A LECTURE
ON THE
SA`NKHYA PHILOSOPHY,
EMBRACING THE TEXT
OF THE
TATTWA SAMASA.

PRINTED FOR THE USE OF THE BENARES COLLEGE
BY ORDER OF GOVERNMENT N. W. P.

MIRIAPORE.
ORPHAN SCHOOL PRESS.—SUPT. R. C. MATHER.
1850.
PREFACE.

This Lecture, delivered in the session of 1849, is a sequel to those on the Nyāya Philosophy delivered to the senior class of pupils in the English Department of the Benares College, in 1848, "with the view of introducing them to the philosophical terminology current among their learned fellow-countrymen the pandits."

For selecting the Tattwa-samāsa as the text-book, there were two motives—the simplicity of its arrangement, and the extreme rarity of the work. Mr. Colebrooke (at p. 233, vol. 1st of his Essays) speaks of it as being uncertain whether the work were still extant; and few of the pandits appear to know it except by name.

J. R. B.

Benares College,
31st July, 1850.
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The operation of the Principles—consisting in
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No. 1.—[The founder of the Sāṇkhya school of philosophy was Kapila. Two treatises are attributed to him—the Sānkhya-pravachana and the Tatwa-samāsa. The latter will form the text of the following observations. The commentary commences thus:—]

श्री गणेशाय नमः || श्री कपिलाय नमः || पञ्चविंशिति नवनते जनन ध्वनिमानवान् || आदिसृष्टोऽनमस्कृते कपिलाय नामवर्षे \|

अधातलस्यानात्माहं आक्षेपाणि अच्छास्ताय: \|

No. 2.—Salutation to Ganesa! Salutation to the great sage Kapila! Salutation to that great sage Kapila who, at the first creation, obtained, merely by birth, a knowledge of the twenty-five principles (tatwa).

Now we shall explain the aphorisms of the Sānkhya, which constitute what is called the Compendium of Principles.

[In saying that Kapila obtained his knowledge “merely by birth,” the author means that Kapila differed from those other tea-
chens who, after being born, received instruction before they were qualified to teach. *Kapila* is regarded as an incarnation of the deity.)

No. 3.—A certain brähman, aggrieved by the three kinds of pain, had recourse to the great sage *Kapila*, the teacher of the *Sāṅkhyā*. Having declared his family, his name and race, and his desire of instruction, he said—“Holy Sir! What is of all things the most important? What is actual truth? And what must I do in order that I may have done what is fitting to be done?” *Kapila* replied—“I shall tell you.”

[ The Aphorisms of *Kapila* here follow.]

No. 4.—“(1) The eight ‘producers’ (*prakriti*); (2) the sixteen ‘productions’ (*vikāra*); (3) ‘Soul’ (*purusha*); (4) the ‘triazd of qualities’ (*traiguna*); (5) ‘emanation’ or ‘development’ (*sanchara*); (6) ‘re-absorption’ or ‘dissolution’ (*pratisamchara*); (7) the ‘ministers of Soul’ (*adhyātma*); (8) the ‘province of an organ’ (*adhibhūta*); (9) the respective ‘presiding deity’ (*adhidaivata*); (10) the five ‘perversities of understanding’ (*abhipudhā*); (11) the five ‘sources of action’ (*karman-yoni*); (12) the five ‘airs’ (*vāyu*); (13) the five which consist of action (*karmaśruti*); (14) ‘ignorance’ (*avidyā*) under five divisions; (15) ‘disability’ (*asakti*) of twenty-eight kinds; (16) ‘acquiescence’ or ‘indifference’ (*tūṣṭi*) of nine kinds; (17) ‘perfection’ (*siddhi*) of eight kinds; (18) the ‘radical facts’ (*anvikāra*) of ten kinds; (19) ‘beneficent nature,’ (*anugraha-sarga*); (20) ‘created existences’ (*bhāt-sarga*) of ten descriptions; (21) ‘parental creation’ (*dhātu-sarga*) of three descriptions; (22) three-fold ‘bondage’ (*bandha*); (23) three-fold ‘liberation’ (*moksha*); (24) three-fold ‘proof’ (*pramāṇa*); (25) three-fold ‘pain’ (*du’kha*):—in this consists all actual truth.

“He who shall have thoroughly understood this, will have done all that is to be done. He will not again be obnoxious to the three sorts of pain.”

Such are the Aphorisms of the *Sāṅkhyā*, entitled the ‘Compendium of Principles.’

[ The commentator then proceeds to dilate on each of the foregoing topics.]
No. 5.—Now which are those eight ‘producers’? To this it is replied—(1) the ‘undiscrete’ (avyakta); (2) ‘intellect’ (buddhi); (3) ‘self-consciousness’ (ahankāra); and (4—8) the five ‘subtle rudiments’ (tan-mattā);—these are the eight ‘producers.’

[Each of these eight ‘producers’ is now taken up in its order.]

No. 6.—Now the ‘undiscrete’ is described. As, in this world, jars, webs, vases, and couches are made manifest, nor so is the ‘undiscrete’—that is to say—it is not apprehended by the hearing or by any other sense. Why? Because it has neither beginning, middle, nor end; nor is it made up of parts. The inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, and likewise eternal, devoid of savour and odour,—without beginning or middle, anterior in order to mind, firm and chief—thus do the learned designate it. Subtle, devoid of characteristic attributes, unconscious, without beginning or end, so too whose nature it is to produce, without parts, one only, the common [source of all]—such is the ‘undiscrete.’

No. 7.—Synonyms of the ‘undiscrete’ are the following—viz: the ‘undistinguished,’ ‘unseparated,’ or ‘imperceptible’ (avyakta); the ‘chief’ (pradhāna); the ‘source of emanation’ (brahma); the ‘receptacle’ or ‘abode,’ (pura); the ‘permanent’ (ādhvema); the ‘chief,’ or ‘that in which all generated effect is comprehended’ (pradhānaka); the ‘indestructible’ (aśkara); the ‘site’ or ‘field’ (kṣetra); ‘darkness’ (tamas); the ‘productive source’ (prāṇīta).

[Several of these terms are not, strictly speaking, synonyms, further than as they are all applicable to the ‘undiscrete.’ They are epithets employed for reasons which may appear in the sequel. A similar remark applies to the various lists of synonyms which will be met with further on.]

We now come to the second of the eight ‘producers’ (No. 5)—viz ‘intellect.’

No. 8.—What is ‘intellect’? To this it is replied—‘intellect’ is ‘ascertainment’ (adhyavasāya). This it is from which, in regard to a cow or any other thing, there is the determination ‘This is so and so, and not otherwise’—‘This is a cow, not a horse’—‘This is a post, not a man.’ Such is ‘intellect’ or ‘understanding.’

[The various aspects under which this faculty is regarded as presenting itself, are next specified.]
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[the capacity of assuming a form of the utmost] 'minuteness' (ānimī) &c.

These four [kinds of 'intelect']—Nos. 10.—13.—are [regarded as] 'partaking of the quality of goodness' (śātwika). [See No. 50].

[No. 9.—Of this 'intellect' there are eight forms—(1) 'virtue' (dharma); (2) 'knowledge' (jñāna); (3) 'dispassion' (vairāgya); (4) superhuman 'power' (aiswarya)—[the remaining four being the opposites or negatives of these. See No. 14.]

No. 10.—'Virtue' (dharma) is the opposite of 'vice' (adharma); it is what is enjoined in the 'scripture' (śruti) and in the 'law' (smṛtī); not opposed to the practice of the pious—of which the symptom is felicity [—prosperity being regarded as the fruit of former virtue, and adversity as that of former vice.]

No. 11.—'Knowledge' (jñāna) is the opposite of 'ignorance' (ajñāna)—an acquaintance with the 'principles' (tattva), the 'forms' of intellect (bhūva-No. 9.), and the 'elements' (bhūtā-No 31.)

No. 12.—'Dispassion' (vairāgya) is the opposite of 'passion' (avairāgya)—it consists in not concerning one's self about sounds or any other 'objects of sense' (vishaya).

No. 13.—Superhuman 'power' (aiswarya) is the opposite of 'powerlessness' (anaiswarya); it consists of the eight qualities,

[...]
The following words are synonyms—[See No. 7]—of 'intellect'—viz: 'mind' (manas); 'understanding' (mati); the 'great' principle (mahat); the 'Creator' (brahma); 'familiar knowledge' (khyati); 'wisdom' (prajnyá); 'intelligence through report' (s'ráti); 'resolution' (dhriti); a 'train of thought' (prajnyá-santati); 'memory' (smriti); and 'meditation' (dhi); in such terms is 'intellect' spoken of.

