिः; (3) संख्यादिलिन्निः; (4) योगविनिदिलिन्निः; (5) वनादिलिन्निः; (6, 7, 8 and 9) तत्त्वविद्याधिइरगुरुः; (10) यथाभुतविधिधिः; (11) तत्त्वदीर्घिः; (12) यथाभुतदीर्घिः. Here the word ‘Yathā-s'rutinidars'anaḥ’ being repeated four times establishes the vaidika character of theistic Sāmkhya. Moreover, even the atheistic Sāmkhya is vaidika in character, inasmuch as the traditional categories have been borrowed from Upaniṣads, etc. [Jacobi takes the atheistic Sāmkhya as older, and believes that there has been an attempt for the synthesis of the theistic and the atheistic Sāmkhyas in the later Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and portions of the Mahābhārata. vide—Ent. Gott. p. 32]. Therefore, from the presence of the names of the ācāryas of Sāmkhya in the offering to Rṣis, it may be fairly guessed that in olden times, even the most staunch theists undertook the study of Sāmkhya. (8. 8., p. 22). This could not have been possible if Sāmkhya was not founded on Srutis.

INTRODUCTION

III. Germs of Sāmkhya in the Vedas, etc.

The presence of Sāmkhya categories in the Srutis in a germinal form corroborates the former guess. We do not mean to say that the principles of Sāmkhya in their detail are to be sought in the Vedas and Upaniṣads as propounded by Sāmkhya-Kārikā. That would be as ridiculous as trying to find out the great banyan tree in its minute seed. Tamās described in the Rgveda (X. 129, 3) “तमौ आसिद्धसृष्टिः गुद्धमेंत्य-प्रक्रेते” etc., assumed later on the form of the Unmanifest. This very Sruti, showing the dissolution of the elements and the elemental world in its cause, the darkness, points to satkāryavāda. Śāyaṇa also favours this interpretation in his bhāṣya on this verse. Giving this very interpretation elsewhere, the Veda even explains Āja (the unborn) as the name of Pradhāna—

तमुर्मधूस श्रुमं देह आये यत्र देवः समस्तवर्ण विशे।
अजस्व नामात्रेऽस्तोणिं यस्मि विशिष्ठं भुवनानि तस्युः॥
(Rgveda, X. 82, 6)

Chronologically, Jacobi has divided the Upaniṣads into four divisions on account of their variety, their origin in different times, and their subject-matter (Ent. Gott. p. 6 and 19: H. I. P. I., p. 28 ff.; I. P. I., p. 141 ff.).

1. The most ancient: as, Brhadāranyaka, Chāndogya, Taittirīya, Aitareya and Kauśitaki.


Among the most ancient ones, in the Br. Up., the Puruṣa is declared to be only a seer, not a doer, devoid of activity in as much as he is without any association with anything (i
red colour colours cloth, etc., so Rajas colours citta, because of its property of activity. Even so, the whiteness of water indicates Sattva, because white water has the property of purifying things. Sattva also purifies the mind with knowledge. The dark colour of anna = Earth is an indication of Tamas. The dark colour covers everything. Even so, the insentient Tamas covers the knowledge born of Sattva. [See, Bāla, p. 3. What has been propounded by Śūryanārāyaṇa Sāstri in contradiction of this will be found in the Introduction, S. N. S.]. This very thing is propounded in the mantra “अजमिको वैहित्याक्षुराय्या” (S'v. Up. IV 5; Mahānārāyaṇa Up., p. 141, Iśādi). The trīvyāka (trebling) S'ruti found in the (Ch. Up. VI. 4 and 5) also corroborates this opinion. We also see that the word trīvyāta has been used in the sense of the three Attributes in “तमकनोयं सत्यम्” etc.” (S’v. Up. I, 4) also. There the three-foldness of grain, etc., has been indicated by the gross, the medium and the small sizes. It appears that the three-foldness of the Attributes has also been used similarly. Jacobi has also accepted this (Ent. Gott., p. 32).

The Sāmkhya categories are clearly stated in the later Upaniṣads, e.g., in Kaṭha “सत्यसुरा पशुत्रिक्षुरायाम् महान् परः” (III. 10). Mahat is the synonym of Ahaṅkara. Similarly we find Avasyākta and Puruṣa in “महत् परमात्मात्वसतुरुपं परः। पुरुशां पर विद्विभाबं काँडा या परा गति:।” (Ibid, III. 11). Prof. Radhakrishnan believes that the indifference and inactivity of Puruṣa have been indicated in “द्रुपण्य सुयज्ञ चारिया समानं चुः परिश्वसाति। तपोर्मण: विद्विभाति अनात्मनो अविचारक्षणति” in the Munḍaka Up. (III. 1) [I. P. I, 259, 1 n].

It is a well-known fact that Svetāṣṭa vātara is essentially a Sāmkhya Upaniṣad. It abounds in the Sāmkhya categories. For instance in this alone, the words  Sāmkhya and Kapila have been used for the first time. "तत्कारणं सांख्यं---
any two opinions among scholars with regard to the fact that the rise of the Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems lies between the most ancient and the ancient Upaniṣads. (Ent. Gott. p. 21).

Among the modern Upaniṣads, the mention of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Sāṁkhya categories of kṣetrajña, saṅkalpa, adhyāvasāya, abhimāna and liṅga clearly show that these Upaniṣads come after the formulation of the Sāṁkhya system.

As—“तमो वा इश्वेत्वमात्र, वश्या प्रकारं प्रवश्ये, रजसोऽस्य तत् कस्यां...सूक्ष्मोऽस्य बिप्रमाणं प्रतिपुर्वं केषाः संकेतप्रच्छिन्नमात्राय-\n\nमानिष्ठानि प्रवश्ये, इति।” (Maitrāyaṇī, Up. IV. 5) “पञ्चतंत्रायाणि युक्तश्चेत्वथार्थियाणि पंचमहासुतानि भृतत्तथान्यथाक्यात् इति।” (Ibid III.12) “गृहीतोऽस्य गृहीतोऽस्य च चापनामपारमात्रायाणि:।” (Pr. up IV. 8)

In the Mbh. and the Purāṇas, we find Sāṁkhya philosophy fully reflected. At one place we find the mention of the five gross elements, the twenty-four categories in their manifested or unmanifested character and the three guṇas (Mbh. III, 209, 16-21; 211, 4). The distinction between Prakṛti, and Purusa has been extensively expounded in Sāntiparvan (283, 33-40). Here the word sattva stands for Prakṛti and not Brahman. But Keith, seeing that sattva was used as the subject of comparison of a spider, erroneously maintains that sattva is referring to Brahman (S. S. p. 17). It will be clear from the two verses quoted below that his explanation is erroneous, since it is opposed to the context:—“मृणुनं तः सूक्ष्मात्मकं तत् कस्याथिर्याः परस्य प्रपीति केषाः संकेतप्रच्छिन्नमात्रायाणि।” (S’anti 330, 23a).

We find a reference in the Mbh. of Sāṁkhya knowledge being called Vais esika which was imparted to Janaka by Pañcasikha of Pārśara gotra, e.g., “यूगावतंत्र द्वारा यानं कैसे ध्यानं पुरा” (S’anti 330, 23a). There again, three paths of emancipation have been described. We find there from the
context that leaving aside the paths of mere knowledge or action, Sāmkhya lays down a third kind of path, viz., a combination of knowledge and action. S'ānti, 320, 38–40. In this connection, vide my article, P. O. C., Lahore, II, 1027 f.

In the dialogue between Janaka and Sulabhā, the latter uses the word Sāmkhya in the sense of a particular kind of a sentence,—‘‘साम्क्यपरायण भोगो विषयस्य: सर्वद्विजः। पञ्चचतुर्यथा- विज्ञानवाक्यमिश्रितं द्वैप्रयोगः। स्नेयाणां च गुणाणां च प्रमाणे प्रवृत्तिधाराः। विबृतिमिश्रिताः स स्नेयाणाः प्रयोज्यताः॥’’ (S'ānti, 320, 79 and 82).


So it has been said:—‘‘विज्ञान- विज्ञातस्य स गुणः: सर्वस्यान्तः स्थानः। समय च यथा वस्तुनि तत्तत्त्वादित्वं च स्वतः॥’’ (ibid, 112).

There, the eight-fold varieties of Prakṛti and sixteen varieties of modifications have been described in the 310th chapter of the same parvan.

Again, the nine kinds of creation mentioned there are not found in Sāmkhya books. They are as given below:

(1) The creation of mahat from avyakta, (2) from mahat there is the creation of ahaṁkāra, (3) from the latter of manas, (4) from it, that of the five gross elements, (5) from these, that of five attributes, (6) from these, that of five senses, (7) from these, that of “connected with the senses (aindriyaka),” (8) from this, that of the upper and oblique varieties and (9) from the oblique, there is the creation of the lower variety. Thus, there is mutual discrepancy in the doctrines expounded in the Mbh. The categories taught by Pañcas'ikha in S'ānti, 219, are nowhere obtained in the Sāmkhya. A teaching of this very teacher, quite different from that mentioned above, is found in 321, 96–112 of the S'ānti. In the 274th chapter, the doctrines expounded by Devala are different from every other. But even in the midst of divergent expositions of Sāmkhya doctrines, all agree with regard to the exposition of Brahman or Īs'vara. Even though the plurality of puruṣas has been accepted, Brahman has been described as the basis of all. (vide—‘‘वहनो च यथा गुणानि स यथा गुणिति सत्योऽनि’’ S'ānti 350. 26). Āsuri, having taught Sāmkhya to Pañcas'ikha, got merged in Brahman—‘‘यथेकस्य श्रेयं तथा नारायणयथेऽ आसुरिष्ठेऽतित्तिर्पिते तद्वयस्य’’ (S'ānti, 218. 13).

In the Bhagavadgītā also, we do not find atheism among the Sāmkhyas. Rather we find the antiquity and dualism of Sāmkhya propounded in it (Tilak's Gitārāhasya, Hindi translation by Sapre, p. 514, 1917 edn.). Kapila, the pioneer of Sāmkhya philosophy has been described by Lord Kṛṣṇa as an example of his own glory; e. g., ‘‘विद्यां तदाधिक श्रद्ध:’’ (Bh. G. X, 26).

Here the Sāmkhya path without karman is only a synonym of Jāna. Therefore S'ānkāračārya explains the word kṛtānta as ‘‘नामभवतं कालोपयते। तत्वत: परिकालों्तिर्तं स इत्यत:। कामोत्तिर्तं कामीन्त:॥’’ (Bh. G. XVIII, 13).

S'āṅkāračārya explains the word gunasaṁkhyāna (Bh. G. XVIII, 19) as the system of Kapila the subject-matter of which is the exposition of the three gunas, vis. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.

Again in the 3rd chapter of Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Sāmkhya doctrines in detail tend to propound devotion to Viṣṇu. Among the Purāṇas also, the various traditional schools interpret Sāmkhya doctrines in their own way (see V. P. VI. 5, 2–8; VI. 4, 35 Sk. P. Prabhāsa-khaṇḍa, 18, 13–15; Brah. P. ch. 213 ff).

In the Manu-smṛti also which is contemporary with the Mbh. (8, 8, p. 52) there is a detailed description of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (XII. 24–52) and reference to the three pramaṇas (ibid, 105). But the word Sāmkhya is not found
in it. Madhātithi, commenting on "अनुसारसात् विकृतांवात् सर्वंनयः नः सार्वायः" (I. 76), says—विकृतांवात् अनुसारसात् सर्वंनयः:—, and thus indicates the presence of Sāmkhya doctrine. In Viṣṇusmiti, the distinction of Puruṣa from the twenty-four categories, preceded by discrimination, has been clearly described. One of the stanzas (XX, 25) of this Smṛti very closely corresponds with the comment on the second Kārīka by Gauḍapāda (S. S. p. 52). In the Sāṅkhya-saṁhitā we find twenty-five categories, but Puruṣa is identified with Viṣṇu (VII 21-25). Yājñavalkya Smṛti has also been influenced by Sāmkhya, e.g. वेदस्पन्दितस्य तत्त्वोऽहस्सि द्वितीयर्गुणिति (II) तत्त्वशीर्षशिशभाविष्यति (III, 179 ff.). We have already said that the Sāṅkhya categories expounded in these books give prominence to Īśvara (See also Bh. Com. pp. 183-4, where Belvālkara points out five stages of the evolution of Sāṅkhya doctrines.)

IV. Sāṅkhya Teachers

Names of twenty-six Sāṅkhya teachers are met with in the Smṛtis, the Mbh., the Kārikās, etc. They are as follows:—

1. Kapila

Mentioned in the Sv. Up. (5. 2) for the first time, Kapila is known everywhere as the founder of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. Many people think that he was not a historical personage. But Garbe, criticising the views of Max-Müller and Colebrooke, believes that the traditionally handed down name of Kapila cannot be regarded as fictitious; there is another support in the name of the town Kapilavastu of the Buddhists (S. V., 2 § 3). Keith, on the other hand, opines that Kapila was not a historical person as he is found identified with Agni or Viṣṇu or Śiva, and is, therefore, another name for Hiranyakāgarha (S. S. 9, In: Mbh. S’anti, 339, 66-67: 342, 92-93). Kaviraja Gopinatha also agrees with this opinion as expressed by him in the introduction to Jayamangala published by me (p. 3). Bālārāma Udāsina, in his footnotes published to Yogabhāṣya I. 25: "आदिविद्वाहिनिविद्वंतिध्वमितित्वं करण्याविवाहम् सर्वाणिुपः विज्ञानमानम् तन्म प्रोक्तवच!" says:

"(1) आदिविद्वाहिन्द्विद्वंतिध्वमितित्वं करण्याविवाहम् सर्वानिुपः विज्ञानमानम् तन्म प्रोक्तवच!"

The Sāṅkhya system of philosophy is divided into two sections: 1. Nyāya, which is based on the Vaiśeṣika School of logic and metaphysics, and 2. Patanjali, which is based on the Yoga School. These two sections are discussed in the following chapter.

From a quotation in the Baudhāyana (2, 6, 30), we learn that an asura Kapila divided the four āśramas. There is another Kapila also who wrote a Kapilasmṛti dealing with the śādāhā, vivāha, pṛayas'citta ceremonies (H. Dh. I, pp. 25, 525). S'ankarācārya also thinks that the Kapila of Sāṅkhya is different from the Vedic Kapila (Br. S. Bhāṣya II, 1, 1.). Anandagiri, commenting on this says that the Vedic Kapila is that one who reduced the sixty-thousand sons of Sagara to ashes. He is quite different from the Sāṅkhya teacher. But we find in the Padmapurāṇa that one Kapila alias Vāsudeva taught the Sāṅkhya doctrines to Brahman, Bhṛgu, etc., supported by the Vedas; another Kapila taught the Sāṅkhya as opposed to all the Vedic tenets (quoted in N. B. S., II 1, 1.
p. 4). But according to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (3.25.1) Vasudeva himself was born as Kapila from the womb of Devahūti कविलतांतुषात्सा भगवानामःमायाय। नामः स्वयमः सत्तानामः सत्तानामः युगायम्।”

Thus, we find no strong proof for believing Kapila a historical person.

2. Āsuri

There is a difference of opinion also with regard to the reality of Āsuri, the first disciple of Kapila. Kaviśāra Gopinatha thinks him to be a historical person (Jay., Int., p. 3). But Garbe and Keith are opposed to this view. S. Y. pp. 2–3: Garbe adds that if Āsuri is really historical then he is different from his namesake mentioned in the S’atapatha-Brāhmaṇa. The two interesting accounts as to how Kapila taught Āsuri are found in the Jayamangala and the Mahāharavyaṭṭī. In the Mbh., Āsuri is made the teacher of Pañcas’ikha “तद् पञ्चसिक्षा नाम कपिलीयो महामुनि:… आदर्शः प्रमथविषयं वि” (S’ānti, 218.6.10). We find only one quotation ascribed to Āsuri, viz., “विविभिकं हिग्निसी कुद्दा भूमिकर्ष कष्ट्यते” in the commentary of Haribhadra on the Saḍdars’anasyamuccaya (p. 36).

3. Pañcas’ikha

Pañcas’ikha, the disciple of Āsuri is found quoted in the following works:

A. Y. Bh.—

(अ) “एकमेव द्वारान् स्वासिर्वे द्वाःसन” [१.१]। (आ) “आदिविद्वानु निर्माणयित्रिविद्याय काश्याःकविजये प्रसंगितयाये विज्ञानसाधनाय” [१.२९]। (इ) “तम्पुरा मात्रामात्रामुन्निविद्यास्मैव तात्स्वच्चाय” [१.३१]। (उ) “क्षक्षमक्षु वा स्वच्छमात्रामुन्निविद्यास्मैव तत्त्वायाय” [१.३२]। (ऋ) “व्रजत: परं पुष्चेर ब्रजत: परं पुष्चेर ब्रजत: परं पुष्चेर ब्रजत: परं” [२५]। (ऋ) “हविविद्वेदो द्वाःसना” [२५]

This verse is ascribed to Pañcas’ikha by Bhāvāganes’a in his Tattvāyāhārthyaśpad and by Haribhadrasūri in S’astravārthasmuccaya (see Int. to Mahāharavyaṭṭī). Bhāvāganes’a was the disciple of Vijnānabhaṣikṣa and flourished in the 17th century A.D. The time of Haribhadrasūri is about 725 A.D.
from him in the Rājamārtanda of Bhoja: "सत्यतत्त्वदेव परार्थायत्वम्. (Y. S. 1 V. 23). Medhātithi also quotes his opinion in his Bhāṣya on Manu i. 55: "सत्यत्त्व देव सर्वदा भवेत सदासमस्यात् किंतु विवादात् प्रसन्नयत्: ".