We now come to the third of the eight 'producers' (No. 5)—viz 'self-consciousness'—that which is implied in a man's employing the pronoun 'I'—a pronoun the employment of which declares the speaker's belief that he possesses an individuality of his own.

[The term anahkára (the 'making of an Ego or an I'), the technical import of which, as remarked by Professor Wilson, is 'the pride or conceit of individuality,* is rendered, in Mr. Colebrooke's version of the Sánkhyá Káriká, by the term 'Egotism.' It must be carefully borne in mind that the word 'egotism,' thus employed, is not to carry with it the familiar import of bustling vanity—the feeling which prompts a vain man to be constantly talking about himself:—for, a man who is no 'egotist,' in that familiar sense of the term, is not the less chargeable with anahkára, if he fancies that his employing the pronoun 'I' at all is not an absurdity. The word, as described by Váchatipati, in his commentary on the 24th of the Káriká of I'swara Krishna, might signify 'egotism' in the ordinary sense—verging even on 'ego-ism,'—i.e., the belief that 'besides me there is nought else:'—but the significance of Kapila's system will perhaps be more clearly dis-

* Sánkhyá Káriká—p. 91.
cerned, if the technical acceptance of the term, as given by Professor Wilson, be strictly adhered to.)

No. 18.—The various epithets given to 'self-consciousness' are the concept of individuality (ahankāra); the modifying (vai-kārika); the 'ardent' (taijasa); the 'origin of the elements' (bhūtādī); 'dependent on inference' (sānumāna); and 'independent of inference' (nīrānunāna).

Of the eight 'producers' (No. 5) we have now to consider the last five—viz., the five 'subtle elements'—the rudiments of what are familiarly called the 'elements.'

No. 19.—To the question—what are the five 'subtle elements'?—it is replied:—the five 'subtle elements' are consequences of 'self-consciousness.' The 'subtle element of sound' (s'abda-tamātra); the 'subtle element of tangibility' (spars'a-tamātra); the 'subtle element of colour' (rūpa-tamātra); the 'subtle element of savour' (rasa-tamātra); and the 'subtle element of odour' (gandha-tamātra);—these are the five 'subtle elements.'

("Tan-mātra is a compound of tadh, 'that,' and mātra, 'alone;' implying, that in which its own peculiar property resides, without any change or variety." In this respect the 'subtle elements' are held to differ from the gross or derivative elements, the properties of which are various at different times and in respect to different mortals.)

No. 20.—The 'subtle elements of sound' [like the 'atoms' of the Nyāya, which are separately inappreciable by the senses of men,] are apprehended only in [derivative and gross] 'sounds.' Varieties of 'sound' are apprehended, such as 'acutely accented,' 'gravely accented,' 'circumflexly accented,' and [the notes of the gamut—viz.:] 'C' (shadja), 'D' (rishabha), 'E' (gāndhāra), 'F' (madhyama—i.e., the 'middle' note of the scale—corresponding to the 'sub-dominant*'), 'G' (panchama—i.e., the 'fifth' note of the scale—corresponding to the 'dominant'), 'A' (dhaivata), 'B' (nishāda), &c. But there is not hence [i.e., in accordance with the variety in sounds appreciable by mortals] any diversity in the 'subtle element of sound' itself.

* It is noticeable that the keynote and those two important notes, the dominant and sub-dominant, have names marking their place in the scale, whilst the other names are unscientific and fantastical. The word rishabha means 'a bull,' gāndhāra means 'red lead,' dhaivata seems to have no sense elsewhere, and nishāda means 'an outcaste.' The keynote—viz., shadja 'born of six' is said to be so named because it is "supposed to require for its articulation the employment of the tongue, teeth, palate, nose, throat and teeth,"—but this is evidently the conjecture of a grammarian, not of a musician. The writers on music may have given it the name as indicative of the acoustic fact that the ear, though content if the keynote be sounded, demands that, if the other six are sounded in their order, the keynote shall follow (before closing) to complete the octave and to form the cadence. It is "the offspring of (all or any of these) six."
No. 21.—The 'subtle elements of tangibility' are apprehended only in [derivative cases—see No. 20—] of 'tangibility.' In these, varieties of 'tangibility' are apprehended—such as 'soft,' 'hard,' 'rough,' 'slippery,' 'cold,' 'hot,' &c. But there is not hence any diversity in the 'subtle element of tangibility' itself.

No. 22.—The 'subtle elements of colour' are apprehended only in 'colours.' In these, varieties of 'colour' are apprehended—such as 'white,' 'red,' 'black,' 'green,' 'yellow,' 'tumeric-colour,' 'madder-colour,' &c. But there is not hence any diversity in the 'subtle element of colour' itself.

No. 23.—The 'subtle elements of savour' are apprehended only in 'savour.' In this, varieties of 'savour' are apprehended—such as 'pungent,' 'bitter,' 'astringent,' 'alkaline,' 'sweet,' 'acid,' 'salt,' &c. But there is not hence any diversity in the 'subtle element of savour' itself.

No. 24.—The 'subtle elements of odour' are apprehended only in 'odour.' In this, two varieties of 'odour'—viz., 'fragrance' and 'stench,' are apprehended. But there is not hence any diversity in the 'subtle element of odour' itself.

Thus have the five 'subtle elements' been made known.

No. 25.—Now the synonyms of these are 'elemental rudiments' (tan-mātra); 'unvaried' (awiś'ēsha); the 'pervading elements' or 'whence the gross elements proceed' (maṁah-bhūtas); 'producers' (prakriti); 'not adapted for [mortal] fruition' (a-bhogyā); 'atoms' (aṇu); 'not soothing' (aśānta); 'not terrific' (aghora); 'not stupifying' (anāṅgha). [These last three names refer to the triad of Qualities—see No. 49]. Thus have the eight producers—viz., the 'undiscrete,' 'intellect,' 'self-consciousness,' and the five 'subtle elements,' been explained.

Now why are these (No. 5) called 'producers'? It is because they produce [the sixteen 'productions'—see No. 4—which are next to be described.]
No. 26.—Now what are those sixteen ‘productions?’ To this it is replied,—the eleven ‘organs’ (indriya), and the five ‘derivative or gross’ ‘elements’—these are the sixteen ‘productions, or ‘modifications’ (vikāra).

No. 27.—Now the ‘organs’ are set forth. The ‘organ of hearing’ (s’rotra); the ‘organ of touch’ (twāch) and the ‘organ of sight’ (chakshush); the ‘organ of taste’ (jihwā); the ‘organ of smell’ (ghrāsa); and the five ‘organs of the intellect’ (buddhāndriya).

(These are called ‘organs of the intellect’ because their function is that of observation, not, as that of the other organs is, of action.)

No. 28.—The ‘hearing’ apprehends its object ‘sound’ (s’abda). The ‘touch’ apprehends its object ‘tangibility’ (spars’a). The ‘sight’ apprehends its object ‘colour’ (rāpa). The ‘taste’ apprehends its object ‘savour’ (rasa). The ‘smell’ apprehends its object ‘odour’ (gandha).

No. 29.—The five ‘organs of action’ (karmendriya), viz., the ‘voice’ or the ‘larynx &c.’ (vāk), the ‘hands,’ the ‘feet,’ the ‘organ of excretion,’ and the ‘organ of generation,’ perform several of their own function. The ‘voice’ pronounces words. The ‘hands’ perform actions. The ‘feet’ perform locomotion; the ‘organ of excretion,’ evacuation; and the ‘organ of generation,’ enjoyment. ‘Mind’ (manas), an organ both of observation and action, performs its appropriate functions of ‘resolving’ (sankalpa) and ‘doubting’ (vikalpa).

Thus have the eleven organs been described.

No. 30.—Now the synonyms of these are—‘organs of sense’ (indriya); ‘instruments’ (karaṇa); ‘changers’ (vaikārika); ‘allotted’ (to each mortal) (niyata); ‘appliances’ (pada); ‘placed under’ (the soul) (avadhūta); ‘subtile’ (aṣu); ‘organs’ (aksha).

No. 31.—Now what are the five ‘gross elements’ (mahā-bhūta)? To this it is replied—‘earth,’ ‘water,’ ‘light,’ ‘air,’ and ‘ether,’ are the ‘gross elements.’

Thus have the five ‘gross elements’ been set forth. The first three are names for the first three great classes of matter, and the latter two are names for the last two great classes of matter. The former three are names for the phenomenal world, and the latter two for the ideal world. The former three are names for the world of sense, and the latter two for the world of thought. The former three are names for the world of action, and the latter two for the world of thought. The former three are names for the world of thought, and the latter two for the world of action. The former three are names for the world of thought, and the latter two for the world of action. The former three are names for the world of thought, and the latter two for the world of action.

Thus, the six elements have been described.

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Thus, the six elements have been described.
[The eight 'producers,' and the sixteen 'productions,' or results of the modification of the 'producers,' having been thus described, the third of Kapila's aphorisms, in which he announces 'soul,' is next adverted to.]

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No. 32.—'Earth,' acting in the character of supporter, co-operates with the [other] four [elements, in the production of effects,' 'Water' acting in its character of the 'humid,' co-operates with the other four. 'Light,' acting in the way of 'maturity,' co-operates with the other four. 'Air,' acting in the way of 'vitalization,' co-operates with the other four. 'Ether,' acting in the way of giving space, co-operates with the other four.

'Earth' is possessed of five qualities—having 'sound,' 'tangibility,' 'colour,' 'savour,' and 'odour.' 'Water,' possesses 'sound,' 'tangibility,' 'colour,' and 'savour.' 'Light' possesses 'sound,' 'tangibility,' and 'colour.' 'Air' possesses 'sound' and 'tangibility.' 'Ether' has the single quality of 'sound.'

Thus have the 'gross' 'elements' been set forth.

No. 34.—Now it is asked—what is 'soul'? To this it is replied—'soul' is without beginning, subtle, omnipresent, intelligent, without [the three] qualities [see No. 49], eternal, spectator, enjoyer, not an agent, the knower of body, pure, not producing aught.

No. 35.—Now it is asked—why [is it called] 'soul' (purusha)? Because it is 'ancient' (prāga) [having been from eternity—see No. 34]—and because 'it reposes in body' (prīśaye); and because it is that towards which the 'highest affections' (puro hiṇa) is entertained [—seeing that each one loves self, if loving nought else—] therefore it is called purusha.

No. 33.—Now their synonyms—'elements' (bhūta), 'varieties of element' (bhūta-visēśa), 'productions' or 'modifications' (vikāra), 'forms' (ākṛti), 'minute,' (tanu), bodies, (vīgraha), 'soothing,' 'terrible,' 'stupifying.'

Thus have the sixteen 'productions' or 'modifications' been described.
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No. 36.—Now why is it ['soul'] said to be 'without beginning' [No. 34]? Because it has neither beginning, middle, nor end. Why 'subtile'? From its being without parts, and its transcending the senses. Why 'intelligent'? From its discerning pleasure, pain, and delusion. Why 'without qualities'? Because neither the quality of 'goodness' [No. 49], of 'passion', nor of 'darkness', is in it. Why 'eternal'? From its not being made or produced. Why 'spectator'? Because it apprehends the modifications which productive nature undergoes. Why 'enjoyer'? Because it discerns pleasure and pain through its possession of intelligence. Why 'not an agent'? From its being indifferent (uddāsina) and devoid of the 'qualities' [see No. 42.] Why the 'knower of body'? Because through bodies it apprehends the 'qualities.' Why 'pure'? Because in this 'soul' there are neither good actions nor bad. Why 'not wont to produce'? Because it is seedless:—that is to say, it does not give rise to any thing.

Thus has the 'soul' of the Sāṅkhya been described.

No. 37.—Now the synonymes of this 'soul'—the 'reposer in body' (purusha); 'self' (ātmā); the 'male' (puns); that which superadds the quality of reason to mere animal life (pun-guyajantu-jiva); the 'knower of body' (kshetra-jna); the 'man' (nara); the 'poet' (kavi); 'deity' (brahīna); the 'indestructible' (akṣara); 'life' or 'vital air' (prāṇa); 'who,' 'who? 'he,' 'this.'

Thus have the twenty-five 'principles' (tattva) been explained—viz., the eight 'producers' [No. 5], the sixteen 'productions' [No. 26], and 'soul' [No. 34].

"He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever order of life he may have entered, and whether he wear matted hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven, he is liberated:—of this there is no doubt."

No. 38.—Here it is asked—is 'soul' an agent, or not an agent? If 'soul' were an agent, it would do only good actions—it would not adopt the 'tria ord of habits.' [What the three 'habits' are, is next stated.]

No. 39.—The 'amiable' (sātvika) habit consists of virtue,
kindliness, restraint [of the senses], regulation [of the organs], freedom from enmity, correct judgment, the attainment of knowledge and supernatural power [see No. 13.]

No. 40.—But passion, anger, covetousness, the reproaching of others, extreme sternness, discontent, fierceness shown in change of aspect—this is called the ‘passionate’ (rájasa) habit.

No. 41.—Madness, intoxication, lassitude, atheism, addiction to women, drowsiness, sloth, worthlessness, impurity—this is called the ‘dark’ (tamas) habit.

No. 42.—Since we see this triad of habits in the world, the agency of the ‘qualities’ [in which these habits originate—see No. 49] is established; and hence ‘soul’ [the agency being thus accounted for independently of it] is proved to be ‘not an agent.’

No. 43.—Through ‘passion’ (No. 51) and ‘darkness’ (No. 52), through an erroneous view, it (viz., ‘soul’) foolishly imagines—‘I am the agent’ in regard to these ‘qualities’ (No. 49) which belong to nature. Though incompetent even to the crooking of a straw, (‘soul’ imagines) ‘All this was made by me—this is mine;’—thus saying, it, through a vain imagination, foolish, insane, becomes as if it were an agent.

No. 44.—On this subject it is said (in the Bhagavad Gîtá—Lect. III v. 27.) “Actions are effected by the qualities of nature, according to their shares:—the soul, deluded by the conceit of individuality, imagines ‘I am the agent.’”

(And again, Lect. XIII. v. 31.)

“From its being without beginning, and its being devoid of the ‘qualities,’ this incorruptible supreme Soul, even while remaining in body, neither acts nor is affected.”

Also—(Lect. XIII. v. 29).

“Whoso beholds actions as in all respects performed by nature alone, and so too beholds Soul as a non-agent—he indeed sees (aright).”
Sánkhya, Kapila, Asuri, Panchas'ikha, Patanjali, &c., describe souls as many. The teachers who speak according to the Vedānta [the doctrine derived from the Vedas], viz., Harīhara, Hiranyagarbha, Vyāsa, &c., describe Soul as one only.

No. 45.—Here the question occurs—is ‘soul’ one, or many? To this it is replied:—the multiplicity of ‘soul’ is proved by the diversity of the conditions of pleasure, pain, delusion, mixture of race, purity of race, soundness of organs, birth, and death, and by the difference of the world (heaven, earth, and hell,) and of office, and of caste. If there were only one ‘soul,’ then, when one is happy, all would be happy; when one is grieved, all would be grieved; when one is deluded, all would be deluded; when one is of mixed race, all would be of mixed race; when one is of pure race, all would be of pure race; when one possesses soundness of organs, all would possess soundness of organs; when one is born, all would be born; when one dies, all would die. Hence ‘soul’ is not one; and hence multifarious ‘souls’ are proved to exist—for these possess a multiplicity of distinctive characters in the diversified allotment of form, birth, habitation, fortune, society, and body.

No. 46.—Thus [as set forth in No. 45] do the teachers of the
regarded as remaining everywhere one—in cows, men, elephants, deer, &c.

No. 49.—Now it is asked—what is the 'triad of qualities'? It is replied—the triad of qualities consists of 'Goodness' (sattwa), 'Foulness' (rajas), and 'Darkness' (tamas). By the 'triad of qualities' is meant the 'three qualities.'