This seems to be derived from the S'lokavārtika: "अमरशमनस्कृत मिष्ठैः विवादाभितः. (p. 707). Also in the Saḍdarśanasamuccaya we find a quotation from him: "पुर्वो-द्वितीयस्वयम् स्वाध्यायस्यतनम्. मन: करति साहित्याद्वारेऽपि स्फटिको यथा."

(p. 36). Vallālasena, king of Bengal (12th century A.D.), has given a list of works which he consulted while compiling his Adhutasāgara. There we find a work of a certain Śāṅkhya teacher named Vindhyavāsin (H. Dh. I, 341, 799n). This proves that the work of Vindhyavāsin was available as late as the 12th century A.D. Tanusukharāma, in his introduction to the Mādhavārvitī (Ch. S. S.), has established an identity between Vindhyavāsin and Vyādi on the basis of quotations from the Trikāṇḍaśeṣa, the Haimakośa and the Sāriyamināmamāla. He says: "त च सत्त्वता वर्णम विष्णू मद्दतम- कालीण: (Kathāsarītāgama, I. 2) पाणिनिविवादिणियो सांसारिकदवाक्य: कल्पितं वेयमयं कमः द्वाराध्यो: पत्रात्मस्य पुराणामां सांसारिकशास्त्रार्थात् " (p. 3).

This leads us to suppose that Vindhyavāsin alias Vyādi, flourished in the 4th century B.C. According to a Chinese tradition Vindhyavāsin wrote a Śāṅkhya work called Hiranyasaptati (Bh. Com. p. 175). According to Dr Belvarkal, Hiranyasaptati is a commentary on the Śāṅkhya-kārikā (ibid 177). But Kaviraja Gopinatha says: "The Anuyogavārasūtra of the Jainas preserves a list of Brahmanical works, which contains the name of Kanagasattar (Kanakasaptati), which I take to be equivalent to the Suvarnasastra or Hiranyasaptati, the name of Śāṅkhya-saptati familiar in China." (Jay. Int. p. 7, 12n). But it must be noted here that along with the Kanagasattar, we find Mādhara also in the list of the Anuyogavārasūtra. If Mādhara stands for the Mādhavarāvita then it is impossible to conclude that Anuyogadārasūtra was written in the 1st

4. Vindhyavāsa

The view that Vindhyavāsa is to be identified with Īśvarakṛṣṇa is not sound (Jay. Int. pp. 6-7). We find one quotation
century A.D. ( F. O. Schrader in a letter to me from Kiel, March 1, 1927 ) In the Mātharavṛtti we find: "यथा द्वात्माकेभवं आमासाहिनः" a quotation from the Hastāmalakastotra which is of the age of Śaṅkarācārya (i.e. 780–812 A.D., See Int., Māṭh., p. 5). Therefore, it is wrong to decide the age of Vindhyavāsa or Iśvārakṛṣṇa on the basis of the Kanagastāri. And, if Vyādi alias Vindhyavāsin, is the author of the Hiranyaśapti, then the latter is certainly different from the Śaṅkhyaśāstra and Vindhyavāsin is different from Iśvārakṛṣṇa. Otherwise the date of Iśvārakṛṣṇa will have to be pushed back to the 4th century B.C. Therefore, it is safe to conclude, as Keith also says, that there are more than one Vindhyavāsins and that their dates are uncertain (S.S., 79 in; also, Karma., p. 59).

5. Vārṣaganyā

We are as uncertain about Vārṣaganyā as about the former teachers of Śaṅkhya. We find two quotations from him in the Vyāsabhāṣya: (1) "सूक्ष्मवविविधिवेषद्वाणात्याति मूढः गुप्तनक्तिः इति वार्षांगणः!" (II 53, 2) "सर्वोपरि परमेन वो न गुप्तक्षणः इति। यतु द्वात्मका पत्नी तद्यथेवेव सुल्तनक्षमः।" (Ibid. IV, 13) Vacaspati thinks that the latter quotation is taken from the Śaṣṭitaṇtra. This very verse is quoted by Vacaspati in his Bhamati with the remarks: "अत एव्यथानमध्यतपादित्वमहादेव एव स्य भगवतम् वर्षांगणः!" (on the Brahmāsūtrabhāṣya, II 1, 3.) Another quotation from Vārṣaganyā, "पञ्चपर्वो अवित्या विस्तारस्य स्य मन्वान्वित्य वार्षांगणः!" is found in the Tatt. K. (on Kārikā 47). The quotation—"प्रकटत्वनिस्कर्त्य स्यान्त्य नवमि!" found in the Gaud., and the Māṭh. (Kārikā 17), is ascribed to Vārṣaganyā by Keith (S.S., 73, 3n). All these lead us to the conclusion that the Chinese tradition ascribing the authorship of the Śaṣṭitaṇtra to Pāncaśīkha is not trustworthy. There is also considerable doubt as to Vārṣaganyā being the author of the Śaṣṭitaṇtra (Jay. Int. pp. 4–6; Hiriyanna: "Śaṣṭitaṇtra and Vārṣaganyā");

Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, April–June, 1929, pp. 107–112). This has been discussed in detail below.

6. Jaigīśavya

According to the Kūmaṇpurāṇa, Jaigīśavya was a classfellow of Pañcaśīkha (S.S., 51). This Jaigīśavya is quoted as an authority on Yoga (Y. Bh., II. 55 and III. 18). Vacaspati also refers to him in his Nyāyavārtīkātātparyaśāstra as the author of Dhāraṇāstāra (on Nyāyasūtra III. 2, 43). But, according to the Buddhacarita (12. 67), Arākṣikālāma refers to Jaigīśavya, Janaka and Parāśara as persons who obtained salvation through Śaṅkhya (Jay., Int. p. 2, 2n.) In the present state of our knowledge, we can say nothing more about Jaigīśavya.

7. Vodhu

Vodhu is also familiar by name alone. We have not come across any of his writings or quotations. In the list of the names of the sages pronounced in the Rśitarpana, we find the name of Vodhu after that of Āsuri, and before that of Pañcaśīkha. The opinion of Weber that it is the Brahmanised form of Buddha's name, is quite untenable (see S. Y. p. 6). Keith has, however, discovered Vodhu's name before that of Āsuri in one of the pārśīṭās of the Atharva Veda (S.S., 51).

8. Devala

We find a dialogue between Asitadevala and Nārada in the Mahābhārata (Sānti, ch. 274). There we find eight kinds of bhūtas (bhūva, abhūva, kāla, pṛthvī, āpas, vāyu, aṅkāśa and tejas); and kāla impelled by bhūva creating all the five elements, viz., earth, air, water, wind and glow. The senses themselves are not the knowers but produce knowledge for the kṣetrajña. Higher than the senses is citta, higher than the latter is manas, higher than it is buddhi and the highest of all is puruṣa. The ear, the skin, the eye,
the nose, the tongue, the citta, the manas and the buddhi: are the eight instruments of knowledge, etc. It is said there: पुष्पपायण्यभि साक्ष्यान्तन्विचिन्यः। तत्कथे वशय पतंति ब्रजसंव रोत्तमे परो गतिः॥
(Verse 39). Thus we see that this dialogue deals with theistic Sāmkhya. The quotations from Devala, as found in the Aparāraka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-smṛti, resemble the Tattvasamāsa very much (See Yājñavalkya-smṛti, Anandārama, Edn. II, pp. 986-7). Kane, in his H. Dh. Vol. I, p. 121, says that Devala was a contemporary of the Śrīvakṣeṣ, viz., Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana. And the age of Kātyāyana according to him is between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D. (See p. 218). But Udayavirāśtri says that Devala is frequently alluded to in the Mahābhārata, his age must be determined by the age of the epic in its present form. The Mahābhārata according to Western scholars (says Mr. S. Āstri), assumed its present form by the 2nd century B.C. (P. O. C. Lahore, II p. 865). But according to Prof. Winternitz, the epic assumed its present form by the 4th century A.D. (See H. I. I. I. pp. 465-475). Devala does not seem to be much older than Iśvarakṛṣṇa. The theory to the contrary does not seem to be convincing. It is based on the following quotation from the Māṭharvṛti: कपिश्वासुरिणि: प्रपादसिद्धांतं सत्यं ततः परमशिवेन तत्तथा भागव‍-वाक्य-वालमीकी-द्रवित‍-देवता प्रस्तुतानायम्, (p. 84), where the word prabhṛti is taken to indicate a wide gap between Devala and Iśvarakṛṣṇa. But the traditional list found in the Māṭharvṛti does not tally with any other such list. Therefore, Māṭhara’s quotation can only establish Devala’s priority to Iśvarakṛṣṇa and nothing else.

9-26. Sanaka, etc.

Gauḍapāda (on Kār. I), quotes a verse and a half in which he enumerates the names of the seven sons of Brahman. They are: Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana, Āsuri, Kapila, Vedhū and Pañcaśīkha. But in the Mahābhārata, the list is different (Sānti. 340, 67-69), viz., Sana, Sanatsujāta, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanatkarṇa, Kapila and Sanātana. Unfortunately we find no information about Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, Sana, Sanatsujāta and Sanatkarṇa, except a reference to Sanandaśācārya in the विद्वानसरग्रहितमपीतसमनवाचयित्रा: तस्मान महाभारत:। (S. Sū. VI, 69). There is a reference to a Sanatkarṇa, author of some Śrīti, in the Nirnayasthī and the Tristha-lisetu (H. Dh., I, 656). Similarly we find Bhṛgu. Sūkra, Kāśyapa, Pañcaśīkha, Garga, Gautama, Nārada, Ārṣṭiṇa, Agastya, Pulastya and Harita mentioned as writers of Śrīti (Ibid, index). The dialogue between Pañcaśīkha and Janaka named the Pañcaśīkha-gītā, and found in the Mahābhārata (sānti, chs. 290-299), deals with the duties of the varnas and āśramas and has no vestige of Sāmkhya teaching in it. It is just possible that Pañcaśīkha came to be regarded as a teacher of Sāmkhya because he happened to be born in the same family as Pañcaśīkha (Mbh., sānti. 320-23). Ulīka is a synonym for Kaus’ika. In the Chinese translation of the Sāmkhya Kārīka, Is’varakṛṣṇa is referred to as born in the Kaus’ika family (Jay. Int. p. 2, 2n). We know absolutely nothing of Vālmiki and Sūka as teachers of Sāmkhya.

V. Standard Works on Sāmkhya

A. Available:-

Of the standard works on Sāmkhya, only three are available. They are “Sāmkhya-Sūtras”, “Tattva-samāsa” and “Sāmkhya-Kārīka”.

Some scholars are of opinion that S. Sū. are not written by Kapila. The reason is that we find many passages from other works in them. For example, “अनुभवसुपरिपाणि” (Br. S., IV. 1, 1) = S. Sū., IV. 3; “प्रति नियमितत्त्वप्रकाशिति...” (Y. S., II. 46) = S. Sū., II. 34 and VI. 24. Again, in the Sūtras establishing the authority of the Vedas (S. Sū., V. 40-51), the influence of the Vedānta is clearly visible. Again, we find many passages from Sāmkhya-Kārīka, quoted in the
Sūtras. Madhavacārya of the 14th century A.D., quotes from the Kārikās and not Sūtras in his S. D. 8. The oldest commentator on the Sūtras is Aniruddha who flourished in about 1500 A.D. Therefore, the Sūtras must have come into existence between 1380 and 1450 A.D. (See S. Y., pp. 6–9). Moreover, the commentator on the Sarvopakārini, a commentary on the Samāsa-Sūtra, opines that Kapila, the author of "Sāmkhya-Sūtras," is different from Kapila, the author of Samāsa-Sūtra (Ch., s. s., No. 246, pp. 93–94). But as the author of the S. D. 8, does not quote from the Tattva-samāsa even, so the antiquity of the latter also is doubtful. And if the author of the S. Sū., is Kapila, then how did he quote Pañcasūtra, etc., who were his grand-disciples and who, therefore, must have flourished much later (See S. Sū., VI, 68–69)?  

But Udayavira Sāstrī has tried to prove that Kapila himself is the author of the S. Sū., in his article "Antiquity of the Sāmkhya Sūtras" (P. C., Lahore, 11, pp. 855–882). He is of opinion that several sūtras have been interpolated in the original of Kapila. For example, in the 1st chapter, the sūtras 20–54 are interpolated, because the 19th sūtra is literally the same as the 55th sūtra, and because the 53rd and 54th sūtras are identical with the 15th and 16th sūtras. And as we find the names of Srugha and Pataliputra in these interpolated sūtras, the interpolation must have been made when these towns were famous (from 4th century B.C. to the 5th century A.D.). The sūtras 79, 80 and 84–115 of the V chapter are also interpolations; the interpolation of these (84–115) is obvious as they discuss the principles opposed to Sāmkhya Philosophy.  

Thus Mr. Sāstrī thinks that 68 sūtras are interpolated. On the other hand, when Sānkara-carā and others quote from Sāmkhya-Kārikā, only, there is no doubt that the Sūtras did not exist in their time. Had the S. Sū., been existent, then Sānkara-carā and others would not have deliberately left aside the composition of a sūtra and quoted from the work of an ordinary mortal like Is'vākṛṣṇa.  

Mr. Sāstrī further tries to prove that V. Bh., and others have borrowed from the S. Sū. His contention is:—  

1. "Praśnānāsūtraḥ pravṛttotkramaṃ nātastu upadānānimāṇaḥ = kṣetarvāduktave khyātīyopadeśaḥ " (V. Bh., on N. S., IV, 1, 48)—here upadāna-nimāṇa is borrowed from "upadāna-nimāṇa" (S. Sū., I, 115). This very sūtra has been quoted again by Vatsyāyana in his gloss on the next N. S., viz., "Vahumuk contrary—grahasthaḥ: kārya nātastu upadāna-nimāṇa iti." Here the insertion of the word iti shows that it is a quotation from some other work. That other work is S. Sū.  

To this we reply—If the word iti is a sure sign of quotation from another work then why did not Vatsyāyana put it after "upadāna-nimāṇa" in the first passage (V. Bh., on N. S., IV, 1, 48) quoted above? And as regards the presence of iti in the second passage, it should be noted that this word is not connected with only "upadāna-nimāṇa" but the whole passage, viz., "praśna-pratītya: kārya nātastu upadāna-nimāṇa." Here Vatsyāyana merely repeats his own words with slight change. Therefore, it does not show that V. Bh. has borrowed from the S. Sū., rather, it may be just the reverse.  

2. In the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yajñavalkya-Smṛti (Prayāś-cittādhya, v. 109), we find quotations from Devala which resemble the sūtras in S. Sū. very much. Therefore, Devala must have borrowed them from the S. Sū.  

Mr. Sāstrī starts here on the presumption of the priority of the S. Sū., to Devala, a fact which he has to prove.  

3. Patañjali, in his Mahābhāṣya, lays down the six causes of non-perception thus—"Papūri: pūrkarā: sātvatā-nimāṇa-

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AVYĀPI in (a) has not been commented upon by Aniruddha. The word pravarīte in (b) is not found in the Ms. in Mr. Sāstri’s possession.

The arguments of Mr. Sāstri do not stand a close examination. If Aniruddha did not comment upon the word avyāpi, then it alone does not mean that the word did not exist formerly. Moreover, Vijnānabhikṣu has commented upon this word. Again, what is there to prove that the Ms. in Mr. Sāstri’s possession is the oldest and the only correct Ms., whose one reading should decide so important a question as the authorship of Kapila. In his zeal to disprove the theory that “the Sūtras were composed on the basis of the Kārikās,” Mr. Sāstri says that if we change the order of words in “sāmaṇḍakarṇabhir: prāṇaṇa vāyaḥ: pṛthvī” and read it as “sāmaṇḍakarṇabhir: prāṇaṇa: pṛthvī vāyaḥ,” we attain anuśīṭha metre in place of āryā. But this flight of imagination, viz., changing the reading itself, is too much to be swallowed even by ordinary people. Therefore, Mr. Sāstri has failed to disprove that the Sūtras are based upon the Kārikās.