No. 48.—Firm as a tree it remains in the heavens. With that Soul all this is filled everywhere. On all sides are the hands, feet, eyes, heads, and faces of that [Soul-tree]—and, with ears in all directions, it stands embracing all—assuming the aspect of all the organs and qualities, though devoid of all the qualities—the lord and ruler of all—the great refuge of all—that which altogether is all the principles, is every soul, is the source of all—into which all is resolved—the sages regard it as Brahma. For only one soul is located in various bodies; as the Moon, though but one, appears many in [many vessels of] water. In all existences, inmoveable or locomotive, it dwells—one only—by which all this [universe] was spread out. This soul, of all worlds, is but one: by whom is it made more? Some speak of soul as several—seeing that Knowledge and other mental states are observable [simultaneously—some being happy while others are sad]; but in the Brāhma, the worm, and the insect; in the outcaste, the dog, and the elephant; in goats, cows, gaddies, and gnats, the wise behold the same [single Soul]. Just as a thread may pass through golden beads, and again in like manner through pearls, gems, coral, earthen beads, or silver,—so this Soul is to be
Summarily, it consists of delusion.

`यत्तात्त्वाकारं आखातं`

`तत्त्वं प्रकाशं विदितं विद्वद्वसृष्टिकं`

`तत्त्वं प्रकाशकं विदितं, चेतृ गयं नाम संबंधितं`

No. 53.—So far (i.e. in Nos. 50, 51, and 52,) has the ‘triad of qualities’ been expounded.

One should regard ‘goodness’ as ‘illuminating;’ one should regard ‘foulness’ as ‘exciting;’ one should regard ‘darkness’ as ‘non-illuminating;’—such is what is named the ‘triad of qualities.’

चारिक् कं संबंधः प्रतिविषयं अचोखते | उपासि: संचरः | प्रतिविषयं: प्रतिविषयं | तत्वस्मायिनां

चर्चा मुः प्रकाश: गगनं स्पष्टं परेराधिष्ठितम् बुद्धि चतःत्।

चर्चा च विद्या: च वैदिकसंग्रहं भुताणिति।

तत्त्वं प्रकाशकं च वैदिकसंग्रहं च प्रतिविषयं आखातं।

No. 54.—The next question is—what is (meant by) ‘development’ and ‘resolution’ (sanchara and pratisanchara—the 5th and 6th in Kapila’s enumeration of topics—No. 6)? To this it is replied—‘development’ is production:—‘reabsorption’ (pratisanchara) is dissolution. [The order of] ‘production’ is as follows:—from the ‘undiscrète’ forementioned (No. 7), superintended by Soul, which is another [than Nature, and for whose use is the assemblage of sensible objects,] and omnipresent, ‘intellect’ is

produced. ‘Intellect’ is of eight kinds—[No. 9]. From the principle of ‘intellect’ ‘self-consciousness’ [No. 17] is produced. ‘Self-consciousness’ is of three kinds [No. 18]—the ‘modifying,’ the ‘active,’ ‘ardent,’ or ‘urgent,’ and the ‘origin of the elements.’ From the ‘modifying self-consciousness’ the gods and the senses are produced; from [self-consciousness as] ‘the origin of the elements’ the ‘subtile elements’ (No. 19) are produced. From the ‘active’ both proceed, [for, without the ‘active,’ both the others are held to be inert]. From the ‘subtile elements [are produced] the [gros] ‘elements:’—such is [the order of] ‘development.’

प्रतिविषयं नाम भूतानि तत्त्वं प्राप्तं विमात्रं विद्वद्वसृष्टिकं

विद्वद्वसृष्टिकं रेवकं बुद्धिश्च वातं.

तत्त्वं स्वरूपवै विद्या: च वैदिकसंग्रहं च च प्रतिविषयं आखातं।

No. 55.—‘Reabsorption’ [No. 6] is as follows:—the ‘elements’ are resolved into the ‘subtile elements;’ the ‘subtile elements’ and the ‘senses’ into ‘self-consciousness;’ ‘self-consciousness’ into ‘intellect;’ ‘intellect’ into the ‘undiscrète.’ The ‘undiscrète’ is nowhere dissolved. Why? Because it was not produced out of anything (into which it might be resolvable). Regard Nature and Soul as being both eternal. Thus has ‘reabsorption’ been explained.

टाभिष कं तद्भवमिमं प्रभुतात्त्वानि प्रदश्मिति।

तोखंते | बुधिः तयं च मौलिकान्यमः प्रभुतात्त्वानि प्रदश्मिति।

चर्चकारो च च मन्त्याधिकं विद्वद्वसृष्टिकं च मन्त्याधिकं चक्षिः।
'taste' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be tasted' constitutes its 'province.' Varuna [the god of the waters] is its 'presiding deity.' The 'smell' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be smelled' constitutes its 'province;' the Earth is its 'supernatural presiding power.' The 'voice' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be uttered' constitutes its 'province;' its 'presiding deity' is either Saraswati or Fire. The 'hands' are 'ministers of soul;' whatever is 'to be grasped' constitutes their 'province;' Indra is their 'presiding deity.' The feet are 'ministers of soul;' whatever is 'to be gone over' constitutes their 'province;' Vishnu is their 'presiding deity.' The 'organ of excretion' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be excreted' constitutes its 'province;' Mitra is its 'presiding deity.' The 'organ of generation' is a 'minister of soul;' what is 'to be enjoyed' constitutes its 'province;' Prajapati is its 'presiding deity.'

Such, in the case of each of the thirteen kinds of instruments [of the soul], is the respective 'minister,' 'province,' and 'presiding deity.'

No. 56.—Now it is asked—what is meant by the 'ministers of soul' [No 6], the 'province of an organ,' and the 'presiding deity?' To this it is replied:—'intellect' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is to be understood constitutes its 'province;' and its 'presiding deity' is Brahma. 'Self-consciousness' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be believed' constitutes its 'province;' and Rudra is its 'presiding deity.' 'Mind' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be resolved on' constitutes its 'province;' the Moon is its 'presiding deity.' The 'hearing' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be heard' constitutes its 'province;' the Ether is its 'supernatural presiding power.' The 'touch' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be touched' constitutes its 'province;' the air is its 'supernatural presiding power.' The 'sight' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be seen' constitutes its 'province;' the sun is its 'presiding deity.'

No. 57.—Whosoever is correctly acquainted with the 'principles' [viz. the 8 'producers,' 16 'productions,' and 'soul'], the nature of the 'qualities,' and the 'presiding deities' [No. 56], being liberated from his sins and released from the whole of his defects, enjoys [the various pleasing effects of] the 'qualities,' (while he remains in the world) and is liberated from the 'qualities' (when he attains to final emancipation).
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चया ब्रह्म: पञ्चासिस्तुः। उच्चते। आयामे जिमान
रूपा कर्मध्रा ब्रह्माति। अभिमुखुद्धिर्दत रुपीयं स्वेद्यते
अवषयो बुधिस्त्रिया। आत्मपरामर्शप्रभाविस्तुः प्रज्ञानोऽर्जुः। रूपा
वाचा संकृतः। सन्नथे। बुधिस्त्रिया। सम्बुद्धिप्रेयमन्त्रमत्याविविधतं कर्त्तव्यं
ञ्चिया। वचनादिक्षमविविधिजिया कर्मकिरिकाण्यं च ब्रजी
यति। एवेनेत। पञ्चासिस्तुः आख्यातः।

No. 58.—Now what are those five ‘intelligent functions’ (No.
6)? To this it is replied:—‘ascertainment’ (adhyavasāya), ‘con-
cert’ (abhimāna), ‘willing’ (ichchhā), ‘adaptability’ (karta tavyātā),
and ‘action’ (kriyā). The function of intellect when it decides
‘This is to be done by me,’ is ‘ascertainment’ (adhyavasāya).
That function of the intellect, self-consciousness,—the notion
‘I act’—which fixes on the conceptions of ‘self’ and ‘not-self’—is
‘conceit’. The intelligent function of ‘mind’ is ‘willing’—desiring
and purposing. The intelligent function of the organs of sense
(No. 27) is the ‘adaptability’ of each sense, such as the hearing,
or the like, to its object, such as sound, or the like. The intelligent
function of those (organs of action—No. 29)—which are recog-
nised by ‘utterance,’ and the like,—is called ‘action’.

Thus have the five ‘intelligent functions’ been explained.

चया ब्रह्म: पञ्च कर्मध्रा रूपा। त्वरि च चः
विविधिउ विविधियां पञ्च कर्मध्राः।

वाञ्चकर्माणि संकृत् प्रतीती ब्रजीस्तति।
obtaining of future enjoyments,—this [conduct of such a one] is called ‘piety.’

‘Indifference about knowledge’ implies that the heart is engrossed with the sweets of sensual objects.

‘Desire of knowledge’ is the source of the wisdom of the wise.