There is a tradition that Paramārtha translated the Kārikās into Chinese in 557–569 A.D. (Bh. Com., pp. 175–178). According to Paramārtha, Buddhamitra the teacher of Vasantabandhu, was vanquished in debate by Vindhyavāsa, the Sāmkhya-teacher; Vindhyavāsa died before Vasantabandhu. Thus, Vindhyavāsa and Vasantabandhu were contemporaries. There is another tradition, according to which Vindhyavāsa was a contemporary of king Bālāditya and pupil of Varsaganyya. A third tradition tells us that the pupil of Varsaganyya composed Hiranyasaptati. But all these traditions should be taken as having no historical value. Otherwise, if Vindhyavāsa, the author of Hiranyasaptati and śvārkṛṣṇa, the author of Sāmkhya-Kārikā are both identified then it would lead to a historical confusion, as stated above. [Das Gupta also thinks śvārkṛṣṇa and Vindhyavāsa as two
different persons, see H. I. P., I, 218, 3n]. The only definite conclusion that we can arrive at is that Is'varakṛṣṇa is older than Vasubandhu [in 300 A.D., see V. A. Smith: *Early History of India*, 3rd edn., pp. 328–334; also Kalipada Bhattacharya: "Some Problems of Sāṃkhya Philosophy and Sāṃkhya Literature", J. H. Q., Sept., 1932, pp. 519–520. According to Bhattacharya Is'varakṛṣṇa flourished in the 1st century A.D.] and flourished in the second or the third century A.D. The remark of Śvapnes'vara, identifying Is'varakṛṣṇa with Kālidāsa, should be rejected as mistaken' (See I. P., II, 255, In.).

The work of Is'varakṛṣṇa had 70 verses in it. But now, finding the bhāṣya of Gauḍapadā running upto the 69th verse only and finding that the verses following the 69th have nothing of Sāṃkhya in them, it is believed that one of these verses is missing. The question has been discussed in detail in the foot-note to 61st Kārikā. Mr. S. S. Pathak has also attacked this problem (see, "The Problem of the Sāṃkhya–Kārikās", I. A., Vol. LII, 1923, pp. 177–181). He says—
(1) In the 72nd Kārikā we read the phrase "पर्वताबिद्विनताभावः" which means "free from the opinions of others". This goes against the Kārikā found by the late B. G. Tilak, as the latter expounds the opinions of others in the shape of God, Soul, Time, or Nature being the causes of Creation.—To this we reply: In the Kārikā of Mr. Tilak, the opinion of others has been merely referred to and not expounded. The phrase पर्वताबिद्विनताभावा: means the exclusion of the expounding of others' opinions and not the exclusion of mere reference even. Otherwise, "हृदयाद्विधिकोऽसंविशिष्टविधिमत्ताययुतः" would also be open to fault, for, here there is no exclusion of the opinion of the Mimāṁsakas. (2) Is'varakṛṣṇa has summarised the work of Pañcas'ikha in his own 'āryās'. Now in the Śaṣṭi- tantra, there is a mention of five alternative opinions (viz., making one of Brahman, Puruṣa S'akti, Niyati, and Kāla, the cause of creation) which are to be rejected. But in this

Kārikā of Tilak, we find only four. There is nothing to represent S'akti—To this we reply: Is'varakṛṣṇa has summarised the work of Pañcas'ikha. But in the first place, it is not as yet definite that Śaṣṭitantra is the work of Pañcas'ikha. Secondly, even if it were so, yet it is not binding upon Is'varakṛṣṇa to give every detail in his summary. The other points raised by Mr. Pathak are covered by the footnote alluded to above.

B. Unavailable.

(1) Śaṣṭitantra. Something has already been said with regard to the controversy of regarding Pañcas'ikha or Vārṣaganyā as the author of Śaṣṭitantra. Here, the question is examined further. Following are the references to Śaṣṭitantra in Jay.

(a) "तेत्रु च परिपन्नात्मकायमित्वम्। विस्तरतत्वम् परिपन्नम् मयांिि रश्चितत्वार्थायां तथत्तत्वार्थायां।” (p. 56).
(b) "विविधपर्वतावलेपीयाः पर्वतावलेप्याः।” (p. 68).
(c) "नन्द्रु च परिपन्नात्मकायमित्वां।” (p. 56).
(d) "तेत्रु च परिपन्नात्मकायमित्वां।” (p. 56).
(e) "तेत्रु च परिपन्नात्मकायमित्वां।” (p. 68).
(f) "तेत्रु च परिपन्नात्मकायमित्वां।” (p. 69).

From the above passages, Prof. Hiriyanna infers the following facts (See—"Śaṣṭitantra and Vārṣaganyā", J. O. R., April–June, 1929, pp. 107–112.)—(a) Śaṣṭitantra has 60 parts, (b) its author is Pañcas'ikha and (c) it deals with 60 topics, and is, therefore, called "Śaṣṭitantra". Vārṣaganyā is not its author, as others think. As regard the verse—

"युनानां परम्पर न दश्यन्त्ययुत।"

which is quoted in Y. Bh., and Bhāmati, Vācaspāti alludes it to Śaṣṭitantra in Tatt. V., and to Vārṣaganyā in Bhāmati.

On the basis of these two references, people have come to
the conclusion that Vārṣaganyā is the author of Śaṣṭītantra. But the reading in the Y. Bh. is मायेव सुतुण्डकम, while as the reading in the Bhāmati is मायेव सुतुण्डकम. The reading cannot have been deliberately altered by Vācaspati, for a scholar of his reputation would not commit such a crime. On the other hand, from the opinions of Vārṣaganyā as found quoted in Buddhist works, it seems that he altered the reading. Moreover, from Bhāskara’s remark, viz., “कपिलपिलियिनिसिद्धांतनिन्यस्तोः” (on Br. S., II, 1, 1). we can infer that Kapila was the author of a Śaṣṭītantra. (See also P. O. C., Lahore, II, p. 882, where Mr. S’asti states Śaṣṭītantra is the real सāṃkhya-dars’ana written by Kapila. Mr. Bhattacharya also holds this view. See I. H. Q., Sept., 1932, p. 518.) This old Śaṣṭītantra of Kapila has been enlarged by Pañcas’ikha in his Śaṣṭītantra.

To this we reply—One should not put implicit faith in commentators when they refer to the names of writers. For example, we see that Bhaṭṭa-Utpala, in his commentary on Bhṛhat-Saṁhitā, quotes the verses (22–30) from Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, preceded by the remark “तथाइ कविज्ञातादि:”. As regards the alteration of मायेव into मायेय, if it is considered impossible in the case of Vācaspati, it should be still more impossible in the case of Vārṣaganyā whom Vācaspati refers to with great reverence as भवान्ति वायक्तयुक्त. The opinion of Vārṣaganyā, as quoted in the Buddhist work Abhidharmakośa (viz., nothing new comes into existence, nor anything born is ever destroyed; that what is existent, is ever existent; that what is non-existent can never become existent) is simply a statement of the sat-kārya theory. It is futile to read from it the difference between the theories of modification according to Sāṃkhya and Yoga, as Mr. Hiriyanna does. His arguments can be valid only when it is admitted that Vārṣaganyā altered मायेव into मायेय. But that requires proof.

Therefore, the question of authorship of Śaṣṭītantra is still undecided.

(2) Rājavartika. In the Tatt. K., we find the following three verses from Rājavartika—

“प्रथात्तत्तत्तवेक्षमथ्यथमथावन्यन्वयम्
परार्थवेच तथार्थद्विविप्यो योगो योग च वच
वेश्वरलक्षणस्मृतैर्माधिकार्यस्य स्वन्ता द्रवः
विनविधान्विशस्त्रोपोऽवि नव तुषणः
क्रियानुमाणयावधिविशिष्टविषंसमु
इति पदण्ड: पर्यार्पणामार्पणसि: सह सिद्धि:”

The first verse is quoted also in the Sarvopakārini (Ch. S. S., No. 246, p. 100.). These sixty categories resemble the sixty categories treated of in the Ahirbudhnyā Saṁhitā (Jay., int., p. 5; S. S., pp. 70–73). It is impossible to determine the authorship of Rājavartika. Garbe thinks Bhoja is the author (8. y. p. 7). These maulikārthas are enumerated with slight variations in Jay., Māṭh., Sāṃkhya-tattva-vivekanā (Ch. S. S., No. 245, p. 22); Tattva-yādārthayā-dipana (ibid, p. 80) and Tattva-samāsa-sūtra-vṛtti (ibid, p. 135).

VI. The Teachings of Sāṃkhya

It has already been pointed out that the activity of all rational beings is directed towards acquiring happiness and avoiding misery. Thoughtful people, on the other hand, avoid happiness even as it is mixed up with misery. Now the nature of this misery, although known generally, is still outside the purview of ordinary people. Īśvarakṛṣṇa has broadly divided that misery into three classes; viz. (1) intrinsic, (2) extrinsic, and (3) superhuman. (1) The intrinsic misery is due to the disorder of wind, bile and phlegm, and is also caused by passion, anger and so on. (2) The extrinsic misery is caused by men, beasts, reptiles and the rest. (3) The superhuman is the outcome of evil influences of spirits, stars and so on.
It may be asked—Why should we engage in philosophical remedy, when we see that ordinary and obvious remedies can very well remove all the miseries? We see that intrinsic miseries in the shape of various diseases are removed by physicians by means of medicines; as regards miseries due to passion, anger and the rest, they are removable by the acquisition of desires for objects in the shape of flowers, scent, women and so on. The extrinsic miseries can also be removed by the knowledge of Politics, residence in safe places and the rest. Similarly superhuman miseries can also be avoided by charms, incantations and the rest. Thus, when obvious means can uproot all the kinds of miseries, it is useless to engage in inquiring into the philosophical remedies.

We reply, yes; but these remedies are not absolute or final. Nobody can take the guarantee that the obvious remedies suggested above will remove the miseries certainly and absolutely.

Thus, as we see, the obvious remedies are not helpful to us, and we should, therefore, enquire into extraordinary remedies for removing the miseries.

If it be said,—Well, granted that the obvious remedies are not of any help to us; but there are means revealed by the Vedas. By performing the various sacrifices prescribed by the Vedas, we can get over the miseries and acquire heaven and other higher regions,—then our reply is the same as above. We know that stay in the higher regions even is of temporary character. After enjoying the fruits of good actions performed on this earth the dwellers in heaven have to revert back to this earth and undergo all the miseries again. Moreover, there is impurity in the Vedic rites. One has to kill animals in performing some of them. Again, the heaven-dwellers are not free from jealousy. If one particular sacrifice leads to bare residence in heaven, the other leads to supremacy over there. This must give rise to jealousy in the minds of the people over there. Thus, we see even the Vedic rites are not absolute or final means for releasing one from misery. Therefore, we should enquire after some other means.

That means is the discriminative knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower. The Sāmkhya Philosophy divides the objects into four kinds viz., (1) Root-matter, (2) Evolvent and Evolute, (3) Evolute and (4) the Spirit.

(1) The Root-matter or Nature is not a modification. It is the root-cause of all matter. Intellect and the rest are the evolutes of this Nature. Intellect, which is the product of Nature, produces Ego. Ego, born out of Intellect, produces the five subtle elements and the organs of sense and action. The five subtle elements, which are produced from Ego, produce the five gross-elements. The five gross-elements and the eleven organs produce nothing, and they are, therefore, Evolutes only. The Spirit is neither produced from anything nor itself produces anything; so it is neither an Evolute nor an Evolvent. Among these, the Nature has been termed as Unmanifest, the Spirit as the Knower and the rest as Manifest. So, by the discriminative knowledge of these three, one attains salvation.

The means of Right cognition (or Pramāṇas) recognised in this Philosophy are Perception, Inference and Valid Testimony. The other Pramāṇas recognised by the rival schools are included under these three. The process of Perception may be stated thus:—

Suppose there is water in a tank. On account of the absence of any outlet, this water, the very nature of which is to flow, is tranquil. But now a small channel is dug. Then water flows through this channel and assumes the form of the object into which it flows. It will be rectangular if it
enters a rectangular field and so on. Similarly, intellect, the very nature of which is to apprehend all the objects, is at a stand-still, being enveloped by the Attribute of Tamas or Darkness. But after the contact of an organ of sense with any object, this darkness is removed. Then this intellect flows through the channel of an organ of sense and assumes the form of the object with which the organ of sense is in contact. This assuming of a particular form of an object by the intellect is called Perception or determination or knowledge. Of course, the result of this perception is experienced by the Spirit. For, intellect being a modification of matter and non-intelligent can produce only a non-intelligent determination. And the phrases like “I am happy” refer to the Conscious Spirit. So what really happens is this:—A part of intellect runs out through an organ of sense to assume the form of an object. The other part reflects the image of the Conscious Spirit. Now, the out-going part of intellect, having assumed the shape of an object presents itself to the part remaining behind and reflecting the Conscious Spirit. So the Spirit, which in reality is free from activity, contact, agency and such other qualities, becomes active or agent through its image reflected in the intellect. The real enquirer or agent is the reflected image of the Spirit.

Inference is based upon Perception. The materialists like Cārvāka deny the authenticity of Inference. But, they may be asked—suppose you talk to a man. After his departure if you are asked about that man, you will very readily say about him that he is intelligent or ignorant. Now, how can you perceive ignorance or knowledge of another man? You will have to infer them. Therefore, inference will have to be recognised as a means of Right Cognition. Inference leads to conclude the presence of Major term in the Minor term on the basis of the concomitance of Middle and Major terms and the cognition of the presence of Middle term in the Minor term. For example,—we see smoke (Middle term) on the Hill (Minor term). Now we remember the concomitance of smoke (Middle term) and fire (Major term). Thus we conclude that there is fire (Major term) on the Hill (Middle term).

The Inference is of three kinds viz., Purvakat, (A priori), Ses’at (A posteriori) and Sāmanyatodrśa (commonly seen). These are defined and explained in the notes on the 5th Kārikā.

Valid testimony is the assertion of a reliable person. A reliable person is that, who ascertains facts on the basis of strong proofs; and when he states a fact exactly as he has seen it, then his assertion is Valid Testimony. The other means of Right Cognition are included under these three. This has been exhaustively explained in the notes on the 4th and 5th Kārikās.

Thus, Nature, Spirit and the rest are cognised by Inference or Valid Testimony. It may be asked—why should not the non-perception of these lead us to conclude their total non-existence? We reply—Mere non-perception of an object cannot lead to its total non-existence in every case. We see that even existent objects are not perceived for various reasons. For example, a man in Conjeevaram cannot perceive the Himalayas; one cannot see a piece of straw fallen in one’s own eye; a deaf person does not apprehend the sound of music; a person absorbed in something does not perceive anybody seated near him; one who is not a yogin cannot perceive an atom which is existent; people cannot see the moon or stars during the day-time because their light is overcome by the sun; drops of water, falling in water cannot be differentiated afterwards. Therefore, the non-perception of Nature and the rest is due to their minuteness and not total non-existence. For, when we see the effects of Nature,
in the shape of intellect, ego and so forth, we infer Nature as the cause of these effects.

Now, we state the theory of cause and effect according to the Śāmkhyas. They state that an existent effect is produced from an existent cause. The Buddhists proclaim that the existent Effect is produced from the cause, which is non-existent. The Vedāntins assert that there is no existence of Effects, but they are illusory forms of one existent. The followers of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika say that the non-existent Effect is produced from the existent cause.

The Theory of the Buddhists is:—"The existence comes into being from non-existence, for without destruction nothing can be produced." (N.S. IV. 1. 14) We observe that a sprout is produced out of the destruction of seed, curds are produced from the destruction of milk. Thus, we see that destruction (= non-existence) produces an object.

But, really speaking, the Buddhists have missed the point. It is not the destroyed seed that produces sprout. It is simply the modification of the structure of particles of a seed that we see in a sprout. That is, when particular kinds of particles are in a particular form, they constitute a seed. When that particular form is changed, then those particles constitute the sprout. If non-existence in shape of destruction were to produce existence, then it will lead to great confusion. The point has been clarified by Śaṅkarācārya (Br. S. Bh. II. 2. 26) as follows:—

"If entity did spring from non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be purposeless, since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For, the non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of the horns of hares and the like, i.e., non-existence is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced from seeds only, curds from milk only and so on. And if non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency, we should also have to assume that sprouts, etc., originate from the horns of hares, etc., — a thing certainly not observed." (S.B.E. XXXIV, p. 416).

The view of the Vedāntins, viz., the cause alone is existent, the effect being only an apparent change, is also untenable. They say that as the cognition of silver in pearl-oyster is false, for it is contradicted by the subsequent cognition of the real pearl-oyster, so the superimposition of this inanimate world on the intelligent Brahma is also false. To this we reply:—The cognition of silver in pearl-oyster is contradicted by perception; we subsequently cognize pearl-oyster and thus our first cognition of silver is contradicted by the second cognition. But we do not find any such thing in the case of this world. There is no subsequent cognition which could render our first cognition of this world false. Therefore, this world cannot be regarded to be mere illusion. Moreover, we find a similarity between silver and pearl-oyster. Both are white. But what similarity is there between the non-intelligent world and the intelligent Brahma, both being poles asunder? How can the world now be superimposed on Brahma?

[The Vedāntin replies—For the sake of illusion it is not necessary that only similarity between two objects can lead to superimposing of one on the other. We see that people whose minds are highly excited by passion, experience the illusion of embracing their wives in dream. The same can be said of waking state also. Moreover, when ignorant people superimpose dark colour on the sky which is beyond perception, then the question of similarity does not arise at all.]
The Naiyāyikas assert that the effect is non-existent before the causal operation. Non-existence is produced out of existence. From the existent lump of clay is produced a jar which is non-existent in that lump of clay.

Their view is not correct. For, non-existence cannot be produced. Nobody can bring non-existence into existence. Who can produce yellow colour out of the blue wherein the yellow colour does not exist? It may be argued:—People use phrases like ‘The jar is non-existent,’ with regard to the lump of clay from which jar has not yet been produced, and ‘The jar is existent,’ after it is produced from that clay. Therefore, the jar has the quality of existence at times and non-existence at other times; otherwise, these phrases cannot be used.—To this we reply:—All agree to the view that a quality exists in the qualified. According to the objector’s view-point, the jar was non-existent before it was produced. That is, the qualified (jar) did not exist then. Then, where did the quality of non-existence reside in the absence of the qualified? Therefore, the objector will have to admit the existence of a jar even against his will in the lump of clay. Moreover, the objector had stated, non-existence is a quality which resided in the jar before its production; for, otherwise one cannot use such phrases as ‘The non-existent jar.’ To this we reply:—How can you use such a phrase.—‘The jar is non-existent before its production? Before its production, the qualified (jar) being non-existent, how can the quality of non-existence be appended to it? For example, we say ‘A blue lotus.’ Here lotus is the substratum of the quality of blueness. Similarly, ‘A non-existent jar’ means that the jar is the substratum of the quality of non-existence. Now, when the jar is not existing before its production, then how can it become the substratum of any quality as the lotus is of blueness; therefore, an effect does exist even before the operation of cause.

It may be asked:—If the effect does exist even before the operation of cause, then, wherein lies the utility of the causal operation? To this we reply:—In the stage of cause an object remains latent and minute. The causal operation simply makes that object gross and patent. Thus the causal operation brings about the manifestation of an effect which is already existing in the cause. For example, the pressing of sesame seeds manifests the oil which is already existent in those seeds.

Again, the effect is existent in its material cause, because the former is related to the latter. A lump of clay is related to a jar even before its production. If the jar were non-existent, then it could not have any relation with the lump of clay. A lump of clay cannot produce anything which is not related to it. If unrelated things could be produced out of anything, then why not produce cloth out of a lump of clay? Or for that matter, why not produce everything from everything. But this is not so. On the other hand, wherever cause is patent enough to produce a particular effect, that cause will produce only that effect. The sesame seeds have the potency to produce oil and not jar or cloth. The yarns have the potency to produce only cloth. This potency is always related to a potent effect. Had there been no existence of jar before its production, then who can instil the potency to produce it in a lump of clay.

Again, it is observed that an effect is of the same nature as its cause. An effect is not different from its cause. A jar is not different from a lump of clay, but is of the nature of clay. If the jar were different from clay, then the jar could not be of the nature of clay. Only those things differ from each other which are produced out of different materials, as a jar and the yarns. The objects which are different can have conjunction or separation. A jar and a piece of cloth can be brought together. The Himalayas
are always separated from the Vindhya. But in clay and jar there can be neither separation nor conjunction. Moreover, the weight of clay from which a jar is made is the same as the weight of the jar. For example, a seer of clay will produce a jar weighing neither more nor less than a seer. Therefore, jar is not different from clay.

An objector says:—Well, jar is different from clay, because (1) We find that with regard to jar, we say it is born, and not with regard to clay; (2) It is the jar which is destroyed and not the clay; (3) The notions about the jar and clay are also different; (4) One is named jar, the other clay; (5) The jar serves the purpose of bringing water which clay does not; (6) We say that the jar exists in clay and not the reverse.

To this we reply that these arguments for proving a difference between a cause and its effect, do not prove the real difference. For, these apparent differences can be explained away by attributing the notions to be appearance and disappearance of certain factors. For instance, the limbs of a tortoise appear from its body and again disappear into it. Nobody on this basis can call these phenomena to be the birth and death of its limbs; similar is the case of a jar etc., which are said to be produced when they emanate from clay, etc., and destroyed when they merge into clay, etc. The difference of notions also can be similarly explained; we call clay as clay as long as jar has not emanated from it. As regards the usage of such expressions as, jar exists in clay, it is like the usage of such phrases as, "Tilaka trees exist in forest." Really speaking the whole forest is made up of Tilaka trees only, still we use a phrase like that. With reference to the difference of purposes served by a cause and an effect (e.g., by clay and jar), we reply that the same things serve different purposes collectively or singly. The atoms of clay collected in the form of a jar, can bring water:

they cannot do so when they are single. "Each individual bearer performs the function of indicating the path, but not that of carrying the palanquin, while collectively they carry the palanquin." If the Naiyāyika were to say again:

You say that an effect already existing in its cause is manifested by the operation of the cause. Now, tell us, does this manifestation exist before the causal operation or not? If it does, i.e., if manifestation exists before causal operation then what is the use of the latter? If, on the other hand, you say that manifestation does not exist before causal operation, then it would mean that causal operation produces a non-existent thing. This goes against your sat-kārya theory.

We reply:—

The Naiyāyika has overlooked his own fault. For the same fallacy can be shown to exist in his theory also. He says that a non-existent effect is produced from its cause. Now, we ask—does this production exist before the cause or not? If it does then what purpose does your cause serve? If it does not, then that production must have another production and the latter another and so on ad infinitum.

If, on the other hand, it is said that this production of jar is nothing else but jar itself, then "jar is produced" would be tantamount to production is produced, which is absurd. It will be still more absurd when we say, "jar is destroyed," for, it would then mean production is destroyed.

Thus it is proved that the effect is always existent.

Pradhāna, Prakṛti and A vyākta are the synonyms of Nature. It is uncaused as it is not produced out of any other thing, eternal, one, of the nature of three Attributes and pervades all its products. The three Attributes are Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Sattva is of the nature of pleasure and illumination, and is light. Rajas is of the nature of pain
and activity, and is mobile. Tamas is of the nature of delusion and enveloping, and is heavy. These Attributes are able to bring this world into being, and carry on its business by their nature of being mutually subjective, and supporting and productive, and co-operative. Sometimes, Sattva subjugates the Rajas and Tamas; sometimes, Rajas subjugates Sattva and Tamas; sometimes, Tamas subjugates Rajas and Sattva. These Attributes have no power of creation singly; they become productive by taking the support of each other. They are always found in union, all three together. And for the purpose of serving the end of the Spirit, they are seen to co-operate, although they are mutually opposed. The end of the Spirit is the worldly enjoyment or emancipation.

It may be argued that under these circumstances, every existing entity should have all the three qualities of pleasure, pain and delusion, as it is composed of the three Attributes. Vacaspati argues—If these external objects themselves are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, then sandal should impart pleasure in winter even. Sandal never ceases to be sandal. Similarly, paste of saffron should be pleasant even in summer. Saffron-paste never ceases to be what it is. In the same way, thorns which are pleasant to a camel should be pleasant to men also. They do not change their nature in the case of any particular individual. Therefore, sandal, saffron, etc., are not of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. They give rise to these different feelings on account of the difference of individuals, times, and condition, etc. (Bhamati on Br. S. II 2-1).

To this Bala replies (p. 141)—Although pleasure, pain and delusion are common to all objects, still they do not spring up accidentally, so as to affect everybody uniformly. They require certain conditions for their generation. Pleasure for its generation, depends upon virtue, and stands in need of Sattva. Pain, for its generation, depends upon vice and stands in need of Rajas. Delusion, for its generation, depends upon vice and stands in need of Tamas. Vacaspati has also explained it well (Tatt. K, Kār. 13)—“A single girl, young, beautiful, gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband,—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Pleasure; she pains her co-wives,—why?—because for them, she appears in the form of Pain; and lastly the same girl deludes or stupefies another man who is unable to get her,—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Delusion. The case of this woman illustrates the nature of all things.” (Dr. Jha’s translation, pp. 49-50)

Thus, the Nature also is made up of the three Attributes, because it is the cause of all the manifest objects which are made up of the three Attributes. The Attributes in the Nature are in equilibrium. Of course, the Attributes are not free from modification even at this stage, for modification is their very nature; but the modification of each Attribute is similar. Sattva is modified into Sattva, Rajas into Rajas and Tamas into Tamas, till the Nature does not come into contact with the Spirit. The moment Nature comes into contact with the Spirit, the equilibrium of the Attributes is disturbed. On account of this disturbance, diverse forms in this world are created from the Attributes. For example, one and the same water produces different kinds of juices in cocoanut, lemon, grape, etc.

It has already been pointed out that all this creation by Nature is for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Now, the existence of the Spirit is proved. We observe that all composite objects are for another’s use. Bed, seat, etc., do not serve any end of their own, but are meant for a man. Similarly, the composite Pradhāna, Mahat, etc., being composed of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, much exist for another’s use. This another cannot be a composite object. For, the latter would then require to serve another composite, and
this another and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, this another, viz., the Spirit, whose purpose is served by Pradhāna, etc., must be recognised to exist. Again, all what is of the nature of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion is seen to require a controller, as a chariot does. Therefore, Buddhi, etc., also require a controller. And that controller is the Spirit. Moreover, Pleasure, Pain and Delusion presuppose the existence of an enjoyer who enjoys them. This enjoyer is the Spirit. Pleasure, etc., cannot be enjoyed by anything of the nature of Pleasure, etc. For, nothing can operate upon itself. Therefore, we must admit an entity devoid of Pleasure etc. And that entity is the Spirit. There is also another argument, which proves the existence of the Spirit. The scriptures tend to bring about Isolation, which is the final cessation of the three kinds of pain. Buddhi, etc., cannot be isolated, because, they are of the nature of Pleasure; Pain and Delusion. Pain is one of their ingredients from which they cannot be separated. Therefore, we have to admit the existence of something distinct from Buddhi, etc. And that is the Spirit.

There are as many Spirits as the bodies, and not one Spirit. Īśvara exists establishes the plurality of Spirits in the following verse (18)—"(1) Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death and the organs, (2) because there is non-simultaneity of activity and (3) because there is diversity due to the three Attributes—the plurality of the Spirits is established." (Dr. Jha’s translation, p. 64).

We see in this world that one man dies, the other is born, one is blind, the other sees well,—one is deaf, the other listens well. All this can be explained only when we admit different Spirits in different bodies. If there is only one Spirit in all the bodies, then, when the Spirit renounces one body, all beings should die; or when the Spirit takes up a new body, all beings should be born. Similarly, when one

becomes blind, all should be blind. Therefore, there is a plurality of Spirits.

If it be argued that just one Ākāśa appears many on account of coming into contact with jar, house, etc., similarly, one Spirit appears many on account of coming into contact with different bodies, then it would not be correct. For, as body is the upādhi (condition) of the Spirit, so the limbs are the upādhis of a body. And when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, would such phenomena be called the births and deaths of the same body?

Moreover, if there is only one Spirit in all the bodies, then when that Spirit moves one body all the bodies should move simultaneously. Again, we see that beings are divided into gods, men, beasts etc. on the basis of the three Attributes. Those abounding in Sattva are gods, those in Rajas are men and those in Tamas are demons. If there were only one Spirit, then these differences would never arise, but the whole creation would be uniform. Thus, the plurality of the Spirits is established.

The Spirit, being devoid of the three Attributes, is the seer or witness of this creation, which is of the nature of the three Attributes. The Spirit is isolated, inactive and indifferent, again because it is free from the three Attributes. This different Spirit appears to be active, although the activity really belongs to the three Attributes. This illusion arises out of the union of the insentient Nature with the Sentient Spirit. As a result thereof, the activity belonging to the insentient Nature is transferred to the Sentient Spirit.

A question arises—why should there be a union between the Nature and the Spirit? The reply is:—The Nature is an object of experience; it stands in need of the Spirit, the expericer. Therefore, one cause of union is that the Spirit may experience the Nature. But, when the Spirit imagines
itself as suffering on account of its union with the Nature, then it desires isolation. This isolation is the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. And as this discrimination is impossible without the Nature, the second cause of union between the Nature and the Spirit is the purpose of bringing about the Spirit’s isolation.

The Nature, having exhibited itself to the Spirit, desists like an actress who has shown her skill on the stage. The Spirit then attains isolation. And as a delicate and newly-wedded girl when seen by a stranger does not appear again before that stranger, so the Nature also, when seen by a Spirit does not come into union with that particular Spirit.

Thus, bondage and isolation which really belong to the Nature are ascribed to the Spirit by mistake. By practising such discriminative wisdom, a person never errs about bondage or emancipation. That is, he attains isolation or salvation.

Har Dutt Sharma

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Kārika I

The topics of these seventy verses are those of the entire Śaṅkūtantra; they are devoid of anecdotes and also omit discussions of rival views.

**Sāmkhyya Kārikā**

**NOTES**

I

About the sons of ब्रह्म, कविता, आदुर, पवार्तक and शृङ्गकार see Introduction. The quotation ‘पवार्तकविवादत्वपि’ etc., is taken from पवार्तक; see Introduction.

आविश्वासिक. The word भूत stands for living beings, according to चन्द्रगुप्त.

आविश्वासिक, according to गोदो, includes miseries due to cold, heat, wind etc., because these are due to supernatural powers. On देवात्मकै देव, Davies remarks—“But in old time, gods of higher class, and not demons merely, were supposed to afflict men with disease and pain. In the Rig-Veda (ii. 33, 7). Gritsamada prays to Rudra that he may be freed from his bodily pains, which he affirms to have been sent by the Devas or gods (daivya).” (p. 15)

The reading adopted by गोदो, viz., तद्वयात्मके is more expressive of the संस्कृत idea of complete cessation of pain, than तद्वयात्मके of बाचो (See, S. N. S., 1, in.). cf. तत्व विविधत्वाय बात्मात्मकै उपरात्मत्वाय (सं. घ. 1. 1). The reading of जयो, viz., तद्वयात्मके does not materially differ from तद्वयात्मके. Compare also Wilson, pp. 6–7; Davies, pp. 13–14, note on this reading.

विष्णुराण describes the three दृश्यs in the following verses:

अत्यामिकोऽवित्वाय: सारोरो मानसस्तथा।
शारोरो वदुहिमेधैः शुभायं च स: \( ॥ २ ॥ \)
सिम्होग्यातिशयायनवरेश्वरभमान:।
शुभार्थात: श्वायुह्वशाल्यायुतिर्यास्त्राक्षेत्र ॥ ३ ॥
तथाभिषेकोऽतिसारश्रुतगमनस्थित:।
भवते देशस्तापे मानसं श्रुतगमस्य ॥ ४ ॥
With the sense of this कारिका, cf. अम्बारासुर—
कुश्ति च दत्तुदुः सर्पांसुसूचारणयथय: ।
विकल्पामयमः विकल्पिकारः निलवम् ॥ ( ११.१०.२१ )
प्रकटोऽध्यायमेव विचारमेव कर्ममिति ।
सत्त्वातिसत्त्वविषयं वयस्मद्विविचारानां ॥ ( ११.३.२० )

The reconciliation of तैतीर्थी हिसा with the अतिक्रमेय—मा
हिसां वनस्पतिः—is an interesting topic which has taxed
the ingenuity of all the orthodox systems of philosophy (See,
S. N. S., p. 5, In.; Sovani, p. 400). बाद्रम has discussed
this question at length, quoting extensively from the standard
authors (See pages 24–36).

The order of व्यवस्थापनमिति is based on the procedure of
recognition. The same order is observed in the following सं.
—प्रथम प्रथमवत्सल ( १. २२); बाध्यवत्सलायं तेनाद्वितीयस्य ( १. ६५ );
tेनाद्वितीयस्य ( १. ६५ ); ततः प्रथमः ( १. ६५ ); and संहृतप्रथमतात् पुरुषस्य
(१. ६५).

Sovani is quite pertinent in pointing out the confusion
with regard to the meaning of the word व्यवस्था. Some call the
महापुरुषस्य as यूक्त: whileas, the author of कारिका seems to regard
everything यूक्त: ( and, therefore, प्रत्ययोऽयः ), except the प्रथम
and पुरुष. विशेष agrees with the latter explanation, in his
commentary on this कारिका, but, changes his opinion in the
comment on the 6th कारिका. At the latter place he says
—सामायति धौऽमानस्य अत्तिक्रमणाय प्रामाणिकत्वस्य प्रतीतिः: He
would seem to include महापुरुष: etc., by the word आदि (See
बाद्रम p. 16 In.). In order to avoid the contradiction, we should
interpret the word आदि, according to तैतीर्थी, to mean the union
between प्रथमतिः and पुरुष: cf. आदि: तत्संयोऽयः। प्रत्ययोऽयः प्रत्ययोऽयः
नित्यातिक्रमेय: समुदाय: (केशवर, p. 183) । See Sovani, pp. 401 and 403,
and notes 36 and 37.
III

In connection with Jacobi's remark that it is very strange that intellect should be regarded as a form of matter by the Sāmkhyas (See Ent. Gott. Ind. p. 32), it is interesting to compare Davies (p. 17, 3n)—Modern Science, like the system of Kapila, makes intellect, a mere form of matter. "Mind, used in the sense of substance or essence, and brain, used in the sense of organ of mental function are at bottom names for the same substance." (Maudsley's Physiology of Mind, 3rd Ed., p. 38).