The unity (of Nature), the separateness (of Nature and Soul), the eternity (of Soul) and its unconsciousness, the subtlety (of Nature), the existence of effect [in its cause—even antecedently to manifestation—as the statue exists in the block of marble—] and the duration (of body even after the attainment of knowledge—see No. 69)—this is to be considered (as constituting the assemblage of matters which form the object of) ‘the desire of (true) knowledge’.

Thus have the five ‘airs’ been described.

No. 61.—It is now asked—what are those five ‘whose nature is action’ (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—the ‘modifying’ (vākārika), the ‘ardent’ (taṭāsa), the ‘origin of the elements’ (bhūtādi), that which is ‘associated with inference’ (sānunāna), and that which is ‘not associated with inference’ (aṇirunāna). Among these the ‘modifying’ [form of ‘self-consciousness’—see No. 18—] is the agent in good actions:—the ‘ardent’ is the agent in actions not good:—the ‘origin of the elements’ is the producer of things good but obscure:—[self-consciousness] ‘associated with inference’ is the worker of what is good but foolish:—and that which is ‘not
associated with inference' is the worker of what is not good and (also) foolish.

Thus have the five been explained, 'whose nature is action.'

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migration because] soul [merges] into [some one or other of] the eight 'producers,' which are not Soul—viz., those called the 'undiscreet,' 'intellect,' 'self-consciousness,' and the five 'subtle elements,'—[the errors in regard to these eight severally making up the eight varieties of 'obscurity']. 'Illusion' is the conceit (of liberation) which arises from the possession of the eight kinds of superhuman power, such as 'minuteness' and the rest (No. 13). 'Extreme illusion' is when one supposes 'I am liberated' through (any one of) the ten modes (supplied by) the objects of sense, viz., sounds, &c., belonging to the seen and to the unseen (or scripture-revealed) world—(i.e. the five as perceived by men and the five as perceived by the gods). 'Gloom' is that unchecked hate (or fierce impatience) in regard to the (possession of the) eight kinds of superhuman power, 'minuteness,' &c., and the ten kinds of objects of sense, which (by preventing liberation) results in the three kinds of pain (incident to corporeal existence). 'Utter darkness' is the name given to that grief which arises at the time of death, when one is in possession of (any one of) the eight kinds of superhuman power, or of the ten kinds of objects of sense.

Thus has fivefold 'ignorance' (the obstruction to the soul's object of final liberation) in its sixty-two varieties, been declared.

No. 62.—Here it is asked—what is that 'ignorance'—under five divisions [No. 6]? To this it is replied:—'obscurity' (tamas), 'illusion' (moha), 'extreme illusion' (mahamoha), 'gloom' (tāmiśra), and 'utter darkness' (andha-tāmiśra). Among these, 'obscurity' and 'illusion' are each eightfold. 'Extreme illusion' is tenfold. 'Gloom' and 'utter darkness' are eighteenfold.

'Obscurity' is the conceit that [he will be liberated from trans-
No. 63.—It is now asked,—what is twenty-eightfold ‘disability’ (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—the depravity of the eleven organs, and the seventeen injuries of the intellect—these constitute twenty-eightfold ‘disability.’ Now the defects of the organs are stated:—in the organ of hearing, deafness; in the organ of taste, insensibility; in the organ of touch, leprosy; in the organ of sight, blindness; in the organ of smell, loss of smell; in the organ of utterance, dumbness; in the hands, crippledness; in the feet, lameness; in the organ of excretion, constipation; in the organ of generation, impotence; in the mind, insanity:—such are the defects of the eleven organs. The seventeen ‘injuries of the intellect’ are the reverse of (the nine kinds of) ‘acquiescence’ and of (the eight kinds of) ‘perfectness.’ What is meant by the ‘reverse of acquiescence’ is next stated.

The causes of the gross elements, is that called avrishti. The concerning one’s self about the acquisition of the objects of sense is that (form of non-acquiescence) called asudára; and (the concerning one’s self) about their preservation is that called asupára. The concerning one’s self about property, without regarding the evils of waste, is that called asuṣuṭra. The addiction to enjoyment is that called asumarīchikā. The engaging in enjoyment, on the part of one who does not look to the evils arising from injury (to created beings), is that called anuttamāmbhasikā.

Thus have the ninefold opposites of acquiescence been explained.

[The technical names here are the opposites of those adverted to in section No. 66.]
No. 65.—Now (as regards) the ‘opposites’ of perfectness. These are called also the eight ‘imperfections’ (asiddhi). When the diversity (of the various principles from which the creation proceeds) appears as the unity of the mere (phenomenal) creation—this (imperfect view of the truth) is called atāra. After hearing the words merely (of a competent instructor), the adoption of the contrary is that called asutāra :—as when, having heard that ‘he who acknowledges the various principles is liberated,’ one determines that it is the reverse—viz., that ‘he who acknowledges the various principles is not liberated.’ When a person, even though intent on studying and hearing, through obtuseness or from his intellect’s being impaired by unsound doctrine, does not attain to a perfect knowledge of the twenty-five principles, then his ignorance is called atāratāra. To another, who, though oppressed by the pain inseparable from body and mind, yet, from feeling no anxiety about transmigration, entertains no curiosity, knowledge is no ‘delight’ (pramoda). Analogously are the next two to be regarded—viz., (the forms of ‘imperfection’ termed—as the opposites of the corresponding two forms of ‘perfectness’ in No. 67—) apramudita and apramodanāsa. Ignorance that arises from the not arriving at certain knowledge even on being instructed by a friend, is that called arasya. When, from his preceptor’s disregarding him, or not instructing him correctly, an unfortunate man does not attain to knowledge, his ignorance is called asatpramudita.

Thus have those ‘opposites of perfectness,’ the eight imperfections, been explained. [The technical names are the opposites of those adverted to in section No. 67.]

Thus have the twenty-eight kinds of ‘disability’ [No. 63] been explained.

No. 66.—Now it is asked—what is ninefold ‘acquiescence’ [No. 6]? To this it is replied:—having supposed that Nature is Soul, a man contentedly betakes himself to indifference:—
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technical [or slang] name of his indifference is ambhas, [the ordinary sense of which word is ‘water’]. Another, having satisfied himself that ‘intellect’ is Soul, is contented. The technical name of his ‘acquiescence’ is salila ‘water.’ Another, having come to the conclusion that ‘self-consciousness’ is Soul, is contented. The technical name of his ‘acquiescence’ is ogha ‘quantity.’ Another, having decided that the ‘subtile elements,’ those called the ‘unfitted for (mortal) fruition’ [No. 25] are Soul, is contented. The technical name of his ‘acquiescence’ is vrishi ‘rain.’ Such are the four ‘internal’ or ‘spiritual’ (ādhyātmika) kinds of ‘acquiescence.’ Where [together or separately] those four kinds of acquiescence exist, liberation does not take place—from the inconsistency [of such sentiments] with a knowledge of the principles.

The five ‘external’ (vāhya) kinds of ‘acquiescence’ consist in abstaining from [the enjoyment of the five] objects of sense, [such abstinence proceeding] from observation of the evils of acquiring, preserving, waste, attachment [to sensual pleasures], and injuriousness. A man is acquiescent (and abstinent) from observation of the evils attendant on the acquiring of property; but his liberation—even though he be an ascetic—does not take place, because of the (quite possibly concurrent, and here assumed,) absence of a knowledge of the principles. This fifth kind of ‘acquiescence’ is (technically) named satāra. Another is acquiescent from observation of the evils attendant on the preserving of property; but his liberation—even though he be an ascetic—in the absence of a knowledge of the principles, does not take place. This sixth kind of ‘acquiescence’ is (technically) named supārā. Another is acquiescent from observation of the evils of the waste of property; but his liberation—even though he be an ascetic—in the absence of a knowledge of the principles,

does not take place. This seventh kind of ‘acquiescence’ is (technically) named suneṭra (‘a beautiful eye’). Another is acquiescent from observation of the evils attendant on attachment (to sensual pleasures)—but his liberation—even though he be an ascetic—in the absence of a knowledge of the principles, does not take place. This eighth kind of ‘acquiescence’ is (technically) named sumaṁchikā. Another is acquiescent, and abstains from worldly acts, from observation of the evils in the shape of injury, &c., to created beings on account of property—but his liberation—even though he be an ascetic—in the absence of a knowledge of the principles, does not take place. This ninth kind of ‘acquiescence’ is (technically) named anuttama (‘best’), or satwikī (‘amiable’).