The nature of गुरुः is explained by चन्द्रिक as अजनकक्षे शतस्य एवं: | आपविषयण प्रतिनिधित्वं; गत्वे वेदान्तिकायमायानादिनिराव:।

Unlike the वेदान्तिकायम, the साधन्यास maintain that शतस्य is a product.

On गुरुः as pure inward light, Davies (p. 18, 1n.) Hegel on Thought (Das Denken), in connection with the Absolute:—"It is that light which lights; but it has no other content except that light." (Phil. der Rel., i. 117) [Translated from German by H. Sharma].

From अहंकार (Ego) proceed not only the इन्द्रियाः, but everything material cognised by them. That is, the Ego (which is the I-principle) is the 'basis of the reality of all our sense-perceptions' (Davies, p. 21, note 1), and consequently of all the existence. Davies quotes Schelling (System des Transcendentalismus, p. 60) in support of this idea—"If at all there exists Something Real as opposed to ideal, then that Something Real must be I, because it is the principle of all reality." (Translated from German by H. Sharma). This position, of course, differs from that of the वेदान्तिकायम, who does not regard the reality of the I-principle (अहंकार) even, but that of the Pure Consciousness (गुरुः),—the I-principle itself being imaginary and due to माया. Distinction should be drawn from the विज्ञानवादी-चंद्रिक also, who denies the existence of everything external, except consciousness. The साधन्यासवाचिक

does not deny the external existence, but considers it to be a modified product of consciousness, in which it lies latent. cf. न विज्ञानवादी वाच्यप्रसारित्: (लाल. ५, ४२.)

IV

Apart from the three Means of Right Cognition, viz., प्रत्ययम, अहम्मम and शान्त, recognised by the साधन्यासवाचिक, the commentators discuss the other Means of Right Cognition, recognised by other schools. The चार्जिक materialist recognises only प्रत्ययम, the जैन and वेदान्तिक schools recognise प्रत्ययम and अनुमान, the साधन्यास also recognise only two प्रमाणाः, but they are प्रत्ययम and शान्त according to them. The followers of रामाचरण, the जैन चार्जिक, the साधन्यास and the योग systems recognise प्रत्ययम, अनुमान and शान्त. The oldest and the most modern वेदान्तिक and the followers of the महेश्मार्य school recognise उपमान in addition to the three named above. The साधन्यास शाल्य of प्रभाकर school add अपूर्वान्त्यते as the fifth. The साधन्यास of कुमारिदास and school and the अविनायवाचिकs recognise one more, viz., अनुपूर्वान्त्यते or अमान. The number of प्रमाणाः reaches eight in the case of the चार्जिकs who add संवेदन and नयेय to the list. Some चार्जिकs recognise वेदान्त also in addition to the above; others add विज्ञान to the list, and thus the total reaches ten. The commentators have tried to show that all the seven प्रमाणाः, apart from the three recognised by the कार्यिक, fall under the latter.

1. उपमान—

वच्चो splits it up into प्रत्ययम, अनुमान and शान्त;
माध्रर regards it to be अनुमान;
जौषो includes it under अनुमान and शान्त;
गोदो includes it under शान्त;
and चंद्रिक under अनुमान.

2. अपूर्वान्त्यते—

All the commentators include it under अनुमान.
3. अभाव—

वाचः और जयः रागित का प्रत्येकः
मार्गः इसे अंदूमानः। अल्पः गौड़ोसः
रिवृक्षः—संसारभावामधिः प्रतिभामातः
तथा सम्बन्धः, सुझोग अंदूमानः, यें अन्यरेषः।
विशेषः यें, अतिरिक्तः अंदूमानः गत्रयः;
इसे से हम प्रत्येकः
चन्द्रिकः इसे अंदूमानः, अन्यरेषः।

4. संबंधः

वाचः, जयः और मार्गः
गौड़ो और चन्द्रिकः
अंदूमानः।

5. अभाव—

वाचः अंदूमानः, जयः
मार्गः और चन्द्रिकः
अंदूमानः।

6. प्रतिभा—

वाचः और चन्द्रिकः
अंदूमानः, जयः
अंदूमानः, जयः
अंदूमानः।

7. वेदः—

अंदूमानः, चन्द्रिकः
मार्गः, अंदूमानः।

Wilson is right in remarking that although the संसारभावामधिः
do recognise six प्रमानः, गौड़ोसः
रिवृक्षः, अल्पः, प्रतिभा, अंदूमानः, चन्द्रिकः, विशेषः,
is not correct; for संबंधः, अल्पः, प्रतिभा, अंदूमानः, चन्द्रिकः, विशेषः,
are nowhere recognised as प्रमानः by the संसारभावामधिः; rather, “
the author of चन्द्रिकः अल्पः, प्रतिभा, अंदूमानः, चन्द्रिकः, विशेषः,
from the character of proofs.”

V

Following the तत्त्वज्ञानः—तत्त्वज्ञानः—तत्त्वज्ञानः—तत्त्वज्ञानः—
सामान्योपज्ञानः—वाचः
(1, 1, 5), वाचः
first divides 
अंदूमानः
to three
kinds. Again he gives another classification:

अंदूमानः

वाचः और चन्द्रिकः
सामान्योपज्ञानः

पूर्ववत्

१. पूर्ववत्

२. सामान्योपज्ञानः

The commentators differ in the explanation of these
terms. वाचः
himself proposes two alternative explanations:

(1) (a) पूर्ववत्—A priori or inference of effect from
cause,—as of rain from the clouds in the sky.

(b) सामान्योपज्ञानः—A posteriori, or an inference of cause
from effect,—as of rain from the flood in a river.
(c) सामान्यतः—Commonly seen, or based on Analogy,—e.g., we observe that a particular man in one town now, is seen in another next day, because he has moved. Similarly, the Sun must also move, as he is seen at different places in the sky at different times.

Or

(2) (a) पृथ्वी—If we have seen two things together in the past, then when we see one of them now, we infer the existence of the other also. For example, from smoke on the hill, we infer fire.

(b) शेषयु—Inference by exclusion (प्रस्तुतेऽपि प्रशस्त निपत्तिः प्रशस्तता विचारणम् शेषयुः परिवर्तिः). The question is,—under which of the seven categories (प्रकार, गुण etc.) should we include शेष (sound)? Now, शेष cannot come under सामान्य, विशेष and the rest, and its inclusion under गुण has been denied. Therefore, by the law of the residue, शेष falls under गुण.

(c) सामान्यतः—Where the relation of the शेष is not within ordinary perception, there we take another object within ordinary perception and similar to the शेष in question; and on this similarity or Commonness, we transfer the शेष from the perceived to the unperceived instance. For instance, we have got to infer the existence of the Spirit. We do so on the basis of the qualities like the desire, etc. The desire, etc., are qualities. Qualities always reside in objects (as we perceive in the case of form, taste and the rest). Therefore, the desire etc., must also reside in some object; and that object is the Spirit.

The two alternative explanations given by वार्तापायन show that the meaning of these terms had become doubtful at his time. Cf. Principal A. B. Dhruba's paper—'Trividham anumānam', POC, Poona. pp. 251-280.

वाच ो agrees with the second explanation of वात्स्यपायन. But अर्थ or शेषयु, according to वाच ो, is a negative reasoning. वात्स्यपायन's instance of शेषयु, viz. शेष is a गुण, is rejected by वाच ो in his तात्त्विक (p. 183, तात्त्विक सिद्धान्तसः). According to him शेषयु or शेष is गुण for द्वितीयमान. The inference of शेष being a गुण is not a द्वितीयमान but अर्थव्यतिरिक्त. The correct example of शेषयु, therefore, is that the qualities desire etc., reside in the आराम. These qualities cannot reside in प्रकार, जल, तेजस्वी and शेष: nor can they reside in आराम, because the qualities of the latter are perceived by the external sense—organ (ear). Similarly the desire etc. being विशेषयु cannot be the qualities of विशेष, अराम and मनस—nor do the qualities of the latter three गुण are साक्षात. Therefore ultimately the desire etc., reside in the ninth गुण, viz., आराम. So there being no शेष of आराम, it is an instance of द्वितीयमान. जय ो and गोह ो agree with the first explanation of वात्स्यपायन. गोह ो and माता explain शेषयु differently—सदृढ़ते जलपावः ज्ञानार्थ शेषयुव्यतिरिक्त ज्ञानार्थ इति (गोह ो)।

विद्युःविद्युः—वाच ो would read one more विद्युः i.e. विद्युः विद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युःविद्युः
It will be interesting to know how वाच्य has tried to bring the other प्रामाण्यs under the three recognised by the सांख्य.

उपमान. According to the शैवाचित्क (प्रणीतसामान्य, सामान्यान्त, उपमान—या १ 1 6), उपमान is that sentence which establishes a relation between a word and its sense. But, according to the सांख्य, a वाच्य is not a प्रामाण्य, but the knowledge (ज्ञान) derived from the वाच्य. It is the सच्चार्थता alone which is प्रामाण्य. So, उपमान cannot be a separate प्रामाण्य, but is included under अनुभाव. According to the मीमांसाक, उपमान is the सांख्य-ज्ञान (or the cognition of similarity, as of गीत residing in the directly perceived गृह्य). A man who saw a cow in the town, now observes a गृह्य in the forest. At this moment he is reminded of the cow which is qualified by the similarity of गृह्य directly perceived. This is the गृह्य of उपमान. वाच्य replies that this उपमान and its गृह्य are both included under अनुभाव. For, सांख्य is like the सांख्य. Just as we have गृह्य in गीत, so we have गृह्यसार्थज्ञान in गीत. And as we directly perceive गृह्य along with गीत, so we perceive गृह्यसार्थज्ञान and गृह्यसार्थज्ञान along with गृह्य. Therefore, गृह्यसार्थज्ञान (उपमान) and गृह्यसार्थज्ञान (उपमानसार्थ) both are प्रामाण्य. सांख्य is not a relation (like सांख्य) which should reside on two objects; it is only गृह्यसार्थज्ञान, that is, the existence of a large number of qualities of one object in another. This सांख्य is, thus, one like गृह्य; and if it is perceived in गीत, then it is perceived in गृह्य also.

अथवापि is Presumption. We presume the existence of living वेद outside the house, if he is not visible inside the house. But, the मीमांसाक objects—देशसामान्य गृह्यसार्थज्ञानपारंपीतक: etc. He says that when we hear जीवन, वेद: कबिज्ञि, then the substratum of the existence of वेद is देशसामान्य (or space in general), which includes the particular space of गृह्य also. Thus, वेद's non-existence in the गृह्य is opposed to its existence in देशसामान्य. And, in order to remove this opposition, we have to resort to अथवापि. वाच्य replies that गृह्य (in which the non-existence of वेद has been established by means of Right Cognition) cannot be included in देशसामान्य. Similarly वेद's non-existence in गृह्य (which is opposed to his existence in गृह्य) cannot be a case of opposition to his existence everywhere.

अथवा is no प्रामाण्य, but is included under अनुभाव. For, अथवा is merely a modification of भूतज्ञ. But, says an objector, how can अथवा (a negation) be a परिणाम (something positive)?

Answer. Under एते तृतीयधिः परिणामाद्विभाषणाम् (या १ III 13), वाच्य has defined परिणाम as अवस्थमयाय गृह्य पूर्वभोज्वति परिणाम इति—i. e. modification is the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of an object, which (object) always remains constant. So, when घट was on the मृतज्ञ, then it was सदिक्षितपरिणाम of भूतज्ञ; and when there is no घट, then it is the केवल or अद्वितीयपरिणाम of भूतज्ञ.

VI

Things directly perceived by the senses need not be taught by the शास्त्र, as they can be easily cognised by even an ordinary person. Now “things beyond the senses are not only those which are too subtle for organs of the sense, but those which are imperceptible by accident, as the fire in a mountain that smokes” (Davies, p. 27). The latter is an instance of पूर्वभाव अथवाम, which वाच्य regards to be as unimportant for our inquiry as the अनुभाव. The most important kind of अथवाम, from our point of view, is सांख्यवादन्त्व (and तथापि, which is not mentioned by the कारिका, but added by वाच्य), which leads us to infer things which are too subtle for the organs of sense. But ज्ञान rejects नृत्यज्ञ and अवस्थमय, both (p. 9).
VII

पतन्त्रित लाइंग आपुर्खय (महाभाष्य IV. 1. 3). See Introduction. The eight causes of आपुर्खय mentioned in the कारिका are reduced to four by नारा—

(1) वेदांग उपसेत्व आत्मित्वाणी.
(2) इन्त्याय आपुर्खय और मोनोस्वच्छान.
(3) विवधायेऽ= शोभ्य, और
(4) अर्थात्मित्वाणी इन्त्याय आत्मित्वाणी.

Sovani is right in remarking that all these can be reduced to two—इन्त्यायेऽ and विवधायेऽ (See p. 405). नारा lays down the causes of आपुर्खय of असत्य (non-existent) things even—हेमण्यातां च असत्यं भवति। चतुर्भूजाते-पापस्य दर्शनात्मावभेदं. . . .

पतन्त्रित द्वारा आपुर्खयाण्विकं। सत्तामयै विसाती च तुंगी.

VIII

On the reading प्रक्तिसूचय, Davies remarks—'Lassen has in the text स्वरूप (having its own form), from the सांख्योपसूचय, which must be referred to intellect (महाभाष्य). All the Mss. but one have स्वरूप (like), which the sense requires. In his translation he has "dissimile et simile".' (p. 27, 1n).

IX

नारा here lays down the opinions of (1) the चाहें, (2) the वेदांगिकाः and the वेदांगिकाः, and (3) the वेदांगिकाः as पुरूषङ्ख.

(1) The चाहें भारतवर्षीय स्वरूप (असत्य: सांख्याः).
(2) The वेदांगिकाः and the वेदांगिकाः maintain that an existence comes into being from non-existence (असत्य: सांख्याः).
(3) The वेदांगिकाः maintain that the cause alone is existent, the effect being only an apparent change (एकत्व तत्तत् विनिवर्त: न कार्यान्तितं वस्तु सत्यं). All these views are fully discussed in the Introduction.

X

वहुमत—, i.e., caused. अन्यक or the evolved is caused. Cause, according to नारा, is of two kinds: कारक (producer) and शारिक (illuminator or indicator). प्रयास, उदाहरण, इत्यादि and तत्साधिकां are the कारकाः, as they produce effects. That is, उदाहरण, इत्यादि and तत्साधिकां are हेतुs and हेतुमयेज्ञ both, whileas, अन्यक (i.e. प्रयास) is only a हेतु. शारिक हेतुs are five-fold, viz., विशेष, अन्तर्यान, अवत्त, दृष्टि, यथिर्दृष्टि and आवृत्त. Now, विशेषय, अवत्त, दृष्टि and यथिर्दृष्टि are the प्रयासिकोत्तर्व (i.e. creations of Intellect), and thus they pervade all the twenty-three तत्रस्. (But what is this अन्यक?) Thus अन्यक is only a कारक हेतु.

अन्तर्यान—non-eternal, destructible. Destruction is the return of a product to its cause. cf.—नारा: कारणाः (सन्तो शो १. १३२). For, according to the theory of सत्ताः, there can be no real destruction or annihilation. यथिर्दृष्टि is लिंग, because it has no कारण to which it could return.
contrast intended between the evolved and the unevolved." (p. 32, 1n.)

सत्यम्—वाचः explains it as अवयावायविकस्यांगसंयोगः Why can there be no अवयावायविकल्पः between प्राणम् and दृष्टि, etc.? Because, between these, the relation is समावयः (=identity or तत्त्वस्मात्), and not संयोगः. There can be no संयोगः between the तत्त्व and the रूप produced out of them. But, will there be any संयोगः between दृष्टि and अहार्यं, etc.? No commentator answers this, although, here also we can show that अहार्यं, being a product of दृष्टि, stands in समावयः relation to दृष्टि. It is for this reason that गौडः, माधवः and वाचः explain the word अवयाव as शब्दम्, शृंखला, रूपम्, रूपम्, etc., but they land themselves in another difficulty; for, the entire शब्दः (viz., दृष्टि, अहार्यं etc.) cannot be called as शब्दस्यान्तरतिपर्यंतमालयः. If it be urged that शब्दम् and the rest do reside in a latent form in दृष्टि and the rest, then it may be pointed out that शब्दम् and the rest do reside in a latent form in प्राणम् also. Even वाचः, who tries to avoid this difficulty, has illustrated this संयोगः as—तथा हि प्रत्यवेदः: परस्परं संयोजयेते एवम्।

परस्परम्—Although, each of the twenty-three तत्त्व is subordinate to the other in the ascending order, yet, ultimately, all are subordinate to प्रकृति. Again, although दृष्टि is independent in producing अहार्यं, and the latter in producing the हिस्तस्य and the तत्त्वस्मात्, yet each one is ultimately dependent upon प्रकृति, the fountain-head of all energy.

XI

त्रिगुणम्—The three गुण्य or Attributes are the essence of प्रकृति; प्रकृति is nothing but these three गुण्य in equipoise. The kinds of temperaments observed in living beings may broadly be divided into three—spiritual, passionate and dull. Therefore, the संबंध theory of three गुण्य, although a mere hypothesis, is yet a very useful and appropriate hypothesis. Davies remarks—"In the system of Valentinus the
Gnostic, all men and all substances are divided into three classes: (1) spiritual, (2) the vital and (3) the material (Hylic). This corresponds to the गुण of कालिक and is probably an importation from India." (p. 37, 2n.)

**Verse:**—The viewpoint of the बिज्ञानारिथी धोष is that there is no existence of the external objects, except in mind. That is, concept and the object denoted by the concept are identical, because both are comprehended simultaneously. Things, which are not identical, are not necessarily comprehended simultaneously; cf. "सह्योगमनिपन्नामेवो भीत्तिजितः। नेत्रस्थ आच्छादिविज्ञानारिथीमायेन्द्रियायेः" (वाच्यम् 32), Vācyaṭˈs refutation of this view has been thus illustrated by बाणादास—यथा किंतु अमेव यथावदी बसल रक्ष्यात्मकुलानामी जनानां विमुक्ती नुक्लिगुणानां जार्याकारपुष्पकं तथ प्रमाणं परोपकारीतन्त्रामाय वस्तुक्याधिक अनुभवात् दर्शने। यदि हि वसल बिज्ञानारिथीं समेव न ठीर्यान्यायाचार्यानाथेनब्याहार्यानेव बिज्ञानारिथालेखनेव साधारण वर्तु न सम्मेव। अत: वसलतावर्यायोपसत्वो बिज्ञानारिथार्यार्यार्यालेखनेव तदस्य वेदितपरिप्रेयमित। (p. 128).

अतीतम्—म्बद (intellect) is merely an instrument of Pure Intelligence or चेतन, and not identical with it, because म्बद is a material product of प्रभृती.

The phrase सत्त्विनसत्त्वताननां च पुरुषां means that in some respects the Spirit is similar to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त, and in other respect it is different from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त.

**Difference of पुरुष from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त—**

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相似ity of पुरुष to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त and difference of व्यक्त from अव्यक्त—

It should be noted that गोमध and मात्र say पुरुष एक:, which is opposed to the doctrine of पुरुषव्यक्त. जयो and वाचो, therefore, rightly point out that पुरुष is similar to व्यक्त with regard to अव्यक्त. After discussing this point, Wilson concludes—"Either, therefore, Gaurapāda has made a mistake, or by his eka is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Calebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans. Vol. I., p. 31), 'individual'. So in the Sūtras it is said, 'that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the ethereal element may be confined in a variety of vessels' (I, 150). This singleness of soul applies, therefore, to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage and liberation; for, as the commentator observes 'one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body). The singleness of soul, therefore, as asserted by Gaurapāda, is no doubt to be understood in this sense." (p. 65)

**XII**

गुणs do not mean qualities residing in a substance, as understood in the व्यय and वेदांसिक systems. They are of the S. N. 2
woman (and therefore, a साधु type) pleases her husband, pains her rivals and deludes the passionate people. The brave soldiers (and therefore, representing राज्य) of a king please their master, pain their opponents and delude the fugitives. The dark clouds covering the sky (and therefore, a ताप type) please the people suffering from heat, rouse activity among the peasants and delude the lovers in separation. But, there is one difficulty. The 3 गुणs (=प्रकृति or मुकुटारण) assume various shapes by permutation and combination. This amounts to saying that the मुकुटारण is not one but many. Now, how does this position differ from that of the वैज्ञानिकs who also assume the plurality of causes? Cf.—नानेश्वर मुकुटारणाय परिवर्तनसाध्वेयत्वात् कालेष्लेष्मन्तात् को विशेष द्रष्टा च—The reply is कारणद्वाय स्वादिशिराधियेत। शवस्पर्शविद्वात् हु स्पासितलिन्यंत्रम् स्वतः तजगायणांतर्गतिमिश्रितम्॥ त्रिति विज्ञानाणादिशिरम् विवेशार् (1.128).

But are not these गुणs opposed to one another? The reply is—yes. Still they unite for ऊष्णार्घ्, as wick, oil and lamp. The illustration is not a happy one, as we do not find any apparent opposition between तृते, वाति and तेजृ in spite of the attempt of विकटे। Cf.—श्रीपरि तदक्षस्त शीतानार्घ्त, तेजानार्घ्त शीत-विद्वेदि, एदी वातिक श्रवनक शीतानार्घकीति। For this reason बाचः gives another example of this विरोधेन—विशेषां, यथा वा वातिस्तत् भेयायायाय: पर्यवर्तिनम् शरीयरपरस्तत्तारणायायः। बाताम् quotes a parallel passage from the देवीपादम् (3.9)—“द्रीम्या यथा काले प्रकृतोपदेशोः। विन्दुस्ते यथार्थिद्विज्ञानविध्व विधिविध्व विधिविध्व विधिविध्व॥२।।” विद्या हि तथा तत्तद्विंशाम् सह स्वकृतम्। तदास्त विन्दुविनन्दे पापकृति पर्यम् अस्तवग्राह्यातः। पदार्थानां प्रेतिनिः प्रथिताय।” (pp.139-140). Really speaking, there can be no विचार of these गुणs in any evolved thing (say, a human body). If at all there could be any विचार, then it would be in the स्वाध्यायम् i.e. प्रकृति. In no परिणाम of प्रकृति are the गुणs in equal quantity. On the other hand, there is predominance of one over the others. So, there is no कुञ्ज्वन्तं in the विकारं. Cf.—राज्याविद्वायां राज्याविद्वायां पर्यवर्तिनम् विन्दुविने सामान्याना विनिमयायः। तथा प्रवर्तनं—(व्यासमाय on यो. सू. II.15).
XIV

The difficulty lies in the expression तद्भव्यप्रमाणात्. गोङ and माराह explain it as—'on account of the absence of the contraries of व्रजन in the व्रजन, अविवेकार्थधर दर resides in the व्रजन. 'वालो' offers an alternative explanation—'on account of the absence of अविवेकार्थधर in the contrary of व्रजन, i.e., गोङ, अविवेकार्थधर resides in the व्रजन and its constituents.' चतुष्क्र कार्ण adopts the second explanation. जयादि also agrees with it. cf. अभिध्व साधनविवेकार्थधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधरधर�...
XVII

The reading संहितपरार्थवात्, adopted by Wilson, is not supported by गोइड़ो, who reads संहितपरार्थवात्. Wilson's reading of the text is an obvious mistake (based upon, perhaps, the सं. सू. — संहितपरार्थवात्, I. 140), as it is not supported by any commentary.

अधिभावता—पुरुष is the अधिभावता of प्रकृति, as a charioteer is that of a chariot. Question:—But, a charioteer is active, and your पुरुष, being निर्गुण—निविलिय, is not active; how can he become an अधिभावता? Reply:—It is not essential that only an active entity can move or urge anything. Sometimes mere proximity or contact brings about activity, as we see in the case of iron and load-stone. Cf. तत्त्वािपालिपिभावलुप्तमाणिवेत (सं. सू. I. 96). Or, mere presence also can bring about an activity, as in the case of a King. Cf.—

व च सर्वं तु त्यथं तु स्वाप्रमायकर्तकमामुृ।
चलन्ति हस्य जो भयृथि प्रथेन छेदन्ते प्रति ॥ ८५ ॥

संगीयसिलु वाचेि मण्यांने विनियोजकः
राजा साध्वियमाणेन विनियुक्ते कर्त्या ॥ ८६ ॥

तस्मात् चतुर्दशः प्रसावले कर्त्यातमन् ।

( कुमारिकी क्षोभावक on मी. सू. I. 5, Chowkhamamba edn., p. 710 ).

बाद्राम thinks that this argument about the अधिभावता of पुरुष answers all the criticisms brought forward by श्रुतार्मयां in his भाप्त on रचनातुपपेक्षा and प्रवृत्त (ब्र. सू. I. 2. 1 and 2).

केवल्यार्थ प्रत्यक्ष—मार्ग assigns this प्रत्यक्ष to प्रथम, whileas, वच्छ and others take this प्रत्यक्ष as belonging to the शास्त्र and the sages—आगमां महाविदया च।

—XVIII—

On जनम and मरण, विश्वास says—जनमरणो च अप्रमाविकाणी शुमाहरूभावप्रति। अन्तर्गत कार्याव्यवहारावर्तते संयोगम वियोगम भोजयत्मानयिनः प्रवृत्त (सं. म. I. 149).

The view of the श्रमविलित is that one and the same आत्मां assumes plurality on account of being conditioned by the different bodies. Cf. ‘उपायविनोपेश्चैति द्वारात्मां आकाशवेद्य परायश:।’ ‘उपायविनोपेश्चैति द्वारात्मां आकाशवेद्य परायशः।’ (सं. सू. I. 150–152). वर्ण sets the पूर्ववर्त in the following words:—

इ ते च द्वितियो वेदपरिवर्तते श्रवपृत्तम् तवं रक्षयते। इह रक्षयते मण्यार्थस्तु सवृषेकः कर्म प्रवृत्तते। एवं मण्यार्थस्तु च गरीरस्तु किमेकः सम्भवतः परमात्मा, आहोपित्त जलद्वत्तानु वृहदि तवं धृतो नृपत्वद्वायिनयोपयोगते हि। Cf. पिनान्तु (सहितकालुविशेष, p. 13, Chow. S. S. No. 246):—‘आदित्यनसमायमस्थायत्वसतिष्ठतीर्विभावहिच्रुताने सांस्कृतायां किष्टिष्ठितमितिविशेषार्थेनां शुन्यस्तु वर्णयति। वेदस्यार्थिनीमार्थस्तु विशेषार्थेन भृगुस्तु शुन्यस्तु वर्णयति। तत्र च ततः………

एक वर द्वारा मेराम शुशु से विस्मित। एक्य ब्रह्म चैव इत्यं ज्ञातस्य न ज्ञातवान्। (This verse from श्रमविनोपर, भ, २, is quoted by विश्वास also on सं. सू. I. 153).

But, does not this doctrine of पुनर्वहुः contradict the शुरूति which lay down the unity of soul (i.e. आत्मां)? The सं. म. says, No.—‘नानाऽहुतीतिरिच्चो जातिष्ठराया।’ (1. 154).—These scriptures speak of one आत्मां in the sense of class notion. वच्छ also tries to reconcile the अन्तर्गतत्वविशेष as follows—

‘एकत्वनीच च मानायणप्रतिवर्तते कर्षणाविभावासादवन भक्तयमुः। परस्त्रे प्रहस्यकर्षणार्थम भक्तयमुः सांहारुप प्रविष्ट्यात्।’ अन्तर्गत कीडेरीक्रुणा वहाँ: प्रजाः: मुनोमानं सवृषेकः। अन्तर्गत कीडेरीक्रुणा वहाँ: मुनोमानं सवृषेकः। तत्र वेदवात्माः। (ले. आ. 6. १०)॥’ तत्वावेदावर्षिनिः, on श, पृ. II. 22.

Further on, says the संहार्य, if you are going to explain away this नानात्मां by उपाय, then you will land yourself into another absurdity. For, as शृद्ध is the उपाय of आत्मां, so the limbs (अवयवं) are the उपायस of a body (संहार्य). And
when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, will the वेदांतिक call these phenomena the births and deaths of the same body?

XIX, XX and XXI

माध्यमत्र or आदर्शिक is of seven kinds according to जयो:-
समस्ति चार्यकर्मसाधयोः। तथा चौत्रूः—प्रवृत्तिः श्रृणीरतिः वृद्धि विवेकविद्यमानाः। जयो। further raises the question that if प्रवृत्ति is माध्यमत्र and अक्षरोत्तर, then how is he a भोक्ता?—नष्ठु च युक्तिः सर्वेऽय मोहविवश्याकारिता प्रवृत्ति: तथा चाहुः:-
बाहुतास्मात्रश्रति: स्याममहतान्यम् यथा हि भोक्ता। प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिवर्जनाः स्याममहतान्यम् तथापि भोक्ता।।

अभेदतः चेतनाविवर्तितं विद्यम् etc. Intellect and the rest, although non-intelligent, seem to be intelligent, on account of the proximity of the Spirit. Thus alone can the experience—'I know' be explained. Although the entire activity belongs to the Attributes (transformed into महत्, अहृत्र and the rest), yet, on account of its reflection in the Intellect, the really indifferent Spirit seems to be active. Cf. उपरान्त कृतेः ब्रह्मानिर्धारात् (सं. शा. I, 164). The Spirit in its turn transfers its intelligence to matter. This transference is thus illustrated by various commentators—'यथाप्रियोऽगात् द्विप्रभुतान्तर्द्वेये।' (जयो) 'अभेदान्यते सधे: श्रीमान्तेषः: समस्तृः श्रीमोऽभेदं अभेदं संपुर्ण उणोऽभेदं।' (महार) 'श्रायाह्यस्योः: परसर्ण संयोगविवेच्यात् परसपरमविलुप्तं अभेदं यथा वा जवलोऽत: संयोगात् परपरसर्वपरमेश्वर वृद्धिवार्तारिति भावः।' (बाहुतः, सं. शा. I, 164)।।

अभेदान्यते कृतेः is further supported by जयो by the following quotation—प्रत्यक्षानि प्रक्रियामात्र। गुणसमवेशसूत्रोऽस्मिन्ने विपरीतद्वितिः। अहं कर्मसंयोगाविधिमात्रे ब्रह्मैहं क्षणसाधनेन्द्रिये।।। This quotation is found in the तत्त्वसमाससम्बन्धित (Chow. S. S. No. 246, p. 124) and साध्वात्त्वविवचन also (ibid, p. 12) with slight variants.

बाहुतः connects दशानाथं (in प्रवृत्ति दशानाथं केतन्यार्थ तथा प्राणार्थ) with प्राणार्थ, and केतन्यार्थ with प्रवृत्ति. The other commenta-

tors take the line as it stands, i.e. पुरुषस्य दशानाथं and प्राणार्थ केतन्यार्थ. While explaining ‘विश्रुतंमार्थं स्त्राथं वा’ (सं. शा. II, 1). बाहुतः also connects केतन्य with प्राणार्थ.

XXII

In his भाष्य (on शौ. शा. II 19) व्यास describes the तपस्विन as the products of महापुरुष (―एके तत्त्वसमाससाधनो महंतपरिवर्द्धानादि)। But there the महापुरुष should not be taken as the immediate cause (i.e. producer) of these तपस्विन। व्यास has himself said at another place (शौ. शा. I. 45) that these तपस्विन are the products of अहृत्यार।

महापुरुष और गोड़ो hold that these तपस्विन singly produce the महापुरुष। The other commentators hold that each succeeding महापुरुष is produced from the combination of the preceding तपस्विन। For example, श्वगतमात्र और श्वसत्तानाथ अभेद तपस्विन । श्वसत्तानाथ और श्वप्रकाश अभेद तपस्विन। तथा so on. But this theory of बाहुतः violates the orthodox परिवर्धक theory of the वेदांतिक। The point is noticed by कृतकृत्वार, who says—

समस्तआधानम् प्रकृतिः श्रवणीयम्।
तथापि युक्तिर्यथा वन्यसत्तमं स्वामम्।
प्रवृत्ति अवस्था गमने परं स्वामि चेतुः।
स्वपविवर्तितं चार्याद्वेयं प्रस्तुतं। अणुस्मृतवस्तं श्रवणादिबिमभवते।
व्यवहारशास्त्रानुमाने मुञ्जे प्रकृतिभेदुण।
जनदेश्य भेदविद्यमेव। भूतोऽतिशुद्धिकिरी।
तिर्कृत्रिति: भूतात्त्वकृत्तिजन कस्म धुमा।।

(quoted by बिनेन्द्र in his comm. on तत्त्वसमास, p. 293 Chow. S. S.).