Thus have these nine kinds of acquiescence been explained.

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to the principles, the conditions of intellect, and the elemental creation, when a teacher is propitiated by giving him veneration,—this eighth kind of ‘perfectness’ is (technically) named *satpramadita*.

Thus have these eight kinds of ‘perfectness’ been explained.

No. 67.—Now it is asked—what are the ten ‘radical facts’ (No. 6)? To this it is replied—the existence of ‘Soul’ and of ‘Nature’; the singleness of ‘Nature’; its objectiveness; its subservience; the distinctness of ‘Soul from Nature’; and the inertness of ‘Soul’; the union of ‘Soul and Nature’; the separation of ‘Soul from its corporeal frame’; the peculiar habit of body—its durability (after it ought to have disappeared).

Such are the ten ‘radical facts.’
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No. 69.—"Since the assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use, the existence of Soul is established. The existence of Nature is established by the pair in order—(of antecedent and consequent)—viz., that 'since specific objects are finite,' therefore 'there is a general cause which is undiscrète.' Since 'what is causable is inconstant (and mutitudinous), &c.,' the singleness (of Nature which is not caused by aught) is established. Since these (meaning the Qualities) consist in pleasure, pain, and dulness, &c.,' (see the XIIth of the Memorial Verses of the Sāṅkhya—) the objectiveness (of Nature) is established. Since 'by manifold means (Nature, without benefit to herself, accomplishes the wish of Soul),' the subserviency (of Nature) is established. Since 'it (the 'undiscrète,' as well as its modifications) has the three qualities, is indiscriminative, objective, &c.,' the distinctness (of Soul, which is, in all these respects, the reverse,) is established. 'From the contrast' (shown to exist between active Nature and Soul) the inertness (of Soul) is established. 'For the Soul's contemplation of nature, and for its abstraction, &c.'—thus is the union (of the two) established. Since 'separation (of the Soul) from the body takes place, when the object is accomplished,' the separation of the two is established. Since 'of birth, death, and the instruments of life, (the allotment is severally diverse),' the multiplicity of Soul is established. Since it is 'like the whirling of the potter's wheel, (after the impulse that set it in motion has been discontinued),' the peculiar habit (of body, which continues, till death, to invest the soul even of him who has attained to perfect knowledge,) is established.

Thus have the ten 'radical facts' been explained.

No. 70.—The fifty intellectual modifications consisting of the seventeen (enumerated in Nos. 64 and 65) and of those (thirty three) previously exhibited (in Nos. 62 and 63), together with these (ten 'radical facts')—No. 69—make up the sixty topics called the 'System of Sixty.'

No. 71.—Now it is asked—what is 'benevolent creation' (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—'benevolent creation' consists in the production of external objects from the five 'subtile elements.' (As it is said) 'Brahmā, perceiving these (senses, &c.) produced from thought' (—see No. 19) to be destitute of a sphere of action, created, from these 'subtile elements,' this 'benevolent creation.'

Thus have the ten 'radical facts' been explained.

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Thus have the ten 'radical facts' been explained.
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No. 72.—Now it is asked—what is the fourteenfold ‘elemental creation’ (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—the divine kind is of eight sorts—that of hrogoblins, of titans, of attendants on the god of riches, of celestial quiristers, of demigods, of divine sages, of the planetary regents, and of the supreme deities. Such are the eight families of deities. The grovelling kind is fivefold—that of domestic animals, winged animals, wild animals, reptiles, and, lastly, of fixed things. Mankind is single in its class—beginning with the Brāhmaṇ, and ending with the Chāndāla. Domestic animals, beginning with the cow, end with the mouse. Wild animals, beginning with the lion, end with the jackal. Winged animals, beginning with the bird of Vishnu (or the adjutant), end with the gnat. Reptiles, beginning with the World-snake, end with the worm. Fixed things, beginning with the tree of Paradise, end with grass. Thus is the grovelling kind fivefold. Compactly (this (elemental) creation is threefold—(viz.,—divine, human, and grovelling—and, thus viewed, it supplies the 21st topic in Kapila’s enumeration—see No. 6.) All this constitutes what is called the mundane orb.

No. 73.—Now it is asked—what is threefold ‘bondage’ (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—the bondage of the ‘producers,’ that of the ‘modifications,’ and that of ‘ritual observance.’ And first of the ‘bondage of the producers’—this is the name given to the ‘absorption into nature’ (No. 15.) of him who imagines that (any of) the eight ‘producers’ constitute Soul. The ‘bondage of the modifications’ is the name given to that (which opposes the liberation) of those worldly devotees who are in the power of the ‘modifications’ of nature (No. 26), such as the senses—who are devoted to objects of sense, such as sounds, &c.,—who have not their organs in subjection—who are ignorant, and deluded by passion. The ‘bondage of ritual’ is the name given to that (which opposes the liberation) of those who, whether householders, students, mendicants, or anchorites, with minds vitiated by passion and delusion, bestow (on Brāhmaṇs, upon solemn or sacrificial occasions,) gifts prompted by conceit.

Thus has threefold ‘bondage’ been explained. And it is said—“Bondage is spoken of by the title of ‘bondage through nature’—‘bondage through nature’s modifications’—and, thirdly, as that through gifts.”

Thus is the mundane orb commenced. Thus is the ‘bondage in the occupation of the world’ commenced. Thus, the Brāhmaṇs, according to the Sāṁkhya, have been described.
the recognition of a 'sign' (linga). For example—by the rising of clouds (regarded as a sign of approaching rain) rain is proved (to be approaching)—by cranes and the like (regarded as a sign attendant on the sheets of water which they frequent) water (is proved to be in the neighbourhood of the place where the cranes are seen). By smoke (regarded as a sign of fire) fire (is proved to exist where the smoke originates):—this is the third kind of inference.

No. 74.—Here it is asked—what is threefold 'liberation' (No. 6)?—It is (1) from the increase of knowledge, (2) from the subduing of the senses and passions, and (3) from the destruction of the whole. From the increase of knowledge and the subduing of the senses and passions, there results the destruction both of merit and demerit, and, from the destruction of merit and demerit, (liberation in the shape of) 'singleness' (kaivalya). And it is said—'The first liberation is (gained) by knowledge; the second, from the destruction of passion; and the third, from the destruction of all:—such are the characters of liberation.'

निर्विविध प्रमाणसिद्धान्तेऽपि एव विविध प्रमाणाः।

No. 75.—What is threefold 'Proof' (No. 6)? To this it is replied—'perception,' 'inference,' and 'right affirmation'—this is threefold 'proof.'

एवं नाबधाखान्ते यावदिक्षिप्तं पञ्चनिंहिताः: प्रख्या

No. 76.—'Perception' (drishta) is now described. Whenever the five objects of the senses are present to the senses, there is 'perception.'

यनुमान प्रमाण विकृत्वा आयमान प्रांव य नेगोद्वये

No. 77.—The proof called 'inference' is knowledge arising on
No. 81.—Pain ‘natural and inseparable’ [No. 80] is of two kinds, corporeal and mental. ‘Corporeal’ means residing in the body; ‘mental’ means residing in the mind. Pain, arising from disorder of the wind, bile, or phlegm, and taking the form of fever, flux, cholera, swooning, &c., is called ‘corporeal’. Desire, anger, covetousness, folly, madness, envy, &c.,—privation of what is liked and approximation of what is disliked—this is called ‘mental’ [pain or evil.]

[The pain called ādhyātmika is that which arises from the things called adhyātma—see No. 56].

No. 82.—What arises from an object of sense (ādhibūta—see No. 56)—is called ādhibhautika (‘natural and extrinsic’). Pain is ‘natural and extrinsic’ which arises from men, cattle, wild beasts, reptiles, or things that do not move.

No. 83.—What arises from a supernatural agent (ādidaiva—see No. 56)—is called ādidaivika (‘non-natural’ or ‘superhuman’). Of this description is pain which arises from cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolts, and the like.
the enquirer that his final liberation from all distress will be the result of understanding "the real nature of all that is." A noticeable distinction between Kapila’s way of speaking of things, and that of the Naiyáikas, presents itself in their respective choice of a fundamental verb. The language of the Nyáya is moulded on the verb “to be,” and that of the Sánkhya on the verb “to make.” The Nyáya asks “what is?”—the Sánkhya asks “what makes it so?” The one presents us with a “compte rendu” of the Universe as it stands—the other presents us with a cosmogony. As the one subdivides its subject-matter into the two exhaustive categories of Existence and Non-existence, the other exhibits everything (except ‘Soul’—the spectator of the phantasmagoria) under the two aspects of ‘producer’ and ‘production.’