महापुरुष गives a queer and fantastic derivation of the word अहृत्यार—चाहुः (कृतकृत्वार् प्रवृत्ति यथासत्तमात्रबन्धितार्थकर्षितो दुःखः मम तत्सन्तात्मकालहायस्यसत्तमात्र। परावेदवर्णावताः परावेदवर्णावताः परळान्तिकम्भित्व दुहो वर्णमयोत्तत्सत्तमात्र। श्रवणादिबिमभवते। परवेदवर्णावताः अहृतिविनिर्देशः।)
XXIII

The first phrase उच्चाकारः gives the general characteristic of the mind and the second phrase संक्षेपः मनः gives the proper function of the mind. गौड़ tóc interprets संक्षेपः as ध्वस्ति कारणम्, i.e., which determines the functioning (of the two sets of इन्द्रियों). वाचः understands संक्षेपः as विशेषणविशेष्यभावेः कारणम् i.e., perceives the definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended. जयः and चांद्रिकः agree with वाचः. What वाचः means is that all the senses of perception cognise their respective objects vaguely, and this is निर्विशेषत्वाकारः or simple-perception. But as mere simple-perception of an object is of no use in our every-day life, so the help of mind is
sought to give a definite and concrete shape to that percept. This is what is called सत्वक्षेत्र or complex-perception. The first is नाम-मूल-निवित्तिक? अर्थोत्तर, and, therefore, निवित्तिक?: the second is नाम-नीतिविज्ञान, and, therefore, सत्तवक्षेत्र. In his support, वाच योगदान अस्ति विशिष्टता विभाग etc., from इमार्थियों के शास्त्रात्मिक (on मी. R. 4., verses 112 and 123, pp. 168 and 172, Chow. S. S.).

The reading adopted by भोगिष्ठ is संक्षेत्रक्षेत्र मन: तथा चेतन:- यथावत् सामहायमान (See S. N. S., p. 126; but he quotes संक्षेत्र-कामन वै यथामोक्षकर्मस्तः सामस्याय in J. R. A. S., July 1931, p. 631). The Chinese version of the Sāmkhya Kārikā also reads “Manas is that which discers” and thus agrees with भोगिष्ठ’s reading. आयामक्षेत्र has been thus illustrated by परमाथेय—“It is in the same manner that a man can pass for an artisan or an orator at the same time.” (Tak. S. K., p. 35).

\( \text{इन्द्रियो व सामवेदः न परमाथेयः} \) remarks:—यथानयिनिष्ठितं तथा मनो-पीपस्यः. But वाच criticises this view—“शेषमात्रेण सातिवाद्विदः पादश्चन्त्र व सामस्याय, न रितंनिरुत्सम्। महामहृद्यार्यायर्मयायामिनिष्ठितं प्रसुज्ज्ञातिगृहस्ते।”

Manas reads यात्रवेस्त्तो in place of यात्रवेस्त्तो. This is noted by चेतनिका also. बाहु’s reading is preferable, because the second line of the कारिका lays down the reasons of the नामावरी of इन्द्रियम, the two reasons being, गुणपरिणामविभागम् and यात्रवेस्त्तो.

The question is—how can one अहृत create these manifold इन्द्रिय whose functions differ? This question is raised by योगिक in his यात्रवेस्त्तीम (Chow. S. S., p. 70)—यतं पुरूषिनिष्ठितं वतं श्रुः, कारणवात:कारणवातःवातःदिक्षित्यवतः न वाहन, सर्व साध्यों स व्यवस्थाते व्यवस्थाते। The reply to it is—गुणपरिणामविभागम्.

Although अहृत is one, yet the three गुण, accompanied by धार्मिक and अस्तरम्य, act and react upon one another; therefore, the modified effects of अहृत (i.e., the इन्द्रियत) differ in their functions.

इस सांख्यों व स्वामित्र नाम द्वारा कारणभास्ति। This seems to be an interpolation or a mistake. In the first place, स्वामित्र is not

recognised as a cause in the सांख्य philosophy. बाहु, in his बुर्ति on the 31st कारिका says—इन सांख्य गुणशालाभावम् न कारणम्। Secondly, even गोहर हिल्सman says so in the वाहा on the 61st कारिका—वह कहाँ वाहायात वाहायम्य प्रभावते कारणम्। स्वामित्रायात् हौँ:। तस्मात्ता कारणम् न कारणम्, नाभि स्वामित्र इति। Whosoever is responsible for the mistake, he has continued his notion of स्वामित्र being a कारण, further in the वाहा. cf. अयोध्यात्मकायुः नेत्रभाण्ड, नाभिहारित, न श्लोकम् न प्रधानम्; न पुरुषम्, स्वामित्रम् इत्यावतप्रभावदेवी।

But if we compare बाहु on the 31st कारिका, we find—अयोध्यात्मकायुः नेत्रभाण्ड न श्लोकम् न प्रधानम् न पुरुषम् न स्वामित्रम् इत्यावतम्। On the basis of बाहु’s reading, I propose that we ought to read न स्वामित्रम्, इत्यावतम्। That is this, नामावरी is not caused by God…… or Spontaneity, but by the modification of the Attributes.

Wilson has translated it—“but from modification of qualities produced by spontaneity.” Keeping the text as it is, I have tried to steer clear of spontaneity as the cause. My translation is—“but is caused by the spontaneous modification of the Attributes.” But to have this sense even we ought to read स्वामित्रायात्मकप्रभावितम्.

परमाथेय seems to translate the word स्वामित्र by ‘Special Being’ or ‘a Special Dharma’, which may be called “Being”.

The reading गुणमाध्यमत्वात्: प्रवशिते: प्रवशिते एव is also faulty. I think we ought to read गुणमाध्यमत्वात्: प्रवशिते: अस्त्रयूः प्रवशिते:।

The following classification of the organs by परमाथेय, has no parallel in any commentary.

“Among the organs, there are those which apprehend objects close by while others perceive things from afar. Their object is double; (1) to avoid danger, (2) to protect the body. ‘To avoid danger’ (relates to the eyes and ears, which ) in seeing and hearing from afar, avoid the danger. ‘To protect the body’ (relates to the eight other organs, which) perceive the eight species of objects, from each of the objects...
approaching the corresponding organ; that permits us to regulate our body, according to these objects." (Tak. S. K., p. 37).

The word मात्र stands in the sense of "uniqueness" according to गोड़ो and मात्र; but, according to वाच, this word means "barenness," seems to waver between the two senses. [See, Tak. S. K., pp. 37-38; S. N. S., p. 63, In. and J. R. A. S., July 1931, p. 632 (I)].

XXIX

धार्मिकता | गोड़ो and मात्र read धार्मिकता.

सामान्यतः मात्र: प्राणशाखा वायुः पञ्चम। Does the word करण stand for विष्णु करण or वायुकरण करण? While वाच adopts the former view, all the other commentators agree to the latter interpretation, although मात्र curiously says at one place —समांतरकारणः करणः (on गोड़ो, तत्त्व, अनुभायम्). विज्ञात also explains the word करण as अनुभायम् in his भाषा (on गोड़ो, तत्त्व, अनुभायम्). But वाच, while commenting on समांतरकारणः प्राणशाखा, जीवनम् (योगभाष्य on तत्त्व, अनुभायम्), has given a different interpretation, viz., स हि प्रयोगः रास्तेष्या न मात्रते स्वरूपकारणः यथा: 'सामान्यतः मात्र: प्राणशाखा वायुः पञ्चम।' बादास्य correctly points out the discrepancy. He suggests that गोड़ो प्राणशाखा is the धार्मिकता करणः, because in deep sleep when all the external sense-organs are dormant, we see the five vital airs functioning. Therefore, these vital airs cannot be said to be the function of external sense-organs.

XXX

Cognition has been divided into three kinds in the सांस्कृतिक philosophy, viz., perception (प्रत्ययः), inference (अनुभायम्) and valid testimony (सत्यम्). Now, in प्रत्यय, the three अनुभायम् and one of the organs of sense,—all four seem to function simultaneously and gradually. But, according to the निर्णय, there are only gradual stages, which, however, are not observable on account of the swiftness of the different functions. Cf. उपायमयोगप्रदेशः मात्र: (न्या. मृ. III. 2. 57.), न युक्त: करणः (निर्णयः. (ibid, III. 2. 58.). वाच says, तत्त्वज्ञानसाधनोऽर्थविशेषिणाः (ibid, III. 2. 59.). For, according to the निर्णय, the mind is अनुभायम्. The followers of वाच, on the other hand, regard the mind to be of मात्रते स्वरूपकारणः, and, therefore, there can be a धार्मिकता.

In the case of अनुभायम् and मात्र|, only the three अनुभायम् function. They can operate simultaneously and gradually both, but they do not depend upon the cognition of senses at that particular moment.

XXXI

आधूः—Davies observes:—'अकृत is glossed in the Petersb, Lexicon by Abisch ( = purpose). Antrieb ( = motive). Colebrooke's translation is "incited by mutual invitation."...

......The meaning of "incitement to activity," mentioned by Wilson, expresses more nearly the sense of अकृत...It is composed of ऑ to, towards, and कृ, to cry. Gauḍapāda says that it means ādarsambhrama (respectful eagerness in action.).' (p. 68, In.).

Davies is wrong in considering that गोड़ो is correct in applying this verse to the three internal organs only (See Davies, p. 68, In.). All the other commentators apply it to all the organs, for each and every इच्छित फंक्शन for प्रत्ययः.

The spirit of the सा. मृ., "स हि सत्यम् तत्त्वात्" (III. 55.) and "इद्धिवर्तिनिक: सिद्धा" (III. 57.), goes directly against the theory of the गौड़पादिक, where no इच्छित is mentioned. Nor is the position helped by विज्ञात’s remark, viz., प्रकटिताय जन्ये।

XXXII

The three functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting are, as Davies rightly points out (pp. 69-70), common to all the organs. Thus "the organ of sight seizes and holds the impression conveyed by an external object and manifests it to manas." (ibid.) According to गाढः, आहरण and धरण belong to केंद्रियेऽयोग्यस्य and प्रकाशन to बुद्धिनिर्वाचनम्. यह आहरण to केंद्रिये्य in general, and धरण and प्रकाशन to अहारार्य and शिशि respectively. वाजः followed by चन्द्रिका, would relegate आहरण to केंद्रिये्य, धरण to शिशि, अहारार्य and मनस, and प्रकाशन to बुद्धिनिर्वाचनम्. According to परमात्मा, आहरण belongs to अन्तःकरण, प्रकाशन to बुद्धिनिर्वाचनम् and धरण to केंद्रिये्य [see Tak. S. K., p. 42].

The word श्रवण in the second half of this verse presents a difficulty. वाजः takes श्रवण with आहारय, धरण and प्रकाशन each. The objects seised by the इतिहास, being only five, are doubled by dividing them into लघु and अल्पमात्र. Similarly, the body which is retained by the अन्तःकरण, is made up of five vital airs; but these are also लघु and अल्पमात्र, and so tenfold. The objects manifested by the बुद्धिनिर्वाचनम् are also tenfold because of being divided into दिशिका and अदिशिका varieties. I think there is another and better way of explaining the कारिका. The objects seized, retained and manifested are altogether ten, viz., five objects of organs of action and five objects of organs of sense. These ten are supervised by the three internal organs.

XXXIII

वाजः explains why काठ is not recognised as a separate category in the सांख्य philosophy. According to the वेदांतिकर्तञ्च "असर्वंभूतं युपविस्तरं विप्रमिति दिनिर्दिनानि" (II. 2. 6), काठ is one category which is divided into three parts-past, present and future—according to different circumstances. प्रवलस्वरूपन्ता clarifies this point—"एकत्रलेख्यं चर्कायतामहाप्रकृतिसिद्धिर्विशालान्यांतरा नानासंगमर्र् धारितानि"; that is, just as one and the same man is called a पाठक or a पाठक in different circumstances, or just as one and the same piece of crystal assumes different colours according to the objects placed near it, so all the effects, though of one nature, become different under the different circumstances of beginning, ending, remaining and perishing. Thus, there is only one काठ. To this वाजः replies—Why should we first assume one काठ and then assume different circumstances or उपासिं to make this काठ multifarious? Why should we not recognise the उपासिः only? Cf. न तत्वप्य काठं सत्तायानयोग्यं बुद्धिनिर्वाचनम्: श्रवणातुपाति तीक्ष्णिकां सुर्भितत्तत्त्वां वस्त्रस्थलं इत्यामस्ये—योगापायण on III, 52.

XXXIV

अविशेष = non-specific, i. e., तन्मात्स्य. विशेष = specific, i. e., पद्धत्मात्स्य.

XXXV

The word द्राक्षि has been translated by S. N. S., as ‘principal’. The translation is based upon ज्ञतः’s phrase द्राक्षिणस्य सन्तीति. I think that ‘warmer’ expresses the sense of द्राक्षि better than ‘principal’. For, in spite of the fact that all the sense-organs bring their percepts to the अन्तःकरण, the latter itself receives these percepts for delivering them to बुद्धा, as S. N. 3.
is clear from the next कारिका. The criticism of S. N. S. would have been right if अनन्तकाल were to retain these percepts for itself and not present them to the Spirit. Therefore, the three-fold अनन्तकाल acts as a warder for the Spirit and not as the principal (one). परमार्थ renders विचिन्द्र काल as 'the three internal organs master the gate.' (Tak. S. K., p. 44).

XXXVII

वाचः interprets both the lines of this कारिका as the causes of the superiority of भुज्ञे. गंडः, on the other hand, interprets the first line as the cause of the second—because intellect brings about the entire enjoyment of the Spirit, therefore, it brings about the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. अन्तर quotes the following speech of अहृतार—

अहृतारी किं धृते से नां सुप्रभोचयः।
प्रवृद्धः परमार्थनां न लठे नाहि न तज्जगतः।
सह तिष्ठे यहः पुत्र: पश्चार्थक:।
तत्त्ववृद्धि श्रिवृद्धि स कथे मानसस्थितः।
गौंडसी सत्येश्त्रे देव: सर्वथा अभिनुजः।
सेहः विचारते यद्युच्यते हि सन्तप्तशः हणः।

अन्तर further remarks—हि सत्यत: कपिहन्दा मे किमिषि
कस्तेवेचमुद्वैधियं, हि तु सांभायानि पञ्चविविक्षतं चायवेष्टं पञ्चविवेष्टं च
वि:अेवसहः। उष्णे च—

हस्त मिच ठठ में नित्येष्व विषायापुण्युक्तु कृष्ण च म श्रद्धाः।
यदि विद्यते ते
कपिलमथ तत्त्वात्यथे मोधसांख्येऽ च।

This verse is more of a tirade against the सांख्य philosophy than an exposition.

XXXVIII

Why तन्मात्र are called अविशेष?—This has been explained by गोठो and अन्तर as देवनामनि भुज्ञे जिवि हु: समद्विहिताः;
which is wrong. For, तन्मात्र, being evolved out of विष्णु-सिद्धिका प्रकृति, cannot be said to be devoid of भुज्ञे and मोह (= रजस् and

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नमस्ते). Therefore, the explanation of वाचः, viz., न चैव शास्त्रसाधितरसुप्रभोभण्यो निनेशः हि सांभावेः, is better. That is, all the Attributes are present in the तन्मात्र, but they are not patent enough to be enjoyed.

XXXIX

The specific elements are divided into three divisions—

‘1) Subtle body; 2) those which are born of father and mother; and 3) gross substances or inorganic matter. . . .
It (subtle body) becomes 'specific' by the aggregation of the subtle elements which in themselves are 'non-specific' or diversified.' (Davies, p. 76). But, according to वाचः, यद्याविश्वे शास्त्रसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारসारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारसारsic
According to this कारिकā, the number of the constituents of विज्ञानिकर is eighteen, but according to सूत, it is seventeen. विज्ञानि has ingeniously removed this discrepancy by saying—अहस्तरूप चुदावतान्तरिता।

XLI

A distinction should be made between विज्ञानि and विज्ञानिकर. The latter is the vehicle of the former, which consists of thirteen principles, viz., intellect, ego, mind, five organs of sense and five organs of action, and which is referred to as अहस्तरूप: पुर्ण in the authority quoted by वाचा।

The reading of गौड़ and माहार is विना अविशेषं; whereas वाचा has विना विशेषं: वाचा calls the सूत्तमरीवर as विशेष in कारिका XL. So विना विशेषं means विना कथा: चाररित। But this is confusing because, to say that the विज्ञानि (composed of thirteen principles) cannot exist without सूत्तमरीवर (composed of विज्ञानि and प्रकटतन्माणस) is not logical. गौड़'s explanation is better when he says that विज्ञानि cannot exist without अविशेषं: विशेष, the five subtle elements.

The reading of परमार्फ is also seems to be विना अविशेषं; and he agrees with गौड़ in explaining अविशेष as the five subtle elements. (Tak. S. K. p. 50.) चाररित gives different opinion: केवल सूत्तमरीवरावलाभार अविनाशितम विना चाररित। तथ्या विज्ञानि सर्ववस्तुमय विज्ञानिकरि विशेषं: सूत्तमरीवरार विनाशितम विना चाररित। अतो न विज्ञानिकरिण सूत्तमरीवर-स्थानायतिरिहितं चाररित।

XLIII

According to वाचा and जय दispositions may be divided like this—

| चाररित: |
| प्रकृति: |
| प्रकाशित: |
| कारणाध्येयं: |
| कारणायोऽध्येयं: |

The प्रकृति, which are innate, are of four kinds, viz., अमृत, ज्ञान, वेदर्थ and एक्षेत्र। They belong to कारिकांकलित only. Those depending on the instruments (कारणाध्येयं:) are eight विशेष, अमृत, ज्ञान, अमृत, वेदर्थ, अवस्थिति, एक्षेत्र, and अस्मित्। Those dispositions which depend on the effect or body (कारणायोऽध्येयं:) are also eight, विशेष, five when the body is inside the womb and three, i.e., childhood, youth and old age, when the body is outside the womb. गौड़ and माहार, however, divide the विना into three kinds—सास्तिरिक, प्रवृत्ति and वेदना। अमृत, ज्ञान, वेदर्थ and एक्षेत्र are born along with कारिकांकलित, so they are सास्तिरिक or innate in his case; but they come to सत्त्व, सन्ततिः, सन्ततिः and सन्ततिः (the four sons of ब्रह्म) after their birth, and are therefore, प्रवृत्ति or natural in their case. The वेदना or acquired dispositions reside in ordinary human beings and depend upon the instruments and the effected body.

परमार्फ, however, explains सास्तिरिक-नाव as “as the state acquired by goodness”, i.e., acquired by good deeds performed in previous birth. But this does not agree with the case of कारिका, whose विना are साहोवता।

XLIV and XLV

According to माहार, the सूत्तमरीवर rises to the eight states by practising virtue. The states are ज्ञान, प्रामाण्य, एक्षेत्र, विश्व, गात्रिक्ष, अमृत, दृष्ट्राज्ञ and स्त्रामरीवर। गौड़ gives सास्तिरिक for विश्व, and आस has been dropped in Wilson's text and our's, but is given in the Benares edition. By practising vice, the सूत्तमरीवर sinks to the five states of पद्ध, पद्धी, श्रुत्र्य, सार्तर्य and स्त्रामरीवर। The वेदना, according to वाचा, is due to the identification of the Spirit with विश्व; but माहार includes the eight kinds of evolvents (प्रकृतिः) in this bondage. The वेदना, according to वाचा, is the identification of the Spirit with the विश्व of प्रकृतिः (i.e. the evolutes); but according to माहार, this bondage is brought about by making the eight states, viz., the ज्ञान, प्रामाण्य and others, as the sumnum bonum. These three
kinds of bondages are explained by वाच at length in his तत्त्वज्ञानी on योगभाष्य 1. 24.

The word प्रकृतिस्तं विश्वास त्व, stands for महाभाष्यमन्विद्याग्नि, according to वाच; but, according to गहं and माउ. the word denotes प्रचारनुस्द्धारमन्त्रानि.

XLVI

For the criticism of Keith, see Sovani ( p. 424 ). This creation of intellect or “the conduct of the human understanding” (Davies, p. 84), distinguished by Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment, is divided into fifty kinds.

गहं and माउ illustrate all these four states by means of an example of post. There is विवर्ण, when you are in doubt, whether you are seeing a man or a post. There is अवस्था, when even after seeing the post clearly, you are not entirely free from the doubt. There is गुटि, when you do not want to remove the doubt as to the identity of the post. There is सिद्धि when you succeed in establishing the correct identity of the post. The explanation of वाच is better. विवर्ण is that which obstructs the path of the Spirit to liberation. “Incapacity (अवस्था) arises from the imperfection of senses. Acquiescence or Contentment (गुटि) is a passive state of intellect. Perfection (सिद्धि) means perfect knowledge, not completeness in moral virtue.” (Davies, pp. 84–85).

XLVII

विबाहम or अविवाह is of five kinds:—अविवाह, अविवस्य, राग, दुःख and अभिविवाह, which are called तमस, मोह, महामोह, तान्त्रिक and अन्यायाधिक 5 by the कारिका.

XLVIII

तमस or अविवाह is of eight kinds and arises on account of identifying the Spirit with Nature, Intellect, Ego, and the five subtle elements.

XLIX

The quotation in वाच, enumerating the list of the injuries to organs, is found with a variant (यूद्धत: for मन्त्रत: ) in the सांस्कृतिक (Chow. S. S. No. 246, p. 77). गहं uses प्रकृति (or paralyse) for यूद्ध, and उपकृति for जागर. Cf. “िज्जा जागर,” in जागर, p. 52. माउ and गहं adopt यूद्धत्व for उपकृत्व ( = obstruction of bowels).

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L

माउ (and not गहं, as S. N. S. says, page 91, 1n) reads आयुर्विहित: in place of आयुर्विहित:. आयुर्विहित: is grammatically wrong, as it is derived from आयुर + विहित (“आयुर्विहितयुतित” वाक्य on पाणिन IV. 3. 60). आयुर्विहित = आयुर्विहित: is an अन्यायविहित compound in the sense of locative case, according to “अयुर्विहित” पाणिन II. 1. 6. Then the feminine termination दुःख (and not
I am tempted to quote the interesting explanation of these terms given by Fuji, the Japanese commentator, and quoted by Mr. Suryanarayana Sastri in Tak. S. K., p. 62, 1n.

1. *lubricating water,* because *Nature* penetrates all, as water lubricates all; 2. *moving* because by the *necessary* objects one purifies oneself as water which is moving and of little depth purifies all; 3. *running*, because with *time* a river joins the ocean; 4. *lake-water*, because the *influence* of the acts committed in other existences is like the water of the lake which the rain refills; 5. *well-penetrated* because one renounces the *acquisition* of riches, as a desiccated ground is irrigated by water; 6. *easily crossed*, because one has not to occupy oneself any more with *protecting*, as [in the case of a piece of] water that has been crossed; 7. *gushes without ceasing;* 8. *transparennt*, for there is no more *attachment;* 9. *excellent and pure*, for not to *injure* others is like water of the purest and most excellent quality.

LI

No commentator has given the names of *असिद्धः; जयः* which gives them—*तामः चासिद्धः मोपश्चालानारमित्या: (1) संग्रहः—.* has a defective reading.

बाचः criticises the view of some writer in para 237. This view, as has been shown by me in my article ("Jayamangali and other commentaries on the Sāmkhya-Kārikās", Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. V, iii, p. 429), belongs to *ण्डः*; this point is of great importance for the question of the relative chronology of the different commentaries. I have discussed it in my article referred to above.
Following is the scheme of the division of सिद्धि according to बाचोः

1. अध्ययन
2. शान्ति
3. कङ्ग
4. सुहोत्माति
5. शानि

6. प्रमोद
7. मुदुद्द
8. मोदमान

The last three are the effects of all the remaining five together.

परमार्यांक’s original gives a very beautiful tale in explaining how शानि secures सिद्धि.

“A brāhmaṇ is hated by others. and he sees it. he becomes an ascetic; when he has become an ascetic, his master and his fellow-disciples also hold him in hatred and do not communicate knowledge to him. Conscious of his little chance, he betakes himself to a distant village to remain there, saying to himself: ‘In this village, there are no brāhmins; I can pass there my summer (varṣa) retreat.’ During his sojourn, one makes him many gifts. He gives the superfluous to his friends and to his acquaintances. He gives of it even to women and to shepherds. All the inhabitants of the village cherish him. At the end of the summer-retreat, everybody makes gifts to him: the triple staff, the water bowl, clothes etc.; at the approach of a festival of S’akra, he says to the villagers: ‘Who wishes to accompany me to my native country to be present there at the festival? Those who wish to accompany me should bring each one a gift for me.’ Arrived at his place, he betakes himself to his old master. Choosing the best gifts, he makes an offering of them to him. Then, the master, the fellow-disciples and the others commence to love him. His master, by way of gift, communicates knowledge to him. By that knowledge he arrives at absolute knowledge and final Deliverance. That perfection then is acquired by gifts.” (Tak. S. K. p. 65)

These eight सिद्धिः, viz. तार, चुतार, etc. are thus translated by परमार्यांकः

(1) तार = Crossing by oneself.
(2) चुतार = Crossing well.
(3) तारतार = Crossing all.
(4) प्रमोद = Crossing with joy.
(5) प्रप्रमोद = Crossing with an excessive joy.
(6) प्रसमान = Crossing with full joy.
(7) रमयुक = Crossing by love.
(8) स्वम्युक्तिः = Crossing by universal love.

परमार्यांक adds to it a lengthy explanation of his own which slightly differs from the original commentary at places. For instance, the शानि-सिद्धि, which is equal to स्वम्युक्तिः, is explained by परमार्यांक thus:

‘Crossing by universal love’. A man of this class, after having been hated by all, gives in alms all his goods and thus makes himself loved by all. Since all wish him to attain Deliverance, one says in this case ‘Crossing by universal love.’

While बाचोः construes अहुः as निवारक and refers by it to विषयं, अवष्टि and तुम्लि, विवाण् (on सी. III. 44) explains अहुः as आकार्यपक and refers by it to the three सिद्धि, viz. ज्ञान शानि and अध्ययन, leaving स्वाृतिः and शानि as of secondary importance. He criticises बाचोः as follows—कथितवैतास्मादात्मामुक्तिः निवारक-परमार्यांकः निबिन्याशास्त्रिः सत्विः बन्धकलातिः व्याप्ते तरु तुष्य...
The word हिन्दु has been explained as महत्तव बृहदिरित by विज्ञान (on म. श. III 45). But this is not correct. बाचो is right in explaining it as referring to the objects of senses and the two bodies—subtle and gross. Davies remarks:—

"Some commentators make the लिङ्ग itself to be बुद्धि (intellect) and भव्यस to be its conditions. The former interpretation (i.e. बाचो H.) is preferable, for the लिङ्ग, though formed of intellect and other internal organs, is yet something different from them. It is, moreover, conditioned by the state of a former life, which is due to 'intellect'." (p. 93).

Curiously enough, Colebrooke translates as विना हिन्दु भव्यस: as 'without person there would be no pause of dispositions.' This is accepted by Wilson also in his translation of the बालो. But, the word in the text is हिन्दु and not हिन्दु. I have, therefore, translated it as 'without लिङ्ग, there can be no elaboration of dispositions.' Because, virtue and the rest are acquired by the formation of gross and subtle bodies. The Spirit cannot experience or acquire virtue or vice. For this purpose, there is always the necessity of gross and subtle bodies. Therefore, Wilson's explanation 'but is equally necessary for their occasional cessation' (p. 216) is quite beside the mark. (See also Davies, p. 89 with In; S. N. S., p. 97).

LV

संबन्धित means where संबन्ध predominates. It may be asked why this state should not be the human goal, why should men hanker after संबन्ध? To this the संबन्ध replies:—

आद्वाधुनियान्तरेतरस्त्रयोनियगाणित्यांत् (म. श. III 52). विज्ञान explains it as—सत्तायमज्ञानाविभागयावेदधार्मिकयोगिता- 

Notes

According to गोडो there are sixteen forms of creations—

"that is, apparently, each of the four classes of beings proceeds from four modifications of nature; or from the invisible principles, from the subtle rudiments, from conditions or dispositions of intellect and from the gross elements." (Wilson, p. 220). It seems that गोडो takes रेण, मायाप and तेष्योन ( = two, दोहो and स्थायत), and divides each of them into four classes, viz., अभाव, विद्वान, भाव, and भूत.

The phrase ब्रह्मांडस्थलपर्यंत: refers to all the three creations above, in the middle and below. Davies thinks (p. 90, 2n) that Wilson construes this phrase with मध्ये रोक्षिनां: . Thereupon, Davies remarks, 'Brahma does not belong to it (i.e. midst), but to the region "above".' I think Davies has misunderstood Wilson who does not distinctly join the two phrases given above. (See Wilson, p. 220). परमांश explains ब्रह्मांडस्थलपर्यंत: as "Brahma is at the commencement and pillar at the end." He goes on to explain स्तन:—"Why is the last of all the creations called 'pillar'? Because the herbs, trees, mountains, rocks etc., support the three worlds; that is why one calls it 'pillar'." (Tak. S. K., pp. 69-70).

LV

पत्यंत also expresses the same idea—'परिणामतापर्यंत: 

Compare also, संयोग जग्यांर्गुणं ह्यं ' (म. श. III, 53).

स्त्राघण is explained by चतुर्भुज as सूर्य एव समग्र हिन्दुः, 

माया reads अत्र in place of त्र, and समयान in place of 

स्त्राघण in the text. The former term he explains as विना लभ्यते, and the latter as संबन्धित.
The illustration of a cook cited by वाच  and the (सं. मू. III 63) —विविक्षोपन्त मूढिनिर्देश: प्रामाण्य सुस्तु, पारे, has got this disadvantage that प्र is चेतन. The illustration of गाँड़ो वि., यथा कपिल स्तवः स्वाध्य विश्वासयोग्यो रूपसारः has the same disadvantage. The second illustration of गाँड़ो, वि., तथा चोर कुमार, प्राप्तते उपर्यायः हत्या नित्यते, is better, because कुमार is non-intelligent.

चन्द्रिका quotes two योगसूत्रs in support of the purport of this कारिका—“तदर्थे एव द्वयन्यानाम्” (II 21) and “इत्यत: प्रतित नन्दन्यानां तद्यत्ताधिकारकवेषः” (II 22).

LVII

मातर, गाँड़ो and जयः, interpret this कारिका as illustrating the प्रकृति and निरुति (of प्राप्तता) both, while as वाचः speaks of प्रकृति only.

LVIII

औसतुक्य means हलछः but it is only a blind instinct or activity, which is the nature of the three गुणs in साध्विक philosophy. It is not the हलछ of the नैवायिकs according to whom it is the quality of a sentient being. भरमार्यान explain औसतुक्य as ‘incertitude’. (Tak. S. K. p. 72).

LXI

This कारिका has given rise to a great controversy. With whom should we construe the word मैं? Is it पुन्छ which feels that there is nothing सुक्तार्थतर than प्रकृति or is it प्रकृति itself which feels that there is nothing सुक्तार्थतर than myself? The first meaning is adopted by मातर; वाचः and गाँड़ो would seem to mean that it is the author of the कारिका who feels that there is nothing सुक्तार्थतर than प्रकृति.

The next difficulty is about the meaning of the term सुक्तार्थतर. जयः explains it by ‘subtlety’, वाचः and मातर, by ‘bashfulness’, and गाँड़ो by ‘enjoyability’.

Again, in the 59th कारिका, प्रकृति is compared to a नाची but here to a कुमार.

—LXIV

As to the existence of another कारिका on the basis of गाँड़ो, see my foot-note to the text of the कारिका and introduction “पुन: इर्ततुक्तम्यति पुरुषस्य” —वाचः explains it as—अग्रमात्मायं परिक्षयतारामण, वने पद्यित। This is not a good interpretation. गाँड़ो is much nearer the mark when he says—अहम्मनं परिप्रेयण द्वायस्मीतस्य उपः; पुन:वं न ययति।

LXIII

Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri remarks (see Tak. S. K. p. 77), “This verse is lacking in the Chinese text. That is perhaps an interpolation posterior to the time of Paramārtha (546), though I cannot give the special reason for it. One may, however, affirm that the original of the Chinese translation did not contain that verse, for there is no room to suppose that the translator had by error jumped over this verse and the commentary, if all the time there had been one. This verse is found in the Śiśu, III. 73.”

On page 58 of our text, read एतति सम प्रच्छन्ति चमः, वैराम्, अवैराम् in place of चमः, वैराम्, अवैराम्.

LXIV

The word तत्त्वाराम, according to जयः, गाँड़ो and मातर, means the अभ्यास or practice of the twenty-five तत्त्व. वाचः clarifies this अभ्यास as तत्त्वारामाराम, which leads to the realisation of the distinction between पुन्छ and प्रकृति.

The following scheme shows the different interpretations of the phrases नाशि, न मैं न नाहूँ, as given by various commentators.—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>वाचः</th>
<th>मातर</th>
<th>गाँड़ो</th>
<th>जयः</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>नाशि</td>
<td>अहिंक्यातानाम् नाशि</td>
<td>नाशि तत्त्वाराम</td>
<td>नाहूँ भवानि</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>न मैं</td>
<td>न मैं स्वामिनायानि</td>
<td>न मैं तत्त्वाराम</td>
<td>न मय सर्वस्य वैराम, नाहूँ भवानि, अविने प्रकृति</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>नाहूँ</td>
<td>अहिंक्यातानाम्</td>
<td>नाहूँ तत्त्वाराम</td>
<td>अहिंक्यातानाम् नाहूँ भवानि, अविने प्रकृति</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LXVI

The idea is that भोग and विवेक are for the purpose of the Spirit (i.e., श्रुत्यायं). They urge the Nature into activity. But, after the Spirit has enjoyed the products of Nature and has attained the discriminative knowledge, there remains no other purpose of the Spirit. भोग and अपवर्ग are no more श्रुत्यायं. So, in the case of this particular Spirit, भोग and अपवर्ग cannot urge the Nature into activity.

LXVII

S. N. S. remarks—“Curiously enough, Paramārtha seems to understand this verse without importing any notion of jīvanmukti. His rendering runs thus: Because of full and perfect knowledge, dharma, etc., have no longer any influence; transmigration is arrested like the body (or force) of the potter’s wheel, whose motion one interrupts: see B. F. E. O., IV, 1056. This is, of course, hardly satisfactory.” (p. 116, 1n).
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