The ‘productions’ are held to be not other than the ‘producers’ modified; and the producers—all except the first of them—are but modifications of the first—the múla-prakriti. By what process of thought the notion of such a first principle is arrived at, the following extract from Morell’s History of Philosophy (Vol. I. p. 208), may serve to illustrate. Mr. Morell is there speaking of one of the latest German systems, that of Herbert.

88.—“The process by which the necessity of philosophy comes to be felt is the following:—When we look round us upon the world in which we live, our knowledge commences by a perception of the various objects that present themselves on every hand to our view. What we immediately perceive, however, is not actual essence, but phenomena; and after a short time, we discover that many of those phenomena are unreal; that they do not portray to us the actual truth of things as they are; and that if we followed them implicitly, we should soon be landed in the midst of error and contradiction. For example,
"what we are immediately conscious of in coming into contact with the external world, are such appearances as green, blue, bitter, sour, extension, resistance, &c. These phenomena, upon reflection, we discover not to be so many real independent existences, but properties inhering in certain substances, which we term things. Again, when we examine further into these substances, we discover that they are not real ultimate essences, but that they consist of certain elements, by the combination of which they are produced. What we term the "reality, therefore, is not the thing as a whole, but the elements of which it is composed. Thus the further we analyse, the further does the idea of reality recede backwards; but still it must always be somewhere, otherwise we should be perceiving a nonentity. The last result of the analysis is the conception of an absolutely simple element, which lies at the basis of all phenomena in the material world, and which we view as the essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation."

89.—This "essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation,"—this, which the European analyst arrives at as "the last result of the analysis"—is what the Sánkhya expositor, proceeding synthetically, lays down as his first position. This primordial essence—among the synonyms for which, given in our text-book (No. 7), are the "undiscerned," the "indiscernible," that "in which all generated effect is comprehended," &c., is the "Absolute" of German speculation. The development of this principle, according to one of Schelling's views (noticed by Mr. Morell at p. 147 vol. 2d) is "not the free and designed operation of intelligence, but rather a blind impulse working, first unconsciously in nature, and only coming to self-consciousness in mind." So, according to Kapila, "from Nature issues Mind, and thence Self-consciousness" [see No. 54]:

—but here a striking difference between the European and the Oriental theory presents itself—for the Self-consciousness, which so many European philosophers assume as the only certain starting-point, and as the very characteristic of Soul, is declared by Kapila to be no property of Soul, and to be regarded as such only through a delusion. In the 64th of the 'memorial verses' of Īśwara Krishṇa, as translated by Mr. Colebrooke, Kapila says:

90.—"So, through study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist."

91.—This statement M. Cousin not unnaturally regards as amounting to "le nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme"—but Professor Wilson, in accordance with the commentaries, declares that "It is merely intended as a negation of the soul's having any active participation, any individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feelings." The Soul, according to the Sánkhya, might be described in the terms in which Fichte speaks of the Mind, "as it were, an intelligent eye, placed in the central point of our inward consciousness, surveying all that takes place there"—(Morell—Vol. 2. p. 95). In the words of Kapila (Verse 19th), "Soul is witness, solitary, bystander, spectator, and passive." Soul being thus inert, all that is done arises from the energy of the 'radical principle'—of which one might correctly speak in the terms employed by Schelling in speaking of the 'Absolute,' where he says—"The primary form of the Absolute is will, or self-action. It is an absolute power of becoming in reality what it is in the germ." (Morell—Vol. 2. p. 150).

92.—The 'Absolute,' the germ, in the hands of Kapila, having reached the form of 'Self-consciousness'—ahānkāra—the
making of an I,—the ‘positing of an Ego’—the course of subsequent development runs parallel, for some distance, with that followed by Fichte, who takes the ‘Ego’ as his starting point. According to a writer in Brande’s Dictionary—‘To use the “language of Fichte—the ego is absolute, and posits itself: it is a pure activity. As its activity, however, has certain indeterminate limits, when it experiences this limitation of its activity, it also posits a non-ego, and so originates the objective world. The ego, therefore, cannot posit itself without at the same time projecting a non-ego; which, consequently, is in so far the mere creation of the ego.’ In like manner the ahamkāra of Kapila creates [No. 54] out of itself the five ‘subtle elements,’ the bases of the gross elements,—so that the world of sense, formed out of these, is, in this as in Fichte’s system, ‘the mere creation of the ego.’ A marked difference between the two systems, as observed before, consists in this—that Kapila makes the creative ‘Ego’ to be something else than ‘Soul,’ which latter, he holds, by confounding itself with the active principle, gets entangled in the distresses of life.

93.—The motive of the Brāhmaṇ’s enquiry at Kapila, it will be remembered, is this—that he wishes he may not be “again obnoxious to the three sorts of pain”;—in other words that he may not be born again—that he may be no more liable to transmigration or the Metempsychosis. Of the Metempsychosis Prof. Wilson (Sāṅkhya Kārikā p. x.) says:—“This belief is not to be looked upon as a mere popular superstition; it is the main principle of all Hindū metaphysics; it is the foundation of all Hindū philosophy.” The doctrine of the Metempsychosis may be regarded as the Hindū theory on the great question of the “origin of evil.” The theory may be thus stated. Evil exists—and it is not to be supposed that evil befalls any one undeservedly. When, therefore, for example, a newborn child, who has had no opportunity of acting either rightly or wrongly, is found suffering evil, it is inferred that the evil is the fruit of evil deeds done in a former state of existence. If it be asked how the person became disposed to do evil in that former state of existence, the answer offered is this—it was the consequence of evil deeds done in a state of existence still anterior—and so on. Applying now the principle of ‘limits’—that what is true at every assignable point short of the limit, must be true at the limit—as there is no assignable point in the existence of evil in past time for its existence at which point this hypothesis does not serve equally well to account, it is argued that, on this hypothesis, and on no other, is the existence of evil fully accounted for. To the European this method of accounting for the origin of evil appears to be vitiated by the regressus in infinitum (anavasthā)—the same consideration which vitiates the theory of the earth’s resting on the elephant, the elephant’s resting on the tortoise, and so on without end. The origin of evil he regards as not having been revealed; and the requirement that we shall maintain our reliance on the goodness of God in the absence of such revelation, he regards as a trial of our faith.

94.—Several of the terms in the treatise of which a translation has been given, do not occur in the Sāṅkhya treatises generally studied. On these and some other points a few annotations here follow.

95.—Among the epithets applied to ‘Self-consciousness’ (in No. 18) are sānumāna and niranumāna. We can get no account anywhere of this application of these terms. Self-consciousness ‘not associated with inference’ might possibly refer to the simple consciousness of existence; whilst the consciousness ‘associated with inference’ might refer to the notion of the Egoist.
who has reasoned himself into the belief that he himself constitutes all that is—(see No. 17)—but then the difficulty would remain of tracing the connexion between this sense and the functions assigned to these aspects of self-consciousness under No. 61.—The technical or ‘slang’ terms in Nos. 64 &c., differ in our textbook from those given in the comment on the Kārikās—see p. 155 of the Sānkhya Kārikā, where Prof. Wilson says “No explanation of the words is anywhere given, nor is any reason assigned for their adoption.”

96.—On the ‘triad of qualities’ (No. 49), Prof. Wilson, at p. 52 of the Sānkhya Kārikā, remarks:—“In speaking of qualities, however, the term guṇa is not to be regarded as an insubstantial or accidental attribute, but as a substance discernible by soul through the medium of the faculties. It is, in fact, nature, or prakṛti, in one of its three constituent parts or conditions, unduly prominent; nature entire, or unmodified, being nothing more than the three qualities in equipoise, according to the Sūtra, ‘Prakṛti is the equal state of goodness, foulness, and darkness.’”

97.—The term abhībuddhi would seem to be obsolete in the sense assigned to it in No. 58. In the copy of the work employed in making the translation, the same term (abhībuddhi) is repeated as representing the first of its own five subdivisions. This, with other obvious clerical errors, has been amended with the concurrence of learned pandits. The term karttavyāt, in the same passage, is akin to our term ‘susceptibility.’

98.—‘Inference’ is briefly noticed in paragraph No. 77. As the writers on the Sānkhya do not appear to be all exactly of the same mind on the subject of inference, it may be worth while to examine the matter:—and, as the terms which they make use of are the same as those which are employed, with less diversity of sentience, by the Naiyāyikas, it may be as well to begin by determining the sense in which the Naiyāyikas understand the terms.

99.—After describing ‘perception,’ in his fourth aphorism, Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya school, proceeds, in his fifth aphorism, to speak of ‘inference’ as follows:—

“Now ‘inference,’ preceded thereby [i.e., preceded by ‘perception’] is of three kinds—(1) that which has the ‘prior’—(2) that which has the ‘posterior’—and (3) that which is [or consists in] the perception of ‘community.’”

100.—Inference, as stated in paragraph No. 77 of our textbook, is “knowledge arising from the perception of a ‘sign,’” and as the ‘sign’ (linga)—the Greek σημεῖον or rather σημαίνω—the “mark from which a conclusion may be drawn”—may be of three kinds; so the modes of inference, as stated in the aphorism of Gautama, are likewise three.

101.—The first kind of ‘sign’ Gautama calls ‘prior’ (pūrvva). The meaning of the term is explained by his commentator (in the Nyāya-sūtra-vṛitti) as follows:—

“[By the expression in the aphorism] ‘prior’ [is meant] cause—a cause being prior to, or the antecedent of, its effect—and, when perceived, serving as a ‘sign’ of the effect yet unperceived]. [By the expression in the aphorism] ‘which has that’ [i.e., which has the ‘prior,’ or cause—is meant] which has that as a ‘sign’.
As (for example) the inference of rain from the circumstance of the gathering of clouds.

In this example of inference, the 'prior' (pūrvavā)—the antecedent or cause—is the 'sign'—the gathering of clouds, the antecedent or cause of rain, being that 'sign' from which a fall of rain is inferred by anticipation. By European writers, this kind of inference is named, in terms strictly corresponding to those of the Nyāya, inference 'a priori' [i.e., the inference of the consequent from the antecedent].

102.—The second kind of 'sign' Gautama calls 'posterior' (śesha). The meaning of the term is explained by his commentator as follows:

"[By the expression in the aphorism] 'posterior' [is meant] effect [—an effect being posterior to, or the consequent of, its cause—and, when perceived, serving as a 'sign' of the cause which was unperceived]. [By the expression in the aphorism] 'which has the posterior' [is meant—inaference] which has that ['posterior' or consequent] as a 'sign.' As [for example] the inference of rain from the swelling of a river.

In this example of inference, the 'posterior' (śesha)—the consequent or effect—is the 'sign'; the swelling of a river—the consequent or effect of rain—being the 'sign' from which a fall of rain is inferred to have gone before. By European writers, this kind of inference is named, in terms strictly corresponding to those of the Nyāya, the inference 'a posteriori' [i.e., the inference of the antecedent from the consequent].

103.—The third kind of 'sign' Gautama calls 'the perception of community' (sāmānyata drishta). The import of the term is explained by his commentator as follows:

"[By inference from] 'the perception of community' [is meant inference] where the 'sign' is other than effect or cause. As [for example] the inferring that something is a substance from its having the nature of earth'.

In this example the sāmānya or 'generic character' termed prthivītva 'earthiness' is a 'sign' from which, when perceived, 'substantiality'—neither the cause nor the effect, but, in this instance, the higher genus—is inferred. The definition applies also to 'inference from analogy', as the term sāmānyata drishta has been rendered.

104.—The commentator from whom we have quoted mentions another opinion in regard to the names of the three kinds of inference;—that they refer to those three kinds of 'signs' (specified in page 38 of the 'Lectures on the Nyāya Philosophy') viz., the 'sign' which is in every case present; that which is absent in every case but one; and that which is present in some cases and absent in others. This notion—apparently originating in nothing much deeper than the consideration that there are 'three to three'—may be dismissed as barely on a level with Captain Fluellen's parallel between Harry of Monmouth and Alexander of Macedon, (in 'King Henry V'—Act iv—sc. 7.), based on the consideration that 'There is a river in Macedon; and there is also moreover a river at Monmouth'.

105.—Of the three examples given in our text-book (No. 77) the first—viz.: the inferring of 'rain from the assembling of clouds,' falls under the first division (—see No. 101.). The second example—the inferring that 'there is water because there are cranes &c.,' exemplifies the second division (—see No. 102)—the
presence of the cranes and such-like waterfowl being consequent on the presence of the water which these birds frequent. The third example—the inferring of 'fire from smoke'—(which the author of the Sāṅkhya Prawachana Bhashya refers to the first class)—falls under the same head as the second—smoke being met with only where there has been fire as an antecedent. The selection of examples here therefore is unsatisfactory—being at once redundant and defective.

106.—In the 5th and 6th of the ‘Memorial Verses’, inference is spoken of as follows:

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<th>Sāṅkhya Philosophy</th>
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<td>देशान्तर ग्रास झट गतिमानज्ञातारूढः स्पाचतः।</td>
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<td>विध्वंसकवच</td>
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<td>साक्षाय च अतिसाक्षाय</td>
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| इति "Inference, which is of three kinds, takes the name of 'that which has the consequent' (see No. 99), 'that which has the antecedent,' and 'that which is [or consists in] the perception of Community.' 'That which has the antecedent,' is that [form of inference] where [it is argued]—'That [which we are adducing as the sign] is the antecedent of this [which we wish to establish]':—as, for example, when one proves [an approaching fall of] rain by the rising of clouds—because this [rising of clouds] is an antecedent of rain. [As an example of inference] 'which has the consequent'—[suppose that] having found a drop of water taken from the sea to be salt, the saltiness of the rest also is inferred. 'Analogous'—as, having observed their change of place, it is concluded that the moon and stars are locomotive like Chattra: that is, having seen a person named Chattra transfer his position from one place to another, and thence having known that he was locomotive, it is inferred that the moon and stars also are locomotive. So too, observing a mango tree in blossom, one establishes the fact that other mango trees also are in flower [not by adducing, in proof of the fact either, the cause of the fact or any consequence of the fact—but] by remarking the common nature [of the mango tree under inspection—in virtue of which common nature the other mango
trees blossom simultaneously with it.] Such is [inference by means of] ‘the perception of Community.’

Again [the words] tallyāṇapārvavaka &c., [may be rendered otherwise,—thus] tadd ‘that’—viz., ‘inference’—tallyāṇapārvavaka ‘where, from a characteristic, that which possesses the characteristic is inferred,’ as [one is inferred to be] a mendicant from his staff [when his staff is of the characteristic description carried by mendicants]. And [the act of inference may be said to be] tallyāṇapārva-
ka, ‘where, from what possesses a characteristic, the characteristic itself is inferred,’ as, having seen a mendicant, you say, this [which he holds in his hand, and which, from distance or some other reason, is not clearly discernible in his grasp] is his triple staff—for where the mendicant presents himself, there his characteristic staff is sure to be found also]."

Now, in his example of inferring the saltiness of the ocean from the saltiness of a drop taken from it, Gaupapāda appears to have been misled by the ambiguity of the word sēśha, which the Nai-
yāyikas employ as the opposite of pūrva—the opposition intended being that of antecedent, and consequent not that of part and remainder. Gaupapāda, taking the word in its familiar sense of ‘the rest,’ imagines that when we infer the rest of the ocean to be salt like a drop taken from it, the process falls under the second head in the division of the modes of inference, whereas it falls under the third head—the same which he exemplifies by the case of the mango-trees. As we infer that other mango-trees blossom when one mango-tree blossoms, because all mango-trees have one common nature; so likewise do we infer that the other drops of the ocean are salt, when we find that one drop is salt, because all the drops in the ocean have one common nature. Thus, whilst our anonymous commentator on Kapila gives two examples of the second kind and no example of the third, Gaupapāda gives two examples of the third kind and none of the second. For the illustra-
tion of Kapila, therefore, some of his commentators would appear, by these discrepancies, to have borrowed the terminology of the Nyāya without considering themselves bound to adhere to the sense assigned to the terms by the inventors. Whether the writers on the Sāṃkhya, as has been suggested, intended, by their peculiar application of the terms of the Nyāya, to inculcate their own tenet of the indifference of cause and effect, is a point the consideration of which we remit to another occasion.
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